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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to report on a transdisciplinary approach, regarding the 
complexity of thinking about human embodiment in relation to machine 
embodiment. A practical dimension of this thesis is to elicit some principles for 
the design and evaluation of virtual embodiment. The transdisciplinary approach 
suggests, firstly, that a single discipline or reality is, on its own, not sufficient to 
explain the complexity and dynamism of the embodied interaction between the 
human and machine. Secondly, the thesis argues for thinking of 
transdisciplinary research as a process of individuation, becoming or 
transduction, that is, as a process of mediation between heterogeneous 
approaches rather than perceiving research as a stabilized cognitive schema 
designed to accumulate new outcomes to the already-there reality. Arguing for 
going beyond the individualized approaches to embodiment, this thesis 
analyzes three cases where the problems that appear in one case are resolved 
through the analysis of the following one. Consisting of three phases, this 
research moves from objective scientific ‗reality‘ to more phenomenological, 
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subjective and complex realities. The first study employs a critical review of 
embodied conversational agents in human–computer interaction (HCI) in a 
learning context using a comparative meta-analysis. Meta-analysis was applied 
because most of the studies for evaluating embodiment are experimental. A 
learning context was selected because the number of studies is suitable for 
meta-analysis and the findings could be generalized to other contexts. The 
analysis reveals that there is no ‗persona effect‘, that is, the expected positive 
effect of virtual embodiment on the participant‘s affective, perceptive and 
cognitive measures. On the contrary, it shows the reduction of virtual 
embodiment to image and a lack of consideration for the participant‘s 
embodiment and interaction, in addition to theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings. The second phase solves these problems by focusing on Mark 
Hansen‘s phenomenological account of embodiment in new media. The 
investigation shows that Hansen improves on the HCI account by focusing on 
the participant‘s dynamic interaction with new media. Nevertheless, his views of 
embodied perception and affection are underpinned by a subjective patriarchal 
account leading to object/subject and body/work polarizations. The final phase 
resolves this polarization by analyzing the controversial work of Alan Turing on 
intelligent machinery. The research provides a different reading of the Turing 
Machine based on Simondon‘s concept of individuation, repositioning its 
materiality from the abstract non-existent to the actual-virtual realm and 
investigating the reasons for its abstraction. It relates the emergence of multiple 
human–machine encounters in Turing‘s work to the complex counter-becoming 
of what it describes as ‗the Turing Machine compound‘. 
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0. Introduction: Transdisciplinarity: Research as 
individuation 
0.1. Embodiment 
This introduction has two aims. First, it introduces the themes of the thesis and 
second, it attempts to establish the transdisciplinary approach as a research 
methodology. The thesis focuses on the complexity in thinking of human 
embodiment in relation to machine representation or virtual embodiment. 
Through its exploration, it also attempts to elicit practical points to consider 
while designing and evaluating virtual embodiment. Current theories and 
technologies have revolutionized the conceptualization of the relationship 
between human and virtual embodiment, considering virtual embodiment as a 
‗new paradigm.‘ This is not limited to different socio-techno-science disciplines 
such as human–computer interaction (HCI), artificial intelligence (AI), 
computational modelling, informatics and communication, but is also the case in 
the fields of media and new media theories or what is seen as the domain of the 
arts and humanities. Here, contemporary debates have already shifted from 
Cartesian mind/body dualism to consider monist philosophers such as Baruch 
Spinoza, Henry Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, who affirm the body and the role 
of affectivity in human life. This thesis follows a transdisciplinary approach to 
work across these disciplines, theories and philosophies in order to find different 
ways of thinking about the relationship between human and computer 
embodiments for evaluation and design in HCI. This section, first, explores 
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embodiment in technological disciplines, then, introduces the transdisciplinary 
approach and the motivations for adopting it as a research methodology.    
The bulk of research in AI, HCI and communication studies seek one goal: 
humanizing the computer, hypothesizing that the resemblances between the 
technical and the human (e.g. brain, image, language and movement) will 
defeat the difference between them.1 These fields question the role of artificial 
or virtual embodiment in machine intelligence, the creation of social bonds with 
humans, and in facilitating communication between social groups, social 
networks and synchronic and asynchronic computer-mediated communication 
technologies (CMC). This area of research is grounded on the work of Alan 
Turing on machine intelligence (this account is explored in chapters five and 
six). Turing argued against perceiving machines through their limitations, 
suggesting a case of machine intelligence in which a machine can be 
considered as ‗thinking‘ if it can fool a human being to believe that it is human  
(1950, p.19). Following the same aim, AI focused on studying the human brain 
and building the mechanical brain. Later on, Rodney Brooks‘ article ‗Intelligence 
without Representation‘ (1991) has influenced the path of research by 
redirecting the focus from building thinking machines to their construction as 
―completely autonomous mobile agents that co-exist in the world with humans‖ 
where they can be ―seen by those humans as intelligent beings in their own 
right‖ (1991, p.142). Brooks specifies the requirements for the creature as the 
ability to deal with the dynamic environment without collapsing, having purpose 
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of being in the world and being able to ―adapt to surroundings and capitalize on 
fortuitous circumstances‖ (1991, p.142).  
It is important to note here that the focus on embodied cognition does not 
explicitly mean focusing on the role of the body in cognition. Wilson has found 
that the mind in the approaches of embodied cognition is ―seen as operating to 
serve the needs of a body interacting with a real-world situation‖ rather than ―the 
body (or its control systems) serving the mind‖ (2002, p.635).2 The only body-
based approach Wilson identifies concerns ―off-line cognition‖ where sensory 
and motor functions run simulations of aspects of the physical world that are 
distant in time and space or are altogether imaginary, as a means for drawing 
inferences or representing information (2002, p.633/635).  
Ziemke conceptualizes the problem of the body by posing the question ―what 
kind of body is required for embodied cognition?‖ and arguing that ―there is little 
agreement on what kind of body an artificial intelligence would have to be 
equipped with‖ (2003, p.1305). He presents an ―organismic embodiment‖, which 
is based on Maturana and Varela regarding the autopoietic organization of living 
systems. According to autopoietic theory, ―a living system as a molecular 
system occurs as a closed dynamic molecular architecture that in its continuous 
transformation through thermal agitation continuously gives rise to itself‖ 
(Maturana 2002, p.8). The  living system has a relational condition to the 
medium or environment in which it exists (Maturana 2002, p.10) where it 
appears to know how to live while conserving its internal autopoietic relations 
and its adaptation to this environment (Maturana 2002, p.17). Yet, it is blind to 
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the consequences rising from its interaction with other molecules (Maturana 
2002, p.8) where these external relations do not change the determined 
structural organization of the system (Maturana 2002, p.12). The living system 
interacts with those changes in the environment or medium that maintains its 
autopoietic organization (the composite unity or totality). Based on this 
interaction, a ‗structural coupling‘ is formed, where certain structures 
(components and the relations between them) of its organization are selected, 
leading to the triggering of a determined structural change in the organization. 
Although it forms a recursive spontaneous and congruent relation with the 
medium to re-establish itself – thus conserving the autopoietic organization – 
destruction or disintegration could occur in the absence of these conditions. In 
effect, within the autopoietic system the organization conserves the virtual 
organization for the organism and, at the same time, relegates evolution and 
reproduction to historical networks of self-interest interactions that cause 
structural change but maintain and protect the physical boundaries of the 
organization.  
Ziemke explains that machines, for Maturana and Varela, have ―allopoietic‖ 
organization rather than autopoietic. In other words, they proceed through 
concatenation of their process. They are not ―autonomous‖ but ―heteronomous‖ 
as their components are produced independently from their organization and 
the changes in this latter ―organization are necessarily subordinated to the 
production of something different from itself‖ (2003, p.1308). Ziemke argues that 
although there are self-organizing robots, these cannot  be autonomous,  in the 
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sense that Maturana and Varela provide, as machines are constructed while, for 
Maturana and Varela, autonomy cannot be ―put‖ from the outside into a system 
that does not already ‗contain‘ it (2003, p.1309). 
Although Ziemke‘s question, ―what kind of body is required for embodied 
cognition?‖ considers body-based embodiment, the body seems subordinate to 
cognition based on his aim of identifying the ―restricted‖ type of body required 
for artificial cognition. It could be argued that Cartesian mind/body dualism still 
has influence on prioritizing the mind over the body (chapter one shows how 
this influence has affected embodied interaction). Scientific explorations show 
the error of this mind/body split. A major influence here comes from Antonio 
Damasio who stresses, ―the organism constituted by the brain-body partnership 
interacts with the environment as an ensemble, the interaction being of neither 
the body nor the brain alone‖ (1994, p.88). For Damasio, this interaction is 
anatomically supported by biochemical and neural circuits (1994, p.87). He 
states that not all behaving organisms or intelligent actions mean having mind 
or cognitive processing. On the other hand, ―no organism seems to have mind 
but no action‖ (1994, p.90). Besides this, through investigations of patients with 
brain damage, Damasio also points out that the cognitive process (e.g. 
reasoning and decision-making), bodily regulation, and emotions and feelings, 
are all interwoven anatomically (1994, p.70/123). He emphasizes the role of 
emotions in decision-making, social behaviour and survival whereas any defect 
or lack in emotions ―may constitute an equally important source of irrational 
behaviour‖ (1994, p.53).  
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In his account, Zeimke refers to one approach which, rather than considering 
the type of body required for artificial cognition, is concerned with understanding 
the role of embodiment in social interactions. This is ―social embodiment‖. This 
type of embodiment rejects amodal architectures of cognition and emphasizes 
that cognition is grounded on physical context and relies on the ―brain‘s 
modality-specific systems and on actual bodily states‖ (Niedenthal et al. 2005, 
p.186). Amodal architectures, as Niedenthal et al explain, are based on the 
computer metaphor where mental operations are processed through a central 
unit, where the sensory system delivers representations of the external world to 
the central unit (as input devices), and the motor system executes the 
comments from the central unit (output devices) (2005, p.185). In addition to the 
offline embodiment explained previously, Niedenthal et al explain online 
embodiment that is related to situated cognition where ―sensory, somatic, and 
motor responses [are] necessary for the encoding and interpretation of the new 
individual, not simply as a by-product of a purely amodal analysis‖ (Niedenthal 
et al. 2005, p.187). Niedenthal et al. review many studies from literature and 
neuroimaging research that show how the ―representations of participants‘ own 
bodies contribute to the performance of the visual task‖, which is called online 
effect, and that ―blocking the embodiment impaired access to the conceptual 
elements of the representation‖, is offline effect (2005, p.187-188). The reviews 
addressed attitudes (where motor movement or body posture of positive or 
negative attitudes reproduce the attitude), social perception (explaining the role 
of mimicry and imitation of other behaviours in social modelling), and emotions 
(where bodily responses facilitate cognitive processing of emotion stimuli).   
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This type of embodiment could be said to apply when thinking about the 
interaction and relations between the human and virtual embodiment in HCI and 
communication applications. These fields of research are interested in the role 
of the body and its embodied effects ‗in relation to‘ rather than in its object 
being. To some extent, it explains why the human shape as well as emotions 
and behaviours become a way of embodying software since it provides effective 
and efficient interaction, as it provides immediate and continuous information 
about many factors related to our presence, affection and capabilities (Benford 
et al. 1995). It is the model of imitation that informs our assumptions; that is, we 
know what our bodies can do and, thus, we expect that we know what the 
embodied characters can do. The ―reduced visibility‖ of the physical body and 
―reduced social visibility‖ in comparison to face-to-face communication (F2F) 
have been reported as missed in text-based interfaces (Derks et al. 2008, 
p.768). Benford uses the word ―Poltergeists‖ to refer to this lack of embodiment 
in computer interfaces (1995, p.242). Virtual embodiment is presumed to reduce 
the ‗poltergeist effect‘ due to the continuity of communication that discloses the 
‗otherness‘ identity through verbal communication. Within text-based interfaces, 
spontaneous emotions and non-verbal gestures remain invisible and their 
verbal disclosure can be controlled as the person can write, edit and reflect on 
their verbal presentation, which makes them less intense and less durable.  
This moves us from ‗cognitive intelligence‘ to ‗emotional intelligence‘ in 
considering design and interaction with embodied computers, especially in 
cases such as software agents where the embodiment of machines carries a 
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body‘s representation. Rosalind Picard, the founder of affective computing 
research, has argued that the role of emotions is ―marginalized at best‖ or 
―completely ignored‖ in science as they are believed to be ―inherently non-
scientific‖ (Picard 1995;  1999). For Picard, computers need ―emotional 
intelligence‖ for self-protection and to express the problems they have such as 
overheating, cooling or leaking (Picard 1997, p.49; 2003, p.60). ―Emotional 
intelligence‖ is defined as consisting of ―the abilities to recognize, express, and 
have emotions, coupled with the ability to regulate these emotions, harness 
them for constructive purposes, and skilfully handle the emotions of others‖ 
(1997, p.49). Adapting human-like emotions for computers can make them 
recognize affects, and perceive human responses easier, so that they can 
adjust their behaviour.  
Computers have bodies. They have different organs than humans such as 
keyboards, mice and microphones which could ―be structured to produce 
human like functioning‖ (1997, p.52). Computers that recognize human 
emotions in a situation can use input devices analogous to human ones, such 
as hearing and gathering facial expressions and gestures, or different from 
them, such as reading infrared temperature or measuring electrodermal 
responses (1997, p.50). Computers can be designed to express or 
communicate emotions (even if they do not have any) through their channel of 
communication such as voice and image. Their output could have the semantic 
information (the what or content) and the affective information (the how), which 
refers to how they carry out pleasant interaction and efficient communication 
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(e.g. voice tone through modulation of vocal parameters) (1997, p.56). Even 
when the machine is used as a means of communication between two people, it 
can also make use of affective information to express the data lost by 
bandwidth (1997, p.57). The issue and challenge for embodied affective 
computers, as Picard sees it, ―is not one of the body, or of the body‘s 
capabilities to express, but the issue is a much harder one: how to get 
machines to express emotion in an appropriate way?‖ That is, to express the 
right emotion in the right situation and time (2003, p.61). Designers should give 
computers ―the ability to act intelligently with emotions‖ rather than poor 
emotional skills which would make the interaction worse than non-affective 
computers‖ (1997, p.48). 
The evaluation of affective computing could be based on describing the system 
behaviour in relation to the intended emotion (1997, p.69), or how fast the 
system responds with distinctive behaviour to certain stimuli (1997, p.70). 
Evaluation entails the computer‘s ability to reason with emotions generated in a 
specific situation, its ability to discriminate different emotions, and whether it can 
retrieve and recognize information based on the condition of its mood (1997, 
p.70).  
0.2. Research background 
This research started with the evaluation of virtual embodiment of embodied 
conversational agents (ECA) in HCI.  A selected area of focus, that is relevant 
to my educational background in technology, is pedagogical agents (PA). The 
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outcome reached, after carrying out qualitative and quantitative reviews, was 
that there was a failure in defining and evaluating embodiment. It was clear that 
the research examined and preserved the methodology (comparative 
experimentation) and hypothesis (ECAs or PAs are effective) without 
questioning the phenomenon itself, that is, without providing deep theoretical 
insight into ‗embodiment‘ in empirical studies. The studies did not confirm the 
base effect that ECA is effective, yet the research has branched into 
comparisons questioning the effectiveness of different aspects of ECA (e.g. 
gender, emotions, and realism). In other words, in the realm of the non-
effectiveness of ECA, which aspects are more effective? HCI conforms to 
Martin Heidegger‘s criticism of modern science in his essay ‗The Age of The 
World Picture‘ (1977). This  account is presented in chapter five but the point to 
be made here is that scientific research as ―on-going activity‖ adheres to 
predetermined plans where ―the methodology of the science becomes 
circumscribed by means of its results‖ (1977, p.124). While on the one hand, 
this ensures the explanation of new findings, it also preserves the known 
findings.   
Hence, my thesis focuses on investigating and integrating the ways 
embodiment is thought of in relation to machine representation, or what is called 
virtual embodiment, by transgressing disciplinary boundaries and framing the 
debate on embodiment within both science and the arts. This transgression is 
referred to as ‗transdisciplinarity‘. Before elaborating on this approach, I will 
explain what makes it important as a way of researching the ECA phenomenon. 
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Transdiscplinarity appeared in my purview, first, in its form of ‗plurality‘ as a 
―disciplinary bias‖ in the design of PA and paper elaborations of information in 
relation to the intended discipline and participants. This plurality of disciplines 
interested in the embodiment of software agents strengthened the research 
interest but, at the same time, it affected its design, conceptualization and 
application (e.g. blurring the difference between the design of an animated 
image and an artificial interface agent). On the other hand, the evaluation and 
the extent of the papers‘ elaboration on certain aspects of design, information 
and findings differ based on the disciplinary background of the published paper. 
For example, papers from psychology or educational psychology elaborate on 
experimental design but overlook topics related to educational and pedagogic 
issues. Computer science papers elaborate on the design and implementation 
model but put less emphasis on presenting the experimental procedures and 
findings. This has affected the evaluation and the findings of studies. 
I have adopted the transdisciplinarity approach as a methodology of research 
that is about a becoming, because, it seems to me as if it is not an approach 
about research. To a certain extent, it is the way through which the research 
evolves or becomes rather than following predetermined convictions or the 
conventional methodology of a certain discipline to which everything is brought 
to fit. Here, I provide two examples of this latter problem. First, statistical results 
are seen as constitutive of the research findings rather than as a part of the 
findings. This difference has already informed the misinterpretation of the null 
hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in experimental studies, which has 
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currently become a focus of statistical researchers. The NHST is commonly 
taken as telling us that, ―given these data, what is the probability that H0 is 
true?‖  rather than ―given that H0 is true, what is the probability of these (or 
more extreme) data?‖ (Cohen 1994, p.997). Although extensive literature 
reviews and effect-size estimations or the measurement of effect magnitude are 
proposed to overcome this misinterpretation, unfortunately, these could be 
interpreted based on the same convictions, that is, the certainty rather than the 
probability of the research data.  
An interesting example of this appears in Reeves and Nass‘s (1998) 
communication research which has guided the general research on virtual 
embodiments, agents and avatars within HCI whether methodologically or 
qualitatively, by addressing the way people treat media objects like television 
and computers; it proposes the ‗media equation‘.  Their research is based on 
social science laboratory experimental methods and addresses human–media 
interaction from a social perspective.3 Investigating different aspects of 
interaction related to communication and media forms (e.g. manners, 
personality, emotions, social roles, media forms and so on), the authors 
emphasize that media = real life since humans treat and respond to media 
forms naturally as social actors and this belief is automatic, and  unconscious. 4 
The authors argue that the evolution of the human brain has made, ―anything 
that seemed to be a real person or place ... real‖ (1998, p.12) and it takes effort 
to resist this primitive response (1998, p.13). In other words, people treat 
computers as feeling entities, so they apply social rules in their interaction with 
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them, and this application of social rules, the authors insist, is ―not just a matter 
of being nice; it‘s a matter of social survival‖ (1998, p.28). But that is not all: 
actually the authors observe that participants have denied that they treat the 
computers as real humans. In other words, for the researchers, it seems as if 
the participants cannot describe the essence of this treatment.  
In another publication, the researchers Nass and Moon referred to this as 
‗mindlessness‘ where the application of social rules to computers and media 
appears without the participant‘s awareness (2000, p.93). The participants‘ 
denial was related to the Greek word Ethopoeia, which involves ―a direct 
response to an entity as human while knowing that the entity does not warrant 
human treatment or attribution‖ (2000, p.94). The direct response is due to the 
―obliviousness to the unique characteristics of a computer as an interactant‖ that 
―certainly can‖ elicit these social responses (2000, p.94). However, the 
detachment between participants‘ knowing and responding does not answer the 
question of why, when it is brought to their attention, the reflective participants 
―vehemently‖ deny their obvious behaviour.  
The ‗media equation‘ tends to convince us that there is only one reality, human 
reality, and when humans respond, their response bears this reality and its 
likeness. What the ‗media equation‘ emphasizes is that, when the ‗interaction 
box‘ is opened with media, different ‗autos‘ emerge and with them only one line 
of flight escapes the box, that is denial.5 The Greek word ‗Auto‘ means ‗self‘. 
Here, it means occurring by itself as automatic or spontaneously as 
autonomous from consciousness. Interestingly, a counter-denial is observed. 
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The researchers, Reeves and Nass, admit the equation itself, media = real life, 
and thus media reality, but what they deny is the essence of this reality as being 
of a different reality from human reality, as for them what seems true is true. In 
other words, this leads to identicality, that is what seems true is identical to the 
true: media reality is identical to human reality (this aim towards this 
dedifferentiation between the two seems to be inherited in AI and HCI, as we 
will see in part three of this thesis). On the other hand, the participants deny this 
identicality; what seems true is what ‗seems true‘ and what ‗seems true‘ is not 
identical with what is ‗true‘. What the participants deny is not the media reality or 
sociability, what they really deny is that the media is ‗human‘ and that they are 
‗experiencing‘ media as ‗humanlike‘ rather than medialike. People do not deny 
the media individuality, its difference, its artefact and they, let us say, cannot 
deny the ‗scientific fact‘ of being unconscious and automatic. They cannot 
submit or accept. They resist. They and the researchers are stampeding over a 
‗margin‘ where the researchers are determinists of identicality, and participants 
are indeterminists or maintaining a level of uncertainty.6 
This margin, I would say, is constituted by emotional intelligence that informs 
the difference between experiencing human and non-human and between 
emotions with intelligence and emotions without intelligence. Reasonably, the 
‗unconscious and automatic‘ response is not constitutive of human reality or of 
social experience. It could be argued that the participants are emotionally 
intelligent. I use the phrase ‗emotional intelligence‘, here, to refer to the fact that 
they are capable of differentiating between their reality and media reality as they 
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feel, even if they cannot name the feeling or give ‗evidence‘ equal to scientific 
empirical data, that the dedifferentiation is a threat to their future survival. It 
could be argued that while, on one level, the social treatment of media is a 
matter of survival, the differentiation between it and human, on another level, is 
also a matter of survival. In this sense, emotional intelligence expresses a 
dimension of futurity within it. Thus, the participants might seem ‗irrational‘ while 
the matter of this irrationality is what is unknown or beyond the graspable 
materiality of rationality, which is based on the collected data. In this sense, the 
direct response warrant the computers a degree of humanness and the reverse 
might be true, that is, it warrants humans a degree of machinery. Nevertheless, 
this degree is not constitutive of either human or media reality.  
Eventually, then, the participant‘s ‗vehement‘ denial of their obvious behavior 
means that this behavior is not constitutive of their social experience. As the 
researchers insist on the ‗equality‘ that pertains to a hazardous dimension of 
‗identicality‘ based on their given data, they do not accept the participants‘ 
denial as true. Hence, without the belief that there is something beyond the 
totality of the cumulative data, this case implies reducing human beings to 
scientific objects that can be calculated and expressed as scientific data. 
However, this belief is essential in rejecting the certainty of this implied 
identicality in the relationship between human and machine embodiment (in 
chapter three this point is made more noticeable as the difference between 
representation and presence).  
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The misinterpretation of the NHST supports the rejection of the certainty based 
on the collected data. In relation to the mentioned case, the researchers should 
perceive their findings as, ‗given the participants‘ denial is true (as this denial 
constitutes the difference between human and media), how likely or probable is 
the collected data?‘ The importance of this is that ‗uncertainty‘ is always there. 
Thus instead of insisting on what ‗seems true is true‘ and media equals real life, 
another level is that what seems true is ‗probably true‘ and media ‗probably 
equals‘ real life as this probability is relative and based on the different 
dimensions of the relationship (for example, culture, generation, duration and 
emotions). Sheneiderman and Plaisant (2009) have pointed out some 
weaknesses of controlled experimentation. These are the difficulty of finding 
adequate subjects, the overlooking of extremely good or poor performance and 
the distortion of the situation so the conclusions may have no application. 
Controlled experimentation also deals with short-term usage, so understanding 
of long-term consumer behavior or experienced user strategies is difficult. It 
also emphasizes statistical aggregation where individual insights maybe less 
emphasized (2009, p.38). The experimental research of Reeves and Nass 
shows that the participants‘ insights may not fully support the statistical data or 
the hypotheses of the research. These insights draw attention to the ‗probability‘ 
of the statistical data. Reasonably, this means that disciplinarity could result in 
reducing human beings and restricting interpretations within certain boundaries. 
The second example of the effect of disciplinarity on research is related to the 
newness of the phenomenon in relation to its spatial and durational dimensions. 
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These dimensions are overlooked as embodiment is staged as a new paradigm. 
In HCI, this leads to dissociation between design and evaluation studies, on the 
one hand, and embodied historical or current virtual representations such as 
Galatea, idols and statues, movie characters and cartoons, on the other hand. 
Regardless of the difference in their materiality, all of these could account for a 
degree of effect or affect in the relationship between human and virtual 
embodiment whether of machine or another materiality. On the other hand, 
dissociation appears between the studies, participants and their culture. As 
Manovich argues, ―the area of new media where the average computer user 
encountered AI in the 1990s was not, however, human-computer interface, but 
computer games‖ (Manovich 2001, p.54). In other words, the participants‘ 
encounter with ECA is not a new phenomena for them and thus, if the effect is 
already established, then, it moves to the realm of a learned habit. Without 
admitting virtual embodiment and the evaluation of the relationship between it 
and human embodiment in these dimensions, an ‗effect distortion‘ may appear. 
Reasonably, there is a risk that the studies and their interpretations cannot 
identify or extract the investigated effect and thus their conclusion might have 
no application to either the participant‘s context or design. The majority of the 
participants in these studies are undergraduate and are from or living in 
developed countries (USA or UK), that is, they are in industrial and highly 
technical cultures, which means that exposure to interface agents or games is 
relatively high.  
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Although ‗embodiment‘ has been adopted with the advancement of the artificial 
body, the word has been taken for granted as referring to the appearance or 
representational character and as a support for the conversational medium. As 
seen from the evaluation criteria of Picard presented above, the evaluation is 
not based on whether humans experience machines as affective but on the 
construction of machines emotions and their usability. The conclusions of 
chapter one shows that embodied interaction, users and their experience were 
not evaluated in the analyzed experiments. A transdisplinarity approach is 
planned to move beyond one discipline to explore the problem of embodiment 
in-between disciplines. 
A similar concern about the lack of theoretical foundations in HCI and an 
attempt to go beyond its limits is expressed by Paul Dourish in his book Where 
the action is (2004). Dourish states, 
Theory grounds design by providing a framework within which 
hypotheses can be constructed and tested, options explored and 
compared, and results analyzed, evaluated, and verified. From this 
perspective, design is simply speculative without an understanding of 
how and why it works; theory makes design real, because it places 
design in a context that explains it. Whichever position we hold, 
though, a working relationship between theoretical understanding 
and design practice is crucial (2004, p.175-176). 
This statement emphasizes that theory and practice are not separated domains 
but are interdependent. For the time being, Paul Dourish‘s work, along with a 
few other studies motivated by his research (Antle et al. 2011), have started to 
consider seriously phenomenological understanding of embodiment (e.g. in 
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty). Dourish emphasizes 
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that ―embodiment is not a new idea‖ (2004, p.100) because it was a common 
theme of twentieth-century philosophical thought and phenomenology in 
particular (2004, p.20-21). Thus, he restages the history of user interface 
development and design, especially in relation to tangible and social computing, 
as modes of interaction based on a perspective that considers human skills and 
abilities (2004, p.4). His approach differs from traditional HCI approaches to 
design by placing embodied interaction ―at the centre of the picture‖ rather than 
the interface (2004, p.2). He argues for ―an approach to the design and analysis 
of interaction that takes embodiment to be central to, even constitutive of, the 
whole phenomenon‖ and not simply ―a form of interaction that is embodied‖ 
(2004, p.102). Embodied interaction “is the creation, manipulation, and sharing 
of meaning through engaged interaction with artifacts” (2004, p.126).7 Engaged 
interaction with computer systems is based on exploiting the fact that they 
occupy our physical and social world in the way that they interact with us (2004, 
p.2).  
Dourish addresses computational and foundational topics rather than computing 
or technical topics where computation is perceived as the ―representational 
power‖ of computing (2004, p.3). His phenomenological exploration is based on 
hypothesizing that embodiment is the core and mutual element on which both 
tangible and social computing are founded (2004, p.22/100). Tangible 
computing entails, first, the direct physical interaction with artifacts rather than 
graphical user interfaces or interface devices such as mice (2004, p.16), 
second, the distribution of computation across different devices that are spread 
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across the environment (e.g. tags), and third, the augmentation of everyday 
objects (e.g. pens and toys) to respond to the environment and peoples‘ 
activities (2004, p.15). Social computing ―attempts to understand how the 
―dialogue‖ between users and computers can be seen as similar and dissimilar 
to the way in which we interact with each other‖ (2004, p.15). Both tangible and 
social computing, for Dourish, encompass ―a number of different activities‖ 
(2004, p.15), draw on the same sets of skills and abilities (2004, p.15) and 
exploit a sense of ―familiarity‖ of the everyday world (2004, p.99). 
Embodiment, for Dourish, is ―a feature of interaction, not of technology‖ (2004, 
p.188). It is defined as “the property of our engagement, with the world that 
allows us to make it meaningful” (2004, p.126). It is about “the relationship 
between action and meaning” (2004, p.126) and ―engaged actions‖ (2004, 
p.189). This means that embodied interaction changes the role of the everyday 
world from being a resource for interface metaphors to something which is 
socially and physically experienced by individuals (2004, p.17/99). The 
metaphors exploit our familiarity with the real world in designing interactions but 
do not use the real world as a ―medium” for interaction (2004, p.101). For 
example in video games and virtual environments, the users are ―disconnected 
observers of a world they do not inhabit directly‖ (2004, p.102). Likewise, 
conversational computational systems using natural language-processing 
techniques, attempt to encode and incorporate conversational rules based on 
familiar patterns of everyday human actions, but they are a world away because 
rules about turn-taking and anaphoric references arise out of a world of human 
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social action (2004, p.102). Therefore, interface metaphors conform to the 
Cartesian and cognitive approach of the disembodied brain that continues to 
dominate the thinking of computer system designers (2004, p.18). In contrast, 
tangible and social computing effectiveness is based on the fact that ―we, and 
our actions, are embodied elements of the everyday world‖ (2004, p.100). That 
is we inhabit conversations as embodied phenomena and ―inhabit our bodies 
and they in turn inhabit the world, with seamless connections back and forth‖ 
(2004, p.102). Tangible computing capitalizes on our physical skills with real 
world objects, and social computing makes the most from the relationship 
between social action and ‗situatedness‘  
Embodied interaction is an embodied design perspective that focuses on the 
relationship between people and systems (2004, p.192). It could be directed to 
inform, support and provide tools for system developers and designers to 
understand, design, analyze and evaluate interactive systems (2004, p.3/22). 
Interaction design utilizes a different perspective in HCI from those used by 
engineering and psychology. It recognizes that the artifact is part of a larger 
system (e.g. culture) and that design both expresses a system of values and 
communicates messages in relation to its task (2004, p.202). Embodied 
interaction does not mean a purely physical manipulation of the information 
object (2004, p.207). ―Software is a representational medium‖ (2004, p.208). 
Thus, the aim of embodied interaction design is to call for, 
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a more nuanced understanding of the role that those representations 
play, how they are subject to a variety of interpretations and actions, 
and how they figure as part of a larger body of practice. The 
opportunity is to break the link between an inevitably 
representationalist stance towards software and a much more 
questionable representationalist stance towards action and 
interaction (2004, p.208). 
This means that actions and meanings, technologies and practices cannot be 
separated (2004, p.204). Meaning resides in the ways the system is used rather 
than the system itself (2004, p.183), redirecting interactive design towards the 
way people engage with the artifact in different settings (2004, p.184) rather 
than interfaces.  
The move Dourish makes from the interface and abstract mental models 
applied in designing interfaces, to embodied interaction or that which is ‗in-
between‘ the systems such as the human and the interface, is crucial in 
capitalizing on the transdisciplinary approach this thesis follows. While Dourish 
uses a hypothesis to structure his reading, my research is guided more by 
resistance to the current state of evaluating and designing ECA in HCI research 
and my interest is in investigating embodiment in other disciplines in order to 
provide design and evaluation alternatives. This should be viewed within the 
limitation that my research is based on exploring ECA in certain areas of HCI. 
My readings inform my motivation to understand and rethink the relationship 
between virtual embodiment and human embodiment, and identify the in-
between of the two systems as a locus of this relationship rather than focusing 
on technology or human.  
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0.3. Transdisciplinarity 
Transdisciplinarity aims to transgress disciplinary boundaries and frame the 
debates of embodiment within a larger context. By disciplinary ‗transgression‘ I 
mean to refer to an evolutionary way of thinking about the interaction of or the 
relation ‗in-between‘ terms; this is the transdisciplinary approach of Basarab 
Nicolescu. This approach is not about research, the body, the machine or 
technology but about a process of researching or of becoming that goes across 
and beyond arguments framed by one field to another. In this way, it shows how 
the multiplicity of levels in thinking about the relation between human 
embodiment and machine embodiment results in either diagnosing failure in 
one field, presenting problems in another or opening new potential in a third.  
A transdisciplinary approach, according to Nicolescu, ―concerns that which is at 
once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all 
disciplines‖ (2008b, p.2).8 By going beyond disciplines, it caters for the 
existence of immanence between the diversity of scientific knowledge and 
artistic knowledge through its three axioms. These are the ontological 
(simultaneous multidimensional and multi-referential levels of Reality),9 the 
logical (the included middle which preserves coherence between disciplines), 
and the epistemological (complexity which refers to multiplicity in perspectives, 
participations and interactions, which could lead to levels of uncertainty and 
unpredictability). Understanding these three principles of transdisciplinarity is 
important to the way my research progresses from one field of thought to the 
other and the potential in-between of these fields.  
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First of all, Nicolescu defines ‗Reality‘ as resistance to our experiences, 
representations, images or mathematical formulations, where each level of 
Reality has its own levels of organization (Nicolescu 2008b, p.4). The passage 
from one level of Reality to the other is signed by a fundamental discontinuity in 
the structures (Nicolescu 2008b, p.4) where ―every level of Reality is associated 
with its own space-time‖ (Nicolescu 2008a, p.18). Each level of Reality has a 
contradiction (A and non-A). Coherence of information transmission between 
these levels is brought by the logic of the included middle. The included middle 
represents a third axiom (T) where the contradiction (A and non-A) is resolved 
in a different level of Reality than the one it exists on. As Max-Neef (2005) 
explains, ―every theory at a given level of reality, is a transitory theory, since it 
inevitably leads to the discovery of new contradictions situated in new levels of 
reality‖ (2005, p.13). In other words, as the resolution is found in a different level 
of Reality, on this same level, a new contradiction appears that is resolved in 
yet another level of Reality. This process is iterative which ensures its 
openness.  
It could be argued that transdisciplinary research is a transductive process. I 
use the term ‗transduction‘ in reference to Gilbert Simondon‘s work on 
individuation. Simondon‘s work is elaborated in chapters five and six of this 
thesis but here I want to pick only one theme related to the methodology of this 
thesis, which is transduction. Transduction expresses a process of individuation 
in progress (Simondon 1992, p.313).10 Simondon defines individuation as a 
process that entails ―the conservation of being through becoming‖ (1992, 
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p.301). He emphasizes the understanding of the individual from the process of 
individuation rather than the reverse (1992, p.301). Simondon criticizes the 
substantialist and hylomorphic approaches of individuation as they both 
presuppose the existence of a principle of individuation though which the 
constituted individual is explained. Substantialism considers the essence of the 
living being in its pre-given or primary unity, which is formed through chance 
association. Thought here is deductive. It seeks to grasp the essence of this 
unity through decomposing it into its original elements (1992, p.299). 
Decomposition requires a powerful force (in the physical case) or a method 
from elsewhere to solve the problem at hand (1992, p.314-315). On the other 
hand, hylomorphism thinks that the individual requires the conjunction of a form 
and some matter to exist as a ‗whole‘ (1992, p.298). It analyzes these terms to 
develop a model of the whole being (1992, p.311). Here thought is inductive. It 
seeks to explain the terms of the investigated reality that are required for solving 
the problem at hand, and to establish conceptual relations that connect their 
independent existence (1992, p.312). This is achieved through developing 
conceptual models and structures that preserve these terms or the positive and 
common characters to all of them. At the same time, singularities peculiar to 
each term are eliminated which results in loss of information (1992, p.315).  
For Simondon, both of these approaches suggest, ―the sort of constituted 
individual at which we will arrive, and the properties it will have once the 
process of constitution is complete‖ (1992, p.298). Simondon emphasizes that 
the transductive process is an individuation or becoming in progress (1992, 
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p.313). It takes place when an activity (mental, social, physical or biological) 
begins at a centre and gradually and correlatively extends itself in different, 
heterogeneous and multiple dimensions around this centre (1992, p.313). This 
process brings forth a structure, which becomes the basis for the next one 
(1992, p.313). Thought here is transductive. It is not a logical procedure but a 
mental procedure that corresponds to a ―course taken by the mind on its 
journey of discovery‖ (1992, p.314). This discovery reveals the dimensions 
according to which a problem can be defined (1992, p.313). Intuition and 
potentiality are inclusive parts of this procedure that allow the emergence of a 
structure that yields a resolution to the problem at hand (1992, p.314):  
[Transduction] represents a discovery of dimensions that are made to 
communicate by the system for each of the terms such that the total 
reality of each of the areas' terms can find a place in the newly 
discovered structures without loss or reduction (1992, p.315). 
In this sense, communication is effected between the heterogeneous terms 
where the latter preserve their singularity and at the same time forms relations 
with each other. A transductive relation is not a connection between these terms 
but it is a modality or a way of being that belongs to both terms and their context 
(1992, p.312). It is in itself a dimension of becoming that is contemporaneous 
with the terms it mediates.  
In respect to this research, there is a need to focus on the individuation of 
research rather than individuality. For example this research starts to explore 
the problem of embodiment from an objective perspective identified by 
collecting and analyzing statistical data in the field of HCI, but it is not satisfied 
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that the search for the solution for this problem or for the contradiction 
recognized by the quantitative review can be restricted within the boundaries of 
this discipline. Similarly, there is a need not to review the state of art (the 
outcome of the logical procedure) but to continually art the state, that is, to 
discover the dimensions through which research in a certain discipline 
‗becomes‘ in relation to other disciplines. Although both the ‗state of art‘ and the 
―arting‖ of the state, show contemporariness, the former, regardless of the 
‗acknowledging‘ part it plays, captures the art within the state presupposing it, 
within the ―disciplinary big bang‖ (Nicolescu 1999, p.2); thus it prevents 
knowledge from opening to other structures, eventually leading to ‗recycling 
research‘. The latter, however, liberates the art from the state to creativeness 
that recursively advances the state. This does not mean that the 
‗acknowledgment‘ part is not important as a base for knowledge acquisition of 
the research field, but that its hazardous limits reside in enfolding the research 
area so that it forms a whole Reality enclosed within itself. In metaphorical 
terms, the state of art, habitually and artificially, evolves as an autopoietic cell of 
disciplinary research ignoring the flexibility, openness and connections, that is 
‗beyondness‘, simply because such openness questions its death and such 
beyondness problematizes the death-after. In other words, is there ‗an after‘ for 
the disciplinary state of art? This question is crucial because it fairly 
summarises the distrust in the chaotic non-state, which also means there is 
nothing for us to art in our second part of the argument. This marks the 
disappearance of research and its displacement, with fragments that cannot be 
brought together to form a unified field or area of research. This ‗after‘ could be 
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rethought through the transdisciplinary approach without falling into chaos. 
Simply, the chaos does not have a guarantee for the emergence of a system or 
order that could preserve the continuity of research.  What characterizes this 
approach is the space-time moment of ‗going beyond‘. In transdisciplinary 
research, I observe this moment where the review of the state of art and the 
potentiality to art the state, the dominating disciplinary or single level of Reality 
and the new level of Reality, and the conflict between certainty and uncertainty, 
all appear simultaneously in what Nicolescu calls an ‗open unity‘. This open 
unity is what Nicolescu defines as the zone of non-resistance between the 
levels, in which they disappear not in emptiness but in unification. The illusion, 
that is the artificial division and the stability of boundaries between disciplines, is 
unveiled. Nicolescu views boundaries as unstable, moving in a space that is 
‗full‘: 
We have a different approach of the boundaries between disciplines. 
For us, they are like the separation between galaxies, solar systems, 
stars, and planets. It is the movement itself that generates the 
fluctuation of boundaries. This does not mean that a galaxy 
intersects another galaxy. When we cross the boundaries, we meet 
the interplanetary and intergalactic vacuum. This vacuum is far from 
being empty; it is full of invisible matter and energy. It introduces a 
clear discontinuity between territories of galaxies, solar systems, 
stars, and planets. Without the interplanetary and intergalactic 
vacuum, there is no Universe (2010, p.23). 
This space-time moment is full of potentiality and energy (1992; Nicolescu 
2010). It reveals the sacred or the ―Hidden Third‖, associated with different 
levels, ―that which does not submit to any rationalization‖ (Nicolescu 2008b, p.9; 
2010, p.27). This moment, on the one hand, frees the subject from following the 
habitual sequence of one discipline by providing it time to think. While its 
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irrationality appears from disciplinary viewing, its rationality is perceived in the 
totality of the research. It marks a living moment where the future can be traced 
―in the sand of the present moment‖ (Nicolescu 2005, p.14). This moment 
differentiates transdisciplinarity as a continual process of research individuation 
or going beyond, that is forever open through transdisciplinarity as ―joint 
problem solving‖ or collaborative projects such as the td-net  project of Swiss 
academies (Pohl and Hadorn 2007; Hadorn et al. 2008). In the latter, different 
disciplines focus on resolving the same problem, starting point, goals and 
requirements, in order to obtain better solutions. For the latter, complexity is 
experienced in relation to the plurality of disciplines and problems occur as a 
result of disciplinary bias or lack of communication within the application 
contexts, thus a mutual understanding of the problem is required, when the 
research focus is on the space between the disciplines. Nicolescu (2005, p.1) 
points out that transdisciplinarity is not a superior discipline or  a ―science of the 
sciences‖. Transductively, it does not search for absolute effectiveness but for a 
resolution to current problematics. In this way it cannot be contained within the 
two definitions provided by Scriven (2008, p.65) where it is seen as a 
perspective with some application in several disciplines, or as a ‗discipline‘ and 
an analytical tool. These definitions already presume that which they deny in the 
first place which is disciplinarity and thus the outcome is evaluated by linking it 
back to disciplinary territories. The integrative finding of a transdisciplinary 
approach should be seen in itself as a ‗unit of becoming‘ with its own complexity 
and relations that advance autonomously with all their heterogeneities. 
Heterogeneity in the integrative phase is not only caused by the participatory 
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disciplines and theories, but also because new relations and perspectives come 
into being that provide this phase with its own particularities or ‗haeccities‘, and 
hence complexity and problematics. In other words, the integrative phase is the 
outcome but not the ‗endcome‘ of the research in individuation; otherwise there 
would be no going ‗beyond disciplines‘. ‗Going beyond‘ takes place when the 
integrative phase is seen as a transductive phase that ―aids in tracking 
processes that come into being at the intersection of diverse realities‖ 
(Mackenzie 2006, p.18) but, as a unit, it starts to individuate as a complex of 
heterogeneity in its own right, that is born to follow its own path. In this sense, 
rather than conceiving Nicolescu‘s transdisciplinary approach as a unity of all 
our knowledge (Nicolescu 2002, p.110; Hadorn et al. 2008, p.29), it can actually 
be conceived as a continual searching for the knowledge required for ‗life-world‘ 
problems. The ―common good‖ (Pohl and Hadorn 2007, p.27; Hadorn et al. 
2008, p.19) aimed at by project-based approaches is effective in terms of the 
‗project‘ but not in terms of research, because any research basically precedes 
from the uncertainties of questioning the ‗common‘ and the ‗good‘.  
The transdisciplinary approach advocates a level of relativity or incompleteness 
of each level rather than totality (Nicolescu 2008a, p.18), which means that 
there is no privileged level, thus rejecting dualism and binaries, as it places 
emphasis on the ‗in-between‘, that is, on the relation or interaction. Knowledge 
is not exterior or interior (Nicolescu 2010, p.27), but in-between. A level of 
coherence (Nicolescu 2005, p.12) allows the communication and the 
transmission of information between heterogeneous levels. Although a 
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transdisciplinary perspective acknowledges the experimental level, it rejects the 
reduction of knowledge and of the subject to an object of science. When 
objectivity becomes the sole reality, it marks the ―the death of the Subject‖ or its 
transformation to 
an object of the exploitation of man by man, an object of the 
experiments of ideologies which are proclaimed scientific, an object 
of scientific studies to be dissected, formalized, and manipulated. 
The Man-God has become a Man-Object, of which the only result 
can be self-destruction (Nicolescu 2005, p.3).  
Consequently, it admits the contribution of body and feelings (Montuori 2008, 
p.xvi), as well as spiritual and cultural levels in knowledge formation. ―Without 
spirituality, the knowledge is a dead knowledge‖ (Nicolescu 2010, p.27). The 
etymological meaning of spirituality, as Nicolescu explains, is representation 
that is ―in an act of communion between us and the cosmos‖ (2010, p.31). He 
emphasizes that technoscience which ―drives a hugely irrational force of 
efficiency for efficiency sake: everything which can be done will be done, for the 
worst or the best‖ (2010, p.32) is one of the reasons for the need for a new 
spirituality. Thus the transdisciplinary approach recognizes values as a main 
aspect of interaction (Nicolescu 2005, p.14). It also considers the effect of 
disciplinarity on the ―New Man‖ who turned out to be ―sad, empty man‖ nostalgic 
to return to the ―Golden Age‖  (Nicolescu 2002, p.108). The new spirituality 
between cultures and religions embodies the transdisciplinarity principle, which 
is ―unity in diversity and diversity from unity‖ (2010, p.32). 
Importantly, the subject, the researcher or the individual is an active participant 
whom through ―a discipline of self-inquiry ... integrates the knower in the 
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process of knowing‖ (Nicolescu 2008c). Once the uncertain knower is integrated 
in the process of knowing, thinking is no longer performed by the subject but 
becomes ―an individuation of a thinking subject‖, where to think transductively 
means ―to mediate between different orders, to place heterogeneous realities in 
contact, and to become something different‖ (Mackenzie 2006, p.18).11 Like the 
transdisciplinary object, which has levels of discontinuous realities and a zone 
of non-resistance between them, the subject for Nicolescu has levels of 
perception and a zone of non-resistance between them. Figure 1 (2010, p.34) 
shows the interaction between the object‘s and the subject‘s levels of Realities 
and zones of non-resistance, which engenders different levels of 
transperceptions and transrepresentations that can explain ―moments of 
scientific and artistic creation‖ (Nicolescu 2008b, p.15).  
 
Figure 1. a. Trandisciplinarity and b. The transdisciplinary Reality defined by its 
Object and Subject and their levels, and the Hidden Third. 
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0.4. Research structure 
To cater for this variation, my research consists of the three aspects of the 
transdisciplinary approach Nicolescu insists on (Nicolescu 2005;  2008b;  2010), 
the experimental, phenomenological and theoretical, as well as an integration 
level. A phase defines a mode, which draws on a case study within a certain 
field depending on the particularities of the field itself. This gives the phase a 
discreteness or discontinuity from the content of other phases. In other words, 
the phase has a structure within itself before condensing into a phase transition. 
The phase transition forms a layer that reserves the continuity and connectivity 
with the next field as the boundaries between them are crossed. The findings of 
each phase are explored in relation to the problems posed by the previous 
phase and the direction or orientation it poses for the next case. The 
experimental phase (meta-analysis in HCI) identifies a logical and objective 
level of knowledge. According to Coryn and Hattie, 
the objectivist view of evaluation asserts that evaluative claims of 
merit, worth, and significance are possible in principle and practice, 
based on logic and reason, and if properly understood, objectivity 
(2006, p.108). 
The second level is the phenomenological (analysis of Hansen‘s work in new 
media), which identifies theoretical or normative influences on a certain 
phenomenon and connects with the logical or objective level. The third one is 
the theoretical or value level, based on what or how to apply (analysis of Alan 
Turing‘s work on machinery intelligence). The final level is the integration of the 
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three levels in explaining certain examples of interaction between humans and 
technology.   
There are two phase transitions in my research. The first one occurs at the end 
of the experimental level, which generally points to a reduction of both the 
virtual body and the participant‘s embodiment due to both the particularities and 
methodological shortcomings of the HCI research field. The second phase 
transition arises from the failure of Mark Hansen‘s work to represent a techno-
human experience per se. His theorization of new media is influenced, I will 
argue, by a projection of a subjective patriarchal view based on the 
transformation of female body and its functions to technological situations. The 
notion ‗technology is female‘ does not allow a critique of technology per se. In 
all cases, Hansen‘s work presents a mind/body and subject/object polarization 
between virtual embodiment and the participant‘s embodiment. This directs the 
research to the final phase of the exploration of the immanent relation between 
the machine and the human. The primary allocation of the case study for the 
third phase is based on the hypothesis that the immanent techno-human 
relationship could be identified by its effects that persist as continuity or through 
the emergence of new productions. Alan Turing‘s relation with machines has 
reserved such a position that is still coexisting within the present and marching 
into the future.  
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0.5. The outline of the PhD phases 
The phases are outlined as follows: 
0.5.1. The first phase (chapter one)  
This phase obtains the objective data. On the one hand, this data is necessary 
as a foundation for the transdisciplinary approach. On the other hand, the 
resistance to reducing the research to ‗objective data‘ adds to the contradictory 
findings, which is what motivates the transdisciplinary view and establishes the 
need to go beyond the ‗disciplinary bias‘. It explores embodiment, understood 
as the embodied conversational agent (ECA), in HCI where it is considered a 
new paradigm and its effectiveness, known as the persona effect, is evaluated 
through comparative experiments. Although the interest in researching this 
effect has expanded in different fields and become the focus of new centres and 
institutions, which indicates multiple levels of Reality and a level of complexity 
due to the plurality of disciplines, contradictory findings are becoming more 
common in the field, raising questions about whether virtual embodiment is 
worthy or worthless. This research uses a quantitative meta-analysis for two 
purposes: first, to measure the effects of embodiment, and second, to find the 
reasons for contradictory results. Meta-analysis research at this stage has great 
potential, firstly, in being able to extract ―the common elements, design, and 
process from existing disciplines and synthesize them into the foundation of the 
new transdiscipline‖ (Ertas et al. 2003, p.291). Secondly, it provides a thorough 
review that shows the boundaries of the discipline in solving certain problems 
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within its current duration of the study and the future directions of its effects. 
That is because it entails a process of thorough study retrieval, categorization 
and coding. As ECA research is driven by application studies, this meta-
analysis focuses on ‗embodied conversational pedagogical agents‘ (PAs), which 
are implemented in learning and training contexts, because: 1) it is one of the 
most mature fields for new implementations to explore; and 2) the number of 
studies enables the application of the methodology and the consistency of 
results. Studies from other fields and disciplines, which report similar measures, 
were included based on having similar experimental designs. The findings of 
the meta-analysis are surprising. First, similarly to a study conducted by Yee et 
al. (2007), the effect size is small, showing that there is no ‗persona effect‘ (the 
embodied effect of ECA), on the participants‘ learning and subjective measures. 
Second, my research emphasizes the confusion between the image effect and 
embodied effect. That is, what has been tested in the interaction between the 
human and the computer is the interface image rather than embodiment. The 
contradictory findings are due to a lack of definition of virtual embodiment and 
embodied effects, that is, embodied perception and affection. Neither 
participants‘ embodiment nor embodied interaction has received any attention 
as almost all the learning measures are concerned with knowledge transfer and 
retention, and the subjective measures are based on questionnaires and 
abstract scales or statements. As we realize from a transdisciplinary 
perspective, this finding, ignoring the embodied participant in favour of 
objectivity, is not surprising. This redirects us to question the definition of 
embodiment and embodied effects. 
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0.5.2. The second phase (chapters two, three and four) 
The second phase investigates ‗embodiment‘ in the work of Mark Hansen in 
new media. Like the studies in HCI, Mark Hansen has identified embodiment as 
the new paradigm in new media theory and new media artwork. Hansen‘s 
research differs in fundamental ways from HCI as it follows a more 
philosophical and, presumably, phenomenological approach to media artwork. 
Yet, through debating and surveying contemporary theories ranging from 
biological (Varela‘s ‗embodied mind‘), metaphysical (Bergson) and media based 
(Deleuze), it highlights the phenomenological experience of embodied 
interaction between the human and the work, media and image, rather than the 
post-reflections observed in the HCI account. The work is characterized by 
arguments and debates with philosophers, theorists and artists – which is not 
observed in the first field and thus could be regarded as a resource, opening 
new potentials in understanding and conceptualizing embodiment. It becomes a 
requirement to research ‗embodiment‘ in this new field of work, rather than 
applying the issues found in the previous phase, which will only bring us to the 
reductions we are trying to avoid (e.g. reducing the embodied effect to an image 
effect). Hansen‘s work introduces us to another account of embodiment and its 
transformation into technology. This is Gilles Deleuze‘s transformation of Henry 
Bergson‘s theory of embodiment in Matter and Memory, in his work on cinema 
leading to embodying cinema. In his book New Philosophy for New Media 
(2006), Hansen argues that Deleuze has disembodied the centre of 
indetermination (that is the human being) by locating embodied perception and 
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affection outside the body. I argue, on the other hand, that Deleuze‘s 
transformation and conceptualization of embodied cinema is very useful to 
understanding the relationship between human and machine embodiment and 
taking it beyond the purview of scientific applications. Chapter three follows this 
argument in relation to embodied perception. It concludes that Hansen 
misinterprets Bergson in regard to Francisco Varela‘s enactive approach and 
that the two approaches are irreconcilable in relation to the concept of 
‗representation‘. Eventually, Hansen‘s misreading of Bergsonian perception also 
leads to what I call the ‗King Midas effect‘. This is because Hansen defines 
perception as the ‗subtraction‘ of what interests the participant from the world 
rather than the ‗subtraction‘ of what does not interest the participant. 
Reasonably, this reversion means that the participant loses interest in the world 
because he subtracts all that interests him in the first place.  
Chapter four focuses on the embodied affectivity of Hansen‘s argument against 
Deleuze. Here, the argument is centred on three points: embodied affectivity, 
spectatorship, and temporality. The three accounts indicate that Hansen has 
departed from Bergson and Varela and misread Deleuze, in order to advocate a 
conscious-affective account, rather than affects as impersonal.  
Both HCI and Hansen‘s account lead to mind/body polarizations. While the 
former focuses on the technology, the latter focuses on the participant. HCI 
evaluates ECA as a mental effect; Hansen‘s explains the interaction in relation 
to the body and physical response. In HCI the effect of virtual embodiment is 
interpreted in terms of its equality to human embodiment. For Hansen, the effect 
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is interpreted in terms of the participant‘s physical response to media. Deleuze‘s 
embodied cinema comes in-between as it focuses on the effect as a relation of 
becoming between the two embodiments. Besides the embodied techniques of 
the cinema and the physical response of the viewer, there is a virtual field in-
between them, full of forces and potentials in which each of them participate. 
The next phase attempts to overcome the polarization and to pursue the 
relational aspect rather than interactional one between human and machine 
embodiments.   
0.5.3. The third phase (chapters five and six) 
This phase investigates ‗embodiment‘ in Alan Turing‘s work on intelligent 
machines. This is considered as a historical account of emerging relations 
between human and machine, which has remained controversial in AI, HCI and 
other literature studies. As noted, the previous cases present a counter problem 
(object/subject, art/science, experimental data/philosophical debate, complexity 
of plurality/complexity of ambiguity) that needs to be overcome in order to place 
the media and the body at a trans-level. The analysis of Alan Turing‘s work on 
machinery provides us with a case different from these accounts, where 
complexity is more oriented towards multiple relationships between human and 
machines.  
Chapter five investigates the material reality of the Turing Machine and the 
reasons for its abstraction.  It repositions it from the abstract, nonexistent realm 
to the actual virtual one. It explores the affective relationship between Turing 
and machines that has led to the emergence of the Turing Machine and the 
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widely asked question of what was in Turing‘s mind. Complexity in explaining 
Turing‘s work is observed in relation to the multiple emergences of encounters – 
the ‗imitation game‘, the ‗Turing test‘, the ‗child machine‘ or ‗learning machine.‘  
Chapter six explores the relationship between Turing and the machine in 
relation to Simondon‘s work on individuation, human-machine counter-
becoming and affective modality. Simondon‘s focus on understanding technical 
culture, the living being and the technical object‘s individuation as a process 
allows a different reading and analysis of Turing‘s work and the Turing machine.  
0.6. Significance and contribution of the research 
The thesis contributes to the transdisciplinary approach by rethinking 
transdisciplinarity at the level of the subject or researcher, where research is 
perceived as a process of individuation. As such, it is appropriate to think about 
or explore the width and depth of the human-machine embodied interaction 
problematic. It argues that one level of reality is not enough to solve the 
problem. The research brings to light the mutual dominant paradigms 
influencing different disciplines. For example, both HCI and Mark Hansen‘s 
accounts, consider embodiment as a new paradigm. Although Hansen‘s 
account (the second part of this thesis) is different from HCI, the mind/body 
polarization persists directly or indirectly in both of them as chapters one and 
two show. Moreover, Hansen‘s account reinforces the issues related to the 
abuse or misuse of interface female characters explored in HCI. That is, it can 
be considered as a form of theoretical abuse of technology.  
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Importantly, the thesis claims that the notion of embodying technology itself, 
does not seem to be restricted to a certain technology. Artificial Intelligence has 
focused on embodying machines or computers, but Gilles Deleuze equally 
philosophised cinema through the transformation of Henry Bergson‘s theory of 
human embodiment. It can be claimed that Deleuze introduces us to embodied 
cinema or cinema intelligence. The difference is in what this embodying of 
intelligent computer or intelligent cinema involves. The cinema for Deleuze is 
not embodied because it has ‗characters‘ who are real but because, similar to 
the human body, it can relate to other bodies, perceive, affect, be affected, and 
act. Deleuze, thus, elaborates on the techniques through which the cinema, as 
an embodied body, that is like the human body but different from it, creates its 
own images. Deleuze‘s account presents us with a different way of perceiving 
technological embodiment and probably technological intelligence, and the 
difference this brings to the relationship between human embodiment and 
machine embodiment. Recursively, this means that ways other than human 
body modeling can be pursued in software development and artificial 
intelligence and these ways can be perceived as intelligent, due to the different 
effects and relations they establish. I believe that my engagement with the 
embodied cinema is a significant account I need to think about and take beyond 
the boundaries of this thesis, to rethink the design and evaluation of virtual 
embodiment in HCI beyond the modeling of the human body, image or 
situatedness as a body of relations.  
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Finally, this thesis brings to light the symptoms of antagonism of the current 
relationship between the human and machine, realized in the different accounts. 
That is HCI‘s determination to show machines‘ effectiveness in influencing 
people, Hansen‘s insistence on a crude patriarchal order by devaluing media, 
Simondon‘s warnings about believing in machine humanization and loss of 
affectivity, and Turing‘s dedifferentiation between human and machine and 
warnings of machine takeover. In other words, there is a crisis in the 
interpretation not only of our relation to the machine but of our relation to 
ourselves that needs us to rethink our own reality, affects, and perceptions. 
Disciplinarity and machine humanization seems to be part of this. Thus, the 
thesis advocates rethinking the aim of design not for design sake but in order to 
sustain the relationship between humans, and between them and the world. 
Here, affectivity could be seen as an immanent capacity of the relationship 
between human and machine. In this way, difference and communication 
between different realities form the basic requirement for the emergence of the 
new creativity and continuity. 
0.6. Limitations of the research   
The major aim of this thesis is to follow a transdisciplinary problem-based 
approach in researching embodiment; nevertheless it does not intend to provide 
a comprehensive theory or practical framework for researching embodiment. 
This is because a transdisciplinary approach requires a balance between the 
breadth and depth of the disciplines participating in the enquiry, which induces a 
source of limitation, particularly, in considering the scope of the (secondary) 
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literature survey. The approach emphasizes the on-going process of research 
rather than focusing on the outcomes. A complementary perspective to 
overcome these limitations is to broaden the research of embodiment into other 
fields. 
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1. Chapter One: Embodiment in Human–Computer 
Interaction (HCI) Research: A Comparative Meta-
Analysis of Research on Embodied Pedagogical Agents 
(PAs) 
1.1. Introduction: Embodied conversational pedagogical agents 
(PAs): Definition and background 
Embodiment is considered the new paradigm in human–computer interaction 
(HCI) research, which has developed from interdisciplinary fields related to 
artificial intelligence (AI), graphical user interfaces (GUI) and social 
communication studies. Embodied conversational agents (ECA) are defined as 
animated life-like autonomous characters that are embedded in computerized 
environments and are designed to interact socially with the users. It is widely 
believed that embodying these in the interface of different applications, that is 
providing them with representational behaviours and appearance, has positive 
affective and cognitive effects as they increase users‘ motivation and interest in 
the application context, therefore resulting in better interaction. However, the 
narrative systemic reviews of the empirical studies in some fields have pointed 
out research shortcomings and indefinite findings. As HCI forms an integrative 
field of different applications that participate in knowledge development based 
on the generalizability of the findings, here I focus on education for two reasons. 
First, it is one of the major contemporary fields where embodiment in relation to 
machine representation has been explored extensively in relation to other fields 
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as part of their training and educational programs. Second, the design of 
computerized learning materials is related to my educational and practical 
expertise and so I can reflect on the findings from both theoretical and practical 
backgrounds before taking further steps in my research field. Embodiment, as 
an emerging paradigm in educational technologies, is included within the term 
of pedagogical agent (PA) (Johnson and Rickel 2000; Domagk and Niegemann 
2005). The use of agents in education originates from intelligent tutoring system 
(ITS) models. Yet, their ability to act as separate social entities from the 
traditional ITS models has been seen as important advancement in learning 
technologies. While an ITS tends to model human tutors (Ohlsson 1986; Merrill 
et al. 1992; Frasson et al. 1996) and use text-based interfaces to communicate 
with the user while focusing on facilitating natural language dialogues, e.g. 
PACT Geometry Tutor (Aleven et al. 1999); Cognitive Tutor (Aleven and 
Koedinger 2002); Ms. Lindquist (Heffernan and Koedinger 2002); CIRCSIM-
Tutor (Michael et al. 2003); and DiaWoZ (Fiedler et al. 2004). The use of PAs 
extended this simulation by simulating a human relationship (Selker 1994), and 
providing the awareness of social interaction, collaborative knowledge building 
(Mørch and Nævdal 2004) and social learning (Chou et al. 2002). Therefore, 
with their spread in interactive multimedia environments, more emphasis has 
been placed on the importance of their visual appearance in the interface. 
Research based on disembodied agents has already pointed out that, with a 
lack of graphical representation, the learners did not feel the agents‘ presence 
and the agents were seen as unbelievable (Chou et al. 2002; Rasseneur et al. 
2002; Faraco et al. 2004). Furthermore, the persona effect, referring to the 
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positive effect of the agents‘ embodiment on increasing learners‘ interest and 
motivation, and on making the software agents more helpful and credible, has 
been supported by Lester and his colleagues (1997b).   
1.2. Debatable issues in PA research findings 
The embodiment of pedagogical agents has become the focus of much of the 
current research and systematic reviews have pointed out that findings of 
empirical evaluations have proved to be contradictory (Dehn and Van Mulken 
2000; Clark and Choi 2005; Gulz 2005; Moreno and Flowerday 2006). Lester et 
al. (1997b) found that animated life-like pedagogical agents are capable of 
affecting a learner‘s perception of the learning experience, positively defining 
this as the persona effect. Similar findings were reported by Van Mulken (1998), 
Lester et al. (1999b; 2000), Mitrovic and Suraweera (2000), Moundridou and 
Virvou (2002), Darves and Oviatt (2004), and De Carolis et al. (2006). However, 
Dirkin et al. (2005) found that learners perceive a higher degree of social 
presence and positive learning experience at both ends of the sociability 
continuum (text only and social animated agent). But in the study conducted by 
Hubal and Day (2006), although the participants were not impressed with the 
overall realism of the character and only moderately liked it, they did better than 
the control group.  
On the other hand, Clark and Choi (2005) point out that, when adequate design 
comparisons are made, the difference in learning might not be due to the 
agent‘s presence but to the instructional methods. This was proved by an 
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experiment conducted by Choi and Clark (2006) where the interface agent was 
replaced with an arrow to direct learners‘ attention to specific information. They 
found that the use of an agent did not increase learners‘ motivation and interest 
more than the other group. Better learning achievement was only obtained by 
learners with low background knowledge. Moreno et al. (2001) conducted five 
experiments to find out whether the use of agents and the agents‘ properties 
enhances learning and learning experience. In both experiments (1 and 2) there 
were no significant statistical effects of the agent on retention, understandability 
of the content or learning difficulty. Significant statistical effects of the agent 
were only constant on far transfer and interest measures. In experiments 4 and 
5 there were no effects of the embodiment (image) of the agent on all the 
dependent variables. Apart from the first experiment, there was no effect of 
agency on motivation. Craig et al. (2002) also points out that there was no effect 
of agents‘ properties (static, with gesture, no-agent) on retention, matching, 
transfer or enjoyment. Van Mulken et al. (1998) found that there was no effect 
of persona on learning (recall and comprehension), although learners found the 
presentation of the technical material entertaining. Gilbert et al. (2005) attributed 
the success of the system (Adam) to adaptive instruction more than 
incorporation of the PA. On the other hand, Beun et al. (2003) found that there 
was a statistically significant result for the realistic agent. Furthermore, acting 
autonomously, the agents were able to focus learners‘ attention on the task and 
help them to develop deep explanations (Holmes 2007). Hubal and Day (2006) 
and Babu et al.  (2007) found that the participants practising with virtual agents 
did better in their post-assessments.  
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Respectively, these contradictory findings make the effectiveness of the 
embodiment of a PA on learning a debatable issue and do not finalize the 
arguments in the field. Thus, this debate mandates a sound research 
methodology that thoroughly examines these studies, cumulates their results 
and comes out with applicable conclusions. This research investigates the 
effect of PAs on learning by applying a meta-analysis methodology to integrate, 
compare and synthesize the conflicting findings. This chapter intends to reopen 
this debate in order answer the following two research questions:  
1) What is the effect size of embodied agents on learning?  
2) What are reasons for the obtained contradictory results? 
1.3. PA development  
The growing interest in the field and its expansion led to the formation of 
centres that focus their research on the effects of implementing agents on 
learning, which indicates a potentiality towards a transdisciplinary perspective. 
For example the IntelliMedia Center for Intelligent Systems at North Carolina 
State University uses education as the application field for its research on 
intelligent human–computer interaction and communication. Another initiative is 
the ‗Social Intelligence Project‘ developed in the multidisciplinary Center for 
Advanced Research and Technology (CART) at the University of Southern 
California. A critical expansion in the field was the formation of research groups. 
The Pedagogical Agents and Learning Systems (PALS) research group in the 
Center for Research of Innovative Technologies for Learning (RITL) was 
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founded in 2004 by Dr Amy L. Baylor at Florida State University. Another 
voluntary international research group is the IEEE Virtual Instructor Pilot 
Research Group (VIPRG) founded by Dr Jayfus Tucker Doswell in 2005 and 
sponsored by the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Learning 
Technology. While developing, the field started to draw on diverse disciplines 
and theoretical perspectives. Embodiment moved the agents from being a 
particularity of computing disciplines to social sciences. On one hand, studies 
were not only restricted to assess the effectiveness of the embodied agents on 
promoting deep learning but also entailed various educational and training 
contexts. Contextualization within these different frameworks increased the 
need for enhanced believability in the agent‘s embodiment and behaviour. On 
the other hand, this required transmitting the different research methods across 
the involved disciplines to effectively implement and evaluate the PA. In the 
following section, some of the core disciplines of the research will be discussed. 
1.4. Applications in educational settings 
The embodiment of the agent became a salient feature of the interface as it 
made the interaction between the learner and the software more visible. 
Commonly, the agents are classified as tutors or tools (Baylor 1999; Chou et al. 
2003; Payr 2003; Sklar and Richards 2006) and consequently their embodiment 
within the learning environment functions as a visual support of feedback 
provision to guide learners‘ attention to important aspects of the content and to 
help them construct their knowledge while interacting with the learning material, 
e.g. PPP persona (André 1996; André et al. 1998), Herman the bug (Lester 
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(1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1997; 1999a; 1999b) and Human Presenter (Noma et al. 
2000). The importance of the contextualized embodiment was recognized as a 
clue that associates the schema base with the content domain (Wonisch and 
Cooper 2002) and therefore establishes a direct visual link to the topic. For 
example, in medical learning environments the embodiment was represented by 
an agent (Adele) wearing medical clothes (Johnson et al. 2003) and in another 
environment about the ‗recognition of heart attack symptoms‘, the agent (Bea) 
took the shape of a heart (Silverman et al. 2001).  
A further development took place when embodiment became a tool. In this 
context, either the learners manipulate the agents or their characteristics to 
observe the results of their actions on the virtual world. Alternatively, the agents 
are used to encourage learners to practise some learning skills. As a tool, PAs 
were exploited to facilitate learning some of the difficult subjects, and modify 
learners‘ attitudes towards them, such as programming (Kidsim, Smith et al. 
(1994); ToonKalk, Kahn (1996); Alice, Cooper et al. (2003); Moskal et al. 
(2004), improve learners‘ skills (e.g. writing and narration, StoryStation, 
Robertson and Good (2003); Ghostwriter, Robertson (2004); Teatrix, Machado 
et al. (2000); Paiva et al. (2001); Puppet, Marshall (2002) and encourage their 
conversational queries (e.g. I SEE, Darves and Oviatt (2004). Furthermore, a 
critical application of embodied agents is their use for therapeutic purposes in 
special education such as autism (Baldi, Bosseler and Massaro (2003); Barker 
(2003) and cognitive impairments (TAPA, Mohamad et al.(2002); Mohamad 
(2004). 
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Anthropomorphic agents enabled studies on cultural and social education 
dimensions, for example the VICTEC (Virtual ICT with Empathic Characters) 
project (Woods et al. 2003; Hall 2004; Aylett 2005; Paiva et al. 2005; Woods et 
al. 2007), which was based on the bullying phenomena in schools in Britain, 
Portugal and Germany, and the interactive pedagogical drama (Carmen‟s Bright 
IDEAS, Marsella et al. (2002; 2003), which focused on the social problems of 
the mothers of paediatric cancer patients. More recently, studies from social 
and cultural psychology perspectives exploring social models, gender, similarity 
attraction and appearance have been conducted (Baylor and Kim 2004; Baylor 
2006; Moreno and Flowerday 2006; Kim et al. 2007). 
1.4.1. Computing and design 
Developing PA applications has been one of the interests of computing, design 
and artificial intelligence disciplines that focus on software architecture in order 
to synthesize the human metaphor by modelling the human agent (Hopkins and 
Fishwick 2001). Natural-looking animations were constructed using either 
computational models or psychological models. Chi et al. (2000), for example, 
developed their EMOTE computational model for generating natural gestures 
based on Laban Movement Analysis by specifying the parameters of effort, 
which refers to the information about how the body should act, and shape, 
which describes the changing forms the body makes in space. Hartmann et al. 
(2005), on the other hand, based their design of expressive embodied 
conversational agents on a set of characteristics drawn from social psychology. 
Unlike Chi et al. (2000), their approach was focused on defining expressivity as 
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perceived by the users. Moreover, more complicated areas such as personality 
and culture (Poggi et al. 2005), emotions (Rehm and André 2005a; Ben Ammar 
et al. 2006; Martin et al. 2006) and politeness (Rehm and André 2005b) were 
emphasized. Likewise, affective computing tended to predict learners‘ goals and 
modify the characters‘ interaction based on them, e.g. The Treasure Hunt 
(McQuiggan et al. 2006) and Casey (Burleson 2006). Using detecting 
techniques to recognize learner effects, such as skin sensors and eye-tracking 
(Wang et al. 2007), provides more accurate methods to support the 
conventional measurement tools, such as questionnaires, although as a learner 
subjective measure, the latter‘s effectiveness has been questionable (Bailenson 
JN 2004).  
1.4.2. Multimedia learning 
The multimedia learning (Mayer 2005) perspective on the effectiveness of 
embodied conversational agents is a leading one in the field. The majority of 
these studies (Moreno et al. 2001; Atkinson 2002; Craig et al. 2002; Mayer et al. 
2003; Craig et al. 2004) and their replications viewed the agent as a media 
element, an image, in the interface and subjected it to investigations related to 
the cognitive-load theory design principles. These included: the interactivity 
principle – providing learners with control over the material rather than 
continuous presentation; the modality effect – the use of a voice with animation 
rather than text with animation to reduce the cognitive load; the image effect – 
the use of images unrelated to the content could be a seductive detail (Harp 
and Mayer 1998) which could result in split-attention effect (Chandler and 
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Sweller 1991); the personal agent effect – the provision of personalized 
feedback through agents promotes constructive learning (Moreno et al. 2000); 
and the embodied agent effect – the provision of non-personalized monologue 
from agents affects the interaction (Atkinson 2002). Foremost, multimedia 
learning studies were concentrated on problem-solving and cognitive 
psychological measures, namely transfer and retention for assessing learning, 
which emphasized learning as a product rather than a process.  
1.4.3. Communication 
Communication studies have also enriched the research of pedagogical agents. 
Studies of animated faces (Waters 1987; Laurel et al. 1990; Sproull et al. 1996; 
Burgoon 2000) and verbal and non-verbal communication (Cassell et al. 2000; 
Cassell et al. 2001) have  motivated the implementation of talking heads and 
deictic agents in learning (Lester et al. 1999b; Link et al. 2001; Biswas et al. 
2005; Graesser et al. 2005; Nakanishi et al. 2005). Similarly, increased attention 
was directed towards affective feedback (Okonkwo and Vassileva 2001; Wang 
et al. 2006). Other studies focusing on accelerating the ―symbiotic partnership‖ 
(Licklider 1960) between the users and computers share similar ground with the 
social perspective of learning that tends to increase the partnership between the 
learner and computer as peer learners (Ryokai et al. 2003) and partners 
(Hietala and Niemirepo 1998; Holmes 2007). Previous research findings that 
people apply social rules to computers and treat them as other humans, 
emphasizing their role as social actors (Nass et al. 1995; Reeves and Nass 
1998; Nass and Moon 2000), supported the emergent social roles of agents 
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which are referred to as ―non-pedagogical roles‖ (Payr 2003) or ―less 
pronouncedly pedagogical‖ (Gulz and Haake 2006) learning companions 
(Goodman et al. 1998; Kehoe et al. 2004) and co-learners (Ju et al. 2005). 
These studies were interested in developing the social bonds between the 
computer and the learner, and directed the attention on the effectiveness of the 
social presence and learning process rather than learning outcome. 
1.5. Research method 
Due to the psychological experimental method that is generally used in HCI and 
specifically in interface agent research, a comparative meta-analysis was 
conducted to determine the effectiveness of PAs.12 Meta-analysis is a statistical 
procedure to integrate and synthesize results from individual studies (Wolf 
1986, p.5; Hunter and Schmidt 1990). It is attributed to Gene Glass (1976), who 
referred to it as ―the analysis of analyses‖ (1976, p.3). Academically it has 
become an ―accepted practice of evaluating the current flood of conflicting 
scientific evidence‖ (Stanley 2001) and is considered ―the highest level of 
analysis‖ (Papadopoulos and Gkiaouris 2007). This research followed the 
process defined by (Rosenthal and DiMatteo 2001), who describe meta-
analysis as a process ―for systematically examining a body of research, 
carefully formulating hypotheses, conducting an exhaustive search and 
establishing inclusion/exclusion criteria for articles, recording and statistically 
synthesizing and combining data and effect sizes from these studies, searching 
for moderator and mediator variables to explain effects of interest, and reporting 
results‖ (2001, p.62). First, an exhaustive search, retrieval and coding of studies 
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concerning PAs were conducted. Then inclusion/exclusion criteria were 
established. The characteristics of and effect sizes from the studies were 
recorded and statistically synthesized and analysed. Finally, effects were 
explained in relation to moderator variables. The following section describes the 
procedure (for keywords see appendix 1:a). 
1.5.1. Studies retrieval 
An electronic search was conducted from May 2007 to July 200713 to identify 
and retrieve published and unpublished studies in the field of pedagogical 
agents written in or translated into English and conducted in the 1990s from 
different disciplines. Five strategies were used in the retrieval process. First, 
Google and Google Scholar were searched with the following keywords: 
‗agents‘, ‗life-like agents‘, ‗pedagogical agents‘ and ‗learning companions‘. The 
results of these searches allowed us to locate databases, institutions and 
author‘s homepages. Each time a relevant document was identified, the entire 
database it was located in was searched. This procedure implied a 
comprehensive search of SpringerLink, EBSCOHost, ScienceDirect, Illumina, 
ProQuest, Blackwell Publishing, Thomson Gale Databases, ACM Digital Library 
and IEEE Library. The references sections of the retrieved articles were 
checked. Finally, 46 researchers were emailed and requested to send or locate 
other published and unpublished studies, and contacts of other researchers 
they knew of in the area. Finally, a librarian was asked for to locate unpublished 
reports and theses.  
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1.5.2. Studies coding  
A numerical coding scheme for systematic recording of study characteristics 
was formed to analyse the information. Each study was used as the unit of 
analysis. Studies from the same paper were differentiated by adding a letter to 
the authors‘ names (e.g. Atkinson-a). Raw information from retrieved studies 
was coded into an ACCESS database. This information was used to induce 
data categories and scales for each coded variable. The statistical package 
SPSS v.16 for Windows was used to analyse descriptive information. 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software v.2 was used to perform the meta-
analysis. Each study was coded for: 1) study demographics (first author, type of 
paper, year, type of publication, country); 2) participants‘ demographics (sample 
size, gender, average age, standard deviation, course of study, selection, 
educational level or occupation, level of domain knowledge, ethnicity, 
institution); 3) learning context (learning environment, content, intentionality of 
learning, objectives, time in minutes of interaction, evaluation, double-blind 
scoring, methods of collecting data, learning measures, test forms); 4) 
experiment setting (design type, conditions, assignment, consent form, 
experimenter presence and role, duration); and 5) agents‘ demographics 
(degree of realism, degree of embodiment, gender, degree of animation, 
communication style, name).  
1.5.3. Inclusion criteria 
The following inclusion criteria were applied: 
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(a) The papers reported on an experiment comparing some form of 
embodied agent implementation to a control condition (no agent). 
(b) The study included measures of learning outcomes.  
(c) The study reported enough statistical information to compute the effect 
size, such as means and standard deviations, p-values, t-statistics and 
F-statistics, or statements of insignificance. 
1.5.4. Analysis procedure 
A hierarchal type of analysis (figure 2.) was performed on two levels: the study 
and the condition. These are explained below. Studies‘ characteristics were 
also analysed following the guidelines provided by Lipsey and Wilson (2001) to 
explore the heterogeneity and validity of studies. 
The following procedures were applied in calculating the effect sizes: 
 Two independent groups, control group and treatment group, and one 
dependent variable (learning measure) were within each study. The 
control group refers to non-agent based systems while the treatment 
group refers to agent based systems. This general approach was 
adapted to answer the general question of whether the embodied agents 
are effective on learning.  
 Studies with multiple independent groups (e.g. control group and/or 
treatment group) with uneven sample sizes were pooled together by 
calculating the weighted mean and the pooled standard deviation for 
each condition. Although the results might not be interpretable in relation 
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to certain characteristics at this stage, this enables us to present the 
overall picture before moving to narrower questions (Rosenthal and 
DiMatteo 2001; Hunter and Schmidt 2004, p.456) (for equations a and b 
see appendix 1:b).   
 Descriptive statistics, raw means and standard deviations of each 
dependent measure were entered separately and then aggregated 
together. Other statistics were used when applicable.  
 Effect sizes were calculated from scores as this is the dominant scale for 
measuring learning achievement. The majority of studies used post-
testing as an evaluation instrument and therefore it became the main 
source for computing effect sizes. Separate analyses were conducted 
focusing on transfer and retention because they were frequently 
measured. 
 Results from the random effect model that estimates the mean effect size 
of the population were presented. This is because the studies included 
were not subjected to homogeneity inclusion criteria. The random model 
permits exploration of discrepancies in the quality and characteristics of 
the studies, and allows generalization of the results (Raudenbush 1994, 
p.307). On the other hand, the fixed model is used when the number of 
studies in comparisons is small, i.e. two or three, because of the 
imprecise estimation of the variance based on small number of studies 
(Hunter and Schmidt 2004). 
 Different tests of heterogeneity (Cochran‘s Q-value, I-squared and tau-
squared) were examined. Cochran‘s Q-value is a statistical test that is 
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used to assess the heterogeneity among a group of studies. If the Q-
value exceeds the degree of freedom (df) of the studies, the test of 
heterogeneity is significant (p<0.05), indicating variation among studies. 
This implies that, if the Q-value is equal or less than the df, the test of 
heterogeneity is insignificant (p>0.05), indicating homogeneity. The I-
squared statistic represents the percentage of the total variation between 
the studies. It has a scale of 0 to 100. The values of 25%, 50% and 75% 
might be considered as low, moderate and high heterogeneity. The tau-
squared test is used to compute the between-studies variation.  
 A residual analysis was conducted to identify outliers. A residual analysis 
represents the distance between each study and the mean effect size. It 
computes a z-score for each study. A z-score greater than 1.95 or 2.55 is 
considered an outlier. Whenever outliers or sources of heterogeneity 
were identified, the data was double checked or/and heterogeneity 
sources were explained in relation to the provided set of studies. The 
studies were weighted following the procedure explained by (Borenstein 
et al. 2009). 
 Hedges‘s g effect sizes for pair-wise comparisons based on a bias-
corrected standardized mean difference were used in reporting the effect 
size. This index was chosen in preference to the commonly reported 
Cohen‘s d in the primary studies because of the small sample sizes. 
Likewise, although both are interpreted in the same way, Hedges‘s g is 
inferential and is adjusted for sample size. The common convention was 
used to refer to the effect sizes (small <= 0.20, medium = 0.50 and large 
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>= 0.80). Confidence intervals (95%) were used to reflect the precision of 
effect sizes. 
 Chronological cumulative analysis was performed to explore the 
sufficiency. Sufficiency examines the need for additional studies to 
establish the effectiveness of pedagogical agents on learning. Stability 
looks at the possibility of additional studies changing the aggregated 
effect size.  
 ‗Fail-safe N‘ analysis was used to assess the publication bias. It 
computes the number of the insignificant studies that could nullify the 
effect. The ‗trim and fill‘ (Duval and Tweedie 2000) method, based on 
random and fixed effect models, was also conducted. It locates and fills 
the missing studies on the right and left of the funnel plot. The method 
was based on the standard error and Hedges‘s g.  
1.6. Results 
1.6.1. Descriptive results 
The following section will report on the results of the descriptive analysis of 
study characteristics, the meta-analysis and the supplementary analyses. 
1.6.1.1. Publication characteristics 
Overall, a total of 351 related papers were retrieved, of which 23 papers 
included comparisons focusing on the effectiveness of embodied agents on 
learning. These included 27 usable studies for this analysis. The studies were 
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published by 21 authors belonging to different disciplines, namely psychology 
and educational psychology (33%), education and educational technology 
(26%), computing (19%), interdisciplinary and others (e.g. informatics and 
system engineering) (19%) and communication sciences (4%). Of the studies 
analysed, 4% were conducted before 2001. A sharp increase took place 
afterwards as the cumulative percentage rose to 22% in 2001 and 52% in 2003, 
which reveals a growing interest in the topic. A total of 82% of the studies were 
journal articles and 19% were conference papers, indicating that they are of 
high quality and reliability. This is because these publishing organizations apply 
evaluation and selection criteria by peer-reviewing the submitted papers (for list 
of included papers see appendix 1:c).  
1.6.1.2. Participants‟ characteristics  
The sample sizes ranged from 18 to 228 participants per study with a total of 
1852 participants (mean 71.81, standard deviation 47.657). A total of 70% of 
the learners were enrolled from US institutions, 19% from Europe, 7% from 
Australia and New Zealand, and 4% from Canada. This indicates that the 
population of the studies is dominated by one source of population, which could 
have some implications for external threads of validity that affect the 
geographical generalizability of findings. Only 48% of the experiments reported 
the gender of the participants, 33% reported the average age, and 15% 
included the standard deviation of the age group. The experiments reporting 
gender proportion revealed more female participants (60%) than male 
participants (40%). 
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The majority of the participants were from the university populations (74%), 
whereas only 19% were school students and 7% were students in different 
types of learning institutions (mean 1.85, SD 1.68). A total of 70% of the 
learners from the university population were undergraduate and college 
students drawn from psychology and educational psychology courses (30%), 
education and educational technology (15%), computing majors (15%) and 
other courses (e.g. medicine, humanities and language) (11%). Some 11% of 
school students were drawn from middle school and 7% were from elementary 
school. Another 11% of studies did not provide clear information about 
participants‘ educational level and/or courses. 
About 67% of the studies provided information about the methods of recruiting 
participants. Commonly, participants were recruited based on their availability in 
courses (26%), in return for course credits (22%) and by volunteering (19%). 
Methods of recruiting participants were not clear in 33% of studies.  
1.6.1.3. Research design and experiment settings  
All of the studies employed a ‗between-subjects‘ design. Most of the studies 
assigned participants randomly to the experimental conditions (82%) while the 
other studies did not clarify the type of assignment (19%). Mostly, the studies 
did not report the duration of the experiments clearly (63%). Some 37% of 
studies reported the experiment‘s time frame. Whereas 22% of the experiments 
were conducted in a single session ranging from 40 to 120 minutes, some 15% 
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of the experiments followed a longitudinal design involving two sessions that 
were a week or two apart.  
1.6.1.4. Independent variables 
Eleven instances were defined, six of which represented the control condition 
including no and disembodied agents and five were treatment conditions with 
PAs. A total of twelve studies contrasted the two conditions whereas the other 
studies contrasted multiple conditions that ranged from three to nine. The 
disembodied system could take an interface with Text only, Voice only or Text 
and voice. Moreover, the control groups could take the form of; Paper-based 
material, Human as a partner and Basic program (e.g. lacked features such as 
explanations, hints or multimedia elements). The treatment groups could take 
the form of the following agent‘s characteristics: agent with text, agent with 
voice, agent with voice and text, or two agents. 
1.6.1.5. Agents‟ characteristics 
Further, the characteristics of the embodiment varied between studies in 
relation to: (a) the appearance of the agent (anthropomorphism, level of 
embodiment, gender, realism); (b) level of animation; (c) provision of names; (d) 
modality type; and (e) the role of the agent.  
a. In relation to the appearance of the agent, human-like agents (56%), full 
embodied agents (67%) and male agents (59%) were more common 
than other types of agent. Non-human and a combination of two agents 
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(human and non-human) represented 33% and 11% respectively. 
Partially or talking-head embodied agents and two agents with different 
levels of embodiment formed 30% and 4% respectively. Female and 
neutral agents accounted for 15% each and others contained a 
combination of the two genders or were neutral (11%). Two levels of 
realism were investigated. High realism, which included human or 
animals that had a detailed visual representation, and low realism, which 
referred to cartoon or less-detailed representations. Pedagogical agents 
with low levels of realism (70%) were used more in learning 
environments than those with a high level of realism (22%) or a 
combination of different degrees of realism (7%).  
b. Equally, fully animated agents (63%) were more frequent than gesturing, 
facially animated characters (33%), or others (4%).  
c. Named agents (48%) were more common than unnamed (41%). Some 
11% of studies did not clarify whether the naming of the agents was used 
in the provided material (e.g. Microsoft Agents).  
d. Likewise, modality analysis showed that agents with voices were more 
frequently used in learning environments (48%) than agents using text 
only (19%), or voice and text (15%). Some studies manipulated the 
modality of the agent (19%). Out of the 63% of the studies using a voice 
(independently or with text), 19% of the voices used were human voices 
and 41% were synthesized voices. Some 22% of studies did not clarify 
the type of the voice used. 
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e. Tutoring agents such as those designed to provide feedback and focus 
learners‘ attention on information were more commonly used than 
training agents that focus on skills development (82% and 7% 
respectively), companion agents (4%) or agents acting in other roles 
such as communication (7%). 
1.6.1.6. Learning context 
a. Environment: About 59% of the computer-based learning materials were 
interactive multimedia programs and webpages, with different levels of 
interactivity. Some 22% were presentations and programs with low interactivity, 
while virtual reality and mixed modes – two or more types of material – 
represented 7% each and educational games formed 4%.  
b. Content: Some 63% of the content of the learning environments was 
scientific, which included computing topics, mathematics (15% each) and 
general science (33%). Humanities topics such as arts, education, language 
and literacy, artwork and history accounted for 26% of the studies. Other topics 
such as social activities accounted for 11%.  
c. Timing: About 59% of the studies included the amount of time set for the 
interaction with the learning material, which ranged from 180 seconds up to 40 
minutes. This differed from one study to the other and ranged from 10 to 20 
minutes (15%), 21 to 30 minutes (11%) and 31 to 40 minutes (7%). In some 
cases the time of learning was treated as a dependent variable (11%). Other 
time allocations, such as uncontrolled time of interaction, accounted for 15%. 
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About 41% of the studies did not report the interaction time. A number of 
studies stated that the time was set as free so the learners could work at their 
own pace.  
d. Objectives and outcomes: The studies mentioned insufficient information 
about the learning objectives and outcomes to learners or the relation of these 
to their courses of study. Two types of indicator were used to infer learners‘ 
awareness of the objectives and outcomes from 56% of the studies. The first 
one was that the learners were informed of the objectives and outcomes at 
minimum that they will be tested or answer questions on their learning after 
interacting with the learning material (44%), and the second one was that they 
were provided with pre-training on the topic or the program (11%). The learning 
objectives and outcomes were not clear in 44% of the studies. Another analysis 
inferred the relationship between the source of the participants and the content. 
Approximately 52% of the content was inferred to be related to learners‘ 
courses or levels of study and about 26% was unrelated content. The 
relationship between the content and the learners‘ courses was not clear in 22% 
of the studies.  
e. Domain knowledge: About 37% reported that participants‘ knowledge of the 
domain was low, 19% were inferred to have mixed levels of knowledge and 4% 
had completed a course related to the topic. Information about learners‘ 
backgrounds was not clear in about 41% of the studies. 
24 
 
f. Learning assessment: Learning was usually tested after the intervention 
through post-tests (63%). Some studies utilized pre-test/post-test methods 
(26%). The other studies focused on continuous measurement of learning and 
learning process before and/or during and/or after intervention (7%). About 4% 
of studies did not provide a clear description of measurement intervention.  
1.6.1.7. Measures 
 Studies usually used more than one learning measure. Transfer and retention 
were frequently used. Transfer was reported in 44% of the studies while 
retention was reported in 37% of the studies. Behaviour coding, where learners‘ 
behaviour was video recorded and coded, was measured in 7% of the studies. 
Performance or learning gain, which was used to address the questions that 
were based on the objectives of the learning topic, was measured in 41% of the 
studies.  
1.6.1.8. Tasks and data collection 
Most of the tasks were problem-solving (30%), multiple-choice (26%) and short 
questions (15%). Writing tasks represented 11% and other combinations or 
types of question formed about 19%. Data was usually collected through ‗paper 
and pencil‘ testing (48%). Some 19% of data was collected through the 
computer, 7% was based on video recording, and 11% was collected through 
multiple methods. About 15% of studies did not report the methods of collecting 
the data.  
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Figure 2 Study analysis structure 
1.6.2. Meta-analysis results 
1.6.2.1. What is the effect of embodied agents on learning? 
A combined effect size for 25 studies, with total participants of 1766 (786 control 
group, 980 agent group), evaluating the effectiveness of the embodiment of 
pedagogical agents on learning outcomes through comparing learning 
measures of intervention with embodied agents to no-agent or disembodied 
agent systems resulted in a small random mean effect size of 0.272 with a 95% 
confidence interval (CL: 0.134 – 0.410). A two-tailed test of the null hypothesis 
was statistically significant (p = 0.000, z = 3.861) (figure 3). This means that the 
26 
 
embodiment of the agent accounted for only 2% of the variance which is, 
according to the binomial effect size display (BESD) (Rosenthal 1991, p.134), 
associated with an increase in improvement rate from 43% to 57%.   
The forest plot provides the visual representation of the data. The forest plot in 
figure 3 shows that each study is represented by a point estimate and its 95% 
confidence interval within a scale range of -2.00 to +2.00. The symbol of the 
estimated point indicates the proportional weight provided to each study, and 
the width of the confidence intervals points out the effect size‘s precision. The 
anchor line (0.00) represents no effect (p >0.05). Whenever the confidence 
intervals include the anchor line (0.00), the p-value is statistically insignificant. 
Studies with larger sample sizes are represented with larger symbols and 
narrower confidence intervals. For example, Xu (2006) is weighted more than 
the other studies. It has the largest sample size (228) and therefore it is 
represented by a larger symbol than the others. Likewise, it has narrow 95% 
confidence intervals (0.176 – 0.700), which means that its effect size is more 
precise than the other studies. The confidence intervals did not include the 0.00 
value and therefore the study is statistically significant (p = 0.001). On the other 
hand, Conati (2004) is weighted less than the other studies. It has the smallest 
sample size (16) and its 95% confidence intervals (-0.313 – 1.608) include the 
0.00 value, which means that it is statistically insignificant (p = 0. 186). Figure 2. 
shows that only 6 studies out of the 25 analysed reached the statistical 
significance (p < 0.05). 
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Figure 3 Forest plot of meta-analysis of PA (25 studies) 
1.6.2.2. What are reasons for the obtained contradictory results? 
1.6.2.2.1. Evidence of heterogeneity 
The heterogeneity tests were statistically significant (Cochran‘s Q-value = 
44.474, df. =24, p = 0.007), suggesting variation in effect sizes across the 
studies. I-squared indicated that there was a relatively medium proportion of 
variation (46%) between the effect sizes which ranged from negative to large    
(-0.242 to 1.828). This difference could be attributed not only to the within 
studies variation or the random error proposed by the fixed model but also to a 
significant discrepancy between studies as indicated by tau-squared = 0.053. 
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Therefore, a residual analysis and sensitivity analysis were conducted to 
identify the source of variation between effect sizes. 
1.6.2.2.2. Residual analysis  
Figure 4 shows the standardized residual bar graph and the p-value of the 
residual analysis. The analysis identified the study of Babu (2007: 1.828) as an 
outlier with a standardized residual of 3.61 (p = 0.00). Interestingly, however, 
double checking these studies showed that effect sizes are influenced by the 
type of comparison used. Two types of comparison could be realized, adequate 
comparisons and inadequate comparisons.  
1) Adequate comparisons were defined as both the control and treatment 
groups having similar versions of the learning material with manipulation 
of the agent‘s embodiment only. These are the studies in the upper part 
of the bar (16 studies). The effect sizes ranged from negative to small 
effect sizes.  
2)  Inadequate comparisons were defined as manipulating other features of 
the control group‘s version than the agent‘s embodiment or using 
different learning material. These studies were in the lower part of the 
bar. The effect sizes ranged from medium to large. The characteristics of 
the studies showed that effect sizes were influenced by excluding hints, 
explanations and personalized comments (Atkinson-a 2002: 0.252; 
Conati 2004: 0.648), or allowing less interaction and personalization 
(Moreno-a 2001: 0.685; Moreno-b 2001: 0.497; Xu 2006: 0.438) in the 
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computerized version of the control group. Larger effect sizes were 
obtained for studies using paper-based material for the control group 
(Hubal 2006: 0.937; Babu 2007: 1.828). The large effect size in the study 
of Babu (2007) was due to learners practising a physical performance 
with the agent whereas they practised an interview with a conversational 
agent in the study of Hubal (2006). 
In conclusion, the contradictory findings of the research in PA were obtained by 
biasing the results through inadequate comparisons.  
 
Figure 4 Residual analysis 
1.6. 2.3. Embodied agent and disembodied agent contrasts  
Figure 5 shows the adequate comparisons from the 16 studies. The mean effect 
size is trivial (0.098, 95% CL: -.021 - 0.216). Both the tests of null hypothesis 
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and heterogeneity tests were statistically insignificant (p = 0.106, z = 1.618; Q = 
10.667, df. = 15, p = 0.776). The variance between effect sizes and studies was 
zero. This indicates that, within these contexts, the embodiment of the agent 
was not effective. 
Using transfer as a learning measure resulted in a small effect size (0.227, 95% 
CL: 0.008 – 0.053) for 8 studies (Moreno-d 2001: -0.067; Atkinson-a 2002: -
0.050; Craig 2002: 0.162; Mayer 2003: 0.187; Moreno-e 2001: 0.310; 
Moundridou 2002: 0.325; Dunsworth 2007: 0.353; Atkinson-b 2002: 0.581) with 
statistically significant tests of the null hypothesis (p = 0.010, z = 2.562) and 
statistically insignificant tests of heterogeneity (Q = 4.842, df = 7, p = 0.679). On 
the other hand, using retention as a learning measure resulted in a trivial effect 
size of 0.073 (95% CL: -0.158 – 0.304) for 7 studies (Moreno-d 2001: -0.366; 
Craig 2002: -0.097; Van Vugt 2007: -0.091; Dirkin 2005: 0.096; Moreno-e 2001: 
0.104; Beun 2003: 0.326; Dunsworth 2007: 0.834). Both tests of the null 
hypothesis and heterogeneity tests were statistically insignificant (p = 0.534, z = 
-0.622; Q = 11.805, df = 6, p = 0.066).  
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Figure 5 Forest plot of embodied versus disembodied agents (16 studies) 
1.6.2.3.1. Modality analysis 
The hierarchal breakdown provided three major types of interface comparison 
based on modality type: Text (9), Voice (9) or Text and voice (5). 
a. Text interface versus agent interface 
Effect sizes for conditions comparing disembodied agents communicating 
through text to embodied agents were examined. A total of 9 comparisons 
resulted in a small mean effect size of 0.264 (95% CL: 0.054 - 0.473) with 
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statistically significant tests of the null hypothesis (p = 0.014 and z = 2.465) 
(Figure 6.).  
 
Figure 6 Forest plot of text interfaces versus PA interfaces (9 studies) 
A further breakdown of the agents based on the modality used by the agent 
produced three comparisons where Text is compared to 1) Agent with text, 2) 
Agent with voice, and 3) Agent with voice and text. The most frequent 
combination is contrasting Text to Agent with voice conditions (7 studies), which 
had a medium mean effect size of 0.610 (95% CL: 0.337 - 0.883) with 
statistically significant tests of the null hypothesis (p = 0.000, z = 4.372) 
favouring the agent (Figure 7.). Moreover, the effect size of four studies 
(Atkinson-a 2002: -0.183; Moreno-e 2001: 0.182; Moreno-d 2001: -0.019; 2007: 
-0.091) comparing Text to Agent with text is -0.035 (95% CL: -0.307 – 0.237) 
with statistical insignificant tests of the null hypothesis (p = 0.800, z = -0.253) in 
favour of the Text interface. Only one study (Dirkin 2005) compared Text to 
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Agent with voice and text and got a trivial effect size of 0.037 (95% CL: -0.472 - 
0.546) that was statistically insignificant (p = 0.887, z = 0.142). 
 
Figure 7 Forest plot of text to agent with voice contrasts (7 studies) 
 
b. Voice interfaces versus agent interfaces 
Figure 8 shows a total of 9 studies and compares the effectiveness of Voice 
interfaces to Agent-based interfaces. This resulted in a mean effect size of 
0.001 (95% CL: -0.229 - 0.231) and statistically insignificant tests of the null 
hypothesis (p = 0.992, z = 0.010).  
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Figure 8 Forest plot of voice interfaces verses PA interfaces (9 studies) 
A breakdown, similar to the previous one, was made. Although the greatest 
number of contrasts (9 studies) compared Voice to Agent with voice, the mean 
effect size was small (0.092, 95% CL: -0.100 – 0.284) and statistically 
insignificant (p = 0.347, z = 0.940) (see Figure 9.). 
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Figure 9 Forest plot of voice to agent and voice contrasts (9 studies) 
On the other hand, the 3 comparisons of Voice to Agent with text (Moreno-d 
2001: -1.026; Moreno-e 2001: -0.833; Atkinson-a 2002: -0.708) favours the 
Voice interface (-0.868, 95% CL: -1.291- -0.444), which is statistically significant 
(p = 0.000, z = -4.017). 
c. Dual-modality interfaces: TV versus ATV 
The mean of the combined effect sizes derived from five studies comparing 
Text and voice (TV) interfaces to Agent with text and voice resulted in a small 
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effect size (0.115, 95% CL: -0.122 - 0.352), which was statistically insignificant 
(p = 0.342, z = 0.951).  
1.6.2.3.2. Subjective measures 
Figure 10 shows the combined effect size for 13 studies, evaluating the 
effectiveness of the embodiment of pedagogical agents on subjective 
measures. This resulted in a small mean effect size of 0.060 with a 95% 
confidence interval (CL: -0.075 – 0.196, p = 0.384, z = 0.870). The subjective 
measures were coded and categorized in relation to: a) agents‘ believability; b) 
sociability; c) learning experience; and d) perception of usefulness.  
 
Figure 10 Forest plot of PA‟s effect on subjective measures (13 studies) 
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a. Believability: Learners‘ perceptions about the believability of the agents 
contained measures related to the values of the character (e.g. 
aesthetics, credibility, human-likeness). The mean effect size of four 
studies (Baylor 2003: 0.254; Choi 2006: -0.243; Van Vugt 2007: -0.326; 
Beun 2003: 0.523) was negative (-0.062, 95% CL: -0.294 -0.170) and 
statistically insignificant (p = 0.602, z = -0.522). This indicates that the 
learners were more likely to perceive the agents as unbelievable. It 
should be noted, however, that these studies used agents with low 
degrees of realism (Baylor 2003; Choi 2006). Although Van Vugt (2007) 
used a realistic agent and unrealistic one, both effect sizes showed 
negative directions when compared to the no-character condition (-0.223 
and -0.417 respectively).  
b. Sociability: Sociability included emotional reactions towards the system 
such as satisfaction, enjoyment, friendliness, interest and motivation. 
Figure 11. shows that a small effect size (0.078, 95% CL: -0.035 – 0.276) 
resulted from combining sociability measures of eleven studies. The tests 
of the null hypothesis were statistically insignificant (p = 0.293, z = 
1.051).  
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Figure 11. Forest plot of PA‟s effect on sociability (11 studies) 
c. Learning experience: Learners‘ perceptions of the learning experience 
contained measures relevant to task difficulty, effort and self-efficacy. 
Figure 12 shows a negative mean effect size (-0.012, 95% CL: -0.166-
0.142, p = 0.881, z = -0.150) was obtained for 10 studies. The 
embodiment did not have an effect on learners‘ experience.  
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Figure 12. Forest plot of PA‟s effect on learning experience (10 studies)  
d. Usefulness: Learners‘ perceptions of usefulness included measures 
related to the usefulness and helpfulness of the material and feedback. 
Figure 13 shows a small mean effect size 0.245 (95% CL: 0.022-0.468,  
p = 0.031, z = 2.157) of 8 studies was obtained. 
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Figure 13. Forest plot of PA‟s effect on usefulness (8 studies) 
1.6.3. Publication 
Sufficiency of studies and stability of results 
An ongoing argument in research is the ‗editor‘s bias‘ toward publishing 
significant results and suppressing insignificant results and the acceptance of 
publishing papers based on their methodological quality (Hunter and Schmidt 
1990, p.508; Mosteller and Colditz 1996; Daniel 1998). Consequently, this might 
bias the results and therefore they become unrepresentative of the entire 
population the sample is drawn from. In order to explore this issue, three 
procedures were applied.  
First, the chronological cumulative analysis is applied to investigate if additional 
studies will change the estimated effect size or not. It indicated that small effect 
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sizes were obtained since 2001 when the first studies were conducted. The 
variation in effect sizes almost vanished with the addition of new studies from 
2001 to 2007. Therefore it is unlikely that additional studies will produce 
different evidence or change the estimate of the mean effect size dramatically. 
Evidently, this is supported by the small difference in the effect sizes estimated 
by the fixed and random models (0.250 and 0.272 respectively). This means 
that the estimated effect size of the sample studies and the mean effect size of 
those studies distributed in the population it was drawn from are relatively close. 
Second, ‗Fail-safe N‘ method is used for the assessment of availability and 
publication bias of the samples used in the analysis. It showed a symmetric 
view which indicated the absence of publication bias and it detected a number 
of 166 required studies to set the combined 2-tailed p-value to exceed 0.050. In 
the context of pedagogical agents this number of studies is considered large for 
three reasons:  
- First, the field addressing pedagogical agents is recent. Analysing 288 
papers (including reports) out of the 351 retrieved papers revealed that 
only about 23% of studies were published prior to 2001.  
- Second, only 37% of these papers, which equals 106, were evaluation 
papers, of which 51% were journal articles and 43% were conference 
papers. This means that the majority of the papers were published and 
peer-reviewed.  
- Third, most of the comparison retrieved papers (30), including the 
excluded papers based on not reporting enough data and methodological 
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problems (7), were published and peer-reviewed (journal papers 70%, 
conference papers 23%, reports and others 7%). The 7 PhD 
dissertations included one paper usable for the analysis and this has a 
corresponding published paper. This reflects that the argument, based 
on publishing significant results only, is invalid since even less quality 
papers and PhD theses are published and the findings are mixed.  
Third, the ‗trim and fill‘ method based on the random effect model of looking 
for studies on the right and left showed that there were no missing studies. 
This ensures that the sample included in the analysis is representative of the 
population. However, using this method with the fixed model showed that 
two studies might be missing on the left side of the mean where the impute 
point estimate was 0.212 (95% CI: 0.11670 – 0.30729) (Figure 14.).     
 
Figure 14.  Funnel plot of standard error by Hedges‟s g 
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1.7. Discussion 
The benefits of anthropomorphized interface agents in learning environments 
are debatable. Traditional narrative literature reviews have already shown 
concern about the methodological shortcomings of the primary studies that 
could mislead the findings. The meta-analysis and the analysis of the studies‘ 
characteristics allowed the identification of a few factors that may be 
responsible for contradictory findings. The discussion section has two purposes. 
First, it presents a discussion of the results and, second, it elaborates on the 
methodological shortcomings and misconceptualization of embodiment.  
1.7.1. Discussion of the results 
1.7.1.1. The effect of embodied conversational pedagogical agents on 
learning 
Embodied conversational agents have a small effect on learning, which means 
that their practical advantages are limited. Our findings showing small effects, 
supporting the previous study by (Yee et al. 2007). Yee et al.‘s study presented 
the effects of the agent‘s representation on behavioural and task performances. 
The analysis involved 25 studies. It addressed a larger number of contexts 
regarding task performance, including the agent‘s influence on participants‘ 
discussions and decision making, participants involved, and the agent‘s role. 
The authors found that studies using performance measures yielded small 
correlation effect sizes (n = 17, r = 0.09; z = 2.37, p = 0.02). The Hedges‘s g 
effect size was converted to the correlation effect size in order to compare it 
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with the previous result. The results of this meta-analysis showed little 
improvement (n = 25, r = 0.14; z = 3.85, p = 0.00). Moreover, the results of the 
analysis did not confirm the persona effect of embodied agents. No effect of PA 
was found on learners‘ subjective evaluation of perceived believability or 
sociability. The fact that the contextualization of the agents in learning 
environments did not provide much advantage over the decontextualized 
contexts raises important issues about the patterns of contextualization.  
1.7.1.2. Multimedia learning principles  
The moderator analysis was only applied to studies that manipulated the 
‗embodiment‘ of PA. It was based on multimodal contrasts of adequate 
comparisons. The analysis confirmed the strength of the voice modality over 
textual representation of information (Mayer and Moreno 1998; Moreno and 
Mayer 1999). The comparisons between conditions showed that the 
embodiment did not have an effect on learning as the effect sizes were 
associated with the provision of acoustic information regardless of the image of 
the agent. Comparing Text to Agent with voice, the Agent with voice condition 
was superior to the on-screen Text condition, but this effect disappeared when 
Voice was used in the disembodied version instead of Text.  
The results are consistent with the cognitive load theory (Chandler and Sweller 
1991; Jeung et al. 1997), which advocates that the presentation of multiple 
sources of information requires learners to search for referents to mentally 
integrate and understand them. Following the dual-processing hypothesis 
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(Mayer and Moreno 1998) this could imply that visual representation of the 
agents‘ image and textual information overloaded learners‘ working memory. 
The comparisons of Text or Voice to Agent with Text indicated better 
achievements for the mono-media conditions. In this case, the embodiment of 
the PA was not considered as part of the content, and therefore the learners‘ 
searches became unrelated to their learning. This reflects that the effort spent in 
the process of integrating the visual representation of the agent with the content 
and other sources of information might not be needed, and could result in 
interference with their learning.  
The effect of the embodied PA on perceived usefulness and learners‘ 
experience is limited. The learners might realize that they receive feedback or 
help through the character while searching for referents to mentally integrate 
the elements of the environment. The character, being unlinked directly to the 
learning content, might attract their attention as they spend time to give it 
meaning and realize its form. In this sense, it might be interpreted as a visual 
indicator similar to images of arrows and flashing effects. The system becomes 
useful and possibly more responsive than a system without any visual indicators 
but not more than a system with simple indicators, as some studies found (Van 
Mulken et al. 1998; Lester et al. 1999a; Choi and Clark 2006). However, 
complexity might arise when the learners try to understand and interpret the 
different actions and behaviours of the agent. 
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1.7.2. Discussions of methodological shortcomings 
1.7.2.1. Factors influencing PA evaluation 
The residual analysis split the studies up into two categories which clarified the 
reasons for the contradictory results highlighted by previous research. The 
studies that manipulated the embodiment of the agent yielded a trivial mean 
effect size. This signifies that the embodiment did not have an effect on 
learning. On the other hand, the studies that have medium or large effect sizes 
were based on manipulating other factors such as explanations, hints, 
personalization and interaction in the versions of the control group. This makes 
the results biased toward the embodied agent-based system. The largest effect 
sizes were obtained by studies using paper-based materials for the control 
group where the results cannot be attributed to the embodiment of PA due to 
the differences between the learning environments and learning materials.  
The manipulation of the previous factors and the use of different learning 
environments are caused by the ambiguity in identifying the characteristics of 
interface agents. This perplexity might actually be related to the lack of an 
agreed definition of software agents (Jennings and Wooldridge 1996; Franklin 
and Graesser 1997). However, as (Russell and Norvig 1995) point out, ―the 
notion of an agent is meant to be a tool for analyzing systems, not an absolute 
characterization that divides the world into agents and non-agents‖. Therefore 
two points could be raised. First, the previous characteristics are generally 
related to pedagogic strategies (i.e. explanation and hints) and ITS systems 
(personalization and interaction) rather than being specifications of embodied 
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agents. Second, the evaluation of the technical upgrading from non-agent to 
agent-based systems differs from the aim of evaluating the social agency of the 
system‘s interface. In other words, if two systems have an identical interface, 
and were developed to interact with the user in an identical way, then whether 
they implement agent or non-agent technology is not relevant to social agency 
evaluation studies. 
1.7.2.2. Embodiment: What was embodied? 
This section argues that the ‗embodiment‘ itself was not situated or 
contextualized and thus its evaluation was limited to representation. In 
particular, it was not seen as a ‗vehicle to learning‘. ‗Human‘ embodiment briefly 
refers to the study of the body, which is perceived as the vehicle of being in the 
world (Merleau-Ponty 2002). Embodiment, then, intertwines both the body 
representation and its being-in-the-world. In other words, the body is always 
contextualized and thus as we cannot separate the body from the mind, we 
cannot separate it from the context. Perception, affection, understanding and 
learning are based on bodily experience and corporal involvement with the 
surrounding environment. The states of the body, that is its gestures, movement 
and postures, that occur during social interaction, from a psychological 
perspective, play central roles in processing social and emotional information in 
the social situation (Barsalou et al. 2003, p.43). 
The main motivation for the virtual embodiment of software agents was 
influenced by Brooks‘s approach towards artificial intelligence (AI). Brooks 
48 
 
(1991) argues that AI should have ―visual representation‖ that enables it to co-
exist with people or be embodied in the world and be seen by people. This 
approach towards intelligence challenges the view held in AI for decades. The 
latter advocates that intelligence is ‗disembodied‘. The intelligent tutoring 
systems (ITS) focus on reproducing the human tutor by designing 
conversational interfaces that provide instructions and verbal feedback. 
Software agents are embedded in the material and their behaviours change 
according to the changes in their world.  
Online, multimedia learning, focusing on the integration of media elements such 
as sound and pictures in the presentation of material, perceives virtual 
embodiment as the graphical representation of real or fictitious life-like forms. 
The graphical representation displays animated communication acts such as 
facial expressions and gestures which give the impression that it is alive. 
Software agents become embodied in this sense. Their behaviours are visible. 
However, as the studies‘ characteristics reveal, their main functionality has not 
changed. Their sense organs are only used to point things out and name them 
(Turing 1950, p.456).  
It follows that the ‗virtual embodiment‘ was conveyed as an ‗image‘ – a media 
element. It is regarded as a pointer or an arrow. It is not a context requirement 
which means it is not critical for the content and does not convey knowledge. In 
these instances it can be substituted by other media forms where ‗human‘ 
characteristics can also be expressed, i.e. in text, graphs, icons, voice, 
animation, multimedia or virtual reality (Chou et al. 2002). The ‗embodiment 
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effect‘ was evaluated as a ‗mental image effect‘. This provides a rationale for 
the robustness of multimedia learning replications through multimodal 
comparisons. Other studies reported that inexpressive, simple embodied agents 
that perform simple tasks can reveal the persona effect (Lester et al. 1997a; 
Mitrovic and Suraweera 2000). Likewise, text was also perceived as being as 
sociable as an animated social agent (Dirkin et al. 2005). Evidently, ―we need 
not be too concerned about the legs, eyes, etc. ... provided that communication 
in both directions between teacher and pupil can take place by some means or 
other‖ (Turing 1950, p.456).   
1.7.2.3. Embodied learning and embodied learners 
The growth in ‗embodied‘ PA research fosters increased awareness of the 
importance of ‗embodiment‘ to human (-like) embodied cognition but for no 
obvious reason (Ziemke 2003). Analysing the studies‘ contexts reveals that 
learners and learning were perceived as being ‗disembodied‘. Learning was 
accomplished through disembodied processing of information, and measured 
through post-tests. It was perceived as an outcome of a process rather than a 
process in itself. Perception, affection and experience were measured through 
post-judgment methods. Current approaches of learning such as constructive 
learning and learner-centred approaches highlight the importance of the 
process, social and situational contexts rather than performance outcome 
(Sugrue 1997, p.6).  
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Learners could be identified as agents that process information cognitively 
through vision and audition. Although the learners interact physically with the 
computer, their bodily activity was not seen as an element of information 
processing. Their embodiment was not perceived as a ‗vehicle of learning‘. It is 
this lack of providing and evaluating information related to the ‗situatedness‘ 
represented in participants‘ embodiment, physical activities, behaviours, affects 
and experience of being in the learning context that affects the definition of the 
role of ‗virtual embodiment‘ and the new potentials it bears.  
1.7.2.4. Researching embodiment  
Researching the virtual ―‗embodiment effect‘ in virtual contexts should be based 
on theories that view the embodiment as a ‗methodological figure‘‖ (Jackson 
1994, p.223) or a standpoint to analyse the world. This implies change in 
culture, self and experience, and can be used for its analysis. ‗Embodiment‘ 
should be perceived as a context requirement where the aim of the human 
metaphor could be seen as making abstract ideas graspable and concrete (Low 
1994). Reeves and Nass (1998, p.252) point out that ―social and natural 
responses come from the people, not from the media themselves‖ and 
―ultimately, it‘s the pictures in our heads that matter, not the ones on the 
screen‖. Likewise, theories of embodied cognition highlight that ―empathy, or 
understanding of another person‘s emotional state, comes from mentally ‗re-
creating‘ this person‘s feelings in ourselves‖ (Niedenthal et al. 2005, p.186).  
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Fewer studies have used other measures in evaluating the embodiment in PA 
research than the conventional comparative experimental method. For example, 
the studies of Hubal and Day (2006) and Babu et al. (2007) situated the 
embodied agent in face-to-face contexts of interview training and social 
conversational protocol. The large effect sizes for both studies cannot be 
attributed to the embodiment of the agent since the comparisons themselves 
were inadequate. Although both studies reported changes in the behavioural 
performance of learners as an outcome of the interaction with the agent, 
indicating a process, there is no description of this process or experience itself. 
Babu et al. (2007), for example, reported less variation in learners‘ behaviour 
after their interaction with the embodied agent.   
 
Figure 15. The immersive virtual reality social conversational protocol training 
system. This system uses two networked PCs for speech and gesture 
recognition, and visual rendering. A data projector displays the life-sized virtual 
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humans on a large screen. The participant‟s head, hands and waist are tracked 
in 6DOF using a Polhemus Fastrack electro-magnetic tracker. 
Hubal and Day (2006) found better response times for the participants 
interacting with the PA than the response times of the participants using books 
where the former participants have taken less time to respond to questions in 
the real interviews.  
 
Figure 16. The virtual environment for health dialogue consent form. This shows 
a country household with a virtual agent using conversational gestures and 
natural language recognition components.   
All these findings indicate a model of unconscious imitation and suggestion 
within the process; however, focusing on the outcome resulted in 
decontextualization of embodied affects and perceptions. Some of the other 
studies in PA had already described some of the behaviours of learners 
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interacting with PA. Ryokai et al. (2003) used a character to improve children‘s 
language literacy through storytelling. The children and the system shared 
some physical materials, such as a castle and figurine. They reported that the 
children (5 years old) were engaged with the character, treated it as a partner, 
acknowledged its role and coached it. The study showed improvement in their 
language. Teatrix (Machado et al. 2000; Paiva et al. 2001) used a collaborative 
environment to build a story on a virtual stage. Learners built a harmonized 
character by deciding its role and personality, and then controlled its interaction 
in the story. The authors (Prada et al. 2002) describe how learners‘ 
personalities develop within this social context. They were establishing skills 
and solving problems related to co-ordination and collaboration while selecting 
the characters and deciding their actions.  
1.7.3. Disciplinary bias 
This displacement of the embodiment of agents in HCI applications generally 
could be attributed to disciplinary bias. The potentiality of the technology is to 
inform us of new embodied behaviours that could facilitate performance not only 
from interacting with the technology itself but also in acting in the real world. 
There was substantial information about the ‗virtual agent embodiment‘ – which 
is reduced to image – but a lack of information on the ‗real agent embodiment‘ 
and the ‗embodied interaction‘ between the two worlds. Indeed, as the field calls 
for more research, the same circle goes on where lived experience or embodied 
interaction is ignored, favouring outcomes and where newer studies follow the 
same comparative experimental design to add new insignificant findings, e.g. 
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Wei (2010). The lack of consideration of participants and their culture could 
result in invalid design.14 Disciplinary bias has resulted in replications in areas 
such as methods, population, content and assessment techniques.  
1.8. Conclusion 
The main problematic issues with the research of ‗embodiment‘ in HCI are: first, 
the reduction of ‗virtual embodiment‘ to image or visual representation; second, 
the reduction of the participant‘s body and experience to ‗mind‘ in order to apply 
experimental studies to determine its effectiveness as a multimedia interface 
element; and, third, the reduction of embodied effects to the reflected, 
measurable and representational. Within this, the research missed what it set 
out to evaluate: embodiment and embodied effects; embodied perception and 
affection. In order to overcome these shortcomings, and find different ways of 
perceiving and evaluating embodiment in HCI, I cannot but, first, turn away from 
HCI itself. Away from HCI, I intend to explore the ‗embodiment‘ paradigm in new 
media and cinema in relation to lived experience. This is the aim of the second 
part of my research as it focuses on Mark Hansen‘s work, specifically his book 
New Philosophy for New Media (2006), in which he engages in theories and 
debates of embodiment and embodied effects. I expect the investigation to 
inform us of a different and, in relation to our current account, new perspective 
of embodied interaction between humans and computers.  
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2. Chapter Two: The „Centre of Indetermination‟ 
Between New Media and Cinema 
2.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, the experimental phase of this transdisciplinarity approach 
attempted to provide an ‗objective‘ level of knowledge about embodied 
interaction between machine and human. It was shown that this interaction is a 
central theme in HCI, which has led to enhancing the computer through 
embodying the interface with the design of embodied conversational agents 
(ECAs). Addressing the evaluation of the two-way embodied interaction in the 
field of learning represented by pedagogical agents has revealed two things. 
Firstly, disciplinary bias has resulted in reducing the virtual embodiment to a 
media element, which is a graphical image. Secondly, it emphasizes the 
methodological shortcoming of ignoring human embodiment in favour of 
reflective evaluations, thus limiting the embodied interaction to outcome 
evaluations. Research in PAs keeps supporting these contradictory findings, 
stating that virtual embodiment is not effective (Bowman 2011), while other 
investigations continue varying other aspects of educational pedagogy 
strategies such as gender, feedback and type of messages indicating a loss of 
interest along with a loss of any promising benefits of virtual embodiment 
(Arroyo et al. 2011; Feyzi-Behnagh and Azevedo 2012; Veletsianos 2012). 
However, the finding that the embodiment of the interface is not effective is 
‗true‘ only as long as the question entails such reductions of embodiment. What 
motivates this research is the view that such findings are not satisfactory and, 
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further, that researchers should not be satisfied with them. What is required, 
then, is not conducting more studies at the same level which, as we have seen, 
would only add to the contradictory stream of studies, but a reframing of the 
question of effectiveness to ‗constitute‘ the problem of embodiment. Prioritizing 
this problem in question reformation means investigating the constituents of 
embodiment (i.e. embodied perception and affection) and making them the 
determining factors of the embodiment‘s ‗indetermined‘ effectiveness (i.e.. 
generalizing the probability level that is based on verbal measures that 
substitute embodied interaction). The ‗indetermination‘ here means that 
effectiveness is a relation that varies based on the participating elements of the 
situation and not a fixed relation or outcome restricted by a generalizing 
principle of binaries; effective/ineffective. In this sense, we admit to variation 
rather than determination in human-computer interaction.  
Focusing on embodiment, this thesis moves away from such determinism to 
explore embodiment in new media and current philosophical trends. This phase 
of my research (chapters two and three) represents the philosophical level of 
the transdisciplinary approach. It focuses on the analysis of Mark Hansen‘s 
work which advocates ―a phenomenological concept of embodiments‖ (Hansen 
2000, p.29) that moves beyond representational and cognitive models. This 
model is presented throughout his theoretical and experimental work and is 
taken as the basis for criticizing other philosophical work. Reading Hansen‘s 
work is stimulating for focusing on embodied effects that are not considered or 
observed in HCI experimentation and thus could be taken as a starting point for 
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the exploration of the embodiment in contemporary works. This exploration 
could be useful in identifying ways for the design and evaluation of virtual 
embodiment. Discussions of embodied effects, that are embodied perception 
and affection, are elaborated in Hansen‘s book New Philosophy for New Media 
(2006) which is based on his theoretical analysis and criticizes artists and 
theorists for privileging the artwork over the body in what he calls the ―aesthetic 
equation‖(Hansen 2006b, p.28). Here, Hansen also provides an analysis of the 
experimentation with the ‗close-up‘ represented by digital facial interfaces, 
which in the first chapter, following HCI terminology, are called embodied 
conversational characters or agents. This book is also a central part of my 
analysis because it is marked by Hansen‘s arguments against Gilles Deleuze‘s 
transformation of Bergson‘s concept of embodiment into the cinema, which is 
incompatible with Hansen, but might be a valuable resource in extending our 
understanding of embodiment in HCI. Hansen, as Guerlac (2006, p.193) 
enthusiastically notes, reverses the direction of Deleuze‘s reading of Bergson‘s 
theory of embodiment. This could be viewed in support of the reversal of the 
privileging balance in the aesthetic equation.15  
Generally, Hansen (2006b) argues that Gilles Deleuze has disembodied the 
―centre of indetermination‖ that is the living being by locating perception and 
affection outside the subject and in the machine assemblage of 
cinematographic images.16 Assemblage is a Deleuzian concept that refers to a 
composition of relations between heterogeneous components that could be 
natural or artificial.17 Hansen argues that ―the montage cut and the frame – both 
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central in the first volume of Deleuze‘s study – remain homologous to the 
dimunition that constitutes perception on Bergson‘s account‖ (2006c, p.6).18 
This diminution is referred to in Hansen‘s book Embodying Technesis (2000) as 
Bergson‘s ―dissolution of the mind-matter distinction‖, which Hansen aims to 
eschew ―by decoupling human freedom from the capacity to translate material 
stimuli into mental representations‖ (2000, p.72). However, regardless of his 
stated disagreement with Bergson in his previous book, in New Philosophy for 
New Media, Hansen foregrounds the rubric of the ―Bergsonist vocation‖, which 
focuses on deploying Bergson‘s embodied understanding of the centre of 
indetermination and redeeming it from the ―assault Deleuze wages against it‖.19 
Therefore, Hansen makes the following fundamental distinctions. First, Deleuze 
equates the framing function as homologous to the body function, that is 
perception (2006b, p.6) and, second, the placement of affection as a 
subcomponent of perception-image, consequently reducing affectivity to 
affection-image; whereas Hansen claims that Bergson sees affection as a 
―phenomenological modality‖ in its own right. In turn, Hansen takes this 
argument as the theoretical basis for his exploration of new media art. 
Exploring Hansen and Deleuze‘s arguments of embodiment transformation in 
cinema is important in two ways. Firstly, it identifies a transformation of 
embodiment to technology as a mutual interest between HCI and Deleuze. 
Chapter one demonstrates a similar movement from abstract mental-models of 
interaction to embodied interfaces illustrated by the virtual embodiment of 
characters and agents, which is perceived as a way of advancing the 
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humanization of the computer. As pointed out previously, embodying the 
computer is supposed to make its interactions visible thus increasing its social 
presence. A great influence on the notion of this transformation of embodiment 
comes from the communication studies pioneered by Reeves and Nass 
advocating the ―media equation‖ that emphasizes that people treat media as 
real human beings or social actors (Reeves and Nass 1998). Secondly, the 
argument Hansen establishes against Deleuze is related to our previous 
conclusion that the experimentation of HCI has ignored the embodied 
participant and embodied interaction in favour of investing in technology. For 
Hansen, Deleuze has ignored the spectator in his analysis of cinema, as 
chapter four of this thesis will show, while for us HCI has ignored the embodied 
participant by focusing its evaluation on reflective measures after the real time 
interaction.  
Hansen‘s account of new media artworks, especially his analysis of 
experimentation with digital facial interfaces, follows a different model of 
embodiment. This model is based on defining embodied experience in 
technological situations in relation to the experience of Erlebnis, which is 
understood as short-lived experience. This experience is weaved into a 
patriarchal discourse where the female body and embodiment is transferred to 
technological materiality. This forms the basis for the technological situations in 
Hansen‘s work, which are physical intercourses (interaction with technological 
interfaces) and pregnancy (dynamic interaction in virtual environments). This 
analysis, focusing on embodied perception and affection in new media, reveals 
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how such a model restricts Hansen‘s account and brings up inconsistencies in 
his reading of other philosophers and theorists, leading to ambiguous 
theoretical discourse and analysis. These inconsistencies are due to the 
bending of different theoretical works and philosophical concepts to reproduce 
the same model or situations. Hansen‘s account has a resulting lack of clarity of 
terminological and conceptual explanations (e.g. virtual as organic quality, 
virtualization of body and place within the body) and an obscure introduction of 
other authors‘ concepts (e.g. Daniel Stern‘s concepts of affective attunement 
and vitality affect). It also seems to depart from some of the theorists (e.g. 
Bergson, Deleuze and Varela) it in that foregrounds as the theoretical 
foundation for its debate an inadequate, unclear or partial interpretation of their 
work (e.g. in regarding perception, affection and self-affection). The next section 
contains an overview, firstly, of Hansen‘s model of embodiment in technological 
situations and secondly Deleuze‘s transformation of embodiment in cinema. 
2.2. Embodiment in new media 
Hansen is interested in theorizing the correlation of the aesthetics of new media 
with a strong theory of embodiment in contemporary media artists‘ work. Similar 
to HCI research, he considers embodiment as the ‗newness‘ of the new media. 
Newness here does not mean in opposition to ‗oldness‘ of media but as an 
expansion of it.20 Mark Hansen‘s project is to move criticism and analysis of 
embodied interaction with technology from a purely discursive articulation, 
dominating both human embodiment and technology within theoretical and 
scientific cultures, to more concrete material or corporeal embodiments. 
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Hansen‘s project is twofold. First, it entails positioning technology or 
technological materiality beyond writing or technesis (Hansen 2000, p.26), and 
second, situating phenomenological (or corporeal) embodiment as the new 
paradigm in the interaction with technology. Generally, three consistent 
characteristics feature in Hansen‘s works. Firstly, he places technology as a 
vehicle or an agent for embodied experiences and material evolution. Secondly, 
he introduces a split between the body and cognition or representation, and the 
mapping of the technology directly to bodily experience. Thirdly, he accentuates 
the primacy of the bodily experience as the site of investment in the interaction 
with technology. Here, I outline Hansen‘s projects based on these elicited traits 
Hansen‘s work describes technology as a vehicle or an agent for embodied 
experiences and material evolution. The theoretical critique Hansen pursues in 
his book Embodied Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing (2000) stresses the 
relocation of technology within both theoretical and scientific cultures. Hansen 
claims that theoretical and scientific studies have ―reduced‖ embodied reality to 
our interaction with technology. He offers a critique of technesis, which he 
defines as ―the putting-into-discourse of technology.‖ Hansen links his critique of 
technology with feminist accounts by relating technesis to ―gynesis‖, a term 
coined by Alice Jardine to mean ―the putting of woman into discourse‖ whereby 
women are reduced to abstraction and language (2000, p.86). Gynesis, 
according to Hansen, is used to broaden the understanding of textuality rather 
than providing a model for thinking about women. Technesis ―advances a 
reduction of concrete technologies in the service of a generative, deconstructive 
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textual model‖ (2000, p.86). This model is motivated by ―situating the 
technology as the ―other‖ within thought as a defense against a ―radical material 
alterity of technology‖ (2000, p.87). This reduction imposes a discursive 
abstraction on embodied reality where the translation into text of technology 
fails to capture its concrete worldly embodiment and ―the abstraction created 
when technology is constrained to fit the textual figure of the machine‖ (2000, 
p.87). Hansen maintains, ―technesis purges technology of its materiality‖  and 
thus the latter ―cannot deliver the experience of otherness it promises‖ (2000, 
p.88). Hansen‘s use of the word ―materiality‖ here entails ―the social, economic, 
psychological, and political realities attached to the technological infrastructure‖ 
(2000, p.54).21  
Thus, Hansen maintains that the more robust contextualization of technological 
materiality in culture is in its reproductive function as an agent or a vehicle of 
―the material complexification of the cosmos‖ (2000, p.48). Hansen defines this 
material complexification in relation to his analysis of the work of Lyotard where 
the latter, 
Eschewing traditional strategies that reductively trace technology to 
factors internal to human culture and society, he argues that 
technologies, while continuing to develop in response to specific 
human needs and within specific cultural contexts, both express and 
contribute to a process of material complexification unrelated in any 
essential way to human pursuit (2000, p.66).   
Accepting the role technology plays in material complexification, Hansen 
asserts a different position from Lyotard‘s cosmological perspective. He points 
out that Lyotard‘s analysis is ―a result of his effort to ally his thinking rhetorically 
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with the cosmological perspective he claims to be explicating‖ (2000, p.67-68)22 
and thus it falls under the major reduction exercised by theory on technology, 
which is technesis. Hansen insists that Lyotard ―tries his best to coax us into 
aligning our perspective with it [the cosmological evolutionary perspective]‖ 
where for Hansen ―we must struggle most zealously against just such a 
cosmological alliance‖ (2000, p.68). Instead of arguing for such alliance or 
theoretical privilege with the human being, technology should be perceived 
through its experiential reality and thus accorded ―a heuristic, rather than a 
perspective role‖ (2000, p.68).  
Technology, for Hansen, ―is and is not cultural in the restricted sense‖ (2000, 
p.58). Technologies are perceived as cultural for being autonomous vehicles for 
the secondary evolution of cosmos. They are ―crucial vehicles of a 
nonteleological, natural or cosmological evolutionary process that is only 
secondarily or tangentially … subject to the more local demands of our cultural 
moment‖ (2000, p.71). Technologies have a ―qualified autonomy‖ (2000, p.56) 
where they contribute directly to ―the autonomous process by which matter ‗self-
complexifies‘‖ (2000, p.37). Technology, then, also plays a mediating role in 
―forging a root sensuous contact between the alienated human individual and 
the constantly complexifying cosmos‖ (Hansen 2000, p.257). However, 
technology is not cultural as it does not create any ―theoretical significance‖ of 
this matter‘s complexification (2000, p.257).  
The second feature of Hansen‘s work is the body/brain or cognition split and the 
mapping of technology directly to bodily experience. In the context of Embodied 
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Technesis, this split appears between the history of science and technology. 
Hansen affirms that scientific studies, like theoretical critics, reduce embodied 
reality through the development of simplified inscriptional models of reality 
(Hansen 2000, p.28). Yet, the field of science studies still provides the 
opportunity for a non-reductive engagement with technology (2000, p.26) and 
thus, his critique intends to expand and supplement this engagement with 
scientific practice which he understands as, ―an ongoing and imperfect negation 
with an unpredictable, ‗noncompliant‘ material domain‖ (2000, p.26). The role of 
the history of science, according to Hansen, is to provide the ―theoretical 
significance of matter‘s complexification‖.  
To respect this duality [between science and technology], we will 
need to sketch a history of technology that serves to distinguish it 
from, rather than assimilate it to science, Insofar as they function as 
agents of material evolution, technologies impact us as material 
forces without being mediated through preconstituted cultural codes. 
Accordingly, the history of technology foregrounds the practical 
impact of matter‘s complexification in a manner that is, admittedly, 
culturally relative but that does not view this impact exclusively as the 
creation of culture; the history of science, by contrast, focuses on the 
particular modes of cultural understanding developed to explain – or 
more exactly, to produce- the theoretical significance of matter‘s 
complexification (2000, p.56).  
Two events have particular significance in both histories respectively: the 
thermodynamic and industrial revolutions. The first, which marks a shift in the 
history of modern science, emphasizes the split between energy and matter. 
This means that the representations of energy - which have come to be based 
on abstract mathematical modelling, are no longer relevant to phenomenal 
embodied experience. The second, which marks a shift in the history of modern 
technology, has accelerated technological modifications that ―impact us at the 
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level of our prerepresentational embodiment‖ (2000, p.59) and ―without the 
mediations of either scientific theory or popular cultural fantasy‖ (2000, p.59). 
The industrial revolution shifted the energy from humans to machines, which 
started to perform tasks that were carried out by humans and nature (2000, 
p.60). The distribution of automated machines resulted in ―a practical 
destabilization of the human measure that prevailed in classical machines‖ 
(2000, p.61).  
The trends observed above, where theory heads towards textual discourse, 
science advances towards abstraction, and autonomous technology develops 
towards embodied materiality, confront us ―with the dissolution of the harmony 
or continuity between our representational capabilities and the material 
structure of the world‖ (2000, p.59). Hansen insists on differentiating the role of 
embodiment in technological situations from those roles in cultural accounts. In 
the former, ―we can experience technologically generated material 
complexification without the mediation of representation‖ (2000, p.73). Simply 
put, the representational models can no longer grasp the excess of 
technological impact on the human body thus resulting in an ―experiential 
alienation‖ (2000, p.71). This alienation is fuelled by ―the technical 
contamination of molecular agency of desire‖ where ―technology embodies the 
very contact between humankind and the world on which societal forms are 
themselves constructed. It thus conditions the movement of desire itself‖ (2000, 
p. 235). Therefore, embodiment has a primacy over cultural construction that 
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separates ‗bodily practice‘ from conscious intellection and modes of 
representation(2000, p. 51). 
embodiment is not the product of logically ordered nonverbal 
sequences of actions and movements designed to achieve specific, if 
not always acknowledged, cultural goals; rather, embodiment here 
involves a far more passive, undirected, and indeed emergent 
adaptation to new, largely unanticipated, and certainly unthematized 
alternations in the material flux underlying and conditioning the 
cultural horizon of experience (2000, p. 50).   
Hansen emphasises that, ―by decoupling human freedom from the capacity to 
translate material stimuli into mental representations, we open entirely new 
possibilities‖ (2000, p. 73). These possibilities relocate technology‘s impact on 
the ―noncognitive and nondiscursive affective bodily life‖ (2000, p. 30), that acts 
―below the threshold of representation‖ (2000, p. 55) and affords reactions to 
the technological situation on the level of the nervous system rather than 
cognition, that is, by stimulating the ―nervous systems to ―learn‖ in an emergent 
and completely practical way‖ (2000, p. 73).  
The third feature of Hansen‘s analysis is that he accentuates the primacy of 
bodily experience as the site of investment in the interaction with technology. To 
emphasize the shift in experience from representation to embodiment brought 
about by technology‘s impact, Hansen insists on a model of corporeal mimesis 
based on Walter Benjamin‘s theory. In the modern economy of experience, this 
model advocates the shift from the experience of Erfahrung (which means 
reflective experience that occurs over time and is derived through observation) 
to the experience of Erlebnis (which refers to isolated, mentally or cognitively 
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unprocessed and immediate experience) in the interaction with technology.23 
With this shift, and due to the experiential alienation of the human, the corporeal 
experience of shock has become the norm governing the interaction with 
reproductive technology. The shock which is related to the economy of 
experience, here, ―designate[s] the corporeal impact of a vastly accelerated 
lifeworld on the physiology and neurology of individuals‖ (2000, p.257). Erlebnis 
as Hansen states, comprises the ―experiential modality‖ most appropriate for 
this world governed by this model of shock‖ (2000, p.235). Hansen insists on a 
corporeal shock rather than the ‗dialectical‘ shock provoked by dialectical 
images focusing on historic-political redemption arguments. The latter are linked 
with the cognitive experience of dissonance. (2000, p.257). This is because the 
corporeal shock ―is made to designate what is most fleeting and transitory – 
those shocks that impact us immediately and corporeally without entering the 
psyche, leaving traces, or producing representations‖ (2000, p.239). The 
corporeal shock and the isolated and immediate experience (Erlebnis) are 
linked to a relatively similar mode of memory, which is ‗voluntary memory.‘ 
Unlike ‗involuntary memory‘ that ―involves the recollection of experience that 
has been safely preserved,‖ voluntary memory ―links us with the past in a way 
that does not depend on the faculty of interiorizing thought- that bypasses 
psychic mediation as such‖ (2000, p.242). It is dissociated from and located 
outside the individual psyche (2000, p.244). This dissociation between 
experience and the psyche allows voluntary memory‘s function ―to protect the 
psyche from shock stimuli‖ (2000, p.244). Reproductive technology, on the 
other hand, exteriorizes voluntary memory into images. According to Hansen, it 
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operates ―a progressive exteriorization of voluntary memory from the human 
body to the machine‖ and ―makes this physiological dimension into an object of 
collective experience‖ (2000, p.250).  
This object of ―collective experience,‖ is important in Hansen‘s work relating to 
the role of the autonomous reproductive technologies of matter 
complexification, the prioritization of the embodied and affective experience of 
mankind, and the constitution of this experience within the realm of Erlebnis. To 
represent this phase which is the material evolution of the cosmos, in his 
analysis, Hansen supplements the shift of experience to Erlebnis with the 
replacement of text by image as a medium of experience. This phase he refers 
to as ―the postlingustic, postarchival stage‖. 
Just as technological modernization produces a shift in the mode of 
experience, from Erfahrung … to Erlebnis …, it also brokers a shift in 
the medium of experience, from nonsensuous linguistic 
correspondences to embodied and practical mimetic activity- what 
one recent critic aptly calls ―contact sensuosity‖ (Hansen 2000, p.236 
quoting Taussig 1993). 
This is exemplified by emphasizing the tactile dimension of film, which re-
functionalizes language as ―an instrument of communication‖(2000, p.261). The 
film tactility forms a kind of embodied communication that turns the focus away 
from the image to affect (2000, p.260).  
In summary, Hansen‘s critique of technesis should not be taken as a rejection of 
technesis but as a call for ‗embodying technesis‘ as his book title indicates. 
Hansen‘s account highlights the importance of going beyond the ‗putting of 
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technology into discourse‘ dominating high theory to the ‗putting of the 
discourse into technology,‘ which should dominate scientific practice, which, as 
pointed out previously, his critique tends to support. To go from words to deeds, 
Hansen draws attention to technological materiality and autonomy and also its 
role in the embodied interaction with mankind. Thus, Hansen privileges a model 
of embodied experience characterized by the following elements: being short-
lived (Erlebnis), alienating, inducing corporeal shock and being momentary.   
2.2.1. Artwork analysis 
Hansen‘s analysis of new media, virtual realities and artworks is a constant 
application of this theoretical critique while embodying his model of technesis 
where he stresses the difficulty to historicize media independently from the 
evolution of the human, and emphasizes the prolonged necessity for mediating 
the biological exteriorization/actualization process of the human being (2006c). 
As such, media supports the transduction between the virtual defined as ―the 
capacity, so fundamental to human experience, to be in excess of one's actual 
state‖(Hansen 2006b, p.50) and the medium or environment of actualization.24 
The digital form of media becomes of intrinsic worth to the human in mediating 
such transduction because of the autonomy of its code. The digital code is 
formless and can be executed and informed only when coupled with the human 
body, becoming accessed and processed, thereby becoming open to 
virtualization, differentiation and singularization. However, the enabling of this 
singularization means displacing media as the source of experience, as we 
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have observed in our previous account, to be sourced by human experience 
and viewing it instead as an extension of human embodiment. 
Hansen‘s analyses of artworks exemplify the separation between science as a 
field of cognitive representation, modeling and technology as an agent of 
material complexification in Embodied Technesis through applying a separation 
between the subject and the artwork in his following books, New Philosophy for 
New Media and Bodies in Code (2006). In the former book for example Hansen 
(re)deploys the embodied dimension in interacting with new media interfaces 
such as Digital Facial Interfaces (DFI), these are types of interfaces that have a 
relative similarity to the embodied conversational agent interfaces (ECA) in 
chapter one but they are designed to elicit purely aesthetic effects. The DFI are 
represented by eight artworks where a division is realized between female/male 
images that rearticulates the corporeal/dialectical shocks. The first four artworks 
Hansen uses represent interacting with female images: Dream of Beauty 2.0 
(Kirsten Geisler 1999), My Kissing Vinoodh (Passionately) (Inez van 
Lamsweerde 1999), Portrait One (Luc Courchesne 1990) and Touch Me (Alba 
d‘Urbano 1995). The other four artworks represent the interaction with male 
images: Colour Separation (Mongrel 1998), If/Then (Ken Feingold 2001) and 
Sinking Feelings (Ken Feingold 2001), and Huge Harry (Arthur Elsenaar 1997). 
This change in the gender of the image is accompanied by a shift in language 
and linguistic capacities. While the female DFI Hansen‘s uses lacks language 
and conversational aspects, thus exhibiting limited dialectical interaction, all the 
selected artworks of the male DFI have language, exhibits verbal and nonverbal 
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communication. Another shift between the two groups is in the function of the 
image. The analysis of the ‗male‘ DFI represents the ‗genetic element‘ of the 
image, where affectivity is seen as a medium of the interface that catalyses 
―affective heterogenesis‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.159). However, the female DFI and 
their materiality are identified as vehicles of ―embodied heterogenesis‖ (2006b, 
p.30) (of matter complexification of the cosmos). This analysis does need not to 
expand the comparison of patriarchal or political issues that might be involved in 
Hansen‘s account but it aims to focus on the transformation of Hansen‘s model 
of embodiment into artworks. The previous two elements, corporeal shock and 
embodied affectivity, inform us that Hansen‘s model of interaction is limited to 
female images. This is not all. As Hansen‘s model in Embodying Technesis, 
addresses technology in its generic form, as well as the technological whole 
(e.g. its history, materiality and embodiment), then, the application of his model 
goes beyond the embodied interaction with female images. Rather, it is the 
technology that is female or woman (this is in accordance with Hansen‘s 
reference to gynesis as ‗the putting of women into discourse‘).25 Identifying the 
female image as the site of the embodied model informs us that the participant 
in the embodied interaction account is a male participant. It also informs us that 
the ―qualified autonomy‖ to which Hansen limits the reproductive technology‘s 
cultural role is the pregnancy phase. Thus, Hansen‘s analysis of artworks could 
be divided into two parts: the first one is the male/technology (where technology 
is feminized or represents a female) physical interaction and second technology 
(female)/image dynamic interaction, which he transforms into virtual reality 
environments. Focusing on Hansen‘s analysis of the female images as the 
72 
 
elicitors of corporeal shock, he insists on mapping this matter or materiality to 
the participant‘s embodiment; that is the affective response to the image – 
rather than the cognitive or dialectal. 
this digitally generated image, …, does not need us, will continue to exist 
in total indifference to our efforts to engage it, and can have meaning for 
us only to the extent that it foregrounds the source of our affective 
response- our constitutive embodiment, which is to say, the profound 
divide between its materiality and our own (Hansen 2006b, p.143). 
The participant‘s efforts are seen as attempts to establish, in vain, 
conversational contact with the image. This experience is illustrated through the 
interaction of the participant with Dream of Beauty 2.0 (Kirsten Geisler 1999) 
and Portrait One (Luc Courchesne 1990), where the participant tries to initiate a 
conversation with the images but he only feels his irrelevance to the images‘ 
world (2006b, p.138) or realizes that his ―social assumptions‖ are threatened 
with contamination (Hansen 2006b, p.140). While the first image responds only 
with sounds and mocking smiles, the second one detaches herself from the 
conversation. The dialectical contact failure brings with it the participant‘s 
experiences of alienation which catalyses an ―intolerable affective reaction‖ 
(2006b, p.143). The other two images elicit the same affective reaction but while 
the still image of My Kissing Vinoodh (Passionately) (Inez van Lamsweerde 
1999) does not allow a ‗ready bridge‘ for physical contact between it and the 
exploratory viewer, Touch Me (Alba d‘Urbano 1995) makes this contact 
concrete in that it ―does more than simply use digital technology to expose the 
bodily dimension of image perception; it engages participant- viewer tactilely 
with the informational materiality of the digital image‖ (2006b, p.141). 
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Foregrounding this tactile dimension and the embodied affective response as 
the basis for the interaction fits with Rushton‘s argument that for Hansen, 
the significance of new media does not lie in the qualities of its 
objects, but rather in our responses to it. The specific qualities that 
make new media new have little or nothing to do with the properties 
of those media, and have everything to do with what they allow 
subjects – those who encounter new media objects – to achieve 
(Rushton 2008, p.122).  
Rushtun‘s point that the variation in qualities and properties of new media has 
little to do with the embodied experience accords with Katherine Hayles‘ point 
that for Hansen, vision cannot 
be allowed to be the dominant perceptual sense, or even on a par 
with privileged faculties that (not coincidentally) are much more 
difficult to automate, particularly what he calls ―affectivity (Hayles 
2008, p.105). 
 As Hansen has already bracketed the technology within the role of being a 
vehicle of reproduction, and mapped its impact to sensorimotor shock, it seems 
that the response of the subject in technological situations is already predicted. 
This response as we have previously seen is the result of ―the punctual shock of 
the confrontation with the alien digital and the contaminating seepage of the 
protracted engagement with the virtual persona‖. What the digital image (of a 
female) allows for Hansen is ―a new mode of framing or the actualizing of the 
virtual‖ (2006b, p.75) and a virtualization of the participant‘s body. Virtualization, 
which Hansen bases on Gerogio Agamben‘s definition of potentiality (2004a, 
p.361), could be understood as the body‘s existing but un-actualized potentiality 
to be in excess of itself and to create the new (Hansen 2004a, p.361; 2006b, 
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p.146). Affectivity‘s definition here is limited to the interruption of the 
sensorimotor circuits and so it does not expand to emotions and feelings 
(embodied affectivity is discussed in chapter four but here it is noticed that the 
embodied experience does not go beyond the experience of Erlebins).  
Another account based on this relationship between embodiment and 
technology but extended to technologies that involve racial issues occurs in the 
digitizing of the racialized body in Hansen‘s book Bodies in Code. A body-in-
code is defined as a body ―whose (still primary) constructive or creative power is 
expanded through new interactional possibilities offered by the coded programs 
of ―artificial reality‖‖(Hansen 2006a, p.38). New media, here, preserves its 
context as a vehicle for, let us say, heterogeneous images that is images 
showing racial differences and thus eliciting different racial affects and 
responses. The agency of digital technology is explored in its being a 
mechanism for ―ethnic differentiation‖ where Hansen declares that ―ethnicity has 
always been technical‖ (2006a, p.162), and for forging a ―whatever body‖ that is 
a racialized image without identity through the experience of impropriety (which 
could be understood as a form of the experience of Erlebnis). This analysis 
does not aim to expand the argument of the racial issues in new media but it 
focuses on the deployment of Hansen‘s analysis of the interaction between new 
media and human. Since Hansen‘s books are focusing on new media, the racial 
context could be seen as supplemental to the corporeal model in technological 
situations, which represents the shift to the experience of Erlebnis in the 
modern economy of experience. It could be read as another aspect of the 
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patriarchal culture Hansen embeds or embodies in his discourse of technology 
(female) where it participates in the reproduction process but as pointed out 
previously, for Hansen, it does not create the ―theoretical significance‖ of the 
production. To apply this model, Hansen focuses on artworks of artists that 
utilize racist techniques such as those techniques used by artists like Keith 
Piper which deploy the relationship between new media, race and image. For 
example, these artworks identify the racial image with violence and thus present 
social difference as a ―universalization of the violence‖ (2006a, p.157). This 
universalization is the result of  a ―racial epidermal schema‖ that refers to the 
stereotyped images imposed on the black body by white society (2006a, p.156). 
These images influence the black body‘s perception and identification of itself; 
especially when identification is understood as a lived and felt embodied 
experience of the racial difference. Hansen states,  
Identification not only crucially involves subrepresentational 
processes of bodily life, but these latter- insofar as they comprise the 
processes through which the effects of differences are actually lived 
or felt – are what makes differences matter (2006a, p.152)!  
In this sense, the black person identifies his/her self only from the outside 
(2006a, p.152) and experiences his/her body as an object of the white man‘s 
gaze (2006a, p.151). In other words, its embodiment is reduced to image. For 
the white body, its imposition of the ―racial epidermal schema‖ or stereotyped 
images on the black body becomes a source of ―an anxiety-inducing, phobia 
image‖ as it interrupts the white man‘s efforts to ―preserve the illusion of 
imaginary integration‖ (2006a, p.155)! The black body acts ―as the corporeal 
reminder of the biological itself, as the dimension of the living … that simply 
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cannot be denied, no matter how forceful and complex the mechanism of 
projection may be‖ (2006a, p.155). Therefore, for Hansen, as long as the digital 
image deploys this reduction of the embodiment of the black body to his 
appearance, it actualizes the bankruptcy of the image and exposes ―the utter 
incongruence of the black body with any form of embodied life‖ (2006a, p.157). 
The image becomes the site for violence because for the black man it 
represents its reduction and for the white man it is an obstacle to his humble 
aim of integration. Similar to the DFI, the racial image, then, induces an 
embodied experience (identification and anxiety) and elicits an embodied 
response (violent reaction). 
Another characteristic of the works utilizing racial techniques is ―the universal 
addressability‖ (2006a, p.168) that is the addressing of everyone black and 
white alike. Hansen celebrates Piper‘s work,  
I would suggest that Piper‘s concrete engagement with technology as 
a site of dedifferentiation and universality [among viewers] must be 
understood in the dual mode of confrontation and invitation. The 
result is a significant complexification: not only is the address to black 
subjects nuanced in a way that routes self-perception through 
perception by the other (that is, through the surveillant and/or 
consumerist gaze), but also the address is opened in an 
unprecedented way to nonback, nonminority white subjects (2006a, 
p.159). 
Being universal, these technologies can fulfill Hansen‘s aim in prioritizing 
embodiment over cognition, and the rethinking of the subject‘s identity in 
relation to the image or, in this context, the racialized image these technologies 
deploy Thus, Hansen stresses that these technologies ―catalyze an experience 
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of impropriety‖ (2006a, p.168) which ―dethrones the image in favor of embodied 
excess‖ (2006a, p.149). Moreover, defining affectivity as the medium for the 
experience of impropriety of life (2006a, p.148), the confrontation with these 
stereotyped images results in the experience of incommensurability that 
mobilizes the ―viewer affectivity as a mechanism for experiencing the excess of 
embodiment and for deploying it toward the forging of a collective ―whatever 
body‖‖ (2006a, p.149). In this sense, affectivity, in both, the confrontation with 
the DFI and the universal racial technologies, is utilized to ―engage with the 
digital processes of image production‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.137). Most 
importantly, in this account, is that the forging of ―whatever body,‖ which, here, 
refers to the raced image, is identified as ―a singularity without identity.‖ The 
deprivation of any identity prevents its identification with or interpellation of the 
subjects interacting with the universal technologies. At the same time, as it is 
the biological reminder that constrains these subjects‘ excess of embodiment, 
thus leading to anxiety and incongruity, it can become the site for their violent 
exertion.  Hansen declares, 
Stripped of any positive meaning for the subjects that it would mark, 
the raced image can function all the more effectively as an 
instrument of control. Without the power to interpellate subjects as 
raced subjects, the raced image can no longer broker processes of 
identify formation and struggles for social recognition and, in effect, 
remains in force solely as an instrument for social techniques for 
identification, classification, and exclusion. The result is a profound 
paradox of our contemporary moment: the subjects targeted by these 
racist techniques can only misrecognize themselves in the images 
that, for this reason, manage all the more effectively to exert their 
violence upon them (2006a, p.172). 
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To achieve this identity-less singularity and delimit the subject‘s excess of 
embodiment three points could be considered. First, new media can facilitate 
the experience of impropriety through an identity/body split (generalization of 
identity passing), where racial identity is identified as ―a performance of pure 
conviction‖ without bodily foundation (Hansen 2006a, p.145). In this sense, 
racial identity is ―a purely disembodied simulacrum‖, that is an imitation of an 
imitation of the other imitating the person (2006a, p.146). Acquiring an identity 
becomes ‗‗to ‗pass,‘ to perform or imitate a role, norm, or stereotype that is itself 
a cultural performance‖ (2006a, p.145). Second, the reinvestment of the 
embodied excess requires an identity/image decoupling (suspension of 
visibility), which forms ―the precondition for a reinvestment of the body outside 
the image‖ and facilitates ―the performance of identity beyond the constraints 
imposed by physical appearance‖ (Hansen 2006a, p.143). In this way, universal 
technologies expose ―the bankruptcy of identity categories as a prosthesis for 
our bodily singularity‖ (2006a, p.168) and, thus, help to rethink identification 
beyond image visibility.  
Third, the reinvestment in embodied excess through catalyzing the experience 
of impropriety requires an image/body ‗absolute discontinuity‘ (erasure of the 
lived body and attempting multiple representations) in online identity play. The 
discontinuity between the racialized image and the lived body of the subject can 
go with the problem of thinking racial difference through interpellation defined as 
―the hailing of the embodied individual that confers identity and agency‖ (2006a, 
p.148) and forces ―a wholesale replacement of the lived body with a new 
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prosthetic body‖ (2006a, p.146). As interpellation takes place ―always at the 
expense of some dimension of embodiment,‖ (2006a, p.148) it constrains bodily 
excess through identification based on identifying the black body with the 
biological. Due to universal addressability in online identity play, the racialized 
image that is the text-body cannot have, 
… analogical correlation with the flesh-and-blood body of the user 
outside the virtual space; put somewhat differently, it lacks all force to 
compel the subjection of this latter body. (2006a, p.144).  
Adding to the previous point the suspension of visibility that preconditions the 
interaction with universal technology, this ―absolute discontinuity‖ leaves no 
racial bodily markings on the player or participant. As Hansen expresses: 
The absolute discontinuity between the materialized body and the 
lived body means that there is simply no possibility for embodiment 
to form a site of resistance within the process of interpellation; insofar 
as it constitutes a prosthetic body that replaces the lived body, 
passing can leave no bodily residue that could be made visible or 
otherwise rendered culturally intelligible (2006a, p.145). 
All these factors mean that the racialized image or ―whatever body‖ forged by 
racial technologies deploys a singularity but without identity as these images fail 
to interpellate the subject with identity. Hansen also explores the type of 
affectivity that fills the gap between the subject and the ‗raced image‘, which he 
identifies as ―affective confusion.‖ That is ―the experience of one‘s incongruity 
with oneself‖ (2006a, p.168) which means one‘s embodied excess in relation to 
ones fixed identity. This incongruity comes from work (e.g. Piper‘s) which 
―confronts us with this incongruity in the other  – the other‘s incongruity with 
itself – in a way that compels us to recognize it in ourselves‖ (2006a, p.169).26 
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This re-embodies the racialized images as a bodily affect, ―as an affectivity 
always in excess of the image‘s desire to fix the body (and the body‘s capitation 
by the image)‖ (2006a, p.169).  
The second aspect Hansen mobilizes from his theoretical account into his 
analysis of artworks, in particular those artworks utilizing virtual reality 
environments, is the ―qualified autonomy‖ of technology due to its role in the 
process by which matter ‗self-complexifies‘ or bodies-in-code are constituted. 
This autonomy and process in relation to the transformation of the female body 
and its reproduction role could be understood as a transformation of pregnancy. 
Thus, what characterized this analysis in both books is ―the passage from 
interactivity to dynamics‖ (2006b, p.167) where a dynamic coupling takes place 
between the image‘s environment and body. The body or participant, here, 
refers to a female as this account moves from embodied subject-technology 
interaction to technological autonomy. Virtual environment (VE) or the digital 
any-space-whatever (ASW) which Hansen defines as an internal bodily spacing 
or framing – and not a type of technical image – that can be ―felt only by the 
body‖ as it lacks any contact with human activity (2006b, p.205), shifts the 
interaction ―from the empirical deployment of touch to its infraempirical basis in 
primordial tactility‖ (that is infratactility or self-movement defined as the body‘s 
action on itself) (2006a, p.122).  
Hansen criticizes the accounts foregrounding vision and visual perception in the 
analyses of virtual reality environments, (Hansen 2006a, p.165; 2006b, p. 118). 
He advocates a functional perspective (2006a, p.117) based on 
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nonrepresentational and non-visual affectivity (2006a, p.112). Perception, 
instead of being a matter of representation, is redefined as ―a process of 
construction or data-rendering that takes place in the body-brain‖ (2006b, 
p.167). It gains its embodied basis through the ―mapping of space into the body, 
through a conversion of an external, geometrical space into an internal, 
dynamic space‖ (2006a, p.122). On the one hand, the body and the internal 
space ―are dynamically coupled so that change in bodily motility ... necessarily 
correlate with changes in lived spatiality‖ (2006a, p.134). On the other hand, the 
dynamism of this space; that is ―the spacing of the embodied organism‖ within 
the body (2006a, p.177; 2006b, p.122), is the source of affectivity or sensation 
in these environments. This self-movement of the materialization is the 
―infralinguistic body.‖ The infralanguage forms the ―infraempirical basis for 
sensory exchange‖ and concerns ―the production of spatiality by the body‖ 
(2006a, p.257) that converts forces into affects (2006a, p.190). In the previous 
accounts the infralinguistic body could be understood as the cosmos. The  
spatializating power of the body [infralanguage body] exemplifies the 
more general capacity of the infralanguage to decode forces into 
affects, to convert information originating in a material environment 
into meaningful experience-experiences capable of affecting the 
body (2006a, p.191).  
To summarize, by ‗embodying technesis‘ Hansen‘s aim is not a rejection of 
technesis but embodying a certain model of technesis in the interaction with 
technology. This model of technesis conjures up technological materiality, its 
operational perspective and the corporeal experience of Erlebnis. The model is 
projective in that it transforms the female body to technology and projects a 
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certain subjective, patriarchal views in the interaction with it. By putting this 
model into technological situations, Hansen‘s work positions technology in 
direct contact with the subject‘s embodiment but denies the technological 
impact on the subject‘s cognition. The interaction places the human in relation 
with the materialization of images and the environment. However, as Hansen 
restricts the interactive experience with new media to Erlebnis, an immediate 
short-lived experience, he prioritizes the excess of embodiment over the image.  
In New Philosophy for New Media, Hansen argues against Gilles Deleuze‘s 
transformation of Henri Bergson‘s theory of embodiment to cinema. Such 
transformation, Hansen insists, has disembodied the centre of indetermination 
and, thus, he intends to reverse Deleuze‘s reading of Bergson‘s centre of 
indetermination. The term ‗centre of indetermination‘ is taken from Bergson‘s 
book Matter and Memory (1896) and refers to the living being. Deleuze has 
borrowed the term in his transformation of Bergson‘s work to cinema. The next 
section elaborates this transformation whereas the difference between 
Hansen‘s and Deleuze‘s accounts in relation to perception and affection will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
2.3. Deleuze on cinema 
Colebrook (2006, p.15) points out in her defense of the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze that ―the essence of the cinema‖ for Deleuze is ―what cinema might be: 
its power or potential‖. For the cinema to give a body, it needs a body to take or 
take from. That is its ―revolutionary potential, a potential to transform the ways 
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in which perception orders its images, and thinking is only when it is creative, 
when it does not repeat the already formed and recognized‖ (Colebrook 2006, 
p.15). It is the human body, then, in which Deleuze defines the power and 
potentiality for an embodied cinema. This transformation proposes a 
mystification between the cinema and the real world that motivates analogical 
thoughts of Deleuzian cinema such as ―the cinema is not a cinema‖, ―the 
camera is not a camera‖, ―it is not mechanism, it is machinism,‖ a body, world or 
life- therefore suggesting another level of metaphoric complexity between 
cinematic technology and philosophical liberation. This mystification and 
complexity is welcomed for being a consequence of Gilles Deleuze‘s 
contribution to philosophy and film theory. 
 Deleuze‘s approach is that cinema can transform philosophical thought, which 
means his analysis of films (and the understanding of this analysis) does not 
stand side by side with his other philosophical books such as Difference and 
Repetition (1968) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980) but within them. In 
cooperation with Félix Guattari, he puts forward an essential contribution to 
philosophical thought, which defines philosophy as the creation of concepts. 
Taking concept-creation as the essence of Deleuze‘s philosophy, Deleuze 
studies have always focused on understanding Deleuze‘s concepts. 
Philosophical concepts, for Deleuze, have specific characteristics. A concept is 
active, creative and transformative. This is because a concept as a whole or a 
unit consists of variables that change based on the situation or problem (Stagoll 
2005, p.50-51). The concept has reached a state where it can be defined but its 
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components are always in a process of becoming. Because of their becoming, 
concepts create possibilities for thinking beyond what is already known or 
assumed and allow the expansion of difference in thinking by forming new 
connections with other concepts. Becoming, fragmentation, and multiplicity are 
central for understanding any Deleuzian work. The sources Deleuze uses in his 
work are themselves seen as a contribution to current philosophy. This is 
because Deleuze tends to revive and interpret the work of philosophers termed 
as ―traditional figures‖ (Colebrook 2002, p.3) in a way that differs from 
mainstream Western thought, which is focusing on being and presence 
(Colebrook 2002, p.3). The complexity and also the contribution observed in 
Deleuze‘s work are not because these works are the resources for Deleuze‘s 
work per se but because Deleuze brings those resources to his own work. In 
other words, he returns to those philosophers who seem to be virtual sources of 
the past, or of historical memory, and extracts from their work elements or 
points that become immanent in his own work. It could be argued that extraction 
in Deleuze‘s context has a special meaning as selecting the qualities of certain 
points and empowering them to form a field of singularities or ‗any-whatever‘. 
As Ian Buchanan states, ―one can safely say D & G‘s work has consistency but 
not constancy- concepts change their meaning between books, indeed 
sometimes within books‖ (Buchanan 2008, p.1). The above characteristics are 
consistent in Deleuze‘s work as Buchnan‘s quotation suggests but they are not 
constant because on the relation or the in-between always constitutes: that 
which changes (a molecular field is one of Deleuze and Guattari‘s concepts 
used in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) to refer to this changing layer) due to the 
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terms or concepts participating in its formation, and that which is constant (a 
molar field that refers to the state of reaching a totality or a structured 
organization through which it can be defined). In this sense, any relation 
emerges as a new one.  
The two cinema books, Deleuze has written, Cinema 1:The Movement-Image 
(1983) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985), have been developed within a 
philosophical view that allows the transformation of thought beyond the 
experience and thus as ―a processual system‖ that is ―an open-ended practice 
of making concepts‖ (Colman 2011, p.22). It creates new concepts such as 
movement and time images. Colebrook points out this potentiality of 
philosophical transformation in Deleuze‘s project, 
Confronting cinema will open us up to a new philosophy, and it will 
do so not because we apply philosophy to films, but because we 
allow the creation of films to transform philosophy (2002, p.29). 
The difference between the two statements is essential because the application 
of philosophy to films requires the breaking of philosophical thought into 
theories, approaches or frameworks, aims and objectives. In other words, it 
becomes a methodological thought and, in doing so, it loses the main character 
defining Deleuze‘s philosophy, which is the relational movement between the 
broken pieces that constitutes their molecular becoming and opening.  Unlike 
methodological thought that is based on what is induced or deduced from a field 
of study, philosophy as creation of concepts for Deleuze is ―not the acceptance 
of already formed images of what counts as good or commonsensical thinking‖ 
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(Colebrook 2006, p.1). Rather the deduced or induced, first comes from a 
relation and then proceeds by creating a different relation. Deleuze makes this 
point clear as he states, ―it is obviously not through the influence of science that 
our relationship with the brain changed: perhaps it was the opposite, our 
relationship with the brain having changed first, obscurely guiding science‖ 
(2005b, p.204) The guide and the guided is not procedural but relational. The 
cinema that transforms philosophy is the one that is relational. Here, films are 
not seen by the totality of their frames or the number of images they deploy but 
by the relations these frames, images or the films as wholes co-form among 
themselves and between them or/and their relations to the outside.27 
In order to avoid the technicality of such philosophical transformation that 
admits the latter to segmental application, and simultaneously, to avoid the 
mere transformation of the technicality of the body, which could be limited to its 
organs and functions rather than powers and relations, Deleuze turns to Henri 
Bergson‘s theory of embodiment. This transformation makes the cinema 
homologous to the human body and, thus, affords it an embodied reality of 
movement and duration through which it can perceive, affect, act and create 
difference. In his first volume of Cinema, that is The Movement-Image, Deleuze 
states ―with the cinema, it is the world which becomes its own image, and not 
an image which becomes world‖ (2005a, p.59) but in the second volume, that is 
The Time-Image, this shifts to conceive that ―the cinema does not just present 
images. It surrounds them with a world‖ (2005b, p.66). In the first statement, 
Deleuze draws on Bergson‘s conversion of matter and body to images where 
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the cinema can be said to provide an opaque screen that turns the unperceived 
image of the world into a perceived one with light and materiality.28 Such 
placement enables the world to be represented.  
The second statement shows progression from presenting the image of the 
world to instigating new images, consequentially, bringing about a different 
world or images. Thus, Deleuze‘s cinema is not of representation but of 
difference - a world that can only be composed by the cinema‘s body; the way 
its camera sees and moves, the way it is shot and frames, it closes-up to things 
or moves closer to or further away from them. This is a body that has its own 
organs that function relatively in a similar way to the human organs- or at least 
this is what defines the concreteness that we can make the most of them, 
starting from what we are familiar with, from a habitual stand (as in the case of 
Hansen‘s transformation), from that which we do not put into question. 
Nevertheless, while some of us are caught in the question of similarity and 
difference, others proceed to that which makes those bodies different. 
Moreover, what makes them different is not that which is not similar to us but 
that which marks their peculiarity or singularity. It is that ‗whatever‘ we cannot 
attain. Because although the difference could be elicited between the elements 
(between body and body or eye and eye in human and cinema), it is only 
included in their wholeness in the whole of a human system and cinema 
system; their bodies, functions, qualities and relations, the way they compose 
and decompose, act and react. That is the undoing of mere repetition or, more 
precisely, redefining repetition as inhabited by difference, where the materiality 
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is the envelope of the spiritual that involves coexistence and virtuality (2004, 
p.106).  
It is in the whole, the spiritual that the difference is included although it is 
subtracted from the repetition of the elements (2004, p.106). This understanding 
of the Deleuzian-Bergsonian account as a repetition inhabited by difference 
enables us to appropriate Deleuze‘s work in cinema by not considering it as 
homologous with the flux of the universe but as, in itself, a flux of the universe. 
That is the cinema does not only represent images of the world from without but 
adds to them images from within so it is capable of depicting embodied 
constituents such as perception and affection. This embodying of the cinema 
using Bergson‘s theory elevates the cinema not only from being a 
representational medium of appearances but also from being a merely 
communicative medium. As an individuated being in the world, it can relate and 
thus create a world of wholeness that can expand beyond the image.29 The 
image and the cinema are each a being for and in ‗itself‘. Each being not for or 
addressing anyone as such moves them from independency to relationality and 
therefore from being to becoming. Yet the becoming-being and being-becoming 
are inseparable, but a continuity of each other.30 In other words, a manifold 
autonomous organism that exists for itself, but its very existence is in its 
relational and thus continuous variation. Colebrook recognizes such singularity, 
In order to understand what is cinematic about cinema we need to 
ask how cinema works. It takes a number of images and connects 
them to form a sequence, and it cuts and connects sequences using 
the inhuman eye of the camera, which can therefore create a number 
of competing viewpoints or angles. What makes cinema cinematic is 
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this liberation of the sequencing of images from any single observer, 
so the affect of cinema is the presentation of an ‗any point whatever‘. 
Our everyday seeing of the world is always a seeing from our 
interested and embodied perspective (2002, p.31).  
The ‗any point whatever‘ or the ‗any anything whatever‘ where the whatever, as 
Giorgio Agamben states, ―relates to singularity not in its indifference with 
respect to a common property (to a concept, for example: being red, being 
French, being Muslim), but only in its being such as it is‖ that is ―for its being-
such‖ (1993, p.1-2).31 Singularity is what comes with Whole difference or the 
different Whole as a point of intensity (affect and quality) rather than extensity 
(perception and quality) where the former is durational and the latter is spatial 
as Bergson‘s thesis in Time and Free Will (1950) shows (this is elaborated in 
chapter four of this thesis). The cinema for Deleuze is the liberation of the 
natural setting, natural perception and affection. Although Deleuze indicates 
that ―certain great movements are like a director‘s signature‖ (2005a, p.22), he 
advocates that even though the genuine creation cannot but return to its creator 
it also cannot but separate from it. As such, the composition becomes a new 
entity where its aesthetic resides in its singularity and deterritorialization; 
basically, it is the aesthetic of difference. The cinema does not provide 
possibilities in that it does not ―double like with like‖ (2004, p.263). As such, it is 
the doubling of human eye with human eye, human movement with human 
movement, and human perception and affection with human perception and 
affection. Body is what provides the cinema its visibility whereas time and 
movement characterizes its subjectivity without granting it any characteristics. 
This is because the notion of ‗becoming‘, keeps the cinema as ‗becoming-
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cinema‘ where it identifies with its histories and the world of realities, a world of 
virtualities that prevents its decline and reserves its cinematic whole.  
The cinema creates virtualities. Deleuze‘s definitions of the virtual tend to 
propose its being in embryonic states (e.g. a structure, pure recollection) and 
therefore it could be differentiated, multiplied, and in continuous change even 
within virtual contexts. The virtual for Deleuze is real as it is completely 
determined but not a whole (1994: 209) as it lacks the relation of the actual 
existence. Its content, as a structure is determined by differentiation but its 
actualization is expressed through diffrenciation, which becomes a genuine 
creation (1994: 212). Whereas differentiation holds the singular points and the 
varieties of relations, differenciation pertains to the qualities and the quantities 
actualizing the varieties and points.  
The concepts of movement and time are central to the two volumes of 
Deleuze‘s books on cinema. Both volumes The Movement-Image and The 
Time-Image stress duration as if cinema is a being in time. ‗The Movement-
Image‟ presents time in indirect way: 
Thus time is subordinated to movement and represented only 
indirectly through the agency of movement in two ways. First it is 
reduced to a constant (in Muybridge's case, 1/100th of a second), 
repeated as equidistantly spaced intervals. Second, it is restricted to 
a line of action; it flows only through rationally segmented, 
contiguous movements. Time serves here as the measure of space 
and movement; it can only be "seen" through the intermediaries of 
space and movement (Rodowick 1997, p.8-9). 
In this volume Deleuze celebrates the cinema wholeness as a ‗machinism‘ of 
the presentation of the planes of immanence, which are defined as movement 
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established within, between, across and over systems, that affects them and 
prevents them from being absolutely closed. The cinema as the ―machine 
assemblage‖ (2005a, p.61) of the movement-image becomes in itself a plane of 
immanence which establishes movement and relations between images, 
objects and frames and opens them to duration and the open whole. Crediting 
the camera with extracting movement from objects promotes its 
cinematographic movement-image as an advantage of the machine‘s ‗natural 
perception‘ (that of being presented in a single movement and duration) over 
humans‘ halting natural perception. Moreover, the cinematographic 
consciousness is perceived in dividing duration according to objects and sets 
and uniting them in a single identical duration, which is immanent to the 
universe. Eventually, everything transduces out of its boundaries to the realm of 
virtuality to communicate with other systems in the universe; the whole film and 
the frame moves out-of-field, perception moves to a gaseous state where the 
reaction could take any-point-whatsoever in the universe, and affection to a 
cursed force fragmenting the whole and relegating it to dedifferentiation. 
 Ronald Bogue (2003) has noted the triad in Deleuze‘s cinema books in his 
elaboration of Deleuze‘s classification of signs and images where the latter has 
used ―Peirce‘s three modes of being ... as tools for developing and extending 
Bergson‘s three types of movement-images‖ (2003, p.67). Deleuze states, ―and 
each one of us, the special image or the contingent centre, is nothing but an 
assemblage of three images, a consolidate of perception-images, action-images 
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and affection-images‖ (2005a, p.68). Bogue identifies six movement-images x 
three signs for a total of eighteen signs in the cinema books (2003, p.65-69).  
The focus of the coming text is not to expand on the signs account but to point 
to a different type of tripartite in relation to perception and affection images. 
Deleuze‘s account seems to start from embodied reality to virtual reality, a 
becoming or relational one, and finally a transition takes place. Of any three 
forms of progress, the middle one is the signalled one as Deleuze insists, ―the 
essence of a thing never appears at the outset but in the middle in the course of 
development when its strength is assured‖ (2005a, p.3). Cinema itself follows 
this trilogy as it starts from giving us instances or movement-images, which are 
mobile sections and not images ―to which movement is added‖ (2005a, p.3). At 
that point of duration, the cinema has its own problematic of reconstituting 
movement, which is related to its being ‗new‘ and, thus, its shot is limited to 
fixation and depends on combining the shooting and projection apparatus 
(2005a, p.3). The cinema has thus developed from projecting instances to 
actualize movement, to a system that ―reproduces movement by relating it to 
the any-instant-whatever‖ (2005a, p.6). This advancement as Bogue  explains, 
is related to a change where instead of time being viewed as ―a string of 
indivisible, quintessential moments,‖ which are poses, it is now seen as ―a 
sequence of equidistant, indifferent, and interchangable instants‖ (2003, p.22) 
that are sections.  
Deleuze, here, refers to a change in the meaning of the notion rather than the 
notion or principle itself (2005a, p.6). There are moments and there is a 
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movement. It could be said that the moments actualize the movement as an 
ideal synthesis of selected poses or privileged instances. But, for Deleuze, it 
could also be said that the moments now belong to the movement and are 
immanent to it (2005a, p.6). There is a section of movement and the moments 
are selected snapshots based on a ―sensible analysis‖ of the movement (2005a, 
p.6). The snapshots give the impression of the movement‘s continuity. There is 
no opposition between the synthesized (transcendental) and the analyzed 
(immanent) as any moment could be privileged, extracted and become any-
instant-whatever.  
Deleuze refers to Eisenstein who extracts ―moments of crisis‖ from movements, 
which are termed the ―pathetic‖ (2005a, p.5). Being ‗extracted‘ does not mean 
that they are torn away from the movement so that the latter does not belong to 
them any longer. Rather their singularity has gained a power peculiar to them, 
which Deleuze refers to as ‗a qualitative leap,‘ that differentiates them from 
other singular points and allows them to make their own conjunctions.32 The 
accumulation of instances is through quantitative process but the extraction is 
qualitative (2005a, p.6).  
Similarly to other arts where poses or forms of a dance, ballet or mime are 
abandoned in favour of movement (2005a, p.7), the cinema allowed certain 
remarkable and singular movements such as the mime of Charlie Chaplin to 
obtain a continuity and space, thus changing even our conception of what 
power a mime has. The essence of cinema is in this formation of any-instant-
whatever and thus it participates in the birth and formation of the new, whether 
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this is a new way of thinking and perceiving, of giving new meaning and affects, 
or of philosophizing (2005a, p.7-8).  
The final stage is that ―movement expresses a change in duration or in the 
Whole‖ (2005a, p.8). The duration never stops changing. Deleuze‘s reference to 
Bergson‘s example of putting sugar in a glass of water and waiting explains this 
point. Bergson explains the waiting as an expression of duration, as mental and 
spiritual reality. In this sense, the cinema‘s focus, for Deleuze, could be seen 
within the internal movements and relations among images, objects and frames, 
and then its relation as a whole to the open universe. But, then, Deleuze asks 
whether Bergson has overlooked the physical reality of the subject. Would not 
this also have meant that the change of the whole, besides being objectively in 
continuous change, is subjectively determined? The subject who changes the 
whole by speeding up the movement, which expresses the change in the whole: 
If I stir with the spoon, I speed up the movement, but I also change 
the whole, which now encompasses the spoon, and the accelerated 
movement continues to express the change of the whole (2005a, 
p.9). 
For Deleuze, Bergson here wants to demonstrate the qualitative change 
expressed by movement in the whole, that is, a change from the water 
containing sugar lump to sugared water. Deleuze differentiates between two 
types of movement: translation, which takes place in the qualitative change 
objectively without subject interference and transformation, which is related to 
the subject‘s stirring. The subject could wait, move the spoon in a slow or fast 
motion, or move the glass in a circular way, in which case the subject also 
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identifies and selects the objects, duration and movements to change the 
whole. The subject does not only accelerate the movement but actually inputs a 
difference by proposing a different movement than the one that existed between 
the objects in the ‗natural‘ setting. This is important point when we consider 
Hansen embodying technesis as an interactional model that deploys a constant 
model of embodiment based on functional perspective, thus, although the 
technology, media or even the terms or concepts change, the relations and the 
new are predictable achievements. Simply, Hansen‘s perspective is 
interactional while Deleuze‘s is relational. The former is determined by a 
perceptual view where change is determined by the subject‘s action (this will be 
seen in investigating Hansen‘s view of embodied perception) while the latter 
presupposes a prepersonal level (this will be expanded in the next part of the 
thesis which elaborates Gillbert Simondon‘s concept of becoming that has a 
great influence on Deleuze‘s philosophy). For the mean time, this difference 
informs us of Hansen‘s motivation to liberate the subject from Bergson‘s and 
Deleuze‘s model of embodiment.   
The same triad is deployed in perception and affection. It should be noted that 
in all cases, the middle form is the form of becoming or the creation of 
singularity. Perception, in its first form, is embodied as a subjective image and 
its varieties based on how the camera‘s vision (cinema eye) isolates, selects, 
transforms and reflects it. Between it and its objective image there is a 
comparison defining it to be from the set and the latter external to the same set. 
Here, the frame ―isolated and solidified the image‖ (Deleuze 2005a, p.82). Then, 
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the second form of perception is an image of a liquid perception actualizing the 
camera consciousness as it flows across the frame (2005a, p.82). Between it 
and its objective there is a relation defining ―the possibility of passing from the 
subjective to the objective pole‖ (2005a, p.79). This passing is the transitory of a 
molar state to level its molecular state as the latter gets subjectivised. Between 
the molecular of liquidity that signals a state of flowing and becoming, and its 
objective as a molar of solidity that the former reforms or effaces (2005a, p.82), 
there is an ongoing interplay of relations as the molecular‘s merging forms new 
relations. The final form of perception is the gaseous perception, ―defined by the 
free movement of each molecule‖ (2005a, p.86). This is the going ―beyond 
perception‖ (2005a, p.85) that is the liberation to the imperceptible which is 
different from going ―beyond the limits of perception‖ (2005a, p.86) where the 
limits still impose a definable boundary of perception found by liquid perception. 
The imperceptible is of material nature, thus, it is ‗pure perception‘ of matter 
itself and its physical movement. Pure perception is the image itself (this 
difference is established between the French school and Vertov) (2005a, p.86). 
Between the subjective and objective images there is ‗any point whatsoever‘ 
and what ‗whatsoever‘ seems to designate, here, the erasure of subjectivity, 
that is de-subjectifying, where molecules do not condensate in any form of 
subjectivity. There is no subjective molecule because once the solid layer is 
effaced, the liquid changes into gas and evaporates due to external powers. 
Deleuze defines this objectivity as ―to see without boundaries and distances‖ 
(2005a, p.83). It is the chaotic state of perception.  
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The affection-image applies the same progression starting, first, from affects as 
being an embodied entity expressing quality or power and constituted by a 
―combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive 
movement‖ (2005a, p.90). It is the face, or the close-up of the face of any object 
that captures or takes part in the ―absolute change‖ (2005a, p.98) that 
expresses ―a mutation of movement which ceases to be translation in order to 
become expression‖ (2005a, p.98). This ‗mutation of movement‘, which is a 
micro-movement, appears as ―each part taking on a kind of momentary 
independence‖ (2005a, p.91) before joining the crowd. While ‗mutation‘ might 
refer to the movement that is taking place without consciousness‘s knowledge, 
‗momentary independence‘ marks each part‘s individuality and degree of 
willingness to relate to other parts and participate in this intensive movement, 
depending on the particular case. This explains the movement‘s 
successiveness that allows the differentiation in quality by which the Power 
passes. Therefore, affective movement is collective, intensive and successive 
(which is Bergson‘s qualitative progression as discussed in chapter four of this 
thesis).  
The face has two poles. First, it has a (reflecting) surface that is its ‗outline‘, 
which runs between its different parts (e.g. eye, nose and mouth) on the 
immobile plate. Second, it has a trait that is its ‗content‘ carried by its 
fragmentary parts and broken lines as intensive micro-movements. Although not 
in strict terms, the outline-face is a reflexive or reflecting face dominated by a 
fixed thought ―without becoming‖ (2005a, p.92). The links between the face and 
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the thought are arbitrary (2005a, p.92), thus the links between images have 
associative or anticipatory roles (2005a, p.93). It expresses ―a pure Quality‖ that 
is ―common to several different things‖ (2005a, p.92). In other words, a pure 
Quality such as the ‗white‘ or ‗hard‘ face links a number of images that the white 
or hard quality are found in. On the other hand, the intensive-face expresses a 
pure Power defined as ―a series which carries us from one quality to another‖ 
(2005a, p.93). There is another movement in Deleuze where the medium shot 
and the full shot are treated ―as close-ups‖ (2005a, p.110). This movement is 
not away from the close-up but it is a movement towards the close-up, where 
the space or background joins in. 
The second type of affection-image that represents its genetic element is the 
spiritual affect presented directly through any-space-whatever as pure 
potentiality. This space is characterised by fragmentation, which allows 
heterogeneity and thus succession among its parts (the face and the space 
have the same characteristics: fragmentation, successiveness and intensity). In 
this sense, it also identified with power and quality and is similar to the face. 
Affection-image then, progresses qualitatively (as will be described in chapter 
four) to relate heterogeneous elements in a virtual field of relations or 
connections that is its collective aspect. The space starts to be constructed 
fragment by fragment.33 Singular points (e.g. the bridge views, the rain drops) 
start to sympathize with each other, change their nature, lose their concepts, 
join in and become pure quality, that is affects (2005a, p.114).  
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Deleuze uses Joris Ivens‘s works The Bridge (1928) and Rain (1929) to 
exemplify how a set of singularities makes up the ‗any-space-whatever‘ as pure 
quality or power.34 The drops of the rain, the images they reflect and the 
movement they follow join the space while the rapid montage of the multiple 
unrelated shots of the bridge become the singularities that make it seen in itself 
as a pure quality. It is a process of sympathy and qualitative progression, as 
discussed later in this thesis, which makes the space heterogeneous, defined 
not by its magnitude and metric relations but by those ‗fragments‘ or ‗elements‘ 
that join or do not join in. The intensification goes beyond the metric co-
ordination of the space and the states of the singular points (beyond the lines 
and flesh) so that ―any-space-whatever‖ can present an affect that corresponds 
to the body (2005a, p.112).  
 Finally, we turn to the impulse-image and the ‗originary world‘ of naturalism. 
Naturalism uses the real, actual milieu as ―a medium of a world which is defined 
by a radical beginning, an absolute end, a line of the steepest slope‖ (2005a, 
p.128). This is the ―originary world‖. For naturalists, the milieu and the originary 
world are immanent, as they do not separate the geographical and historical 
milieu from each other (2005a, p.129). This world is beyond any-space-
whatever. The impulse depth emerges from the depth of the body, that is the 
milieu, and its space is an ‗originary world‘. ―An impulse is not an affect‖ (2005a, 
p.127) as the body does not constitute it and thus cannot feel or express it. 
Rather, it constitutes the body as one of its slaves, fragments it to ―heads 
without necks, eyes without faces, arms without shoulders, gestures without 
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forms‖ (2005a, p.128) and uses its intelligence to obey its choices. Similar to the 
imperceptible perception, it shows no differentiation between the elements 
anymore. The quality, which has related the body and the space previously, is 
now intensified. It has turned into a force to take over, so that nothing could 
satisfy it, as such, the affect and action, both, become powerless (2005a, 
p.127). But unlike the external force that marks the transition of perception from 
liquidity to gaseous, the transition of affective quality to impulse marks an 
internal force. If there is anything that differentiates the ―psychological 
motivations‖ from the ―physical law of gravity‖ (Bogue 2003, p.83), it is the 
turning of motivation to energy and this to uncontrollable gravity force that the 
individual cannot seize itself from except with another dramatic force. It is a 
slaving force.  
If an ―originary world‖ is comprised of ―non-formed matter, sketches [ébauches, 
rough forms, vague outlines] or fragments [morceaux], traversed by non-formal 
functions, acts, or energy dynamisms that are not even related to constituted 
subjects‖ (2005a, p.123), and if its fragments are seized by energy, then this is 
because it is a chaotic world where the subject is only a matter of force that 
marks its death. It is for this reason that the impulse is the death drive. An 
originary world has ―an inherent temporality of decline‖(2003, p.83) ending in 
destruction. Originary worlds do not rise to form new beginnings because such 
upward movement, such elevation, requires the gain of a moment of 
subjectivity- Deleuze does comment that the naturalists have come close to 
time-image (2005a, p.131). There is no way but to decline, to go towards the 
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end to begin. Yet, the time-image has never occurred in the naturalist films 
because this ‗time‘ itself in these films has become inseparable from the curse 
of the mainstream of the force.35 These moments of subjectivity or time-images 
have to await a war that seizes new worlds and beginnings for the actual world 
and seizes the cinema from the ‗originary world‘ of demon forces.  
These moments occur in a virtual world of memories, dreams or irrationality as 
a disturbance of the present after which the possessed subject, who is a prey to 
acting and reacting to any point whatsoever, remembers, awakens or 
contemplates. That is why the time-image is ―an image of thought and an image 
that must be read‖ (Bogue 2003, p.165). Alas, it will be carried away by the 
force of possessing subjects and passes unthought and unrecognized as a 
movement-image. It thus ‗occurs.‘ It is not doing, it is not what thinking and 
contemplation brings, otherwise its nature is perceptual, but it ‗occurs‘ as a 
dream while the body is a sleep, as a vision between actions, or a déjà vu 
between the doings. This ‗occurrence‘ is called the direct presentation of time, 
which characterises the second volume of Deleuze‘s books on cinema that is 
The Time-Image.  
Rodowick emphasizes that the movement from movement-image to time-image 
is not evolutionary but he asserts that the change is due to the new, postwar 
understanding of the relation between time and thought (1997, p.12). The time-
image is irrational in that, ―the interval no longer forms part of the image or 
sequence as the ending of one or the beginning of the other.‖ Therefore, ―it no 
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longer facilitates the passage from one image to another in any decidable way‖ 
(1997, p.12-13).  
In defining and elaborating different time-images in cinema such as the crystal-
image, sheets of the past, peaks of the present and the powers of the false, 
Deleuze relies on Bergson's theory of recollection and memory. The analysis in 
this thesis aims to focus on the two constituents of embodiment: perception and 
affection and to introduce time-image mainly in its direct relation to Hansen‘s 
analysis of temporality and affectivity, which is described in chapter four. 
Therefore, it will not provide detailed analysis of the time-image. To outline the 
basics of the time-images, it is important to notice, first, that it is a virtual image. 
The memorized, pure, past recollections (the seeds of time) get selected based 
on attentive recognition, which refers to the movement of returning to the same 
object that constitutes pure, optical-sound images‘ descriptions that replace or 
erase it, or select certain features of it (2005b, p.43). These optical-sound 
images are actually ―the disturbances of memory and the failures of recognition‖ 
(Deleuze 2005b, p.52). The pure past recollections or virtual images differ from 
the mental images in that, as pointed out previously, they ‗occur‘ to 
consciousness rather than being in the course of actualization in the present 
(2005b, p.77). The pure past recollections develop into another set of 
‗recollection-images.‘ This fills the gap of subjectivity, the interval between 
action and reaction is now filled by affection-image, on the one hand, and 
recollection-image of the past on the other hand (2005b, p.45). Thus, the 
second aspect of the time-image is subjectivity. Deleuze affirms that  
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subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the 
virtual. The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it 
was initially the affect, that which we experience in time; then time 
itself, pure affectivity which divides itself in two as affector and 
affected, ‗the affection of self by self‘ as definition of time.‘ (2005b, 
p.80) 
The pure virtual, the pure recollections of the past are actualized in ‗recollection-
images,‘ which correspond to perception-images (2005b, p.54), but instead of 
extending into movement to be perceptual reactions, they enter into relations 
with other images such as optical (sound) images, and psychological states.  
The third characteristic of the time image is that it is relational but this relation is 
not a linkage between two images, rather they are non-commensurable. 
Relations are formed between two terms that differ in nature such as the 
physical and mental, the objective and subjective, the imaginary and real, and 
the actual and virtual. The relation is a round point of indiscernibility or 
indeterminability formed between each pair of terms which coexist 
simultaneously (Deleuze 2005b, p.7/44). Being a round point designates 
reciprocal reflections where ―there is no virtual which does not become actual in 
relation to the actual, the latter becoming virtual through the same relation‖ 
(2005b, p.67). The same for the past and present time where for the former the 
sheets or the region of the past such as childhood or maturity co-exist, so we 
can jump to the past and then to a selected sheet or an event could exist in the 
present of past, present of present and present of future simultaneously. 
Besides the presentation of the incommensurable and the indiscernible, there is 
the direct presentation of the cut or interval itself that is irrational and is dealt 
with in chapter four.   
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The cut or the interstice, between two series of images no longer 
forms part either of two series: it is the equivalent of an irrational cut, 
which determine the non- commensurable relations between images 
(Deleuze 2005b, p.205-206). 
In summary, then, Deleuze applies Bergson‘s theory of embodiment to cinema, 
but he does not restrict the cinema or his own transformation to Bergson‘s 
theory. His transformation follows three stages starting from embodied reality, 
passing through becoming (which is the essence of every stage), and ends in a 
transition (open duration, imperceptible, originary words, and irrational cuts).  
2.4. Summary  
Hansen advocates a model of embodied experience based on Erlebnis that is a 
short-lived experience, characterized by alienation and a corporeal shock in the 
interaction with technology. His work implies a mind/body polarization where he 
maps the technological effect to the body but rejects such effects on cognition. 
Hansen transforms the female body to technology, and explains embodied 
interaction based on its operational functions. The engagement with Hansen‘s 
work introduces another account of technological embodiment which is 
Deleuze‘s approach to cinema.  
Deleuze‘s work shows that the transformation of embodiment in technology 
should not obscure the qualities and potentialities peculiar to the technology 
itself. Three stages are explained in relation to the cinema and its images 
showing how the cinema has its own ways of perceiving and affecting. The 
middle stage, that is ‗becoming‘, is considered as the essence of each image. 
The first stage is embodied (movement as perception, face/close-up as 
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affection), then becoming (liquid perception and any-space-whatever) and 
finally transition (imperceptible and impulse/originary world). The next two 
chapters investigate embodied perception and affection in order to identify ways 
in which they can be designed and evaluated in HCI. 
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3.  Chapter Three: Embodied perception: From 
representation to enaction 
3.1. Introduction 
This section investigates Hansen‘s concept of embodied perception and the 
consequences of Hansen‘s inconsistent reading of Bergson‘s theory of 
perception in Matter and Memory (2004). This leads to: 1) reduced implications 
of the impurity of perception by affection. This is due to Hansen‘s attempts to 
draw a dualism between perception and affection that either takes the form of 
orderliness or annihilation of perception from the lived experience; 2) a derision 
of Deleuze‘s reading of Bergson while providing a different interpretation which 
implies a deterritorialization of Bergson; and 3) explaining Bergson on the basis 
of the neurophenomenological view, which is obvious in his reference to 
Francisco Varela whose approach is incompatible with Bergson in some areas. 
Ultimately, Hansen has departed from the Bergsonist theory that he claims to 
be central to his book, and his work is fundamentally influenced by the 
neurophenomenological perspective seen in the work of Varela, whose 
approach is in turn indebted to phenomenology (Merleau-Ponety, Husserl and 
Heidegger). Secondly, Hansen‘s redefinition of Bergson‘s embodied perception 
results in the King Midas golden touch effect.36 That is, the participant‘s action 
excludes all that interests it in the world. 
In his book Matter and Memory (2004), Bergson describes matter and the 
universe as images. This makes his theory of perception of interest in imagining 
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technologies, especially for Deleuze and recently Hansen. Deleuze starts his 
first volume on cinema by elaborating on the three theses of movement 
contained in Bergson‘s Book Creative Evolution. He emphasizes that Bergson‘s 
contribution to the cinema actually occurred ―before the official birth of the 
cinema‖ - and even outside Bergson‘s own purview of cinema as illusion- in the 
first chapter of Matter and Memory (Deleuze 2005a, p.3) where he describes 
movement as mobile sections or as movement-images. This is an idea which 
Deleuze adapts for his own thesis on cinema, as presented previously.   
Hansen, on the other hand, seems to be interested in Bergson for his 
description of an ‗embodied perception‘ which is ‗impured‘ by memory and 
affection. (‗Impured‘ is used in the translated text of Matter and Memory to give 
an opposition to the word ‗pure.‘ Bergson speaks of ‗pure perception‘ but this 
perception in ‗impured‘ by affection and memory, which means that it never 
occurs in its pure state). As pointed out in the introduction, Hansen is clearly 
against the mind-body dissolution Bergson‘s theory implies, and maintains 
mind/body, subject/object polarization. Yet, he claims to posit an update of 
Bergson‘s theorization of the ‗embodied selection‘ from selecting pre-existent 
images to filtering information and creating images directly – a process through 
which the body enframes the formless digital information and thus deploys its 
own constitutive singularity (2006, p.3).  
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3.2. Bergsonian image 
Bergson uses the term ‗body‘ in two ways. Firstly, as a reference to its unified 
state with the brain as a ‗perceived matter‘ that is living matter, and secondly, in 
its dualist state, that is in relation to the distributed functions between the body 
and the brain. Bergson crucially draws boundaries between the image and the 
body, which is the object of the image. In fact, Bergson has used the term ‗body‘ 
to address the image he calls ―my body‖, and the representation, ―the image of 
the body‖. As an image, independent from perception, the body is a ‗being‘ in 
itself that is undifferentiated from all the other images in the universe. For this 
reason, Lawlor points out that the pure Bergsonian image has no affection 
mixed with it (2003, p.4) but it is defined by its extension and objectivity on 
which the order of our perception depends. Yet it can be distinguished from 
other images by affective identification, which is a localized speciality within the 
image itself.   
Yet there is one of them [images] which is distinct from all the others, 
in that I do not know it only from without by perceptions, but from 
within by affections: it is my body (Bergson 2004, p.1). 
As matter,37 an aggregate of images, its presence is based on its solid 
materiality which differentiates it from some bodies (e.g. atoms) by allowing it to 
be perceived, that is, acted upon. In being perceived it becomes a 
representation, an image of the body; it cannot create representations or, in 
other words, perceive itself or other images. 
You may say that my body is matter, or that it is an image: the word 
is of no importance. If it is matter, it is a part of the material world; 
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and the material world, consequently, exists around it and without it. 
If it is an image, that image can give but what has been put into it, 
and since it is, by hypothesis, the image of my body only, it would be 
absurd to expect to get from it that of the whole universe. My body, 
an object destined to move other objects, is, then, a centre of action; 
it cannot give birth to a representation (2004, p.5).  
Following this conversion, Bergson works on his theory of perception. Bergson 
has used the term ‗indetermination‘ to express the indefinite variability or 
uncertainty within both the universe and the living being. He posits that the 
living being‘s activity is surrounded by a ‗zone of indetermination‘ that allows a 
prior estimation, of the number and distance of things with which it is in relation.  
The degree of independence of which a living being is master, or, as 
we shall say, the zone of indetermination which surrounds its activity, 
allows, then, of an a priori estimate of the number and distance of the 
things with which it is in relation. Whatever this relation may be, 
whatever be the inner nature of perception, we can affirm that its 
amplitude gives the exact measure of the indetermination of the act 
which is to follow. So that we can formulate this law: Perception is 
master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of 
time (2004, p.23).  
But the living being itself is a ‗centre of indetermination‘, which implies a positive 
reciprocal relationship between the zones of indetermination and the 
indetermination of the possible actions - where the zones‘ indetermination 
increase the richness of perception but exceed any representations pointed out 
by the nervous system. In this sense, the presence of the living being does not 
equal the totality of the representations it extracts from the world, since there 
are the suppressed parts of those objects that do not hold its interest. 
Now if living beings are, within the universe, just ‗centres of 
indetermination,‘ and if the degree of this indetermination is 
measured by the number and rank of their functions, we can 
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conceive their mere presence is equivalent to the suppression of all 
those parts of objects in which their functions find no interest (2004, 
p.28).  
Bergson used this indetermination to deduce conscious perception. Bergson 
elaborates on perception types (automatic and voluntary) and processing (pure, 
conscious and actual perception). Bergson starts with pure perception, which 
exists only in theory, as an objective state that is not influenced by duration and 
memory and, therefore, it is defined as the instantaneous reaction to images. 
Pure perception is external as it is one of the objects which gets influenced by 
encountering a reactive image (the image called ‗my body‘) that changes their 
actions in a way that interests it. Further, Bergson explains the difference 
between movements or reactions to stimulation influenced by the body or the 
brain, where those of the former kind are more automatic (reflex), sourced by 
the spinal cord, and those of the latter kind are more voluntary activities, 
determined by brain intervention. Possible actions from both nerve elements in 
the cortex (brain) and spinal cord (body) are identified as perception centres 
that differ in the degree of complexity (2004, p.10).  
In a word, the more immediate the reaction is compelled to be, the 
more must perception resemble a mere contact; and the complete 
process of perception and of reaction can then hardly be 
distinguished from a mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary 
movement. But in the measure that the reaction becomes more 
uncertain, and allows more room for suspense, does the distance 
increase at which the animal is sensible of the action of that which 
interests it (2004, p.22). 
Regarding perception in relation to space or distance and time, the body deals 
with real actions those that require less distance, and immediacy. Thus, it is 
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seen as the centre of real actions. When the distance is increased and the time 
becomes uncertain, the actions are defined with virtual actions of conscious 
perception. The brain deals with these actions and is therefore responsible for 
the selection, delay and transmission of movement to the motor mechanisms. .  
Conscious perception primarily expresses two things. First, the isolation of what 
interests the living being from the external influences of things that pass through 
it and, second, the reaction to these isolated influences.38 The isolated 
influences, which are converted to pictorials,39 become our representations of 
the perceived things.  
I should convert it [the image called a material object] into 
representation if I could isolate it, especially if I could isolate its shell. 
Representation is there, but always virtual being neutralized, at the 
very moment when it might become actual, by the obligation to 
continue itself and to lose itself in something else. To obtain this 
conversion from the virtual to the actual it would be necessary, not to 
throw more light on the object, but on the contrary to obscure some 
of its aspects, to diminish it by the greater part of itself, so that the 
remainder, instead of being encased in its surroundings as a thing, 
should detach itself from them as a picture (Bergson 2004, p.28). 
Our representation is always ‗virtual‘ by the very fact of being isolated from the 
whole and converted. This representation determines the possible actions upon 
the objects. Being established on a virtual basis, these actions are virtual. It 
becomes, then, that our conscious perception of matter, that is representation, 
is less than the presence of matter.  
Lawlor indicates a difference between phenomenology and Bergson, 
represented by the distinction between the image and the representation, where 
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the representation is less than the image. It is a decomposition of the whole and 
differs from the image in degrees rather than nature (2003, p.9-10), whereas 
presence is the image as it appears and not in its idealistic form. 
It is true that an image may be without being perceived; it may be 
present without being represented; and the distance between these 
two terms, presence and representation, seems just to measure the 
interval between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter 
(2004, p.27).  
Finally, Bergson identifies the actual perception in relation to the degree of 
utility. That is to say, that it lies in the selected action that prolongs into activity. 
As Roy puts it in his book The New Philosophy: Henri Bergson (1998 [2008]): 
‗natural‘ perception does not aim at a goal of disinterested 
knowledge, but one of practical utility, or rather, if it is knowledge, it is 
only knowledge elaborated in action and speech (Roy 1998 [2008], 
p.160). 
Bergson indicates that, ―perception as a whole has its true and final explanation 
in the tendency of the body to movement‖ (2004, p.41). This tendency towards 
movement is the virtual action of perception that is formed by converting the 
isolated influences to pictorials that had turned into our representation of the 
object. Perception then could prolong40 into actual action where the latter, 
representing the ‗degree of utility‘, is seen as the measure of our perceived 
‗degree of reality‘.   
We had every right, then, to say that the coincidence of perception 
with the object perceived exists in theory rather than in fact. We must 
take into account that perception ends by being merely an occasion 
for remembering, that we measure in practice the degree of reality by 
the degree of utility, and, finally, that it is our interest to regard as 
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mere signs of the real those immediate intuitions which are, in fact, 
part and parcel with reality (2004, p.71).  
Perception, then, ends by remembering and prolongs into an action that is 
carried out by the body. Bergson asserts that,  
Thus, neither in perception, nor in memory, nor a fortiori in the higher 
attainments of mind, does the body contribute directly to 
representation (Bergson 2004, p.300) 
This is an important point that differentiates between the phenomenological 
account and Bergson – which also can be detected in Hansen‘s account of 
perception. For Bergson, perception is the determinate of the body's activity. As 
Lawlor insists,  ―when perception has vanished the body cannot extract from 
external objects the quality and quantity of movement in order to act upon them‖ 
(2003, p.17). Tonner explains, that for Bergson, the human's practical activity 
expresses the substitution of the real and internal organization with external 
representation. Tonner presents this as one of Merleau-Ponty‘s criticisms of 
Bergson. For phenomenology, knowledge, history and perception are 
conditioned by being in the world and there is no absolute knowledge as 
Bergson suggests.  
The fundamental difference can be put as follows: whereas Bergson 
sees in this metaphysical intuition of the whole the transcendence of 
the relative and the attaining of the absolute, the phenomenologist 
will, while recognizing its significance from the first person point of 
view, maintain the relativity of this perspective. Our lived experience 
can be as vivid and as singular as Bergson has here outlined and 
never transcend to an absolutely apprehended metaphysical reality 
(Tonner 2009, p.315). 
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Although both phenomenology and Bergson prioritize lived experience, Bergson 
advocates durational time as the free creative becoming over practical activity, 
whereas phenomenology advocates practical activity over duration:  
...concrete lived experience finds its highest expression in the 
experience of duration as opposed to the world of our practical 
activity. For the existential phenomenologist, our lived experience is 
fundamentally oriented by our world of practical activity (Tonner 
2009, p.316). 
The activity is seen by Merleau-Ponty and existential phenomenologists as the 
relativity of being in the world. For Bergson this activity is ‗impured by‘ memory. 
Tonner (2009) pinpoints the difference between the phenomenological views of 
Hamilton, Merleau-Ponty and Bergson. He simply states that, 
if Bergsonism is displaced by phenomenology then this reintroduces 
a fundamental relativity into philosophy (Tonner 2009, p.309).  
3. 3. Deleuze‟s reading of Bergson 
Deleuze‘s reading follows the same differentiation – pointed out above – 
between the image, the body and the perception of the body. The body is 
distinguished from the image for being a subject or an object that carries out, or 
submits to, movement (2005a, p.62). He refers to the ―perception of the body‖ 
as a ―special image‖.41 Deleuze entitles the brain the ―living image‖ because it 
occupies the interval between the actions, those which are received, and 
reactions, those which are executed, and accords it the privilege of being the 
―centre of indetermination‖ formed in an acentred universe of movement-images 
only by the fact that it is constitutive of a ―special image‖ and is indissoluble 
from it (2005a, p.64).  
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And the brain is nothing but this – an interval, a gap between an 
action and a reaction. The brain is certainly not a centre of images 
from which one could begin, but itself constitutes one special image 
among the others. It constitutes a centre of indetermination in the 
acentred universe of images (2005a, p.65).  
Bearing this in mind, Lawlor supports Deleuze‘s position: ―when Bergson 
speaks of the role of the body, he is really speaking of the brain, because the 
brain creates representations‖ (2003, p.17). The brain is the instrument of 
analysis of vibrations and their distribution as well as an instrument of selection 
which puts the received vibration in relation to a particular chosen motor 
mechanism therefore allowing communication. It is contained in the material 
world and so it works by suppression of this world. It follows then that the 
‗centre of indetermination‘ for Deleuze is the mental representation of the body. 
In agreement with Bergson, Deleuze confirms that the cinema lacks centres of 
reference,  
...but the cinema perhaps has a great advantage: just because it 
lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it 
makes would not prevent it from going back up the path that natural 
perception comes down. Instead of going from the acentred state of 
things to centred perception, it could go back up towards the 
acentred state of things, and get closer to it (2005a, p.60).  
The ―centre of anchorage,‖ here, refers to the body as a centre of action or for 
anchoring the perceptual reactions. Deleuze identifies this lack as 
advantageous based on Bergson‘s own argument in Matter and Memory – 
which differentiates it from the phenomenological account – where for Bergson 
pure perception begins from other bodies and, then, through sensorimotor 
experience, it limits itself to the body as the centre (2005a, p.64). This 
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sensorimotor experience, or as Bergson calls it, ―education‖ (2004, p.61), leads 
to associations between affective sensations, perceptual images and actions. 
This enables the body to anchor an automatic reaction towards acquired 
perceptions (this is different than body‘s perception identified with spinal cord 
which is transformed into movement but not reaction). Hence, Deleuze identifies 
the action-image where action is the delayed reaction of the ‗centre of 
indetermination‘ so that it is not a reflexive or automatic reaction carried out by 
the body. This action is the actual perception, which is defined by the 
sensorimotor activity. This is subjective in relation to an assumed end or 
result.42 Regardless of its lack of natural subjective perception the cinema‘s 
sections, mobility and framing variability enables it to travel in both directions 
from pure perception to subjective perception,43 that is from centre to peripheral 
and vice versa.  
Here, Deleuze seems to differentiate between the human body and the 
cinema‘s body where the latter does not react automatically to stimulus as the 
former does. The body has a representation, a ‗special image‘, and this 
representation of the body is the centre of perceptions or representations, but of 
course the cinema‘s ‗special image‘ is not a representation of a human‘s body 
but that of a cinema‘s body, which is the centre of cinema‘s perception and 
informs us about what the cinema‘s body can do. The perception of the thing, 
then, is reflected by the ‗living image‘ and is framed by the ‗special image‘ which 
―retains a partial action from it, and only reacts to it mediately‖ (2005a, p.65). It 
is subjective because it ―subtracts from the thing whatever does not interest it‖ 
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(2005a, p.66). Hence we have a perception-image as the first avatar of the 
movement-image (2005a, p.66). After this transformation, Deleuze elaborates 
not only on the types of subjective perceptions of cinema (discussed in section 
3.5. revisiting the enaction approach) but also on different types of perception-
images the cinema can produce as a movement-image as described in chapter 
two in relation to Deleuze‘s cinema.  
In summary, the ―centre of indetermination‖ of the cinema for Deleuze is not the 
human body as in the case of Hansen but the cinema‘s body itself (e.g. its 
apparatus, cameras, frames, shots and montage) and the main difference 
identified between these two, at this point, is that the cinema does not produce 
automatic reactions to its perceptual images. Therefore, the question of whether 
Deleuze has disembodied the centre of indetermination, itself becomes invalid. 
The human‘s body and the cinema‘s body are not identical but homologues (as 
pointed out in chapter two).This means the cinema is a centre of 
indetermination similar to the living being which is a different centre of 
indetermination. On the other hand, from our previous account of Hansen, it 
seems that this automatic reaction is the body‘s perception (e.g. the corporeal 
shock). This could be seen as one of the consequences of the mind/body 
polarization where the reaction is reduced to movement (which Bergson 
identifies with the spinal cord).  
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3.4. Hansen‟s interpretation 
3.4.1. The enactive approach 
Hansen‘s interpretation determines the body as the ‗centre of indetermination‘, 
differently from Deleuze, in what he comes to call the ―body-brain achievement‖. 
Hansen clarifies that his use of the term ‗embodiment‘ implies an understanding 
of the brain‘s cognitive activity drawn from Francisco Varela (2006b, p.3 n 2). 
Varela studies the ‗mind‘ as the cognitive activity that occurs in a special place 
in the immediate present. This differentiates him from the cognitive science 
studies which have placed the mind in the brain meaning cognition is 
understood as a neural activity. He puts forward the example of Marvin Minsky‘s 
model of mind consisting of ‗agents‘ working on small-scale problems, 
organised into agencies or societies. 
It is important to remember here that, although inspired by a fresh 
look at the brain, this is a model of the mind. In other words, it is not 
a model of neural societies or networks; it is a model of the cognitive 
architecture that abstract (again!) from neurological detail, hence 
from the ‗wet‘ of the living and lived experience. Agents and agencies 
are, therefore, neither entities nor material processes; they are 
abstract processes or functions (Varela 1995, p.324).  
Therefore, Varela advances his philosophical stance by focusing on naturalizing 
phenomenology. By that he means viewing phenomenology (lived experience) 
and cognitive science (natural) as ‗mutually constraining‘. He foregrounds 
mutual cooperative or collaborative development at both 
cognitive/neurobiological and phenomenological levels of phenomenon 
descriptions where each enlightens the research and the elaborative progress 
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of the other (Gallagher and Varela 2001). In his book The Embodied Mind 
(1992), Varela is concerned about cognition and the situated human 
experience. The questions he poses throughout his chapters – ―What is 
cognition?‖ ―How does it work?‖ and ―How do I know a cognitive system is 
functioning adequately?‖ – guide his inquiry. The first step Varela takes to 
radicalize his project is by proposing the enactive approach. The ‗enactive 
approach‘ to cognition aims to highlight that cognition depends on the cognitive 
agent‘s bodily sensorimotor capacities which are situated and embodied in 
biological and cultural contexts (Varela et al. 1992; Varela 1995). Furthermore, 
these agents exhibit autonomous activities based on their self-organizing 
neuronal activity.  
Cognition as a self-organizational process refers to its endogenous nature or 
self-reconfiguration through synchronization of its constituents in real-time, and 
its development based on the stream of sensory events and experience-
dependent changes (Lewis 2005, p.173). Perception consists of ‗perceptually 
guided actions‘ that entail a structural coupling between the senses and motion 
and then the sensorimotor body and the situation.44  
The enactive approach tends to explain ―how the perceiver guides his or her 
action in the local situation‖. Varela supports his view of ‗perceptually guided 
actions‘ in the case of vision by a comparative experiment taken from Held and 
Hein (1958) where the latter encaged a group of kittens in baskets exposing 
them to light in certain conditions. In each pair, one cat, inside the basket, can 
move around freely, pulling the basket of the other cat. When the two cats were 
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freed from the baskets, the first cat behaved normally while the other behaved 
as if it were blind. For Varela this study emphasizes that objects are not seen 
through visual extraction but rather by enaction or visual guidance of action 
(Varela et al. 1992, p.175). Accordingly, the perceiver is conceived as embodied 
because his perceptually guided actions are determined by recurrent patterns 
between the sensory and motor systems. These patterns form learned 
communication patterns, which are called ‗lawful linkages‘ or common 
principles. In turn, the world is dependent on this activity.  
Moreover, Varela defines cognitive systems by their ‗operational closure‘ as 
autonomous systems, which void the representational concept and require the 
enactment concept.  
A system that has operational closure is one in which the results of 
its processes are those processes themselves. The notion of 
operational closure is thus a way of specifying classes of processes 
that, in their very operation, turn back upon themselves to form 
autonomous networks. Such networks do not fall into the class of 
systems defined by external mechanisms of control (heteronomy) but 
rather into a class of systems defined by internal mechanisms of self-
organizing (autonomy).The key point is that such systems do not 
operate by representation. Instead of representing an independent 
world, they enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is 
inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitive system 
(1992, p.139-140).  
Varela, therefore, concludes that ―cognition consists not of representations but 
of embodied action‖ (1995, p.336). The autonomous system has to find its way 
to the next moment by acting appropriately from its resources where the 
cognitive activity of the immediate moment forms the source of creativity. 
Accordingly, the autonomous agent does not have a priori representation to 
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configure future actions and, therefore, it creates unprecedented solutions 
based on its autopoietic, that is the time-dynamic organic coupling with the 
context (Hansen 2006b, p.164/195; Depraz 2008) and observing the outcomes 
of its actions.45 The world, then, is not pre-given but coevolves while the 
grasping mind searches for an absolute, inner or outer, ground; but, faced with 
failure, it clings to treating everything else as illusion (Varela et al. 1992, 
p.143).46 The perceiver, then, becomes an active agent depending on acquired 
skills and a common sense of a context-dependent ‗know-how‘ background 
(1992, p.148) rather than representations. 
3.4.2. Hansen: Practical activity  
Although Hansen remarks that Bergson explains the body‘s function as ―a 
privileged image among images‖ (2006b, p.3), Hansen himself does not clarify 
or differentiate between the image, body and image of body or between the 
body, brain and mind functions of the embodiment. Hansen‘s illustrative 
examples seem to follow two trajectories: interactive and dynamic coupling with 
technology.  
In examining the work of Jeffrey Shaw, Hansen focuses on the bodily activity of 
the participant while interacting with the ‗technical‘ environment by manipulating 
tools such as joysticks or free-activity movement to trigger the ‗virtual‘. which 
Hansen insists must be understood as the capacity/quality of human life that is 
―so fundamental to human existence, to be in excess of one‘s actual state‖ 
(2006b, p.50-51). Hansen‘s prioritization of the activity of the participant and its 
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role in actualizing the potential informs us of his position in relation to the 
accounts of Varela and Bergson. Actually Hansen describes a 
‗deterritorialization‘ from Bergsonism, perceived in the coupling between the 
participant‘s activity and the image environment.47 In other words, the 
―perceiver-dependent world‖ Varela describes, and the delimitation of the 
Bergsonist universe of images: 
By emphasizing the dynamic coupling of the image environment and 
the activity of the body within it, Shaw‘s initial experiments in 
expanded cinema already delimit the Bergsonist universe of images 
into a selective ‗virtual‘ milieu or space specifically correlated with the 
body or bodies within it (2006b, p.53).  
Hansen foregrounds the collapse of perception and bodily action (2006b, 
p.54/58). He sees this collapse as materializing by increasing the images in the 
zone of indetermination and placing the body within the space of images where 
he subsequently insists that, ―without the activity of the body within the space of 
the image, there would simply be no perception at all‖ (2006b, p.54).   
This leads us to understand Hansen‘s description of the deterritorialization of 
Bergsonism or what he calls ―neo-Bergsonism‖, deployed by the aesthetic of 
new media art (Hansen 2006b, p.74) as a reterritorialization of phenomenology 
or neurophenomenology. If we understand the ‗body‘ according to Bergson, 
then the bodily functions that collapse perception and action will only be related 
to immediate real actions, those including the spinal cord and sensory nerves 
(reflexive movement), and will therefore diminish the process of selection and 
enframing that Hansen foregrounds.  
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Consequently, perception, for Bergson, is not the operation of ―isolating certain 
of its [the object‘s] aspects, leaving the rest aside‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.4)  or ―the 
product of the body's filtering of some images and not the others‖ (2006b, 
p.162) where perception is seen as the result of practical activity, in a coupling 
between the body and environment. Perception for Bergson is isolation by 
‗suppression‘ (Bergson 2004, p.28), In other words, for Bergson, nothing is left 
aside. That is, all the influences of objects or images pass through the living 
being but some are isolated, as being reflected but this reflection is affected by 
distance and time.  
This isolation by suppression, allows Bergson's theory of dreams where dreams 
are conceived as extensions of perception and that follow a similar process, 
where sensations keep acting in states of relaxation, such as sleep, as in states 
of tension or action. However, in the states of relaxation they embrace vague 
outlines (impressions) that get occupied by phantom images, those which were 
preserved in memory during the states of tension but could not arise because 
they were subsidiary, peripheral, to the selected images related to the present 
situation.  
When we are sleeping naturally, it is not necessary to believe, as has 
often been supposed, that our senses are closed to external 
sensations. Our senses continue to be active. They act, it is true, with 
less precision, but in compensation they embrace a host of 
‗subjective‘ impressions which pass unperceived when we are awake 
– for then we live in a world of perceptions common to all men – and 
which reappear in sleep, when we live only for ourselves. Thus our 
faculty of sense perception, far from being narrowed during sleep at 
all points, is on the contrary extended, at least in certain directions, in 
its field of operations. It is true that it often loses in energy, in tension, 
what it gains in extension. It brings to us only confused impressions. 
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These impressions are the materials of our dreams. But they are only 
the materials, they do not suffice to produce them (Bergson 1914, 
p.7).  
It follows that Hansen, first, put less emphasis on the image called ‗my body‘ as 
well as on the representation of the body and, second, put more emphasis on 
the perceiver‘s activity. Identifying perception with the perceiver‘s activity and 
defining it as ‗subtraction‘ evokes the precise effect of the difference between 
Hansen‘s definition and Deleuze‘s use of the word that is ‗subtract.‘ For 
Hansen, subtraction is of whatever interests the body while, for Deleuze, 
subtraction is the reverse, that is of ―whatever does not interest‖ the body 
(2005a, p.66). Reasonably, for Bergson, the actions of the body do not ―subtract 
the relevant image from the universal flux of images‖ as Hansen claims 
(Hansen 2006b, p.5). That is because ‗subtraction‘, here, is an actual action that 
expresses the degree of utility whereas perception is a virtual action that ends 
by remembering. Moreover, semantically, what is subtracted usually is that 
which does not hold interest, which means that, for Hansen, the body‘s activity 
of subtracting removes the object that interests the body from the world, In this 
way, gradually the body loses its interests in the world and becomes a body 
without any interest, that is a ‗disinterested‘ body. The participant‘s actions 
seem to have King Midas‘s cursed ‗golden touch‘ effect where, by touching 
whatever interests it, it cannot enjoy it anymore. 48  
3.4.3. Virtual Environments 
Hansen moves to cases where the body could be viewed as an object where it 
is screened (e.g. Jeffery Shaw‘s air-inflated dome for works such as 
125 
 
Corpocinema, 1967; Movie Movie, 1967) or could give materiality, ‗give body‘, 
to the image. In such cases the body is placed within a constantly changing 
space and its movement is one of causality elements (besides other moving 
objects that change the images). On one hand, this marks the body, when 
viewed from outside, as an object or image among others and so it takes part in 
determining the viewers‘ perception of the image (screening). On the other 
hand, Hansen claims that this is a subordination of the image to the actions of 
the performing body, which materializes Bergson‘s conception of the perception 
as virtual action. However, Hansen then highlights another deterritorialization 
from Bergson‘s conceptualization of virtual actions and perception as 
determined by distance and time:  
Otherwise put, rather than having an existence independent of the 
potential action of the perceiver, the image exists only in and through 
the actions of the perceiving body (2006, p.58).  
Two issues could be considered there. First, Hansen‘s understanding that 
Bergson‘s conceptualization of perception implies an independence of the 
image from the ‗potential action‘ where, for Bergson, the image‘s existence 
initiates the possible and potential actions of the perceiver. As Bergson sees it, 
perception exists outside the body and the perceived object reflects our 
possible action upon it.  
The truth is that the point P, the rays which it emits, the retina and 
the nervous elements affected, form a single whole; that the 
luminous point P is a part of this whole; and that it is really in P, and 
not elsewhere, that the image of P is formed and perceived (2004, 
p.37). 
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Second, placed within such space, the relationship between the individual‘s 
perception, bodily action, the effected change and the image that ―exists only in 
or through the action of the perceiving body‖ (2004, p.58) becomes unclear. 
This is because of the existence of other moving images and effects where any 
movement, conscious or unconscious, causes change. The performer‘s body 
actually loses its centrality, which might represent the case of materialistic 
realism, as Bergson explains it, where in the universe, images, all on the same 
plane, have mutual relations by fixed laws but no centre. Perception, in this 
sense, becomes accident and mystery (2004, p.14). In other words, as the 
images, the bodies and the environment are in constant unstable movement, 
perception cannot take place due to lack of time to perceive, lack of attention, 
and lack of conscious correlation between the action and reaction. In addition to 
that, the image and environment keep changing regardless of the action of the 
bodies.  
Emphasizing bodily activity, Hansen steps further toward embodied framing in 
new media environments (Hansen 2006b, p.107/110). Although Hansen has not 
mentioned the ‗frame problem‘ in artificial intelligence, the issue suggests itself. 
Here, he pinpoints the significance of the shift from vision to bodily action, which 
is enaction, in differentiating machine-vision from human perception, as well as 
the embodied human framing. The frame problem could generally be 
understood as the challenging task in machine simulation of the embodied 
mind. This is because the construction of rules to process information 
meaningfully is context dependent and, therefore, the machine needs to take 
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environmental changes into account in every situation which, currently, seems 
unachievable. As Hansen points out, both the machine and the human process 
‗raw‘ data to generate organized precepts, ‗data packets‘ or images, based on 
their internal rules. However, unlike the machine, which inscribes information 
passively, the embodied-cognitive human processes them actively. Following 
on from this, new media should catalyse a ‗splitting‘ of perception between a 
‗machanic‟ form where a ‗vision machine‘ transforms the activity of perceiving 
into a computational data, and a human embodied form that is placed within an 
evolving field (Hansen 2006b, p.101). Such environments or fields draw 
attention to the body-brain achievement that could be understood as ‗body-
mind‘ unity where they become naturally coordinated and embodied when the 
person lets go instead of struggling to achieve a state of activity (Varela et al. 
1992, p.29-30).  
Hansen‘s  illustrations (e.g. Tamás Waliczky and Miroslaw Rogala) demonstrate 
situations that ―constantly change as a result of the perceiver‘s activity‖ 
therefore ―the reference point for understanding perception is no longer a 
pregiven‖ (Varela et al. 1992, p.173) but it depends on the bodily modalities, 
tactility, affectivity and proprioception that could even underlie vision itself 
(Hansen 2006b, p.104). The participant or viewer, being aware of the changing 
environment, struggles to obtain control over the changes in the image and then 
starts experimenting with their bodily movement.  
By positioning the direct immediate dynamic coupling of the body and image as 
the aesthetic feature in new media, specifically the virtual reality environment 
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(2006b, p.167),49 Hansen insists that the ‗new‘ experimentation with new media 
does not correlate with any analogical experience (2006b, p.170). This allows 
Hansen to perceive perception as an ‗operational closure‘ process, where the 
results of a process are themselves the process (Varela et al. 1992, p.139). 
Therefore, Hansen equates perception with simulation and the image with the 
mental simulation that is created in the process (2006b, p.170). Here, Hansen 
foregrounds Raymond Ruyer‘s theory of perception and the concept of the 
absolute survey, which could be taken as an act of reversing some of the points 
in Paul Bains‘s (2002) article ‗Subjectless Subjectivities‘, in which he discusses 
Ruyer‘s influence on Deleuze and Guattari. Here, Bain‘s article is used to map 
Ruyer‘s work to the account of Hansen. To sum up these points, Bains 
emphasizes that Ruyer distinguishes his own theory from Bergson‘s by insisting 
―that ‗images‘ or sensations are ‗in‘ our heads not out there at the point p of 
emanation, even if we form a whole with the image á la Bergson‖ (2002, 
p.114).50 In other words, 
Sensations are brain achievements rather than ‗representations of‘. 
There is no re-presentation of one world but only the multiple words 
our brains achieve. This is not subjectivism – no philosophical or 
psychological subject is involved. The brain or organism as an 
autopoietic, self-referential, primary true form, is naturally producing 
a virtual world (or actualizing a virtual world that is real but not actual; 
the indiscernible oscillation at infinite speed between the 
virtual/actual; chaosmosis) (Bains 2002, p.108).51 
The absolute survey, according to Bains, postulates that the existence of matter 
or real extension has ―an autopoietic ‗primary true forms‘ or subjectivities as 
indivisible unities‖ (2002, p.108-109). Visual sensation or perception as ‗true 
form‘ means that the surface (e.g. a table with checked squares) is grasped at 
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once as an ‗absolute unity‘ without division or space that separates its parts in 
the physical surface. That is, in visual sensation the distance between the 
objects is not a real distance (2002, p.110). Moreover, visual sensation does not 
observe itself but has a primary consciousness that is ‗self-enjoyment‘ – defined 
as an immediacy without objectivation, with auto-subjectivity that constitutes its 
own being (2002, p.111). In this sense, even an organism without a nervous 
system such as the unicellular protozoa has a ‗self-enjoyment‘ or auto-
subjectivity and thus can ‗see‘ itself directly without a second consciousness 
(2002, p.111). Thus, the absolute survey differentiates between a primary 
‗subjectless‘ consciousness and a second consciousness of the subject where 
the latter cannot occur before the former. Bains quotes Ruyer:  
In order to ‗speak‘ of primary consciousness, to evoke it, we are 
obliged to use expressions like a ‗form perceiving itself‘, a ‗form that 
sees itself without eyes‘. First, we transform the form into a ‗visual 
image‘, primary consciousness into secondary consciousness, then 
we emphasize that there is no secondary consciousness before 
primary consciousness (Ruyer 1966, p.167, cited in Bains 2002, 
p.113).  
Bains explains that Deleuze and Guattari‘s relation to Ruyer‘s work is 
manifested in their project of ―absolute interiorities‖ and ―proto-subjectivities‖, 
which refers to a self-referential, autopoietic or self-producing/positing plane of 
immanence – a plane of existential integrity and at the same time of relations or 
becomings – without supplementary dimension to that which emerges upon it 
(2002, p.102). This is, in Bains‘s view, not accepted easily when thought in 
terms of dualism where subjectivity is taken as ―a gas ‗inside‘ something called 
the ‗body‘ which now becomes a purely material support‖ (2002, p.102). Instead 
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of dualism, Bains perceives Deleuze and Guattari‘s recognition of qualitative 
multiplicities of heterogeneous components leading to a fragmentary whole – 
the molar/molecular distinction in Deleuze‘s work – that emerges as a unity in 
multiplicity, an absolute survey, which can only be grasped through ―affective 
pathic awareness‖ (2002, p.103). The brain here is not viewed as a corporeal 
organ but also as an indicator of an incorporeal topological surface. This is 
demonstrated by the progression from the movement-image to the time-image 
where the latter image ―no longer has space and movement as its primary 
characteristics but topology and time‖ (2002, p.110).  
Hansen argues that Bergson‘s theory does not apply in new media because of 
the latter‘s commitment to the ‗monism‘ between the body and the universe 
(2006b, p.163). Thus, Hansen specifies Ruyer‘s concept of absolute survey that 
is ―a sovereign individual autonomy with an intrinsic existential reality of self-
referential territory‖ (Bains 2002, p.102-103) to undo the ‗monism‘ between the 
body and the work, specifically for virtual reality (VR) environments, ―where 
there is, literally, no ‗there‘ there‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.162/170). VR marks the 
―technical supplementation‖ of the absolute survey or simulation because ―the 
VR interface brings the capacity for absolute survey into contact with the purely 
computational or digital ‗field‘ of machine vision‖ (2006b, p.176).52 In other 
words, the priority VR environments afford for human framing functions through 
the manipulation of some devices which bring the digital images into the view of 
the participants. This eliminates the distance between the viewer and the image 
(the image could be displayed from outside) and, in turn, enables the viewer to 
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survey and grasp the image immediately (2006b, p.170). VR environments that 
provide nongeometric, nondimensional or typological space forming an 
―absolute surface‖ inform what Hansen calls ―absolute subjectivity‖ (2006b, 
p.196);53 that is, an autopoietic self-referential pure form sensation. Hansen 
thinks that the cinema is insufficient as ―a model for experience‖ because it 
cannot account for the primacy of the body-brain status as absolute survey 
(2006b, p.194). However, this is due to the contradiction Hansen presents in his 
interpretation. For example, Hansen quotes Ruyer: 
A photograph apparatus, in order to capture the entirety of a surface, 
must be placed at some distance from it, along a perpendicular 
dimension. A living being, likewise, localizable as a body, must have 
an eye placed more or less like the photographic apparatus in order 
to perceive the entirety of the surface and its decorative pattern. If I 
were to see the photograph from the surface of the table, I would be 
again obliged to place my eyes at some distance from this 
photograph. It is necessary to be in a third dimension to photograph 
or perceive a surface (2006b, p.174). 
In his interpretation, Hansen claims that, here, Ruyer contrasts and shows the 
limit of the photographic image (and cinema) in the presentation of absolute 
survey but, as we see, the quotation does not show such contrast. Rather, it 
demonstrates the likeness between the eye and the photography apparatus and 
Bains – referring to the same quotation – points out this likeness: ―this is also 
the case for the camera‖ (Bains 2002, p.109).  
3.5. Revisiting the enaction approach 
In the previous section, Deleuze‘s and Hansen‘s transformations of Bergson‘s 
theory of perception in relation to cinema and new media are examined. We find 
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that Hansen has departed from Bergson‘s theory of perception in favour of 
Varela‘s sensorimotor approach. Here Hansen defines perception with the 
participant‘s practical action through which images are created without any 
reference to representation. Here, another view of the enaction approach (at its 
baseline this approach suggests that the living being‘s perception is based on 
its actions within its environment through which it forms sensorimotor recurrent 
patterns that informs its learning), which seems more compatible with Bergson 
and Deleuze, is presented. This is the enaction approach introduced by Alva 
Noë (2004). By revisiting the brain activity and representation, Noë‘s position 
appears to admit to a non-representational perspective yet not to an anti-
representational one. This, on the one hand, lets us overcome the gap Hansen 
tends to occlude in championing a phenomenological-Bergsonist account based 
on a sensorimotor approach that voids representation and, on the other hand, 
restores the brain as the ‗moving-image‘ without giving up the unitary system 
constitutive of the body, the brain and the world. In this way we can determine 
that the living being is a centre of indetermination, as Noë expresses it:  
the world is made available to us in a way that is determined by the 
fact that we occupy a tentative and a shifting place within the world 
(2004, p.86).  
The enactive approach towards perception, introduced by Noë, bridges the gap 
between internalism (perceptual experience depends on neural activity 
stimulation) and externalism (perceptual experience depends on the external 
world) by explaining the perceptual experience within a phenomenological 
perspective. Noë argues that the brain‘s neural activity or stimulation is 
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important but it is not enough to produce all experiences. Consciousness 
depends on our dynamic and active interaction with the world (2004, p.211):  
the enactive externalism I defend here is compatible with its being 
the case that the only way the world produces changes in animal 
consciousness is by producing changes in the brain; that appropriate 
changes in the brain will produce changes in consciousness, even if 
the environment is unchanged (2004, p.221). 
The second aspect, which is directly compatible with the Bergsonist-Deleuzian 
account of perception, is that the experiential content of the perceptual 
experience is represented virtually. It is ―virtual all the way in‖ (2004, p.193). We 
have virtual representation of the detailed world which we can access through 
our sensorimotor knowledge, so we do not need to construct an internal 
representation of its details (2004, p.50). This virtual content is accessible 
through the sensorimotor and cognitive skills, through movement and attention. 
Thus, because experience has content as a potentiality (2004, p.215), Noë 
insists that: 
Experience isn‘t something that happens to us. It is something we do; 
it is a temporally extended process of skilful probing. The world 
makes itself available to our reach. The experience comprises mind 
and world. Experience has content only thanks to the established 
dynamics of interaction between perceiver and world (2004, p.216). 
This allows Noë to forward amodal perception to solve the problem of 
perceptual presence where the out of view which cannot be actually perceived 
is present virtually as a whole and thus it is experienced as detailed even if we 
do not attend to the details (2004, p.61). This experience is mediated by the 
sense that we know that we can have access to these details through our body 
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movement (2004, p.86). It is not that we see the thing as a whole but that we 
experience the thing as a whole. 
The enactive approach views perception as the direct encounter of what is 
‗given‘ in the world. Simply, ―we experience the world by experiencing how it 
looks‖ (Noë 2004, p.85). What is encountered is the visual appearance or the 
looks (let us say images) of the objects referred to as their perspectival 
properties (P- properties). The P- properties (e.g. P-size, P-shape) are spatial 
features that can be distinguished from the ‗actual‘ properties (e.g. size and 
shape) in respect to their location in the perceiver‘s visual field (e.g. the plate 
looks elliptical from a certain vantage point, a tree looks bigger by being closer 
to the viewer). These are real and objective properties of the environment. That 
is, they are appended by mathematical laws and they are not related to 
sensations or feelings but depend on the spatial relation between the 
perceiver‘s body, the perceived object and the environment. In this sense, 
perception is mediated by appearance where it is a mode of exploring how 
things are. The variation of how things are, that is in the object‘s P-properties 
can be explored by movement which allows the details of the object to be 
perceived.  
It is because mobile perceivers gain access to variation in 
perspectival properties as they move about that the actual spatial 
properties of objects are made available to the subject for experience 
(2004, p.86). 
It is relevant that Noë considers the duality of the perceptual content, which is 
based on object-dependence (movement of object) and movement-dependence 
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(movement of perceiver). The former is where experience presents the world as 
being (representational content), as separate from the perceiver‘s perspective 
(for example, the plate looks circular, it really does). The world as being is two-
dimensional, revealing how things are as a factual, world-directed dimension of 
perception. But ―how things look does not only depend on how things are‖ and 
here comes, as Noë persistently argues, the latter aspect of perceptual content 
which depends ―on the perceiver‘s relation to how things are‖ (Noë 2004, 
p.171). This second aspect is where the world is presented in experience in ―a 
way that always incorporates some reference to how things look or sound or 
feel from your vantage point‖ (2004, p.163) (the plate looks elliptical from here, 
it really does). Looks (images) are ‗relational properties‘ between the objects 
and the environment but they have an intrinsically perspectival, self-directed 
dimension where the variation in their appearance depends on the vantage 
point the mobile perceiver occupies. Thus Noë highlights: 
Perceptual experience is intrinsically perceiver-centred: Visual 
experience is always experience of things being some way or other 
from a point of view. Perceptual content has an intrinsically 
perspectival aspect (2004, p.170). 
In a reverse fashion, then, Noë insists that if we count the perspectival 
properties of the perceptual content then we should count ourselves or our 
vantage point as well (2004, p.172).  
According to the enactive approach, the living being requires sensorimotor 
knowledge in its interaction with the environment. This sensorimotor knowledge 
is an essential part of perception. Noë points out that the kitten experiment 
136 
 
mentioned above is ―misleading‖ (2004, p.234). The kitten behaved as blind not 
because it could not use its vision to guide its actions in the environment but 
because it could not acquire certain sensorimotor dependencies which were 
necessary to mediate its relation to the environment. This kitten had mastery of 
other sensorimotor skills that it could use (eye and head movement) but the 
failure to acquire the required sensorimotor knowledge relevant to the 
environment, due to its being harnessed, caused a kind of ―experiential 
blindness‖ which leaves the perceiver ―without experience‖ (Noë 2004, p.10) as 
the environment become inaccessible to it. Noë points this insufficiency in 
Varela‘s sensorimotor approach out where 
The enactive, sensorimotor approach offers an explanation of how it 
can be that we enjoy an experience of worldly detail that is not 
represented in our brains (Noë 2004, p.66-67). 
But then he insists that 
The detail is present – the perceptual world is present – in the sense 
that we have a special kind of access to the detail, an access 
controlled by patterns of sensorimotor dependence with which we are 
familiar (2004, p.67).  
This means that the sensorimotor contingencies are not constitutive of 
perception (Goldman and de Vignemont 2009, p.154), which brings us to the 
next aspect of the enactive approach. The sensorimotor skill, according to Noë, 
constitutes a kind of implicit practical knowledge of the patterns of change. The 
perceiver knows that this sensorimotor knowledge or skill mastery mediates its 
relation to the environment so its perceptual presence of the unrevealed part of 
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the object or environment requires the relevant sensorimotor contingencies to 
access it. For Noë, 
Perceivers have an implicit, practical understanding of the way 
movements produce changes in sensory stimulation. They also have 
an implicit practical understanding that they are coupled to the world 
in such a way that movements produce sensory change. It is this 
implicit practical understanding that forms the basis of their readiness 
to move about to find out how things are (2004, p.66).  
In this sense, normal perceivers experience objects as having specific 
sensorimotor profiles where they know that the objects‘ appearances would 
vary in precise ways based on their movement. Simply, their movement varies 
their relation to how things look, even if things have not changed and, on a 
counterfactual basis, they know that the movement of the object varies the way 
things looks in relation to their vantage point (2004, p.117). This sensorimotor 
knowledge, Noë insists, is not propositional or inferential but is based on the 
perceiver‘s awareness of the properties and states of affairs around them and 
their expectations of sensory effect of movement rather than prior knowledge of 
the effects (2004, p.118-120). In other words, they ―don‘t apply sensorimotor 
knowledge to experience‖ (2004, p.194) but they know they can present objects 
in their consciousness by movement;54 movement conditions the presence of 
the perceptual detail, rather than knowing that the details are in their 
consciousness. 
The presence of detail consists not in its representation now in 
consciousness, but in our implicit knowledge now that we can 
represent it in consciousness if we want, by moving the eyes or by 
turning our head. Our perceptual contact with the world consists, in 
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large part, in our access to the world thanks to our possession of 
sensorimotor knowledge (2004, p.99). 
Moreover, arguing against dreaming - which is usually considered as being 
activated by neurals -55 being taken as identical to perceptual experience, Noë 
asserts that dream states are unstable and poor in detail because of their 
dependence on the neural activity only rather than the stability of the 
environment, which reminds us of Bergson‘s previous account. 
Dream states are unstable and poor in detail precisely because 
dream states, unlike normal, non-dream perceptual states, are 
produced by neural activity alone. Actual perceptual consciousness 
is anchored by the fact that we interact with, refer to, and have 
access to the environment. The stability of the environment is what 
gives our experiences their familiar stability. The stability of normal 
experience is explained by the involvement of the world in our 
experience (Noë 2004, p.214). 
Noë further challenges the question of whether there can be ―art of experience‖ 
or ―experiential art‖ which catches ―experience in the act of making the world 
available. Experience is a kind of activity, an activity that acquires content, as 
we have seen‖ (2004, p.176). Noë elaborates on painting as a process in which 
the world is painted as it is rather than the way it looks. However, the painter, 
shall we add the ‗experiential‘ painter, paints the world from his perspective as it 
appears to him. The painter‘s ‗seeing‘ is characterized by a ―dynamic pattern of 
engagement among the painter, the scene and the canvas‖ (2004, p.223) where 
he continuously looks up, paints and looks back again to the world. In other 
words, it is an ongoing process of copy-and-paste of looks, details or images, 
from one reality to the other in order to reproduce the looking at the looks. 
Because Noë sees pictures as another reality, as ―partial environments‖ or 
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simple ―virtual space‖, he suggests that experiencing a depicted scene does not 
produce on us a similar effect as if we were in the actual scene, nor does it aim 
at constructing an internal representation in us similar to the one we might 
experience in the actual scene, rather it prompts a certain sensorimotor grasp.  
The enactive approach suggests a rather different conception of 
pictorial representation. Pictures construct partial environments. They 
actually contain perspectival proprieties such as apparent shapes 
and sizes, but they contain them not as projections from actual 
things, but as static elements. Pictures depict because they 
correspond to a reality of which, as perceivers, we have a 
sensorimotor grasp. Pictures are a very simple (in some senses of 
simple) kind of virtual space. What a picture and the depicted scene 
have in common is that they prompt us to draw on a common class 
of sensorimotor skills (Noë 2004, p.178).  
In saying this, Noë insists that doing phenomenology should focus on the active 
exploration, that is, it should study ―the way in which perceptual experience – 
mere experience ... acquires world-presenting content‖ (Noë 2004, p.179) rather 
than facts and states of affairs.  
But how does this relate to cinema in Deleuze‘s account and the enactive 
approach of perception? The cinema and its camera as living bodies are like 
ours but unlike us as Deleuze states:  
the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor 
the hero: it is the camera – sometimes human, sometimes inhuman 
or superhuman (Deleuze 2005a, p.21).  
Deleuze explores the complexity of perceptual perspective in cinema in relation 
to the camera in terms of subjective/objective perception. Defining the objective 
image as being ―when the thing or the set are seen from the viewpoint of 
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someone who remains external to that set‖ in contrast to the subjective image 
where ―the thing seen by someone ‗qualified‘, or the set as it is seen by 
someone who forms part of that set‖ informs directly the question (2005a, p.73), 
―For what is to tell us that what we initially think external to a set might not turn 
out to belong to it?‖ 
The objective image is perceived in the camera‘s sole presentation of an image 
without a character‘s perspective and the subjective image is the presentation 
of the same image as the character‘s perspective. There seems to be confusion 
here, in Deleuze‘s framing of the problem, between definition of the 
subjective/objective perception and the camera‘s perspective. The problem with 
such a definition, which Deleuze himself thinks of as nominal, is not actually the 
movement between the objective and subjective image as he proposes, but 
whether the camera itself is part of the set or external to it. More explicitly, can 
the camera capture an objective image, capture the world as it is?  
Unlike the painter, the challenge for the camera is to show the world as it is 
without looking; that is, show the representational content, because it always 
sees the looks, and it hears the sounds. The camera can have its own 
perspective either by moving or remaining silent and fixed. If the grass, as it is, 
is green, then the camera has to travel to find the green grass to fit the 
representation or someone has to present the camera with the portrait to look at 
it.  
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The problem might appear in the form of the viewers‘ embodiment. The viewer, 
unlike the camera, knows that if s/he turns he will not be able to get more 
details. The details are there, but only when the camera moves do they become 
present, as long as it keeps watching. If the objective image is redefined, it will 
be redefined precisely within this externality within which the camera‘s 
perception departs from the viewer‘s, where the latter knows that other 
sensorimotor skills would not bring more details. On one level, this has become 
the habit of watching, to fix the eyes on the screen. An image that represents 
‗objective perception‘ can be no more than the one which is viewed from the 
viewer‘s habits of watching. In contrast, habit does not have perception. But the 
viewer‘s habit of watching is paradoxical. It sets the body itself as a present-
absent site. As a moving image, the body becomes also an image that does not 
move in its own physical space; it becomes like a paused, flickering image. In 
other words, the image that represents the ‗objective perception‘ is an image 
without perception and, in this sense, objectivity is only a component of the 
experience of watching.  
Because of this, it becomes a challenge for the camera and cinema to create an 
objective image that fixates the viewer on the screen rather than the moving 
image itself. The cinema is the creation of images not screens. Being ‗the 
society of the screen‘ is only secondary to being ‗the society of the image‘. In 
this sense, the viewer‘s inability to bring the out of view into view meets with the 
camera‘s ability to present the ‗moreness‘ of the absent details, can be 
understood as a limit of viewing. ―The limit,‖ Massumi states, 
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is not unreal. It is virtual. It is reality giving. Since the reality it gives is 
a movement or tendency, the limit may be called a virtual attractor 
(2002, p.147). 
The cinematic image is a movement image that addresses the viewer‘s 
movement not only by presenting the details and prompting certain 
sensorimotor skills in a way similar to pictures, but in its continuous movement 
to an opening, even to an ‗out of field‘ where the viewer‘s expectation of the 
details draws on his sensorimotor knowledge and thus sensorimotor readiness 
(virtual action). In other words, the sensorimotor grasping is never complete in 
the presence of the movement-image. The difference is not in the existence or 
objectivity/subjectivity of perception but it is in the probing activity, which the 
viewer is always forced to take.  
For the camera to work continually to determine the world as it is from an 
‗indetermined‘ universe, it has to shoot, close its eyes, travel, open them and 
shoot; it has to close-travel-open-shoot a determined image. More than one 
camera can be in the team where each collects shots of the world as it is 
determined to be and presents it. This is basically because the camera‘s natural 
perception is perspectival in the first place. But perspectival perception is 
human and is defined by its halts: 
for natural perception introduces halts, moorings, fixed points or 
separated points of view, moving bodies or even distinct vehicles, 
whilst cinematographic perception works continuously, in a single 
movement whose very halts are an integral part of it, and are only a 
vibration on to itself (Deleuze 2005a, p.23). 
143 
 
This potentiality of the cinematic perception allows directors to go beyond the 
limits of the receptive organs of the human to register new virtual realities and 
sensorimotor stimulations and skills. Here, what is not natural is constructed in 
the form of montage.  
The objective/subjective binary seems unsatisfactory for the camera‘s 
perception. The camera shows the looks and relations of itself, the view within 
the world, and the character – the viewer of the view. The looks of the camera 
can be considered objective by only taking the camera as being ‗external to the 
set‘; in other words, what is seen is not seen but presented as it is. So what is 
objectively there is not the image, ‗what is seen‘, but the event, ‗what is 
happening‘. The camera is external to the happening and not to the viewing 
perspective. Showing the character, that is the viewer of the same view, makes 
the viewed a shared image, not a shared perspective, between the camera and 
the spectator; that is, it becomes relational, where the camera shows the 
relation of the viewer to the image (viewer‘s subjective viewing) and its relation 
to the viewer. The camera identifies its perspective with the viewer‘s 
perspective by duplicating the latter; the camera is inside the telescope; the 
camera is the eye.  
We have to clarify that while the camera‘s existence inside the character‘s 
telescope duplicates or unites their perspectives, the same cannot be said for 
the spectator as the details s/he attends to in the image might not be the same 
as those of the camera or character.56 We should wait until the retina and the 
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screen merge (Manovich 2001, p.114). This waiting will bring new subjectivities 
to the surface but subjectivity itself is already all over, that is inside and outside. 
By considering this question of whether the camera is part of the set or external 
to it, and our answering it by saying that the camera‘s perception is 
perspectival, the next evolutionary framings make their appearances. Deleuze 
elaborates on these framing types, where the camera has its subjective stand 
and self-consciousness, nevertheless, he maintains his own concern for the 
―nominal‖ subjectivity/objectivity binary (2005a, p.78). For example, in the semi-
subjective perception the camera is ‗being-with‘ the characters by taking 
unidentified perspectives as it sees what they see or shows part of the content.  
In obsessive framing,57 the camera obtains its self-consciousness, where its 
distinctive perspective is presented by making it a being, separated from the 
characters. The camera transforms the perception-image and reflects on it. This 
attention to the camera‘s perspective and its relation to the world and the 
characters has taken framing towards ‗making the camera felt‘ which flourished 
into a ‗cinema of poetry‘. The camera waits for the character, watches him 
entering, hears him speaking, watches him leaving, and continues looking at the 
space ‗which has once again become empty‘ after his leaving; but now, there is 
something in the air. In these terms, it sounds as if the camera is the perceiver 
and the character is one of its perspectival properties; a moving object. That is 
why to present the world ‗as it is‘ the camera has to look at matter. Unlike the 
human‘s objective reality, which is contaminated by a subjective reality viewed 
from a centre point, it goes beyond the human‘s perception, to disclose matter‘s 
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perception captured by the camera‘s consciousness. This is the capturing of the 
objective universal variation, where all images vary in relation to each other with 
the absence of the subjective image. All the camera extracts from objects, water 
as a dominant case of a moving movement-image, is movement, which is their 
liquid perception. Further, the camera‘s eye can be fixed to stare at matter. This 
staring for Deleuze is constructed and thus cannot be achieved by a human 
eye. This is the assemblage of the world through montage. Matter as a moving 
image shows only its differential; there is no centre of indetermination or a point 
of view, only viewing points (gaseous perception).  
Let us now clarify the difference between Noë‘s enactment approach in relation 
to new media and Hansen‘s analysis. First, Noë‘s approach retains what has 
been taken away by Hansen, the image itself, its materiality, its existence and 
its virtual presence. Secondly, in Noë‘s view, the participant brings with him 
sensorimotor skills or knowledge, motor habits, that form an analogical 
background, which come to bear on whatever new situation or perceptual 
problem he faces, whether in a real or virtual environment. For example, a 
joystick is an affordable tool to be used by the hand. The participant, even if he 
does not know how to use it, has the skills that enable him to explore the way it 
is used – if not provided with instructions – and to bring the image into view. 
The participant seems always to be equipped with familiarization strategies that 
enable him to explore new environments and to acquire new skills.  
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3.6. Summary 
Summarizing the previous argument, we find that the argument Hansen levels 
against Deleuze‘s appropriation of reading Bergson in his books about cinema 
is inadequate. First of all, Hansen has departed from Bergson by voiding the 
representational concept, central to Bergson‘s theory of perception, and 
inverting Bergson‘s prioritization of perception over practical activity.58 Evidently, 
Hansen‘s account could be appropriated within the neurophenomenological 
work conducted by Varela and his enactive or sensorimotor approach. On the 
other hand, Deleuze has transformed Bergson‘s work taking into account the 
difference between the human body and the cinema‘s in creating images. The 
main difference between the two accounts is in Hansen‘s prioritization of the 
automatic reactions of the body in the human-technology situations. For 
Deleuze, the cinema does not react immediately but its reaction is always 
delayed.  
A more compatible enactive approach with Bergson‘s work is introduced by 
Noë, who elaborates on virtual representation as the content of perception as 
well as sensorimotor knowledge and skill mastery. The exploration of Deleuze‘s 
cinematographic perception informs the reframing of the problem related to 
subjective/objective perception-image, to be seen in the light of 
perspective/relation cinematographic framing. This means that new media and 
virtual realities do not need to give up the image or its qualities to give way to 
the body. As the body and new media already exist in a mutual milieu, new 
media can give the body new ways of perceiving and experiencing the world.  
147 
 
The next chapter explores the second aspect of the phenomenological 
embodied interaction between the human and technology that is explored in 
Hansen‘s concept of embodied affection in relation to Deleuze, Bergson and 
Varela. 
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4. Chapter Four: From Perception to Affection: 
Embodied Affectivity  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the second constituent of embodiment in the aesthetic 
equation, which is embodied affectivity. As pointed out in chapter two of this 
thesis, Hansen claims that Deleuze has disembodied the centre of 
indetermination by locating perception and affection outside the subject and in 
the machine assemblage of cinematographic images. Hansen redefines 
perception in a way which we find incompatible with Bergson, as chapter three 
shows. Hansen levels a similar argument, against Deleuze‘s transformation of 
Bergson‘s concept of embodied affectivity to the cinematographic realm - this 
will be explored in relation to spectatorship and temporality. Hansen claims that 
he prioritizes affection over perception in interacting or dynamically coupling 
with new media.  
Hansen‘s analyses of the various case studies mostly conclude either by 
identifying perception as a subcomponent of affection, affection is impured by 
perception, or eventually annihilate it in favour of affectivity that ―steps in 
precisely where no perceptual contact can be made‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.133). As 
this chapter will show, no support is found for Hansen‘s claim that Deleuze has 
disembodied the centre of indetermination. This is supported by Deleuze‘s 
account of the shock image. Hansen considers corporeal shock as the 
fundamental cause of embodied affectivity in interaction with technology.  
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An analysis of Bergson‘s ‗qualitative progression‘ of embodied affects shows 
that Hansen‘s description of affectivity might be taken as acquired perception 
that is cause and effect. This is because of his application of a pre-determined 
type of experience, that is, Erlebnis (a short lived experience). Redefining 
spectatorship in Deleuze as a relation means that it is not restricted to the 
temporal encounter between the film and viewer. Hansen‘s analysis of 
affectivity departs from both Bergson and Varela because of his prioritization of  
consciousness over affection. The discussion presented in this chapter allows 
HCI design and evaluation to refocus on embodied affects that progress 
qualitatively and temporally during the process of the interaction.  
4.2. Embodied affection 
For Hansen, Bergson‘s embodied conception of affection is understood as the 
transfer of ―affective power from the image to the body‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.130) 
that takes place while interacting with the image, rather than a quality intrinsic to 
the image as Deleuze puts it. The example of a facial application is given, which 
Hansen calls the Digital Facial Image – DFI.  New media artworks amplify this 
transfer through a process of ―affective attunement‖ where the image or ―facial 
signals spontaneously trigger an affective bodily response‖ (2006b, p.136) and 
the sensorimotor connection attunes the body to novel stimulus, thus catalysing 
the affective interruption where no perceptual contact can be made (2006b, 
p.133).  
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Rushton (2004, p.356) points out that Hansen conceives that this interaction 
gives affectivity back to the body, which he understands as marrying facial 
characteristics to personhood, in order to equate them with person types. As an 
example, an image of a murderer‘s face is ascribed as ‗evil‘ and an image from 
a fashion magazine is attributed to ‗beauty‘.59 For Hansen, rather than liberating 
affectivity from the body, new media ―reinvest the body as a privileged site for 
experience‖ (2006b, p.213). Moreover, Hansen interprets Bergson‘s account of 
affectivity as the agency of the body over itself - ―the capacity of a sensitive 
element to isolate itself and to act on the whole body as a force, or rather, to 
catalyze the body‘s action on itself‖ and therefore open an internal space within 
the body. This is because it comprises ―a separate sensorimotor system internal 
to the body‖ (2006b, p.226) where affection emerges ―on the basis of another 
interval altogether‖ (2006b, p.225).  
Affectivity, as Hansen perceives it, is ―the capacity of the body to experience 
itself as more than itself and thus deploy its sensorimotor power to create the 
unpredictable, the experimental, the new‖ (2006b, p.7). Affects proceed by this 
‗sensorimotor power‘. Hansen defines Bergson‘s view of affection as a 
―phenomenological modality‖ in its own right. Hansen claims that for Bergson 
affection and perception are inseparable but they differ in kind (2006b, 
p.130/134). Yet, Hansen maintains that for the Bergsonist embodied affection is 
considered as ―a phenomenological mode autonomous from perception‖ 
(2006b, p.130/205). As in his previous account of perception, Hansen 
emphasizes the role of bodily activity in interacting with the technical 
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applications where the affection-image is perceived as an interruption of the 
sensorimotor circuit (2006b, p.6). 
We might say that new media art reinserts the body in the circuit 
connecting affectivity and the face, thereby supplementing what 
Deleuze calls the ‗icon‘ (the set of the expressed and its expression) 
with a third term: the embodied activity that produces affect from 
image and exposes the origin of all affectivity in embodied life 
(2006b, p.136).   
Criticizing Deleuze‘s inadequate transformation of Bergson‘s work, Hansen 
asserts that Deleuze has reduced bodily affection to one specific permutation of 
movement-image, which is affection-image. For Hansen, Deleuze‘s 
interpretation firstly, makes a break from Bergson‘s definition of affection as 
phenomenological modality by determining affection as a (sub)component of 
perception; a particular modality of perception that is ―an attenuated or short-
circuited perception that ceases to yield an action, and instead brings forth an 
expression‖ (2006b, p.134). Secondly, unlike Bergson, Deleuze places affection 
between perception and action, to fill the interval that allows the body to delay 
reaction, and organize unexpected responses. Therefore, the affective-image or 
close-up becomes ―the external expression of an internal bodily state, the 
extraction of a ‗pure quality‘‖ (2006b, p.134-135). Thirdly, for Hansen, Deleuze 
breaks from Bergson who identifies ―a difference in kind between affection and 
perception‖ (Hansen 2006b, p.135).60 
In relation to the perception/affection debate Hansen initiates, for Bergson 
perception lies between the ‗external actions‘ and ‗volitional reactions‘, to be 
‗impured‘ by affective sensation, 
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Affection is, then, that part or aspect of the inside of the body which 
we mix with the image of external bodies; it is what we must first of 
all subtract from perception to get the image in its purity (Bergson 
2004, p.60).        
But the image can never exist in its purity because for Bergson, pure perception 
exists only ―in theory rather than in fact‖ (2004, p.26). Perception is impured by 
affection and memory. Although ―there is no perception without affection‖ (2004, 
p.60), affection differs in function and nature from perceptual actions. Affection 
is localized at places where the sensory nerves receive the stimuli to signify 
affectivity.61 First, in relation to perception, it is distinguished from other objects 
by the zero distance that exists when the body, itself, is the object of perception. 
Although in this case it is an image of the body, that is representation, unlike 
other images, the reaction is a real action as it is internally experienced by the 
body, rather than being a virtual action. Second, in relation to other images 
when the zero distance between an image and the body (another image) exists, 
then affection state occurs at that point (e.g. pain) and initiates a bodily action in 
the form of resistance. 
And, consequently, our perception of an object distinct from our 
body, separated from our body by an interval, never expresses 
anything but a virtual action. But the more the distance decreases 
between this object and our body (the more, in other words, the 
danger becomes urgent or the promise immediate), the more does 
virtual action tend to pass into real action. Suppose the distance 
reduced to zero, that is to say that the object to be perceived 
coincides with our body, that is to say again, that our body is the 
object to be perceived. Then it is no longer virtual action, but real 
action, that this specialized perception will express: and this is 
exactly what affection is. Our sensations are, then, to our perceptions 
that which the real action of our body is to its possible or virtual 
action. Its virtual action concerns other objects, and is manifested 
within those objects; its real action concerns itself, and is manifested 
within its own sub stance (Bergson 2004, p.85).  
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Bergson informs us that the living body:  
It [the living body] does not merely reflect action received from 
without; it struggles, and thus absorbs some part of this action. Here 
is the source of affection (2004, p.57).  
Moreover, Bergson explains that the difference in kind between perception and 
affection is metaphoric: 
We might therefore say, metaphorically, that while perception 
measures the reflecting power of the body, affection measures its 
power to absorb. But this is only a metaphor (2004, p.57).  
The truth for Bergson is that: 
We must consider the matter more carefully, in order to understand 
clearly that the necessity of affection follows from the very existence 
of perception (2004, p.57).  
Following this, then, Rushton (2008) correctly argues that ―the all-too-clear 
divisions between subject and object that Hansen relies upon‖ in drawing this 
distinction between Bergson and Deleuze ―are clearly non-existent‖ (2008, 
p.136). First, Deleuze affirms that affection-image is ―both a type of image and a 
component of all images,‖ (2005a, p.89) which means that it exists in-itself and 
in relation to other images. This is consistent with Bergson‘s point that there is 
no perception without affection. Second, Deleuze follows Bergson in affirming 
that the source of affection is the ‗absorbance‘ of part of the external action that 
does not pass to a virtual action that is perception but coincides with the body 
and thus it becomes a real action that is affection. And this is what Hansen‘s 
own quote of Deleuze states. Hansen quotes Deleuze: 
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Indeed it is not sufficient to think that perception – thanks to distance 
– retains or reflects what interests us by letting pass what is 
indifferent to us. There is inevitably a part of external movements that 
we ‗absorb‘, that we refract, and which does not transform itself into 
either objects of perception or acts of the subject; rather they mark 
the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality 
(Hansen 2006b, p.134-135).62  
Third, the Deleuzian affection-image occupies the interval but not to fill it, as 
Hansen claims,63 between perception that is the tendency towards movement, 
and action. Hansen‘s quote from Deleuze confirms that: 
Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without filling 
it in or filling it up. It surges in the center of indetermination, that is to 
say in the subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain 
respects and a hesitant action (Hansen 2006b, p.134).  
For Deleuze, it is the recollection-image that fills the interval. The recollection 
image is related to Bergson‘s account of memory (2005b, p.45) as pointed out 
in chapter two.  
Lawlor differentiates between the role of the body in Bergson‘s theory and 
phenomenology. He asserts that for Bergson all questions are posed in relation 
to time and not space. Furthermore, the introduction of affection means that the 
difference between the body and memory is in nature, and that the body, being 
affected from inside, is conditioned by memory or duration and that is how it 
produces something new. The interval in matter allows the insertion of 
memories.    
So, if we speak of the Bergsonian body known from the outside by 
perceptions, we are in the scientific body (and ultimately the body 
taken up by science when it enters into its remotest aspiration); and if 
we speak of the Bergsonian body known from the inside by 
affections, we are in memory (Lawlor 2003, p.16).  
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Lawler sees that ―Bergson conceives the living body as a machine‖ in that he 
compares it to a ―telephonic desk‖ (2003, p.16). Lawler even emphasizes 
Bergson‘s selection of the telephonic desk image rather than the computer or 
artificial intelligence as these are concerned with speed and ‗fastness‘ whereas 
the telephonic desk allows ‗slowness‘ and therefore an interval that makes room 
for spirit (spirit here refers to memory) (2003, p.16). As we have seen in chapter 
two, this interval is what characterizes the time-image, in Deleuzian cinema, as 
Colebrook stresses: 
...the mind does not respond or react immediately to the world within 
which it moves, for it delays response and in so doing forms an 
image of itself. If, for example, the brain receives a stimulus but does 
not act, it produces affect, and this feeling or immobilization allows 
for the very slowing down of action which is the thinking itself. 
Modern cinema takes the very event that made thought possible – 
the interval or delay – and gives it an image (2006, p.79/80).  
This interval or delay is the time-image, that is the between two images where 
the irrational cut or unrelated image is inserted.64 For example the image of the 
snowy black screen that cut the sequence of images in Alain Resnais‘ film 
L‟amour ὰ mort (Deleuze 2005b, p.239).  
4.3. Qualitative progression 
To explore Hansen‘s reading of Bergson‘s version of affectivity, we must 
examine Bergson‘s sophisticated theory of affectivity, developed in his book 
Time and Free Will (1950) where he elaborates on the qualitative progress of 
psychic states. ―Qualitative progression‖ means that intensities progress 
through alternation of the nature of isolated heterogeneous yet successive 
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psychic states, feelings or sensations, and, when they are accompanied by 
physical movement, through muscle contractions as a way in which the body 
sympathizes with the sensation or psychic state. Bergson identifies three types 
of intensities or affects that differ in nature but progress through a gradual 
―qualitative alternation‖ of other psychic states and a sympathetic physical 
and/or moral contraction: the sensations of muscular efforts, the intermediate 
states and the deep-seated psychic states.  
The first one is affected by physical conditions and is linked to an external 
cause such as ―the perception of a movement or of an external object‖ (1950, 
p.11). Consciousness portrays the sensation of effort as quantitative by 
overlooking its fundamental psychic state, which exists ―previous to its 
manifestations, but in smaller volume, and ...in a compressed state.‖ However, 
when the muscular effort appears to our consciousness, it is manifested in a 
magnitude that expresses its sphere of action (1950, p.21). This is because, our 
consciousness translates to the sensation of effort what it can capture in the 
first instance, and what it captures is only the movement of the muscle 
contractions resulting from the force. The psychic force itself escapes its 
purview (1950, p.21-22). Thus, Bergson insists that ―some movement is carried 
out somewhere: otherwise there is no sensation of effort‖ (1950, p.22) as 
consciousness would not be able to catch it.  
The movement itself is not ‗a moving towards‘ but a gradual alternation of a 
number of other peripheral sensations as they change their nature – or their 
colour – in sympathy with the sensation of effort and in this sense it is 
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qualitative and heterogeneous. Other muscles, each in its own right, sympathize 
with the localized point in which the force occurs, contracting to take part, to 
participate in bearing the effort. The estimate of intensity is a parallel correlate 
to the number of the participating muscles and sensations. The more 
participants, the more intense the sensation  is (1950, p.25). The spreading 
movement is the outcome of these alternations and contractions and not the 
cause of them. Yet, the eye of the consciousness only counts this as it appears 
on the surface; an outward movement or spatial spread, and interprets it as 
intensity.   
We maintain that the more a given effort seems to us to increase, the 
greater is the number of muscles which contract in sympathy with it, 
and that the apparent consciousness of a greater intensity of effort at 
a given point of the organism is reducible, in reality, to the perception 
of a larger surface of the body being affected (1950, p.24). 
The second type of intensities are the intermediate states, which are systems of 
muscular contractions co-ordinated by either reflective ideas such as attention 
or by unreflective ideas or psychic tension, such as violent or acute emotion 
(1950, p.27-28). Unlike sensation of muscular effort where the movement is the 
result of the effort, in the intermediate states, the movement is part of the state 
that expresses it in terms of space (1950, p.27). The physiological movement of 
the intensity accompanying voluntary attention or psychic tensions expresses 
the feeling of the muscle contractions underlying them. That is to say: while in 
the former case the contractions are participatory – muscles take part in 
sympathy with the point affected – in the latter one they are what express the 
emotion or idea itself. As such they constitute its descriptive account.  
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Although the emotion is irreducible to this account as it has a psychic element 
pertained to it – thus defining its intermediate state between sensations of effort 
and deep-seated psychic states – without this contraction account the so called 
―emotion‖ has no intensity (1950, p.29-30).  
As in the case of muscular effort, the intensity of these emotions depends on 
the number and the qualitative change of the participating peripheral sensations 
and muscles. But their intensity depends on another element, which gains them 
a similarity to the deep-seated psychic states: that is their degree of depth. This 
dimension of depth comes into view when the moment of physical sympathy of 
intensity smoothes thus giving way to a graceful movement towards a moral 
sympathy of inner states related to many memories, perceptions, emotions and 
ideas, guiding their alternation in a certain direction (1950, p.31).    
Beside these intermediate states, there are the affective and representative 
sensations. Affective sensations like pleasure and pain correspond to organic 
disturbance whose molecular movement cannot be captured by consciousness 
and thus they do not have a magnitude. These occur in the interval between an 
external stimulus and a definite automatic reaction to it; only to prefigure the 
latter and resist its definitive direction in that they call up the intermediary of 
consciousness. Consciousness, then, becomes aware of this resistance to the 
automatic reaction marking the intensity of the sensation, and thus it forms ―a 
sign of the future reaction‖ (1950, p.34) and informs us of the possibility of 
choice. In other words, the existence of the intensity of affective sensation as 
resistance is determined by this definitive automatic movement and by the 
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consciousness awareness of it. Without these two, there is no intensive 
sensation (1950, p.35). As we have seen before, the intensity progresses 
through qualitative alternation and muscular contractions of the participating 
sympathizing parts (1950, p.35-36). 
The intensity of affective sensations might thus be nothing more than 
our consciousness of the involuntary movements which are being 
begun and outlined, so to speak, within these states, and which 
would have gone on in their own way if nature had made us 
automata instead of conscious beings (1950, p.36).  
Representative sensations caused by external objects or sound and light show 
the body‘s inclinations defined as movements of the participating organs - 
through muscle contractions, towards the pictured sensation. When two or more 
images of a sensation such as pleasure simultaneously make their appearance 
in our mind, our body seems to creep spontaneously towards the preferred one, 
thus to say it is attracted, ―attraction serves to define movement rather than to 
produce it‖ (1950, p.39). The enjoyment of this sensation is in the body‘s inertia 
as it resists all other sensations or images. Representative sensations‘ intensity 
is determined by the affective character they have. This character calls for a 
reaction in our body as we have seen in the affective sensation and prevents 
the sensations from being purely representative. A pure representative 
sensation‘s intensity depends on the degree of the strength of its external 
cause. 
It will be perceived that the magnitude or a representative sensation 
depends on the cause having been put into the effect, while the 
intensity of the affective element depends on the more or less 
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important reactions which prolong the external stimulations and find 
their way into the sensation itself (1950, p.47). 
When the external cause is weak (low sound or dim light), it requires more effort 
of attention to be perceived thus its intensity is reduced but when it is strong it 
causes a reflexive intense movement in our body (1950, p.40). Medium 
intensities of representative sensations, which do not call for other ideas, 
attentive effort or bodily reactions, proceed by being compared or repeated 
(1950, p.40) and thus reflected upon in relation to their external cause.  
The idea of the external cause is associated with a certain effect as sensation, 
thus, forming a relation of ―acquired perception‖ (1950, p.42) between the 
magnitude of the cause and the quality of the effect. In other words, the 
sensation is an acquired perception of intensity known from without rather than 
affective intensity from within the body.   
We thus associate the idea of a certain quantity of cause with a 
certain quality of effect; and finally, as happens in the case of every 
acquired perception, we transfer the idea into the sensation, the 
quantity of the cause into the quality of the effect (1950, p.42).  
The third type of intensities or affects, which are deep-seated psychic states 
refer to emotions and feelings representing ―pure intensity‖ without the 
involvement of extensions (e.g. joy, aesthetic feelings). Yet, Bergson clarifies 
that this purity of physical symptoms is actually rare and hardly exists (1950, 
p.20). These emotions appear either isolated (i.e. desire) or mediated 
consciously by certain ideas such as thinking of the future or the past. Both 
cases progress by qualitative alternation where the isolated feelings get 
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intensified by such progress, and the mediated ones directly alter the nature of 
the fundamental emotions and pervade them (1950, p.10). Aesthetic feelings 
follow the second case where they are resolved in many other emotions that 
could suggest possible movement of virtual sympathy, so we think it is a change 
in magnitude (1950, p.13).  
The aesthetic feelings offer us a still more striking example of this 
progressive stepping in new elements, which can be detected in the 
fundamental emotion and which seem to increase its magnitude, 
although in reality they do nothing more than alter its nature (1950, 
p.11).  
The differences in the nature of the heterogeneous feelings influence the 
qualitative progress of the aesthetic feelings. This progress displays a 
difference in the degree of intensity and a difference in the degree of elevation 
or depth (1950, p.17).  
The degree of intensity is based on the power by which a certain feeling 
influences other feelings and the extent to which the latter alternate as such the 
influencing feeling might either completely replace or scarcely change them. In 
this sense, a division might occur between the successive intensities 
differentiating two degrees of the same feeling, so they are experienced and 
distinguished. For example, we experience extreme joy and our perceptions 
and memories are heightened up to the extent that when ―we stare at our own 
self, we wonder how it can really exist‖ (1950, p.10). Then, we are tempted to 
turn to the future with its infinite and fruitful possibilities only to realize that such 
a future unfolds in either: a challenge that presumes infinite efforts or a dream 
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that cannot be. The feeling of joy is diminished. Thus, joy is experienced in its 
purity and brutality.  
The degree of depth, on the other hand, refers to the richness of the emotion 
itself with many other sensations, feelings, memories and ideas that turn 
towards it. For Bergson, the merit of art is in this richness rather than in the 
power of intensity.  
The successive intensities of the aesthetic feeling thus correspond to 
changes of state occurring in us, and the degrees of depth to the 
larger or smaller number of elementary psychic phenomena which 
we dimly discern in the fundamental emotion (1950, p.18).  
The process of art aims to ―impress‖ rather than to ―express‖ and such 
impression is achieved through art‘s suggestibility of emotions and our body‘s 
ability to mechanically imitate them (1950, p.17), facilitating a graceful 
movement that passes between the two. This movement expresses the 
qualitative progress, which is an effortless motion accompanied by a physical 
sympathy that takes possession of thought and will and a moral sympathy 
towards ourselves that makes us prefigure what is coming next, that is the 
future, and even have the feeling of controlling it (Bergson 1950, p.12-13). The 
dancer‘s movement, for example, with the rhythm and music allows the viewer 
to prefigure the future movement, thus, lending viewers to feel as if they are 
controlling the dancer‘s movement, and as if the latter obeys them. Thus, 
Bergson insists: 
that in anything which we call very graceful we imagine ourselves 
able to detect, besides the lightness which is a sign of mobility, some 
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suggestion of a possible movement towards ourselves, of a virtual 
and even nascent sympathy. It is this mobile sympathy, always ready 
to offer itself, which is just the essence of higher grace. Thus the 
increasing intensities of aesthetic feeling are here resolved into as 
many different feelings, each one of which, already heralded by its 
predecessor, becomes perceptible in it and then completely eclipses 
it. It is this qualitative progress which we interpret as a change of 
magnitude, because we like simple thoughts and because our 
language is ill-suited to render the subtleties of psychological 
analysis (1950, p.13). 
Although the artist chooses signs and representations that suggest emotional 
experiences, these intensities remain unique to the individual experiencing them 
and cannot be grasped by another subject except if the latter lived the life of the 
first which brings us to the ways of assembling psychic states in Bergson‘s 
account (1950, p.18).  
For Bergson, two ways of assimilating conscious states with others could be 
defined (1950, p.186). The first is static (viewer as a spectator) and the other is 
dynamic (viewer as an actor). The static one is imagined because the conscious 
state is substituted with its idea, where intensity is added to the image as it is no 
longer felt in real time (1950, p.186). Related to this, the spectator is able to 
predict the character's feelings due to learning about some of their history. The 
more that is known about the character and the more one grasps of their 
existence, the closer one is to living their life. In the second one, the dynamic 
spectator is experiencing conscious states themselves, in which case the 
viewer as an actor does not predict the character‘s feelings but lives them. If the 
two, viewer and character, are one, then it is not time that tells them apart, as 
the two-in-one ‗One‘ are hypothetically living the same real moment qualitatively 
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and with identical intensity. It is their occupancy of different places that marks 
their twine-ness.  
While the first mode of assimilation is related to the principles of causality on 
prefiguring the future act (cause-effect or idea-feeling of effort-act), the dynamic 
mode eliminates this prefiguration as the act becomes unpredictable. But as we 
know the two-in-one ‗One‘ does not exist, as there is always a challenge left to 
the viewer; a challenge that intertwines his virtuality and his experience with his 
prefiguring. This challenge emerges from the degrees of intensity and depth 
which depend on the number of participating muscles and the heterogeneous 
feelings, ideas and memories participating in the affective state and which show 
the difference in the viewers‘ sense of identification with characters.  
In response to the points Hansen initiates we can claim that to ‗transfer‘65 
affection or affective power or effect from one space to the other or from an 
image to the body, it must, in the first place, exist in the former.66 On the other 
hand, that which goes out of the body does not go back to it, whether it is affect 
or effect. Bergson points out that ―turning backward‖ is never applicable to or 
accomplished by living beings because of the lapse of duration. He attributed 
this error to us perceiving ourselves as ―forms borrowed from the external 
world‖ (Bergson 1950, p.153-154).67 Affection that goes from the body to the 
image is never returned or turned backward. That which the body inputs and 
that which it outputs (e.g. air, water, effort) is always processed differently. The 
same never remains the same (1950, p.153). As we have seen, for Bergson, 
the aesthetic emotion is ―suggested‖ but not ―caused‖ (1950, p.17); in other 
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words, it is not triggered. Affectivity is not in the transfer of the suggested 
power, as Hansen claims, but rather in the richness of its emotions, feelings and 
ideas.  
Actually, it is only the ―illusion of consciousness‖ which, according to Bergson, is 
accustomed to think in terms of ―space‖ and therefore that which is intensive will 
be thought of as extensive (1950, p.26).68 Otherwise, pure psychic states are 
not quantitative, and do not occupy space or have a magnitude (1950, p.21) as 
we have seen. Rather than being a separate force acting on the body, as 
Hansen claims, psychic states, emotions and feelings progress qualitatively in 
the body, altering the nature of other sensations and fundamental emotions 
which, in turn, join the experienced sensation (1950, p.27).69 Indeed, we can 
say it is as if the body summons itself from inside, calls its muscles and organs 
to join together, answer one another, be there for each other and unite in their 
pleasures and sufferings. Affectivity is then intensified by such sympathetic 
contraction, whether physical or emotional, accompanying the psychic 
phenomena in relation to its own or individual particularities. This enables it to 
prefigure future movement or attitude. 
A large number of psychic states are accompanied, in fact, by 
muscular contractions and peripheral sensations. Sometimes these 
superficial elements are co-ordinated by a purely speculative idea, 
sometimes by an idea of a practical order. In the first case there is 
intellectual effort or attention; in the second we have the emotions 
which may be called violent or acute: anger, terror, and certain 
varieties of joy, sorrow, passion and desire (1950, p.27). 
This intellectual or emotional coordination between psychic states, muscular 
contractions and peripheral sensations does not allow any bodily element to 
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isolate itself from the body as Hansen claims. Those elements that isolate 
themselves from the body to act on it, either from within or without, in the first 
place, detach themselves from the body. Whatever forces or actions they 
exercise on it is, then, solely of their own but are foreign and a burden to the 
body. Thus, they require power to force the body to submit. 
Hansen‘s account seems to lack elaboration of the affectivity account he 
advances, for example it does not explain what constitutes the body‘s feeling of 
itself more than itself or how the bodily activity produces affects, in order to 
allow us to identify it with the versions described by Bergson. If we consider 
Stern‘s description of the process of ―affective attunement‖ (Stern 1998), which 
Hansen links to physical contact, we find that it does not necessarily require 
bodily interaction or response as Hansen conceives. Moreover, the incapability 
of the cinema and the capability of new media to initiate such affects are not 
clear.  
According to Stern, the display of categorical affects such as sadness can be 
directly felt by the viewer where evolution and experience has made the 
transposition of feelings between individuals comprehensible. On the other 
hand, Stern has emphasized that vitality affects can be felt by the viewer 
precisely by automatic transposition of perceptual qualities (time, intensity and 
shape) into feeling qualities, specifically those related to people. He provides 
the example of how an arm gesture, instead of being transposed as a 
perceptual quality, is experienced as ‗forceful‘ in terms of vitality affects (1998, 
p.158). Vitality affects are experienced from within, as in others‘ behaviour 
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(1998, p.54), but they differ from categorical affects in that they are not 
identified by activation (amount of intensity and urgency of feeling quality) and 
hedonic tone (the degree of the pleasurability of the feeling quality) (1998, 
p.55). They are not limited to categorical affects.  
Stern gives the example of ‗rush‘ as a vitality affect; one could not determine 
whether the ‗rush‘ is due to anger, joy, a perceived flooding of light or an 
immeasurable wave of feeling evoked by music. All of these can be felt as 
‗rushes‘. Moreover, dancing could reveal multiple vitality affects in that it 
expresses a way of feeling rather than the content of feeling (1998, p.56). In this 
way, vitality affects are experienced before the formal acts. Vitality affects 
precede the sensorimotor connection with the interface, proving that this level 
could be achievable by the cinematic close-up. Stern has already clarified that a 
vitality affect ―resides in virtually any behaviour one can perform and thus 
provides a continuously present (though changing) subject for attunement‖ 
which could be made with inner quality of feeling. They are not about what 
behaviour is performed but how a behaviour, any behaviour, is performed 
(1998, p.175). Stern stresses that this aspect has actually been addressed in 
the art domain and that it is the understanding of art that will help us to 
understand behaviour. Different art forms present us with vitality affects. Stern 
points out that ―some behaviour as a form of expressionism makes attunement 
a precursor to the experience of Art‖ (1998, p.158). Stern‘s suggestion that art is 
helpful in understanding human behaviour in relation to affect, specifically 
vitality affects is directly related to Bergson (1950, p.14), who suggests studying 
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beauty produced by ―conscious effort‖ in the work of the arts and then pass on 
from art to nature.  
The characteristics that can be deduced from Hansen‘s account of the affective 
in the interaction with new media is that affects: 1) are caused by the power 
transfer of the image that appears as a corporeal shock, 2) have bodily bases 
but not emotional depth which is an affective dimension so they do not have any 
future direction, and 3) follow physical activity. In this sense, affects could be 
seen as a form of pure representative sensation, the intensity of which intensity 
depends on the degree of the strength of the external cause. Such sensations 
develop into acquired perception where the repetitions and comparisons lead to 
the association between the quantity and the effect, which suits the experience 
of Erlebnis Hansen emphasizes in his model of embodied interaction with new 
media.  
Eventually, then, there is a linear relation of experience where: the new media 
image causes perceptual sensations leading to embodied effect and response. 
This reinforces the point made in chapter two  – although Hansen criticizes the 
concept of technesis as ‗the putting of technology into discourse‘ he is 
embodying a different model of technesis, a model of discourse based on 
acquired perception that limits the embodied experience to Erlebnis, a 
momentary short-lived experience of interaction with technology.  
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4.4. Spectatorship 
4.4.1. Imitation and suggestibility 
Hansen seems to think that Deleuze does not consider the spectator in his 
analysis of cinema. In a debate with Rushton,70 Hansen (2004a, p.362) agrees 
with Rushton‘s point that by setting the expression as autonomous from the 
face, it can condition communication with the spectator‘s body. Hansen (2004a, 
p.362) considers the triggering effect of the face on the body of the spectator 
who ―undergoes a process of ‗cognitive‘ reorganization‖ in which ―the difference 
of its new configuration just is the meaning of the autonomous expression in-
itself of the face‖ (2004a, p.362). However, he disagrees that Deleuze is 
concerned with the body of the spectator but rather argues that he is focusing 
on the body of the character as part of the image. For Hansen, this extension is 
part of Rushton‘s ―own gloss on Deleuze‘s concept‖ and Hansen‘s own effort to 
bring in such a correlation. 
The correlation of the face (or the image) and the perceiving –
cognizing – feeling body of the spectator is precisely the pay-off of 
my critical appropriation–extension of Deleuze‘s work on the cinema, 
and in particular, of my effort to ‗rescue‘ Bergson‘s embodied notion 
of the center of indetermination from Deleuze‘s disembodying 
generalization of it as the abstract operation of cinematic framing 
(2004a, p.362). 
Rushton (2009) admits the absence of an explicit theory of spectatorship or 
even use of language associated with film studies in Deleuze‘s books about 
cinema (2009, p.46).71 He states that research in film studies and screen theory 
has been informed by Deleuze‘s non-cinematic work due to the difficulty of the 
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cinema books. Yet, Rushton insists that ―an implicit theory of spectatorship can 
be found in the Cinema books‖ (2009, p.47) which, unlike the trends in screen 
theory, sees the passivity of the spectator who is hypnotized by the cinema as 
positive.  
Rushton differentiates between the two terms immersion and absorption. 
Immersion means that the film comes out to the spectator, the latter is 
conscious of the film to be there for him, to attract or arouse him, in other words 
the spectator is aware of his own subjectivity. Rushton links immersion to 
physical interaction where the participant feels his mastery for controlling the 
film which becomes the object for him (2009, p.52). Absorption, on the other 
hand, means that the viewer goes into the film (2009, p.49), and there is a loss 
of subjectivity due to bodily sensations of occupying the space of another world 
or of being another being by which one becomes the object (2009, p.51). 
Rushton aligns his position on Deleuze‘s spectatorship with the latter. 
Deleuze throws down a quite extraordinary and risky challenge: that 
we lose control of ourselves, undo ourselves, forget ourselves while 
in front of the cinema screen. Only then will we be able to loosen the 
shackles of our existing subjectivities and open ourselves up to other 
ways of experiencing and knowing (2009, p.53). 
Rushton‘s prospect is interesting but as Deleuze poses the cinema as 
transformation of philosophy, as mentioned in chapter two, it is reasonable to 
build a Deleuzian approach of spectatorship based on this relation with other 
Deleuzian work. However, this research is focusing primarily on the arguments 
related to Hansen, Deleuze and Bergson. The discussion of spectatorship is 
therefore restricted to the influence of Deleuze‘s transformation of Bergson‘s 
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works on spectatorship, which results in seeing the cinema as embodied or as a 
centre of indetermination.  
It is important to notice that spectatorship follows a relational approach and not 
a transformational one. Deleuze‘s objective is to transform Bergson‘s theory of 
embodiment to show how the cinema and its operations can be embodied 
rather than abstract (there is a cinema eye, cinema consciousness or 
perception, cinema can affect and be affected in human ways as well as in/non-
human or superhuman ways peculiar to its being ‗in itself‘).  
A relation is what defines the whole or duration. For Deleuze, the relation ―is not 
a property of objects, it is always external to its terms. It is also inseparable from 
objects, and displays a spiritual or mental existence‖ (Deleuze 2005a, p.10). 
This spiritual existence or reality means the relation expresses a qualitative 
change in duration or a whole that is always open. As spectatorship is a 
relation, the focus is not the object/subject nor the going into/coming out 
movements of either the film or viewer into the other‘s space. This is a 
peripheral matter where the central point is the ‗coincidence‘ of the subject and 
the object and the qualitative change of the whole. The absorbed at this point, 
as quoted previously, ―does not transform itself into either objects of perception 
or acts of the subject.‖ For this reason, spectatorship could be based on 
Bergson‘s ways of assembling affective or psychic states.  
For Bergson and Deleuze, experiencing the artwork is characterized by the 
uniqueness of the subject, where subjectivity emerges due to the weaving of 
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different feelings, ideas, perceptions and memories. This allows ‗qualitative 
progression‘ to act only at the level of suggestibility, not imposition. In this way, 
spectatorship could be seen as a form of virtual reality where the virtual act of 
perceiving an image coincides with the real act of the body making what is 
perceived, felt and experienced by the body.  
Spectatorship as a relation is not restricted to moments or temporaries, as 
argued by Hansen, but extends to the changing duration. This could be seen as 
the virtual dimension of the film, which is called the out-of-field. It refers to ―what 
is neither seen nor understood, but nevertheless perfectly present‖ (Deleuze 
2005a, p.17) as a continual, immanent to the movement or image duration in its 
relative aspect and to the whole universe in its absolute aspect.72  
Rushton argues that, for Hansen, the aim of the ―communication‘‘ between the 
human and the computer is the exchange of information (2004, p.354). Rushton 
(2004, p.355) believes that the realm of the virtual for Deleuze is ―beyond 
information and, for this reason, it does not include a ‗communication 
exchange‘.‖ Actually, it does include a form of ‗communication exchange‘ that 
makes the frame or the closed set ―informatic‖ by communicating data to 
spectators (Deleuze 2005a). The virtual, for Deleuze, is determined by duration 
or the opening whole which he describes as a ―thread‖ that passes through 
each frame and connects the frame to other systems; a relational movement 
from being to becoming. This is evident in the relative aspect of the out-of-field, 
which can be validated when the virtual is actualized within the duration of 
closed sets of images and becomes visible, so that the image acquires more 
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space by the addition of the imaginary space. The thread, which links the ‗seen‘ 
set to the ‗unseen‘ set that turns to be seen or to infinity, gets ‗thicker‘ through 
acquiring more actualisable relations with other sets or systems. It could be 
inferred correctly that the words ‗unseen‘ and ‗seen‘ and the other system 
cannot but refer to the human system. This system forms the bases for 
Deleuze‘s transformation to what Colman calls a ciné-system that is defined, 
used and depicted to function according to the way its body functions, and 
forms relationships between its elements, social and becoming aspects 
(Colman 2011, p.22). The out-of-field is to be actualized or expressed in the 
other system and bears the possibility of being true as an actualization in the 
succession of the sets of the closed system.73  
Spectatorship,  here, is based on the prefiguration of action where ―what the 
viewer perceived … was a sensory-motor image in which he took a greater or 
lesser part by identification with the characters‖ (Deleuze 2005b, p.3). The 
absolute aspect of the out-of-field does not return communication exchange of 
information and thus it is not ‗informatic‘. This aspect is transspatial, open to 
spirit, which is the whole that is constantly changing due to its relations, and 
time. It ―testifies to a more disturbing presence, which cannot even be said to 
exist, but rather to ‗insist‘ or ‗subsist‘, a more radical Elsewhere, outside 
homogeneous space and time‖ (Deleuze 2005a, p.18). The relation to the whole 
is virtual and thus the thread, here, is ‗very fine‘ to assure the openness and 
continuity of the frame or the whole film to the universe. It could be argued that 
the medium does not support such potentiality of returning communication 
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exchange or such potentiality might actually be beyond any medium. However, 
it should be emphasized that the change in the whole or duration does not 
always happen within transformative movement brought in by the subject but 
also as a translation taking place through relation or becoming of the changing 
whole that includes both the human and the cinema as described in chapter two 
of this thesis.  
A change in identification occurred during the post-war where the dynamic 
assembling of psychic states was transformed to the cinema. Here, ―the 
character or the viewer, and the two together, become visionaries‖ (Deleuze 
2005b, p.18). The viewers are now included in the film, where they find 
themselves ―in front of ‗descriptions‘, in front of optical and sound-images, and 
nothing more‖ (Deleuze 2005b, p.3). At the same time, ―the character has 
become a kind of viewer‖ where they ―reacted to situations; even when one of 
them found himself reduced to helplessness, bound and gagged, as a result of 
the ups and downs of the action‖ (Deleuze 2005b, p.3). 
Noting Hansen‘s major claim about Deleuze‘s inadequate transformation of 
Bergson‘s theory, this is a key difference between Hansen‘s transformation of 
embodiment and Deleuze‘s. Hansen transforms the embodiment of the female‘s 
body to technology or new media thus establishing within his critique a univocal 
set of relations. This is because he restricts the embodiment to functional or 
operational perspectives (e.g. pregnancy), and limits technological situations to 
a certain form of interaction conditioned by acquired perception and momentary 
experience, that is “Erlebnis”. Consequently, the determination in the relational 
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constituents of embodiment, that is affection and perception, situates the 
variation in technology or media, which makes their qualities meaningless, as, 
observed in the analysis of Hansen‘s work in chapter two.  On the other hand, 
this determination leaves the spectator with nothing that could hold its interest 
as explained in chapter three. In other words, spectatorship in Hansen‘s work 
becomes moments of temporalities guided by acquired perception, which could 
fall into the realm of a habit where it causes the same intensity, affective 
response and action. Therefore, it becomes a form of a non-spectatorship 
experience. In contrast, what should define spectatorship in Deleuze is that the 
embodied cinema provides different forms of perception and affection as 
presented in chapter two. Here, spectatorship should be defined by the duration 
and its openness to the whole as pointed out previously. This also means the 
embedding of different relations between the embodied cinema and the 
embodied human that vary based on the interacting participants; different 
images and different human beings. This variation in relation is brought about 
by the use of different cinematic techniques such as framing, cutting and 
montage, and the varying ways subjects experience them.  
Rushton‘s analysis seems to recognise one aspect of this spectatorship related 
to ―qualitative progression‖ where the work of art puts the spectator in a 
hypnotic state. This process, of what Rushton calls absorption, falls within the 
imitation-suggestion in the work of Bergson and Deleuze and which is taken 
further by Thrift (2007). Bergson argues, art induces the viewer into a hypnotic 
state: 
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we shall perceive that the object of art is to put to sleep the active or 
rather resistant powers of our personality, and thus to bring us into a 
state of perfect responsiveness, in which we realize the idea that is 
suggested to us and sympathize with the feeling that is expressed. In 
the processes of art we shall find, in a weakened form, a refined and 
in some measure spiritualized version of the processes commonly 
used to induce the state of hypnosis (Bergson 1950, p.14).  
Thrift devises the study of imitation and suggestibility to understand affective 
contagions. These phenomena are effected through hypnotic paradigms, 
making certain objects fall into the interest of psychopathologic (e.g. 
hallucinatory) and spiritual forms of communication, leading to a 'take over' of 
the subject/object relations. Affects, in this sense, are flows moving through the 
bodies of humans and other beings, which in turn become passages that 
process, receive, interpret and transmit them. Space is the conditioning 
environment to ‗prime‘ and ‗cook‘ affects based on pre-discursive means that 
allow changes in bodily states. These changes have their biological roots which 
challenge the body as a ‗fixed component‘ of humanity and call for ―cartographic 
imagination in order to map out the movement between corporeal states of 
being which is simultaneously a change in connectivity‖ (2007, p.236).  
Affective contagion is the norm where imitation, perceived as a higher level of 
cognitive function rather than simple emulation or mechanical copying, is rapid, 
semiconscious, automatic and foreshadowed by suggestibility that influences 
the person‘s spontaneous thinking (Thrift 2007, p.240). For Thrift, the effect of 
automatism, taking the body as the medium for transmitting unconscious 
affective forces and thoughts, is evident in Western cultures, which have 
become vulnerable to emergent events and political inventions. The change in 
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the affective time structure, where brief moments of engagement and 
attachment are paralleled by moments of disengagement and detachment, has 
become a dominant condition. Specifically, affects such as anxiety, obsession 
and compulsion are perceived as outcomes of a sense of corporeal vulnerability 
that diminishes humans‘ self-agency over their bodies and actions. Creative 
corporeality, continuous intentionality and embodied actions all need bodily 
effort effecting reluctance to engage in the embodied experience of being in the 
world, emphasizing the challenge of corporeal vulnerability (Thrift 2007, p.242). 
Media and mass media are perceived as affective techniques in two ways. First, 
they reinforce the regularity of automatism through the facilitation of the 
manipulation of time, either by speeding up the presentation through a selected 
affective platform, one which has been communicated repeatedly, or by 
deferring the presentation in order to pre-treat the work to get the deserved 
action. Second, they maximize the processes of suggestion and imitation by 
bombarding the spectators repetitively with multimedia which make the 
individuals feel that they are the originators of the thoughts and beliefs rather 
than mechanical reproducers of the ―beliefs of a charismatic other‖ (Thrift 2007, 
p.242-243).   
By pointing the corporeal vulnerability out, Thrift‘s account overcomes the 
terminological dualism between absorption and immersion presented by 
Rushton. It emphasizes that even action in the interactive paradigm can be 
automated. Interestingly, this perspective could also be used to criticize 
Hansen‘s work, which advocates the physical activity of the participant. Thrift‘s 
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account simply informs us that the embodiment of the participant Hansen 
advocates in technological situations could be the result of automating the 
participant‘s actions. Subjectivity, in this sense, could itself be no more than 
imitation where the embodied technesis equals the mechanical reproduction of 
subjectivity. To follow this discourse in Deleuze‘s books about cinema, the next 
section elaborates on the close-up.  
4.4.2. The close-up  
The close-up of the face is the main affection-image for Deleuze and Hansen. 
Deleuze asserts:  
There is no close-up of the face, the face is in itself close-up, the 
close-up is by itself face and both are affect, affection-image 
(Deleuze 2005a, p.90).  
This is an example of ‗qualitative progression‘ that unites the face and the 
close-up, altering the nature of the former as they both become affects – 
affection-images (2005a, p.90). The affect does not exist independently from 
(although it could exist independently of) the face that expresses it. The close-
up does not tear the face from the body but it implies an ―absolute change‖ that 
―calls forth the pure affect as the expressed‖, and even the space in the 
background loses its co-ordinates as singularities join in and it becomes ―any-
space-whatever‖ (2005a, p.98-99).74  
Rushton (2004, p.355) has already emphasized that by liberating the affects 
from the face to enter the realm of the virtual, the quality of the emotion is felt 
rather than thought in relation to the personhood of the subject. Rather than 
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liberation, this could be perceived as a unification intensifying the emotion itself. 
The increase in the magnitude is a result – an outcome rather than a process.  
Deleuze presents affects as a complex that it is ―made up of all sorts of 
singularities that it sometimes connects and into which it sometimes divides‖ 
and that ―it constantly varies and changes qualitatively‖ (2005a, p.108). Deleuze 
insists, ―what produces the unity of the affect at each instant is the virtual 
conjunction assured by the expression, face or proposition‖ (2005a, p.108). 
Deleuze speaks of face, affect and effect that are not anymore related to the 
state of things, to the actions, roles or individuals,  
... but the event itself, the affective, the effect, goes beyond its own 
causes, and only refers to other effects, whilst the causes for their 
part fall aside (2005a, p.109). 
 ―It is the anger of the bishop‖ (2005a, p.109). This anger, in this or that 
situation, is not any anger whatsoever but whatever. Its singularity, its power 
and quality is that of the anger of the bishop (2005a, p.109). ‗The anger of the 
bishop‘ becomes a continuous event but why, where, what, when and how the 
bishop got angry -or even who that bishop was - is the part of the event that 
becomes a historical event. This is what Deleuze seems to mean when he uses 
the word ‗extract‘. It is not based on liberation but on a qualitative continuity of 
the effect of the expressed.  
The close-up or the Digital Facial Interface (DFI) for Hansen, is based on 
Hansen‘s model of embodied experience (elaborated on in chapter two). These 
are considered as ‗alien‘ installations and ‗triggers‘ of affection identified with 
the corporeal shock, by posing the problem of forging a contact with the image 
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(Hansen 2006b, p.139). This level of embodiment is already achieved in 
cinema. Here, Deleuze conceives the shock as ―the very form of communication 
of movement in images‖ (Deleuze 2005b, p.152). Marks explains Deleuze‘s 
interest in shock in relation to Deleuze‘s image of thought, where he presumes 
that ―we think rarely and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the 
excitement of a taste for thinking‖ (Marks 2005, p.278). This is the ‗spiritual 
automatism‘ where the continuous movement or the succession of images – 
especially the irrational associations and continuous variation between images 
– does not spare time for the viewer to grasp the image or to contemplate. The 
shock, produced by the automatic movement of the image, is physically 
experienced by the viewer as it directly touches his nervous and cerebral 
system (Deleuze 2005b, p.151). This indicates that thought comes before 
consciousness.75 As Lambert and Flaxman, elaborating on Eisenstein‘s and 
Deleuze‘s description of the dialectical intellectual montage, remark: 
The mind of the spectator is forced to respond, to react, to think; and 
this, in turn, changes the shape and the sensibility of thought, which 
appears from a shadowy region that is outside the subject‘s own 
powers of autoaffection (Lambert and Flaxman 2000, p.258).  
This is a cinema of thought which ―has as correlate ‗sensory thought‘ or 
‗emotional intelligence‘‖' (Deleuze 2005b, p.154) and which defines it as a real 
vocation76 in the supreme of ‗monism‘ where action-thought indicates the 
relation between the man and the world, between man and nature, the sensory-
motor unity (Deleuze 2005b, p.156). Its circus is a coexistence of sensory and 
affective shocks that passes from the image to the concept, to affect and to the 
intellectual cinema.  
181 
 
With this effect of cinematic shock, and the shock deployed in Hansen‘s 
analysis and examples, we can see the inadequacy of Hansen‘s claims about 
Deleuze disembodying the centre of indetermination, at least at this level of 
corporeal shock.77 Yet what Hansen strips from the shock-image is the 
automatic movement characterizing cinematographic image. In new media, this 
turns to take the form of ‗deliberate contact‘ involving, against Hansen‘s efforts 
to annihilate perception as we have pointed out previously, the provision of 
instructions while interacting with the new media installation that brings the 
participant to the point of being an active cognitive agent. In this case, 
consciousness (being informed by acquired perception of intensity) comes 
before thought. Therefore, the relationship between the subject and image has 
come in the form of a reciprocal communication triggering bodily sensations; a 
shock through alienation rather than movement.  
The problem posed later on is how to continue being in contact with the 
unresponsive image where the failure to do so catalyses the participant‘s 
affective reaction of being irrelevant to the image‘s world. Hence, Hansen 
advocates the pre-cinematic regime for its manual and tactile dimension as 
affecting the embodied experience of visuality and involving the viewer more 
than the cinema that embodies, for Hansen, the illusion of image (2006b, p.127-
128). It is worth noting, here, that from our previous account in HCI we have 
learnt that, although the manual interaction is an effective contact technique in 
communication, it does not guarantee the affective engagement of the 
participant with the image. This is not only because such engagement depends 
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on the context and the participant‘s interest in the image but also because, once 
the alienation effect comes to an end and the manual interaction turns into no 
more than a contact medium, it is the virtual embodiment‘s or image‘s 
properties that become the main catalysts of affective experience.78 Indeed, 
while Hansen‘s analysis of perception as subtraction left a subject without any 
interest in the world, his reliance on the short lived corporeal shocks left a no-
shocked subject. The experience of this subject is either of perceived cause-
effect intensity of sensation without affective characteristic; that is without any 
richness in feelings. Undeniably, without this dimension the body cannot feel 
itself more than itself but it can only sense itself without even making sense of 
the affective experience, as the subject can enjoy no emotions, no colours or 
variation. The corporeal shock represents only a sensational quality of a 
perceptual idea turning it into a bodily habit.  
4.5. Triggering affectivity and temporality 
4.5.1. Hansen’s account of time-image  
As demonstrated in chapter two about embodied perception, in order to 
understand Hansen‘s conceptualization of the embodied affection of the ‗centre 
of indetermination‘ in new media, we turn to neurocognition, in particular, 
Varela's project of naturalizing phenomenology (Varela 1995;  2000), which is a 
better match for Hansen‘s phenomenological account than Bergson and 
Deleuze. Hansen defines affectivity as ―the capacity of the body to experience 
itself as ‗more than itself‘ and [it] thus, deploys its sensorimotor power to create 
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the unpredictable, the experimental, the new‖ (2006b, p.7). He defines 
―affection-image as interruption of the sensorimotor circuit‖ (2006b, p.166) 
where the image is perceived as a ‗trigger‘ of affectivity, definitions that can be 
explained within Varela and Depraz‘s work.79  
In the first place, however, we should pinpoint the points of departure between 
their work and Hansen‘s presentation. The first of these is that their work does 
not imply the separation between perception and affection (Varela 2000; Varela 
and Depraz 2005). Actually, recent work carried out by Marc Lewis (2005) on 
emotion theory in relation to neurobiology and psychology deals with this issue 
in terms of part-whole vision. For Lewis, neurobiology is more concerned by the 
parts, that is the brain-circuit analysis, and ignores the whole, whereas 
psychology takes the opposite direction as a way of viewing the emotion-
cognition relationship. His theoretical work emphasizes the primacy of the 
integration and the inseparability of emotions and appraisals which he supports 
by pointing out the anatomical and functional overlap in all neural circuit levels 
of the brain‘s systems.80 In agreement with other researchers, he asserts that 
the separation could be at a psychological level and the duality between them, 
while considering their interdependence, should be noted for heuristic purposes. 
He informs us that:  
Tucker is not surprised that, when examining neural circuits at all 
levels, we find no separation of cognitive functions from emotional 
functions, thus losing the functional categories with which the 
analysis began. In fact, much like Colombetti & Thompson, he 
suggests that these isolated functions are ‗psychological fictions‘, 
and losing them may be a necessary step in the development of 
more sophisticated neuropsychological models. Tucker goes on to 
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suggest that the embedding whole in psychological terms is the self, 
and that this corresponds to the vertical integration of neural activities 
reflecting both past and present needs and demands (Lewis 2005, 
p.231). 
Varela identifies his position as expanding the phenomenological account in 
relation to temporality and affects in a way, we can claim, that is close to 
Bergson. Hansen is right, thus, that Varela‘s analysis suggests ―the necessity of 
introducing into the experience of temporality the very same ‗impurity‘ – the 
impurity of affection‖ found in Bergson‘s account (Hansen 2006b, p.250) and 
evident in Deleuze‘s work. Second, Varela announces his departure from the 
phenomenological account that perceives the ―duality‖ between affection and 
consciousness in relation to time. By seeking a ―non-dual synthesis‖ (Varela 
2000, p.25) of a cognitive agent, Varela and Depraz  (2005, p.154) emphasize, 
first, the placement of ―altered‖ affect at the ―very core of temporality‖ or 
perhaps as ―its antecedent‖.81 They insist 
This means that our exploration here departs from the generally 
accepted view in the phenomenological tradition, since we do not 
base our analysis on an original temporality that would, itself, 
structure affect (2005, p.154). 
Bearing the avoidance of the problematization of the chicken-egg, affection-time 
and affection-perception primordiality in mind leads us also to notice that, for 
both Varela and Bergson, consciousness is something, rather than 
consciousness of something and consciousness is sensation rather than 
consciousness of sensation. Here, then, we need to have a digression with the 
time-image and the theoretical differences Hansen elaborates on between the 
Deleuzian cinema and new media artworks. In Time and Free Will (1950, 
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p.181/190), Bergson puts forward the question, ―is time space?‖ In his 
neurophenomenological analysis, Varela (2000) replies to this question, though 
not to Bergson, with ―the spacious present‖. We are in the realm of time-
consciousness: ‗real duration‘ (Bergson) and ‗nowness‘ (Varela), the direct 
presentation of time (Deleuze) and the expanded now (Hansen). Varela‘s 
(2000) initiative of exposing the temporality of natural dynamical systems is 
based on the Husserlian analysis of temporality and a Neurocognitive analysis. 
Husserl identifies retention and pretension as two important categories of 
temporality. Instead of seeing time as objective linearity consisting of past, 
present and future moments, for Husserl, the present moment‘s experience 
constitutes retention and protention. While retention is the just past experience‘s 
shading in the present and thus it is not yet fully past that is a memory, 
protention is an anticipated future shading in the present that is not yet a fully 
future event. Dostal (2006) asserts, ―There is certain symmetry in the 
constitution of the lived experience of time; both protention and retention are 
essential to the account and both are distinguished, respectively, from memory 
and hope‖ (2006, p.147). As the time goes by, the retentional shading fades 
until it wholly trails away from the present succeeding moments to become a 
memory, and the future shading thickened until the future moment is the 
present moment.  
Varela‘s analysis shows that for a cognitive act to be completed it passes 
through three scales of temporality. The first one is elementary events or the 
neuronal-level constitutive events (the ‗1/10‘ scale), which are represented by 
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the time of a fusion interval (ranging from 10 to 100 milliseconds) that is 
perceived as ―the minimum distance needed for two stimuli to be perceived as 
non-simultaneous‖ (2000, p.6). The elementary events are regarded as synaptic 
integrations which give rise to incompressible micro-cognitive phenomena 
among which are perceptual moments and iconic memory, excitability circles 
and subjective time quanta.  
The emergence of the complete cognitive act is triggered by specific reciprocal 
determination of cell assemblies (CAs). Cell assemblies are distributed and 
actively interconnected subsets of neurons that engage different and separated 
geographical regions of the brain, forming dynamical networks. Neural activity 
from multiple regions forms transient aggregates of phase locked signals, which 
cause the ensembling of the cells. This grouping is related to the situation in 
order to ―constitute meaningful contents in meaningful contexts for perception 
and action‖ (2000, p.7). Varela defines three casual and temporal levels of 
emergence that form the genesis and determination of CAs. These are first the 
onto-genetic level which sets the anatomical architecture of a given 
brain into circuits and subcircuits; a second, developmental-learning 
level: sets of neurons that are frequently co-active strengthen their 
synaptic efficacies; and a third level of determination for CAs‘ 
constitution. The third level is the faster time scale of the experience 
of immediate daily coping, which manifests at the perception-action 
level, a duration of the order of seconds (2000, p.7). 
The second scale (the 1-scale) emphasizes that CAs have relaxation or holding 
time followed by a bifurcation phase. This time is longer than the time of 
elementary events (neural activity) and comparable to the completion of the 
cognitive act. Here, neural synchronization of the ensembles takes place as 
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bifurcations of phase transitions where new circles begin. This represents a 
perceptual shift, and is reflected based on the ‗hold‘ time of ensembles and the 
number of CAs. The integration-relaxations at the 1-scale are strict correlates of 
present-time consciousness. The integration in moments of ‗nowness‘ gives rise 
to broader temporal horizons. The third and final scale is the descriptive-
narrative assessments (the ‗10‘ scale), which is linked to linguistic capacities 
(2000, p.9).  
Affection, as Varela states (2000, p.27), prefigures the change in perception. 
That is, an emotional change accompanies the sudden perceptual shift (2000, 
p.23). As we have seen, the triggering event or phase that interrupts the orderly 
behaviour of the system and, as Lewis presents it, the appraisal-emotion events 
is important for Varela and Lewis‘s neurobiological and psychological emotional 
interpretation account. This triggering phase marks a phase transition that 
defines the first moment of emotional episode (time-0) in the psychological 
model and starts off temporal instability in the biological system. Novelty 
emerges as the system elements interact among themselves to reach stability 
and orderliness. That is, the triggering event changes the appraisal-emotion 
events in relation to the context and inner state characteristics. 
Of importance to the previous account, first, is that the developmental-learning 
level of emergence is based on co-activation, that is, habitual rather than 
rememorative (2000, p.9). A second evolving point is that time-consciousness, 
for Varela and Depraz, is ―guided by the experience of the future‖ (Depraz 2008, 
p.249). Varela emphasizes that, while Husserl‘s analysis of time is static, giving 
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the impression that retention and protention are symmetrical, his own analysis 
perceives protention as asymmetrical to retention. The protentional aspect of 
consciousness has an intrinsic sense of agency for action based on controlling 
the anticipatory processes that precede the action itself. Depraz and Varela call 
this ―self-previousness‖; that is, a temporalization process open to the 
indetermination of the future (2008, p.248). This involves an indetermined 
anticipatory sense of content (what I am about to experience) and a relatively 
determined sense of self (what I am going to experience) (Gallagher and Varela 
2001, p.30-32).  
Providing this understanding of protention, Varela is close to Bergson, who sees 
the present as a whole as a perception of both immediate past that is sensation, 
and immediate future that is action. Movement prolongs or extends the 
sensation to action, thereby making the present sensorimotor (Bergson 2004, 
p.177). Consciousness is preoccupied by determining the undetermined future 
(Bergson 2004, p.194) and prefiguring the future action, which remains 
realizable but not yet realized (Bergson 1950, p.211). Bergson describes the 
present as the ―infinitesimal element of the curve of time‖ that indicates the 
future (2004, p.177). This metaphor of movement to the ‗curve‘ flowing in time is 
essential in establishing a feeling of grace as we have seen in our previous 
analysis of qualitative progression.  
Still, might not we say, then, that for Deleuze it is the frame, the movement-
image, that is the moment of the present? Its content is defined by a tendency 
that is never accomplished. Its closing is never absolute and its wholeness is 
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never ‗closed‘ but ‗open‘ to connectivity, integration and communication through 
a thread that is manifested in an actual or virtual relation. It is the movement 
that expresses such change or articulates duration (Deleuze 2005a, p.18-30). It 
is not surprising, then, that Varela points out that the ‗now‘ moment or centre of 
temporality of the mental act corresponds to a frame or window of simultaneity 
of the integrated components and holds for the duration (2000, p.6). Precisely, 
this moment of nowness, this frame, is heterogeneous to all those others that 
have just preceded or will just follow in the temporal horizon because, simply, it 
does not depend on the ‗ticking clock‘ but on the dynamic integration and 
aggregation of heterogeneous, non-linear brain elements. Its ‗ticking clock‘ 
duration, that is, its space, its semantically measured time, is artificial. But is not 
what Varela is saying regarding cognition also what Bergson says about 
psychic states?  
Indeed, Varela announces his second point of departure from phenomenology. 
As Varela and Depraz (2005, p.156) point out the affect-emotion remarks time-
consciousness‘s openness to an emotional space that contains the source of 
the protention. They put it: 
Our focus here has been to argue that affect-emotion is not simply 
one among many types of aspects of lived experience; they are 
generative for consciousness itself (2005, p.174).82 
The previous account of Varela could be aligned with Bergson‘s qualitative 
progress of consciousness where he defends his thesis of real duration against 
the illusions of reflective consciousness. Bergson insists that duration within us 
is: 
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A qualitative multiplicity, with no likeness to number; an organic 
evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure 
heterogeneity within which there are no distinct qualities. In a word, 
the moments of inner duration are not external to one another 
(Bergson 1950, p.226). 
Thus correcting the three illusions of perceiving time, Bergson asserts that, first, 
psychic states are pure quality, unextended and do not have magnitude 
(discussed previously); and, second, real duration is a dynamic progress of 
psychic state processes. It is the time ―flowing‖ and not the time ―flown‖ (1950, 
p.226). Third, real duration is deep-seated psychic states which are 
heterogeneous where each state cannot reoccur; what seems the same is 
always new because it occurs in a different moment and has its own life-story 
(1950, p.200). Consciousness cannot measure the real duration, the internal, 
but homogeneous time.  
What seems important for all the previous accounts is the interval (Bergson), 
the relaxation time followed by phase transition (Varela), or the cut (Deleuze). 
As we are aware of Hansen‘s inadequate interpretation of Deleuze, we come to 
his claim that  
When Deleuze suggests that invention in the cinema doubles and 
must be doubled by invention in the brain – that new circuits in 
cinema generates new cerebral circuits – he effectively renders the 
time-image something that can only be thought. Put another way, by 
strictly correlating the presentation of the outside in cinema with a 
modification of the brain, Deleuze asserts a direct transmission of the 
force of time into thought (Hansen 2006b, p.249).83  
The use of the words transmission, brain and thought here is of importance 
because it again has the same assumption that time has been presented and 
then transmitted into thought rather than time being directly presented and this 
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presentation is defined with the temporal consciousness of the viewer. Deleuze 
differentiates between the movement-image and the time-image precisely by 
this direct ‗presentation‘ of time as he, like Bergson and Varela, confirms the 
heterogeneity of the moment of nowness and, simultaneously, sets the interval 
free. For Deleuze modern cinema is, 
defined by a reversal where the image is unlinked and the cut begins 
to have an importance in itself. The cut or the interstice, between two 
series of images no longer forms part either of two series: it is the 
equivalent of an irrational cut, which determine the non- 
commensurable relations between images. It is thus no longer a 
lacuna that the associated images would be assumed to cross; the 
images are certainly not abandoned to chance, but there are only 
relinkages subject to the cut, instead of cuts subject to the linkage 
(2005b, p.205-206). 
The irrational cut is what brings the viewer‘s consciousness in direct contact 
with the ‗flowing‘ time rather than the time which has 'flown‘. Moreover, what is 
at stake by speaking of the brain and cerebral circuits and the innovation of the 
cinema is the activation of neurons where the cinema initiates new cognitive 
acts that could activate different brain circuits. This effect of mirroring or 
simulation theory has been evident in social theory and investigated in learning 
new skills, mind reading and inner states of others.  
Contrasting new media works to Deleuze, Hansen focuses on time as discrete 
quantified units by pointing to techniques of slow (Douglas Gordan) or fast (Bill 
Viola) recording and their experiential effects. While the first is correlated with 
‗affective anticipation‘, the second is correlated with the imperceptible and non-
lived content. Douglas Gordan‘s work of slowing motion, 24-Hour Psycho, 
exemplifies the interstice between images and temporality,84 and could be 
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viewed in relation to the movement-image where the cut forms a ‗shift‘, 
occurring ―once every twelve seconds‖ that the associated images cross 
(Hansen 2006b, p.244). Although the production of the out-of-field effect might 
be affected by slow motion and voicelessness, there is certainly a causal 
relation taking the form of idea, feeling of effort and action (Bergson 1950, 
p.211) in Hansen‘s description:   
Because the image changes only once every twelve seconds, 
viewers quickly find their attention intensely concentrated on 
anticipating this moment of change. 
Where  
this process of anticipation becomes ever more affectively charged, 
to the point of becoming practically unbearable (2006b, p.244-245). 
Generally, we cannot say that this shift does not coincide with the lived duration 
of the viewer or that it does not involve modifications in the neural system. But 
this is not the point. The point is that the shift is anticipated, affected or 
prefigured in the space of prior consciousness. In this sense, it is not a direct 
presentation of real duration in unconsciousness, understood by time-image, as 
we cannot claim that it is ―mediated by the process of non-conscious neural 
dynamics from which the now emerges continually and perpetually‖ (Hansen 
2006b, p.253). Bergson puts it as follows: 
Hence there is no question here of duration, but only of space and 
simultaneities. To announce that something will take place at the end 
of a time t is to declare that consciousness will note between now 
and then a number t of simultaneities of a certain kind (1950, p.116). 
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It does not free the interval where the viewer can ―recover possession of 
oneself, and to get back into pure duration‖ in order to ―act freely‖. First, it 
should be observed that this account informs us that the time-image for Hansen 
appears as being anticipated which means that, similar to our previous account, 
consciousness comes before affection. This brings us to the third point of 
departure between Hansen and Varela where Hansen (2004b) explores the 
―technical expansion of self-affection‖. While Hansen foregrounds self-
affectedness or subjectivity, Varela and Depraz emphasize that ―self-affection is 
from the very start traversed by alterity‖ (2005, p.154). Varela objects to 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty‘s treatment of time as self-affectedness making it 
―a key insight into the nature of consciousness‖. Varela quotes Heidegger: 
... even the most precise consciousness of which we are capable is 
affected by itself or given to itself. The very word consciousness has 
no meaning apart from this duality (Varela 2000, p.24) 
Varela and Depraz (2005, p.154) term this ‗valence‘. Valence generally 
describes the organic somatic neurobiological level (amygdala, hippocampus) 
of analysing our intersubjective bodily attitude. It refers to the level of 
subpersonal neuro-vegetation system of the micro-bodily dynamic generation of 
intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity is based, at this level, on primary, 
involuntary attraction and repulsion dynamics which are anchored in our 
somatic organization. These attraction/repulsion dynamics are manifested in the 
polarization of affective sensory modalities (positive/negative, 
pleasure/displeasure, gust/disgust) which informs the initial dynamic of our 
interpersonal relationship with others; that is, the immediate feeling of being 
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attracted or repelled by the other. Other levels (phenomenological level, 
affection, that is the movement that informs self-other folded coupling, and 
psychological level, i.e. emotion-constituted affects which the individual 
oscillates between, e.g. binary affects) inform the intersubjective coupling.  
This is in agreement with Hansen that  
Viola‘s aesthetic experimentation with new media intensifies the now 
by literally overloading it with stimuli (units of information)85 that are 
properly imperceptible (that is, imperceptible to natural perception) 
(2004b, p.610).  
In relation to time, the transition of affects in Viola‘s works, such as Quintet of 
the Astonished, is built in through the technique of shooting in high speed and 
playing back in slow motion, which extends the time of experiencing the 
intensified affects. On the other hand, it should be noted that the expansion in 
the technical moment does not correspond with the expansion of the ‗biological‘ 
moment. Although, it is reasonable that the intensity of the affective image 
intensifies the biological ‗nowness‘, there is no reason to think that the image‘s 
ticking-clock is the biological ticking-clock or that the latter will keep ticking 
identical ticks until it concedes with the ‗minute shift‘. In other words, if we 
retrain the missing half-second from Massumi‘s account, there is no reason to 
think that the following half-second will be missing, even if the intensity effect of 
the image continues.   
The distinction Brian Massumi draws between intensity (affect),86 depth 
reactions and free higher functions, in his book Parables for the virtual: 
Movement, affect, sensation (2002), is worth mentioning here because it 
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precisely marks a critical difference when compared to Hansen‘s account of 
triggered affectivity. Massumi differentiates between intensity or affects and 
emotions where the latter is defined as ‗qualified intensity‘, that is intensity is 
extended into communicable forms.  
Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of 
insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed 
progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function 
and meaning. It is intensity owed and recognized (Massumi 2002, 
p.28).   
Massumi asserts that affects are autonomic reactions manifested in the skin. 
They are incipient happenings in the body and their incipiency is just captured 
but to be missed in the experimental ‗half of a second‘, in the Deleuzian-
Bergsonian ‗interval of virtuality‘ and in neuroscience‘s ‗bifurcation shift‘ or ‗time-
0‘ to mark the emergence of the new.87 It impinges on the body and brain but is 
not yet seen by its consciousness and mind (this seems to be the qualitative 
progression in Bergson‘s account). On the other hand, the depth reactions are 
related to the qualified form/content and are associated with expectations. They 
are observed in higher levels of arousal, heartbeats and deep breathing, and 
most importantly they are a mix of conscious and autonomic reactions. 
Hansen‘s definition of affection-image falls within the range of this mix. Thus, 
although it puts a foot in the interval, the virtual or the shift, it is never there 
because consciousness keeps pulling it back, as we have seen, either by 
expectations (as in his analysis of the time-image), by instructions (as in the 
interaction with DFI) or by bodily activity (as to accord the participant‘s body the 
framing function). All of these act as concrete barriers representing the agent‘s 
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conscious resistance to affective involvement with the image, and redirecting 
the interaction towards a representative idea of acquired perception underlying 
embodiment in Hansen‘s model of technesis. 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter focuses on investigating embodied affectivity as the second 
constituent of embodiment based on the argument levelled by Hansen 
regarding Deleuze‘s inadequate transformation of Bergson‘s theory.  The 
analysis reveals an agreement between Bergson and Deleuze‘s transformation 
regarding affectivity as affection-image in relation to its ‗place‘ as noted in the 
elaboration of qualitative progression and discussion of the close-up. The 
analysis of spectatorship does not support Hansen‘s claim that Deleuze has 
disembodied the centre of indetermination or has ignored the viewer‘s body and 
feelings in his analysis of cinema. Moreover, neither Bergson nor Varela 
separate perception from affection, as Hansen advocates, but their accounts 
are comparable in relation to the heterogeneity and temporality of the moment. 
Hansen‘s claimed separation between affectivity and perception lacks evidence 
as contemporary approaches shows the opposite.  
Generally, Hansen‘s model of affectivity is positioned in relation to acquired 
perception where the intensity of the sensation is already determined due to 
cause-effect perception.  The problem we sense in Hansen‘s account is that it 
denies art its fundamental artism or aesthetics in relation to human experience, 
rather cornering it to a subordinate role. The findings of these two chapters on 
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perception and affection indicate that Hansen‘s account of embodiment is 
problematic as it departs from other theorists and reveals a lack of clarity in its 
concepts.  
4.7. Conclusion: beyond polarization 
The first phase of the transdisciplinary approach introduced an analytical study 
of the empirical research on embodiment. The findings revealed that there was 
a reduction of embodiment to image and of embodied interaction to verbal 
evaluation of the outcome, which motivated the second phase of this research. 
This latter phase aimed to overcome the previous issues through the provision 
of understanding embodiment, embodied interaction and their constituents from 
another discipline. The focus here was on the analysis of the work of Mark 
Hansen on embodiment in new media.  
Hansen claims to introduce a phenomenological model of embodiment that 
supports the scientific practice. However, Hansen‘s engagement with other 
philosophers and theorists such as Bergson, Varela and Deleuze seems more 
relevant to achieve our aim than Hansen‘s own account. This is because, on the 
one hand, Hansen poses a similar problem to HCI as his account implies 
mind/body polarization within human computer interaction which restricts its 
analysis. In HCI, as the first chapter concluded, this articulation is indirect but is 
the consequence of the experimentation strategy and measurement tools that 
favor verbal measurement over a behavioral one, thus ignoring the embodiment 
of the subject (embodied perception and affection), which in effect limits the 
virtual embodiment to representational roles. On the other hand, the polarization 
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in Hansen, which prioritizes the subject over technology, is deliberate due to his 
selection of the model of transformation, which is based on a patriarchal 
account.  
Hansen‘s patriarchal account views the technology as a woman, where the 
experience in technological situations is described as Erlebnis, which is a short-
lived subjective and corporeal experience. Technological materiality and 
qualitative autonomy are explained in relation to knowledge of the female body 
and its functions. Technological variation, situations and experiences are 
restricted to the projection of this account. Hansen‘s model of embodiment and 
his analysis of the female Digital Facial Images (DFI) falls within the interest of 
studies focusing on agent‘s abuse or misuse in HCI. These studies investigate 
verbal abuse in participants‘ direct interaction with embodied conversational 
agents (ECAs) (Brahnam and Angeli 2008; Brahnam et al. 2011; Brahnam and 
Angeli 2012). Similar abuse cases are also reported in learners‘ interaction with 
pedagogical agents (PAs) studies, although these were not intended or 
designed for such explorations (Veletsianos et al. 2008; Gulz et al. 2011). 
Brahnam (2011), looking at the historical shift from women working as human 
computers, to the emergence of electrical computers in the 1950s as their 
counterparts, emphasizes that ―computer is woman‖ is a foundational metaphor 
that has an impact on HCI second person interface design (2011, p.402). This 
feminization ―can reinforce traditionally inscribed feminine values that 
perpetuate the oppression of women‘s material and social bodies within a 
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patriarchal society‖ (2011, p.406). Brahnam stresses that such metaphors have 
influence on how people treat and relate to each other in real life (2011, p.410).  
Hansen‘s transformation becomes problematic to our understanding of 
embodiment as it fails to account for embodied interaction and experience in 
technological situations, however it is a by-product of the research. Deleuze‘s 
work, in contrast, shows us a different type of technological embodiment. The 
embodied cinema, for Deleuze, similar to the computer, has its own organs but 
instead of modeling natural perception and affection, it creates its own images 
of perception, affection and action. Three stages of development characterize 
the cinema and its images within the dimensions of movement, time and 
becoming. These are the embodied stage, as the initial or new phase, 
becoming, as the stage of development, and transcending, as a final stage of 
going beyond. The second stage is the most important. This stage is relational 
and leads to the creation of new images and virtual connections. This focus on 
relation and becoming makes cinema open to duration, where the effect of the 
extracted image can continue beyond the time of viewing.  
For Deleuze, a change in a notion can create new ways of thinking. It could be 
this that HCI requires, change in notions, focus on relations, and viewing of the 
participants and technology as becoming. Embodiment in HCI should pass the 
stage of being viewed as new and peculiar to computers, in order to be related 
to the familiar. This means it will be addressed in its stage of development, 
where the focus will be on the creation of new effects, images and relations, 
rather than equating virtual embodiment with the human and addressing 
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aspects that focus on convincing participants that the machine is human, as we 
have seen in the introduction. The evaluation of embodiment should overcome 
the reduction of the participant to their mind, as the body is not considered as 
an active determinant in this evaluation. The design and evaluation could 
benefit from building on the ‗relational dimension‘ between the machine‘s and 
human‘s embodiments instead of the ‗effectiveness‘ measure. In this way, the 
design will prompt questions on how to create relations between the two forms 
of embodiment, rather than how to create effective interfaces. It is not that the 
latter is not important, but it is a dimension of the relation or the experience and 
is not constitutive of it. 
4.7.1. Embodiment constituents  
The engagement with other philosophers and theorists has informed our 
understanding of embodied interaction and embodied constituents. Chapters 
three and four focused on embodied perception and affection. Here, a summary 
is provided of the main points found in the research of different perspectives of 
embodied perception, which are important to the design and evaluation of the 
user experience and embodiment in HCI. First, the perception of the living being 
involves different degrees and types. Its simplest form is an automatic 
movement related to the spinal cord stimulation. As a complex form, it 
addresses the process of selecting a reaction from a variety of virtual actions 
that exist due to the reciprocal relationship between the participant and the 
variation in the environment. Another form explains automatic reactions based 
on the associations of recurrent patterns between sensorimotor, perceptual 
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images and actions, which could form learned communication patterns. Second, 
distance and time are inseparable dimensions of perception, which is explained 
as a tendency towards movement or an action. Perception is defined as the 
extraction (extracting, defined previously, as bringing into focus by suppression 
or abstraction of other parts of the image) of an image of interest from the object 
and qualifying this either by developing real or virtual connections. Virtual 
representations and connections, along with participant‘s sensorimotor 
knowledge, awareness and expectations are part of the user‘s perceptual 
experience. Third, perception also counts for the activity through which the 
participant brings new information or details into view.  
This means that embodied perception can only be evaluated in its emergence 
and through the process of interaction. Studies in HCI that explore the analysis 
of participant‘s experience can make use of strategies for evaluation of physical 
activity and behaviour to evaluate perception. Other studies that aim to evaluate 
achievement should consider the correlation between the degree of complexity, 
variation and pattern‘s associations. On the other hand, the design of virtual 
embodiment should consider the extraction of those animations or physical 
activities of the character, in relation to the quality and effect the design is 
required to achieve.  As we have seen in the discussion of chapter one, the 
pedagogical agents‘ role is limited to pointers and verbal feedback; those 
pointed out by Turing in his paper in 1950. However, while the design can start 
from natural perception, it can be used to change or undo already established 
associations and produce new perceptions that enable new sensorimotor 
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grasps. It is important to think what a virtual character can do instead of what a 
human or an image can do, in order to achieve a qualitative leap in design and 
evaluation.  
The second constituent of embodied interaction is embodied affectivity. As 
elaborated, affection has bodily bases (muscles contraction), degree of depth or 
quality (richness of feelings and emotions) and intensity (conscious reaction). 
Affective states are temporal and vary during the process. Qualitative 
progression, suggestibility and temporality are three important aspects that 
come out of our analysis. First, qualitative progression means that affective 
states do not spread out, but are based on participation and the independent 
joining in of each element. That is, different muscles, feelings, emotions, 
memories and perceptions observe change in their nature due to the force of a 
certain stimuli or feeling. The degree of this change varies from one element to 
another, which means that the strength or intensity of the affective state is 
based on heterogeneous elements and thus it is subjective to individuals.  
Second, suggestibility means that the image does not impose certain effects on 
the subject, but suggests certain directions or emotions. Third, temporality 
refers to affective states in their emergence. The emergence of new emotions 
or feelings during the process, affects future actions or decisions whether at the 
time of interaction or later on. The affective dimension also explains the 
anticipation of future experience but does not guarantee its repetition. This 
explanation of affectivity provides a different way of investigating the affective 
dimension in the interaction with virtual embodiment. Instead of verbal 
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feedback, the changes in affective intensity and affections could be observed 
during the process. This facilitates the acquisition of feedback about different 
aspects or stages in the interaction, without ruling out the individual‘s 
subjectivity.      
Embodied perception and affection inform the evaluation and design of 
embodiment and embodied interaction. Besides these two, the interaction 
seems to be revealed in physical or visible behaviour. This motivates us to 
investigate the becoming and relational dimension that appears in the analysis 
of cinema, in the field of HCI. This dimension characterizes the ‗development‘ 
stage in the relationship between the human and the computer. It influences the 
evaluation or analysis of human‘s experience and interaction with computers.  
As pointed out in the research background, the lack of considering duration has 
led to addressing and evaluating embodiment and its effect as a ‗new‘ 
phenomenon. The next phase of the transdisciplinary approach has two aims. 
Firstly, it extends the understanding of this dimension through the exploration of 
Gilbert Simondon‘s work on individuation. Secondly, it intends to counter the 
issue of mind/body polarization observed in HCI and Hansen‘s accounts, by 
focusing on immanent perspective. Here, it hypothesizes that the Turing 
Machine is a heterogeneous compound, representing a relationship between 
Turing and computers that was developed through a process of becoming. In 
this sense, it provides a reading of Alan Turing‘s work based on this 
understanding. 
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5. Chapter Five: From Polarization to Immanence: 
Embodiment in AI 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous phase of this research showed that the translation of human 
embodiment into technology is crucial in actualizing these technologies and in 
determining human interaction with them. A reversal from the investment in 
machine embodiment explored in chapter one to the investment in participants‘ 
own embodiment examined through Hansen‘s account was observed. The 
studies in chapter one focused on providing an objective account for the 
evaluation of the user‘s experience of interacting with virtual embodiment. This 
was referred to as the persona effect. It showed that the participant‘s 
embodiment in the learning situation was ignored in favour of evaluating the 
effects on learning measures of transfer and retention and subjective measures 
of perception, affection, believability and usefulness through eliciting verbal 
responses after the process. Disciplinary bias reduced virtual embodiment to an 
animated image added to the interface, which acted as feedback indicators (e.g. 
arrows).  
Hansen‘s account, on the other hand, provided a subjective account based on 
restricting the user‘s experience in technological situations to Erlebnis, which 
referred to a short-lived subjective experience. It demonstrated a body/mind 
polarization where the technology‘s effect was ‗claimed‘88 to be limited to the 
body but did not entail the cognition of the participant. The gendering of 
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technology or new media (e.g. DFI images) by viewing it as a female body 
restricted technological situations and embodied interaction as described earlier 
in chapter two. Due to the nature of Hansen‘s research, in particular his 
theoretical and philosophical analysis, another account of embodied technology 
is linked to this, namely Deleuze‘s work on embodied cinema. Deleuze 
transferred Henry Bergson‘s theory of embodiment to the cinema showing that 
the cinema can perceive, affect and be affected like living beings. Moreover, the 
cinema also has its own perception and affection images. The cinema can 
shock the viewers, create virtual conjectures, induce subjective images that 
make them think, have an impact on and affect their relation to the world in the 
course of its duration.  
A particular investigation into embodied perception and affection emphasized 
that evaluation should take into account the participants‘ embodied interaction 
and physical behaviour during the process. At the same time, a movement from 
human-computer interaction (HCI) to human-computer relation (HCR) should be 
considered. This change means the design should target extracting qualities 
from embodiment in a similar way to the cinema in Deleuze‘s account. The 
extracted qualities can become ‗singularities‘ and, so they can create real or 
virtual conjectures. Virtual embodiment does not need to be restricted to real 
embodiment. Evaluation of the effects or interaction should follow a similar path 
where a focus is placed on the changing relation between the participant and 
the machine throughout the process. What makes this change important is that 
the embodiment of the machine is no longer at the stage of ‗newness‘ but has 
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moved to the stage of development or becoming. This stage, as Deleuze 
affirms, is where the essence of a thing makes its appearance (elaborated 
earlier in chapter two). However, the previous two accounts placed and 
evaluated the machine or virtual embodiment as new, thus, never taking into 
account the counter-becoming of the machines and humans, and the relations 
between them. 
This phase of the transdisciplinary approach aims to establish a constitutive 
account of the human and machine‘s embodiment, leading to innovations, 
creativity and continuity. This account intends to overcome the mind/body and 
object/subject polarizations found in the previous accounts. It attempts to grasp 
and accept two fundamental aspects: first, the multiple emergences of different 
relations that materialize from the relation between a human‘s embodiment and 
a machine‘s (i.e. Turing and the digital computer); and, second, the irreducibility 
of this relationship to be seen as an invention that has occurred within a certain 
period of time and space as a result of acquired scientific knowledge. Affectivity 
is perceived as central to both aspects.  
This part of the thesis explains the relationship between the human and 
machine‘s embodiment in relation to two accounts, Gilbert Simondon‘s and Alan 
Turing‘s. Gilbert Simondon‘s work can inform our understanding of a ‗relation‘ 
and process rather than interaction and outcome. This view can be used to 
overcome the polarization observed in the HCI and Hansen‘s account of 
embodiment. A fuller account of Simondon‘s concept of individuation will be 
given in chapter six, but here it is important to introduce the main points in 
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relation to the theme of this part of the thesis. Simondon states, ―in technical 
reality there is human reality‖ (Simondon 1980 [1958], p.11); which can also be 
understood as ‗in human reality there is technical reality‘, which should not be 
comprehended on the basis of an entire reversal but a complex integration of 
relations and becomings. He takes the initiative in thinking about the process of 
individuation instead of the individual as an outcome.  
Simondon‘s conviction was that no thinking that was in thrall to 
constituted individuals, and blind to the processes and operations 
that brought them into existence – blind to individuation, in short – 
could cope with the challenges of a technological society (Toscano 
2007, p.1).89 
For Simondon, individuation or becoming is a central dimension of the life and 
evolution of both the human being and the machine or technical being. 
Simondon‘s concept of individuation differs from the substantialist‘s self-centred 
monism that defines the unity of the individual by its essence, and 
hylomorphic‘s bipolarity that perceive the individual as ―the conjunction of a form 
and some matter‖ (Simondon 1992, p.297). Simondon focuses on the process 
that is the in-between rather than the beginning or end of the individual. In this 
sense, his approach is based on energy ―taking-form‖ or ―effect‖ that becomes 
―real‖ by passing through the ―material clinching of an effective event‖ and 
―ideal‖ by coming ―into the effective present of that energetic event as the action 
of its future‖ (Massumi et al. 2009, p.43-44). In other words, the real-time of the 
present event is defined by taking a futurity ―effect‖.  
Massumi stresses that the integral reshaping of disciplines by digital 
technologies is reflected in the human being. The question of how a being 
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‗becomes‘ has also become a question of technology as a ―constitutive factor in 
human life‖ (2009, p.38).  
becoming-human only makes sense in relation to a nonhuman 
phase-shifting into it. And becoming-posthuman only makes sense in 
terms of the human phase-shifting out of itself, back into a 
nonhuman. If the nonhuman phases in and phases out, it is 
conceivable that it phases through – which raises the issue of the 
immanence of the nonhuman to all of the vicissitudes of the human 
(2009, p.37).  
A technical culture, then, represents an interplay of human-technical 
individuations. Massumi stresses the importance of considering the ‗natural‘ 
habitat or, more precisely, the integration between the physical and biological, 
the matter and information for the emergence of the new. ―Inventivism‖ is used 
here to signify this integration and emergence within the process of becoming. 
 ―An inventivism‖ Massumi asserts, ―is not afraid of nature, and its creativity‖ 
(2009, p.38). It marks ―an action of the future on the present‖ (2009, p.39). This 
action is based on the sensitiveness to present qualities or effects of individual 
elements that when assembled bring a new self-conditioning individual into 
being. For this reason, Simondon‘s work differs from the constructivists who are 
interested in constructing ―perspectives or paradigms and the corresponding 
subject positions‖ (2009, p.37) by applying linguistic models, which ―reduced the 
constitution of the human plane to the question of human subject‖ (2009, 
p.62).90 It could be said that ―inventivism‖ for Massumi marks ‗the future of 
becoming.‘ Becoming, here, is a process marked with points such as inventions 
and discoveries, that is, crossing thresholds, rather than being thought of as ‗the 
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becoming of the future‘, perceived as time in a becoming process where there 
are points, which remark beings of future. Thought, in the latter sense,  cannot 
be grasped by the thinkers themselves but it unfolds within time and can be 
thought, only backwards more than forwards as a reasoning about a 
relationship when the relationship is blind to the future of its own becoming.  
A technical culture, for Simondon, requires a technical mentality that has 
―coherent and usable schemas for a cognitive interpretation‖ (2009, p.20) that 
allows the understanding of technical reality. In order for technical reality to lend 
―itself remarkably well to being continued, completed, perfected, extended‖ it 
needs ―a single criterion the manifestation of cognitive schemas, affective 
modalities, and norms of action: that of the opening; technical reality lends itself 
remarkably well to being continued, completed, perfected, extended‖ (2009, 
p.24). This necessitates a different science, which Simondon calls 
―mechanology‖. Mechanology‘s definition is realized in three aspects. Firstly, it 
is not a science of studying mechanisms but the ―exchanges of energy and 
information within the technical object or between the technical object and its 
environment‖ (1980 [1958], p.42). Secondly, as John Hart points out in his 
preface to the translated version of Simondon‘s doctoral thesis On the Mode of 
Existence of Technical Objects (1980 [1958]), there is an implicit reference to 
the centrality of,  
the human body with its balance, its rapport, and its emanations 
which gives to mechanology a degree of universality which put it into 
legitimate comparison with the broad extension of science 
(Simondon 1980 [1958], p.3). 
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The technical object, for Simondon, could be seen as a ―physicochemical 
system in which mutual actions take place according to all the laws of science‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.31). That is, although the technical object is designed in 
response to human needs, it is not limited to them. Its design should also be 
identified with universal scientific knowledge (1980 [1958], p.31). The former 
assures it of being a representation of a human goal, and the latter guarantees 
it being a representation of scientific knowledge where it is considered as never 
being completely known, never fully calculated, and so never completely 
concrete (1980 [1958], p.31). Therefore, it ―approximates the mode of existence 
of natural objects‖ (1980 [1958], p.40). Thirdly, mechanology postulates that the 
understanding of the role of the man and the nature of machines cannot be 
attained by scientific knowledge, which ―sees in a technical object the practical 
application of a theoretical law‖ (1980 [1958], p.15) or through the habit of using 
them. An organizing engineer who is a psychologist, sociologist or 
mechanologist of machines might be able to attain the required understanding 
(1980 [1958], p.15). 
Simondon elaborates on the human being‘s becoming in the ‗The Genesis of 
the Individual‘ (1992). A similar account of the becoming and evolution of the 
technical object is in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (1980 
[1958]). In ‗Technical Mentality‘ (2009) he outlines the conflict between the 
human and the machine that appears due to the industrial modes of production 
and attempts to define ―schemes of action‖ that mark its universal ―value code‖ 
relevant to the psychosocial level of human society.91  
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To understand this complex integration, individuation and conflict between 
machines and humans, I outline an analysis of Alan Turing‘s work on intelligent 
machinery. Turing is considered the father of computer science and the founder 
of artificial intelligence (AI). His later work on intelligent machinery (1948–1952), 
has influenced past and current trends in computing, the role of the computer, 
and technological and human science applications. The basic seed for 
machines or digital computers‘ embodiment, could be traced back as far, if not 
further, as the ―thinking machines‖ and ―learning machines‖ described by Alan 
Turing (1950s) who described his ideas as ―recitations tending to produce 
belief‖ (1950, p.455). Turing argues that machines can think, develop and be 
experienced as other living beings. He pursued the design of a universal Turing 
Machine, which refers to a digital computer with infinite memory that can imitate 
any other machine. Besides this, Turing also described the imitation game and 
the Turing test, intended to defend and demonstrate machine intelligence. 
Analyses of Turing‘s writings also imply that these settings are underlain, like 
the previous account, by a transformation of human embodiment and by gender 
issues. These initiate various debates in science as a discipline and scientific 
culture. At the same time, they also motivate research in user‘s experience or 
the persona effect of embodied software agents explored in chapter one.   
This analysis differs by viewing the Turing Machine (Machine is capitalized in 
order to emphasize its equivalent role in the compound) as a compound within 
the process of individuation rather than explaining it in the light of scientific 
rigours and hegemony or philosophical judgements. In other words, we are 
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focusing on the complexity of the relationship between Turing and machines 
itself, rather than determining the dominant term in the body/work equation, as 
observed in the previous accounts. The multiple emergences refer to Turing‘s 
papers on intelligent machinery, game and test, as well as the debates 
addressing the question ‗what was in Turing‘s mind?‘ The compound and the 
relation are elaborated in reference to Simondon‘s work and Deleuze on 
becoming and individuation. By perceiving the Turing Machine as a compound, 
the focus moves from the individual element to the whole, as a unit of 
individuation and analysis. For example, the Turings or the ‗other things‘, as I 
call them, which refer to a certain test, a game and a universal property that are 
associated with Alan Turing‘s works on machines have started to individuate on 
their own, thus bringing their own ceaseless discursive, technical and cultural 
dimensions into the computing field and machine embodiment. This 
emphasizes the relation in-between the elements, and is yet inseparable from 
them. Each term participates progressively through forming a set of relations 
between them and their environment. A relation is formed first through attraction 
between the terms and, second, through establishing a dynamic background 
with which both terms interact. 
The analysis in this part of the thesis is divided into two chapters. The first 
chapter investigates the reasons for abstracting the actual existence of the 
Turing Machine. Here, Turing Machine is repositioned within the virtual-actual 
existent realm rather than the abstract-probable nonexistent realm. It also 
examines the multiple relations emerging from Turing‘s 1950s papers, in 
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response to the question, which has repeatedly appeared in other Turing 
studies, ‗what was in Turing‘s mind?‘ The second chapter in this analysis 
introduces Simondon‘s work on becoming or individuation. Then, taking the 
analysis of Alan Turing as a case of this individuation, the Turing Machine is 
established as a compound by applying Deleuze‘s concept of ‗dark precursor‘ 
as a point of formation between two heterogeneous systems. Moreover, it 
examines the lines of becoming-same/other relationship between Turing‘s 
embodiment and machine, or machine representation in relation to the 
gendered accounts implied in both Hansen‘s and Turing‘s work.  
5.2. Turing Machine 
5.2.1. Reality of Turing Machine  
Many of the current developments in and debates about the technical and 
cultural advancement in the computer‘s role could be detected in Alan Turing‘s 
writings and as a consequence of his aim to design a Turing Machine, which is 
considered an abstract for an electronically stored-programme digital computer. 
What encourages us to reopen the Turing Machine file now is that, while the 
machine‘s embodiment becomes visible and necessary to the human‘s 
interaction, it cannot be separated from the human‘s psyche or soma anymore. 
In other words, the constructed ‗boundaries‘ between them are already 
vanishing and a sort of transmission of affect is taking place which is supported 
for example by modelling and biofeedback techniques. If Turing is regarded as 
the father of computer science, and the founder of artificial intelligence and 
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artificial life it is not ultimately because of his scientific knowledge but because 
the Turing Machine has challenged these boundaries allowing multiple 
emergences. 
Before elaborating upon the counter-becoming and multiple emergences of the 
Turing Machine relationship, which is in the next chapter, it is important to 
determine the actual reality of the Turing Machine. This section argues that the 
Turing Machine could be repositioned from being abstract or conceptual (that is 
non-existent) to being regarded as actual (that is existent), which implies virtual 
conjectures and a relation of becoming between Turing and Machine. To 
relocate the Turing Machine and Turing‘s work, this table (figure 17) is adopted 
from Rob Shields‘ book The Virtual (2005), which aims at investigating the 
virtual in relation to everyday life including virtual realities and environments. 
Shields insists that a critique of the virtual and probabilistic entities is required 
for avoiding problems and definitional debates (2006, p.284).  
The virtual, according to Shields, means ―incomplete imitation of the real‖ (2005, 
p.46) that is ―what is so in essence but not in form‖ (2005, p.22). ―Humans have 
a cognitive ability to substitute ‗what is so in essence‘ for actual things 
themselves‖ (2005, p.23). For example in calculations x, y and z are understood 
as quantity substituting actual objects. What is transferred between the virtual 
and the actual is ―a quality‖ that ―becomes the essence of the matter‖ (2005, 
p.22). He affirms that the word virtual in commonsense is deployed as ―a place-
holder for important forms of reality which are not tangible but are essential and 
necessary to our survival‖ (2005, p.19). The virtual is a multiplicity or a capacity 
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that can be actualized in different ways where its effect is known through a 
specific instantiation (2006, p.285). This provided, the table below is intended to 
give an understanding of the distinctions between the common set of categories 
that usually occurs in philosophical readings.  
 
Figure 17. Figures of speech and movement between categories of the real 
(2005, p.34) 
Abstract according to the provided table is nonexistent and to become concrete 
it requires a sudden materialization; that is a miracle. So is Turing Machine an 
ideal abstract, a myth, a fantasy or a chance happening, or is there any actual 
or concrete materiality to the Turing Machine? The reasons for the abstraction 
of the Turing Machine or its reduction to text could be pursued within two 
influences. The first one is related to the machine‘s states and materiality and 
the second one is due to the disagreement between the scientific culture and 
Turing.  These reasons and arguments are presented in the next section.  
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5.2.1.1. Machine‟s statue and materiality 
Three reasons could be said to influence the actual existence of Turing 
Machine. Firstly, the Turing Machine, which is an electronically stored-
programme digital computer, is perceived in Turing‘s final complete theoretical 
project rather than the development process of the project. Turing‘s complete 
project is to be realized in the universal Turing Machine, which is ―a type of 
machine which had a central mechanism, and an infinite memory which was 
contained on an infinite tape‖ and can imitate any other machine (Turing 2004d, 
p.379). In this quotation the word ―infinity‖ is generalized to constitute all the 
different forms of Turing Machines. As Copeland says, ―Indeed, because they 
are abstract machines, with unlimited memory, they are capable of 
computations that no actual computer could perform in practice‖ (Copeland 
2004, p. 17).  In other words, Turing Machine is perceived in holistic thought. 
Secondly, machines‘ existence is perceived in their limitations, that is ‗whatever 
they cannot do‘, or the non-existent.92 In this sense, existence is not identified 
with materiality but with that which does not exist per se; that is the limitation. 
This existence of the limitation is constitutive of the perception of a machine‘s 
corporeality, which means all that exists is already existent in its entirety that is 
fully calculated and represented. The existence, which is whatever the machine 
cannot do, is equivalent to the non-existence through a perceived perfectness. 
The existing corporeality is not existent because it is perfect, that is complete, 
flawless and attracts no further attention or calculations now and in the future. It 
has been perceived in its perfectness, and thus it belongs to the realm of 
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abstractness where ‗whatever they cannot do‘ appears in fantasy and fiction 
representations, but they will not be called into object of representation in 
science or culture any further. The non-existence within the table in figure 17 
means the probability of their futurity is a matter of chance and predication. 
Thirdly, in relation to the previous point, the concrete here is allocated to the 
hardware, and the abstract is allocated to the software. That is the software 
does not exist prior to the hardware that carries it and in which it functions. A 
problem arises when the software operates in advance of the hardware it aims 
to operate within. As Copeland states ―Turing‘s philosophy ... was to dispense 
with additional hardware in favour of software: in his design, complex behaviour 
was to be achieved by complex programming rather than by complex 
equipment‖ (2004, p. 366). Turing‘s experience of designing and developing 
machines is only considered actual, concrete or evident through the acceptance 
of engineers. The implementation is limited. The rest of the programming and 
prepositions are taken as abstract. The software is actual but in a different 
matter, that is, text and not in the matter that it is intended to be in, which is 
digital. The fact that it is in one state means that it is perceived as non-existent 
in the other state. In this sense, the relation, if not abstract, is, at best, one of 
‗prediction‘ or probability. Shields explains the probable as the ‗actual 
possibility‘, for example, ―the likelihood of rain in the weather forecast‖ (2005, 
p.25). 
This indicates that the complexity of the Turing Machine (compound) is not only 
a question of its actual existence but also of its actual cultural acceptance, as 
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well as the acceptance of the multiple emergences of Turing‘s work. The extent 
to which this actuality is foothold is examined below.  
Firstly, in relation to the first and second points, outside the infinite property, the 
Turing Machine has actual implementations. However, as pointed above 
machines are perceived in their limitations whether in carrying out different 
tasks, or in the case of the Turing Machine in the unachieved infinite property. 
Turing has rejected this view insisting that machines have actual existence and 
there are varieties of machines. Turing‘s response to this argument shows the 
progress of his work on the Turing machine. He argues,  
The objection ... in its crudest form is refuted at once by the actual 
existence of machinery (ENIAC [Electronic Numerical Integrator And 
Computer] etc.) which can go on through immense numbers (e.g. 
1060,000 about for ACE [Automatic Computing Engine]) of 
operations without repetition, assuming no breakdown (2004c, 
p.411). 
The ACE (designed by Turing and installed in 1945) is a practical version of the 
universal Turing Machine with the exception of the infinite memory and infinite 
tape (Turing 2004d, p.379). Another version of the Turing Machine was the 
implementation of the ‗Manchester baby‘ (1948), which was run in the 
Computing Machine Laboratory by Manchester University. This was followed by 
Ferranti Mark 1 (the first commercially produced electronic stored-programme 
computer) also designed by Turing (Copeland 2004, p. 16). From 1951, Turing 
worked on Mark1 to model aspects of biological growth (2004, p. 3). Copeland 
elaborates on two of Turing‘s contributions to modern computers. These are: 
―controlling the function of a computing machine by storing a programme of 
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symbolically encoded instructions in the machine‘s memory,‖ and his 
demonstration ―that, by this means, a single machine of fixed structure is able to 
carry out every computation that can be carried out by any Turing Machine 
whatsoever‖ that is the ‗universal‘ property‘ (2004, p. 15). Eventually, then, the 
Turing Machine‘s existence, regardless its actualized varieties, is perceived 
through the limitation of the property Turing proposed and that which modern 
computers still lack, which is the ―infinity.‖ 
Secondly, there is problem of allocating abstractness to the software. For 
Turing, the software was operating on what he calls the ―Paper Machine‖. The 
―Paper Machine‖ refers to a ―combination of a man with written instructions‖. 
The man is provided with a set of procedural rules, a pencil, and rubber, and is 
―subject to strict discipline‖ (Turing 2004c, p. 416).Turing used this in one of his 
experiments for playing chess. He confirms that ―playing against such a 
machine gives a definite feeling that one is pitting one‘s wits against something 
alive‖ (2004c, p.412). In this sense, it is actual (being actual here refers to its 
effect). It could be argued that the relation between the paper machine and the 
digital machine, or the code on paper and the digital code on computer in 
Turing‘s work – and even the preposition and their future achievement- is of a 
different relation than the possible or probable. It is not a case of a cloud that 
might rain or not, but that of water that constitutes the evaporation or change to 
gas within it. In this latter case, the change in state is an ‗associative‘ 
inseparable part of the state itself while in the case of cloud/rain it is based on 
repetition or temporality of occurrences, and for this reason, it is forecasted. 
220 
 
Associative in this context is used to donate a relationship between text and 
digital and whether the design or programming is developed on a paper 
machine or on a digital machine does not really matter, as it does not change 
the final products.93 The final product is experiencing the machine‘s intelligence 
and building the universal Turing Machine. The remaining task for Turing is a 
matter of physical effort in building the sufficient hardware. This might mean that 
the infinite and universal properties of the Universal Turing Machine do not fall 
within the abstract-probable but rather within the virtual-concrete. The virtual for 
Shields, 
retains its creative character as an ontological category pertinent to 
discussions of change, becoming, genesis, development, 
emergence, autopoesis, the genetic power of codes as well as of 
codings themselves (2006, p.285). 
As the paper machine‘s experiment shows, Turing attributes to machines not 
the matter they are created in, but the quality of producing certain experiences.  
Moreover, the associated relation, which occurs in the course of a digital 
computers development, is the repetition that his work, either as designs or as 
prepositions are realized in the present time and are still in the course of 
realization. This also means that the provision of alternatives of the same 
implementation - such as modem computers- does not mean that the original 
design of the Turing Machine itself is faulty or abstract. Even if the provided 
alternatives could function in a better way than the original or initial one, they 
remain alternatives provided in the course of development. In this way, they 
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have an associated relation of representing the future, that is the ‗fate‘ of the 
original design.  
An associative relation appears where the course of development shows that 
the digital functions in the same way as the text. Transformation from one 
materiality to the other becomes a matter of verification in the course of 
development rather than a miracle. This transformation is based on the 
engineers‘ and programmers‘ work. For Turing, sooner or later – in fifty years‘ 
time, a hundred years‘ time, etc. – a sufficient digital computer, better than the 
Manchester machine (1950, p.441), which in turn was better than Babbage‘s 
machine (1950, p.439), will be constructed. The program will be found, if 
programmers work as steadily as him (1950, p.445) and in the meantime, 
potentially, the universal aspect will become true. The relation between the 
digital and the text then remains within the realm of existence that is virtual-
actual rather than abstract-probable.94 
5.2.1.2. Scientific Culture and Turing 
Cultural abstraction, in the Turing Machine‘s case, could be perceived as an 
expression of rejection or denial and, at the same time, as a means through 
which scientific cultural adaptation takes place without risking its adherence to 
methodological and structural thinking. Martin Heidegger in his essay ‗The Age 
of The World Picture‘ (1976) explains how this adherence is crucial in identifying 
the essence of the scientific research. Heidegger‘s account is helpful here to 
reflect on the nature of the scientific research in the modern age and to 
understand the conflict between it and Turing. For Heidegger the essence of 
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science is research. Metaphysics of any phenomena is based on reflection 
defined as the ―courage to question as deeply as possible the truth of our own 
presuppositions and the exact place of our own aims‖ (Heidegger 1976, 341). 
Mechanical technique is not an application of modern mathematical natural 
science to practice, but an autonomous transformation of practice that demands 
the application of mathematical natural science (1976, 342). In other words, we 
do not start from mathematics and use machines to transfer it but we start from 
machines and what is required by them to work. Heidegger defines the essence 
of modern science as research through which knowledge is established.  
Modern science simultaneously establishes itself and differentiates 
itself in its projections of specific object-spheres. These projection-
plans are developed by means of a corresponding methodology, 
which is made secure through rigor. Methodology adapts and 
establishes itself at any given time in ongoing activity. Projection and 
rigor, methodology and ongoing activity, mutually requiring one 
another, constitute the essence of modern science, transform 
science into research (Heidegger 1977, p.126). 
A research is rigorous as long as the cognitive procedures or models strictly 
remain within the topic of the research field (that is projected) and adhere to its 
predetermined plans, which must be ―accessible in all the complexity of its 
layers and interlacings,‖ in order to be objective (1976, 344). To be objective, 
means that the procedure should present the facts and investigate the variables 
that cause constant changes of these facts. Facts are revealed within a rule, a 
law and spatiotemporal magnitudes of motion that is exactness. The rule means 
that the facts are permanent and permanently change due to certain factors. 
The law (e.g. hypothesis) is that change to these facts always occurs due to 
some factors (1976, 344). The methodology ensures the clarification of the facts 
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by explaining the unknown (findings) by the known (means), simultaneously 
preserving the known means by the unknown findings (1976, 345). In other 
words, it is rigorous as long as it allows replication, through which the new 
findings are explained in view of the previous findings. Scientific research is 
characterized by an ―ongoing activity‖ through which specializations (that is 
disciplines), institutionalization and adaptation of new procedures appear. This 
is because ―the methodology of the science becomes circumscribed by means 
of its results‖ (1977, p.124), which leads to singularization, individualization and 
solidarity of research topics. ―The real system of science consists in a solidarity 
of procedure and attitude with respect to the objectification of whatever is- a 
solidarity that is brought about appropriately at any given time on the basis of 
planning‖ (1977, p.126). 
Knowledge as research means that any being‘s existence is determined by the 
extent to which a researcher brings it to be an object of representation. 
Represented, the object can be bound to calculations, which allows the 
verification of its past and the calculation of its future, course in advance (1976, 
p.349; 1977, p.127). In this sense, the being must appear as object first, in 
order to be admitted to its certain existence.  
The modern age for Heidegger has brought with it an interplay of subjectivism 
and objectivism. This interplay is deployed in the event of simultaneous 
emergences of the essences of the man and the world. Through this event the 
man becomes a subject (subiectum) and the world becomes a picture (an 
object of representation) (1977, p.132). The modern man becomes a subject if 
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his essence changes and not by freeing himself to himself from previous 
obligations (1977, p.128). This change occurs when the man intentionally sets 
himself in precedence over all other centres, as a representative of the world, 
and maintains his position in being, so as constitutive (1977, p.132). In other 
words, the man does not find himself as the centre of the world but he 
establishes this position by himself. Defined as a subject, he brings a world 
picture or the world as a picture. This becomes the essence of the modern age: 
the conceiving of the world in its entirety as a picture. The world, then, becomes 
an object of representation. The extent of its being in its entirety is determined 
by the man (subject) representing it (1977, p.130) and the latter‘s relation to the 
man‘s lived experience. To represent means, 
to bring what is present at hand … before oneself as something 
standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing 
it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the 
normative realm (1977, p.131). 
Represented, then, the world‘s history, nature and so on can be seen as a 
system, which is a unity of structures developed and produced by man and 
according to the plan of objectifying (1977, p.141). Man can set the measures 
and guidelines for it (1977, p.134). Nothing else is admitted into existence 
without being first objectified, represented and interpreted in this way (1977, 
p.130). Through this route of ―representedness‖, newness and new things, 
which define the modern age come into being (1977, p.132). Achieving his 
essence of being a subject brings into question a counter struggle for and 
against individualism, that which is the ―I‖ in society and that which is the ―we‖ 
(1977, p.133). It also brings up the confrontation between different views of life 
225 
 
or lived experiences of different men. To resolve these confrontations, science 
as research becomes essential for the struggle of the ―establishing of self in the 
world‖ (1977, p.135) where the ―man brings into play his unlimited power for the 
calculating, planning, and molding of all things‖ (1977, p.135). In this way, then, 
science becomes the man‘s vehicle to represent and to exist itself. This struggle 
is not an event but a sign of another happening that is the ―gigantic‖. The 
gigantic does not announce its appearance in visible, recognizable or realizable 
ways to man. It takes place with ―a velocity unknown to the participants‖ (1977, 
p.135). It appears in that which is ―increasingly small‖ and quantitative (e.g. the 
increase in the number of mediums that decrease distance and time, for 
example, in travelling and communication) making quantity itself its special 
quality.95  
Quantity as quality becomes ―a remarkable kind of greatness‖ that characterizes 
this historical moment. The gigantic, the ―increasingly small,‖ keeps 
increasing/decreasing until it becomes incalculable and thus invisible. It could 
be said, that what has come into existence through representation has departed 
the representation through the increased quantity of representations. Thus, it 
cannot be represented anymore outside the incalculable struggles. It is 
extended to the incalculable determinateness, which is a field of struggling 
representations rather than being a field or representation itself. In other words, 
it loses what has defined it as a field representing certain phenomena. 
Consequently, as long as its existence as a being or object in-itself is denied, 
that is it does not exist without being perceived and calculated, then ―self-
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deception and blindness in relation to the historical moment‖ occurs (1977, 
p.136). To recognize the incalculable, reflection as a power of creative 
questioning is required to transport the man of the future from his extreme 
subjectivism, through which the world is set in extreme objectivism, to the 
‗between‘ ―in which he belongs to Being and yet remains a stranger amid that 
which is‖ (1977, p.136). 
Turing by formal definition is a scientist and scientists, as Snow declares,  
have their own culture, intensive, rigorous, and constantly in action. 
This culture contains a great deal of argument, usually much more 
rigorous, and almost always at a higher conceptual level, than literary 
persons‘ arguments – even though the scientists do cheerfully use 
words in senses which literary persons don't recognise, the senses 
are exact ones, and when they talk about ‗subjective‘, ‗objective‘, 
‗philosophy‘ or ‗progressive‘, they know what they mean, even 
though it isn‘t what one is accustomed to expect (Snow 1990, p.171). 
Except in the case of Turing the ‗one‘ is a self-reference to the same culture of 
‗science‘ and thus in relation to the discipline of science, Turing has to prove his 
word rigorous. As Heidegger‘s account shows, science or the scientific culture 
has its own hegemony over its individuals, through which it determines what 
matters: basically exactness and rigorousness. Reasonably, in relation to 
Turing‘s work, scientists are interested in the well-established facts (calculated 
and measured representations) but resist the conjectures these facts are 
wrapped in. They struggle to read Turing‘s paper, especially ‗Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence‘ (1950), objectively because the conjectures 
address their subjectivity: ‗Why gender and not only human?‘ ‗Why imitation and 
not just thinking?‘ ‗Why game and not only test?‘ This paper introduces the 
227 
 
‗other things‘ (i.e. game, imitation, emotions, child machines), which are not only 
related to Turing‘s scientific research, but which are neither objective nor 
replicable. For scientific research, these are associated with the risk of stripping 
its essence.  
Turing himself is part of this abstraction. Turing has already established a 
position for himself as a scientist and as a code-breaker of the Enigma, which is 
the German machine used for military communication in World War II. His 
intelligence was undeniable and his contributions were much appreciated. Yet, 
after that, Turing showed that he did not adhere to the essence of science nor 
to the social culture. Turing spoke of ―the art of using‖ machines (Newman et al. 
2004, p.127), and of having ―some experience‖ with them (Turing Papers AMT 
A/1,cited in (Wilson 2004, p.42), as well as, considered intelligence as an 
―emotional concept‖ (2004c, p.431). For him, reliability does not bring newness 
as it ―seems to be confirmed by the well known fact that the most reliable 
people will not usually hit upon really new methods‖. The mathematician hits 
upon ―entirely new methods‖ not by being reliable but by making mistakes – a 
specificity that machines can also be constructed for (Turing 2004f, p.105-106). 
Turing argues that for theorems, machines must not make mistakes, while for 
Turing ―this is not a requirement for intelligence‖ but a matter of development 
similar to children‘s learning (2004c, p.411). Moreover, he argues for the 
disassociation of that which is credited to machine from that which is credited to 
its programmer. In other words, crediting whatever the machine does to its 
programmer is the same as crediting the teacher for the result reached by his 
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student (2004c, p.411).96 In this way, science becomes a vehicle through which 
machines represent themselves rather than representing the scientists.  
Hodges has already pointed out that Turing never suggested that the physical 
world is computable and thus a computer can simulate it, so that all its 
experiences could be imitated. Instead Turing imagined ―a machine learning 
from interaction with the world‖ (1997, p.49). This interaction appears in his 
propositions of the imitation game, test and machines learning by experience, 
which has initiated a great discussion and discourse about intelligence and a 
machine‘s gender in relation to his homosexuality. Turing was not adhering to 
science nor to the social culture. His writing ―stands intransigent in style as well 
as content‖ as he has written it ―with typical sang-froid, ignoring all conventional 
cultural barriers‖ (Hodges 1997, p.34). Whatever hypothesis or speculations 
Turing wrote did not only arise from objective knowledge but also from his 
desire or subjective experience. In a way, science becomes the vehicle for self-
expression of desire. Turing mixes the well-established facts with his 
conjectures and selectively advocates ―the wisest ground‖. He asserts, 
the popular view that scientists proceed inexorably from well-
established fact to well-established fact, never being influenced by 
any unproved conjecture, is quite mistaken. Provided it is made clear 
which are proved facts and which are conjectures, no harm can 
result (1950, p.442). 
―No harm can result‖ only if the boundaries between the two are clearly drawn. 
Boundaries are what science establishes as part of its essence between facts 
and everything else, but science here is what Turing himself challenges. 
Turing‘s views of machines are different and based on no foothold grounds. 
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Turing confesses that he has ―no very convincing arguments of a positive 
nature‖ to support his views, for this reason he only proceeds by arguing 
against contrary views (1950, p.454). He asserts that his arguments are not 
convincing and that they are ―recitations tending to produce belief‖ (1950, 
p.455). He also confirmed that, at the time, he did not know how the mechanical 
brain ―might be programmed to behave like brains‖ (2004a, p.484). However, he 
insists, ―I, personally, am inclined to believe that such a programme will be 
found‖  (2004a, p.484).  
The scientific culture is faced by a mixed character of the scientist, the hero and 
the unorthodox. Total acceptance of Turing‘s papers on Turing Machine 
intelligence might mean the acceptance of their implications, while total 
rejection puts at risk the potential they have: the new possibilization of 
machines that will not only change the way they are perceived but also the way 
they are felt. Thus, the papers are subject to disagreements within the different 
disciplines. The scientific culture uses abstraction as a means to avoid the 
influences of desire, affection and personal experience on the work. Being a 
scientist, Turing must be represented in a scientific manner. He must be 
calculable in a way that allows the verification of his scientific work in the past 
and future. The ‗Turings‘ have to adapt to the scientific cultural norms, which 
took place by generalizing a generic version of the Turing Test or game that 
excludes the gender version. This allows their adoption through which they 
have obtained a different statue and have gained their futurity and continuity. In 
this way, they have started to individuate in their own way or ways by being 
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separated from the decision problem related to Turing‘s desire that haunted 
their history and risked bringing them to a stopping point in the scientific culture. 
Within this adoption-adaption process, research and scientists provide new 
dimensions of understanding the relationship between humans – even Turing – 
and machines as a constitutive relationship.  
In summary, the Turing Machine has an actual existence that could be seen in 
some of the first designed machines. At that time, machines were perceived by 
their limitations. Turing challenged this by perceiving machines through 
interaction and experience. In other words, it is only through experience we can 
know what machines can do. In this way, Turing made machine‘s intelligence 
an object of representation and thus it becomes a matter of scientific research 
interest. Crossing the line of representation, the machine being has become 
part of human subjectivism. It could even be said that the Turing Machine is one 
of the participants in bringing about what Heidegger calls the ‗gigantic‘ (1977, 
p.135), where here human-machine relations and encounters quantitatively 
increase, decreasing the differences between machines and humans. As was 
seen in the introduction and chapter one, embodiment has a major role in 
decreasing this difference and increasing the ‗equality‘ between human and 
machine. The following section investigates the test or game versions in relation 
to the question of ―what was in Turing‘s mind?‖ that has initiated many scientific, 
cultural and philosophical arguments and debates. These versions of interaction 
also set the base for the methodological experimentation of the studies in 
chapter one. 
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5.3. What was in Turing‟s mind?  
5.3.1. Is it a game or a test?  
Shieber (2004) states that ―there is weak internal evidence in the Mind paper 
itself that the nongendered variant was what Turing had in mind‖ (2004, p.102). 
He insists that Turing does not consider gender and uses the word ‗man‘ in its 
generic form. Shieber supports his claim by presenting quotations from Turing‘s 
talks and interviews with the BBC in 1951 and 1952, where the descriptions of 
the test in its simpler form (the interrogator distinguishes between 
machine/human) are free of gender complications referred to by other authors. 
Sterrett (2003) insists that the rationalizations of other researchers ―do seize 
upon an important feature common to both tests: the requirement of being able 
to carry on a conversation with a human.‖(Sterrett 2003, p.81) With this focus, 
Sterrett eliminates the equivalence and the gendering issues between the tests. 
He argues that there are two nonequivalent tests in the paper: the first ―The 
Original Imitation Game‖, which is based on the first version of the imitation 
game (elaborated below) and the second, ―The Standard Turing Test‖ (2003, 
p.80) based on the third version (described below).  
Hodges quotes Turing‘s ―relatively unambiguous words‖ in formulating the 
imitation game question, yet, when it comes to the gender issue, he ironically 
insists that such formula is nothing but a ―careless syntax‖ (1997, p.37) and ―a 
poor analogy‖ (Hodges 2011) that detracts from his main arguments that ―the 
successful imitation of intelligence is intelligence‖ (1997, p.38). It seems as if 
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―the literal meaning of the words‖ is not literal anymore, as long as it does not 
confirm to the conventional culture. Piccinini (2001) asserts that:  
Any reading of Turing‘s rules must explain how the imitation game 
fulfils his goal of replacing the question of whether machines can 
think. As I said, the standard account is straightforward: if a machine 
can demonstrate mastery of human language, knowledge, and 
inferential capacities to the point that it is mistaken for a human 
being, most people would consider it intelligent – or so they should 
according to Turing (2001, p.575-576). 
No support for this definition of the standard reading is found in Turing‘s paper 
or the BBC interview previously mentioned. As pointed previously, intelligence 
for Turing is an emotional concept, which means mistaking the machine for a 
human being or not is emotional. Actually, Turing does not explain his goal 
except as avoiding the attempt of defining ‗thinking‘ and, yet, he says the 
replacement is ―closely related‖. But as he does not put a definition on and 
perceives the ―normal use of the words‖ as dangerous (1950, p.433), it is 
difficult to determine the relation and whether it has a semantic, magnitude, kind 
or constitutive closeness.  
What could be noted is that the 1950 paper does imply a gender issue as other 
researchers explained, where, in this particular paper, the use of the word ‗man‘ 
is not generic as Shieber claims. In the 1950 paper, Turing described three 
versions of the imitation game. The first version of the game consists of three 
people: player (A) is a man, player (B) is a woman and player (C) an 
interrogator. Players A and B are placed in one room, which means that they 
can see and hear each other‘s answers.97 The man (A) imitates a woman and 
tries to convince the interrogator that he is a woman, and the woman (B) tries to 
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assist the interrogator in deciding that she is the woman. Their answers are 
transmitted to the interrogator through a  teleprinter or an intermediary device. 
The interrogator who knows them by labels X and Y could be a man or a 
woman and his task is to identify which is the man and which is the woman from 
their answers (1950, p.434).  
The conditions of the game are as follows. First, the language is neutralized 
through the device and is related to one gender, ‗woman‘, which means that this 
is the only factor influencing the interrogator‘s strategies. Second, the man wins 
the game if the interrogator ―decides wrongly‖ that he is a woman and the 
woman is a man. Therefore, the interrogator‘s skills and strategies decrease the 
player or imitator‟s chances of winning and add levels of difficulty to the game. 
The player‘s task is to convince the interrogator and not to defeat the woman. 
Third, the woman tries to ‗prove‘ that she is the woman, which actually in the 
game‘s context gains her no points, as she is not imitating and thus has nothing 
to win. This implies that the woman herself is actually not a core player but, as 
we can infer, is a model for imitation or for comparing the imitative performance. 
The man increases his imitative performance and chances of winning by using 
the woman as a resource. Turing points out that the man can say similar things 
to those said by the woman, and thus the fact of being a woman does not bring 
her any benefits over the man‘s performance as anything she says, he can say. 
The object of the game for the third player (B) is to help the 
interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful 
answers ... She can add such things as ‗I am the woman, don't listen 
to him!‘ to her answers, but it will avail nothing as the man can make 
similar remarks (1950, p.434). 
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Finally, the interrogator evaluates the performance of the players. If he cannot 
distinguish between the performances of A & B, his labelling and identification 
of the man and woman will be wrong. This means the man (A) wins the game 
because his performance is good. If the interrogator is able to distinguish 
between the two performances, the man (A) loses the game, as his 
performance is not good enough. The correct identification matters only to the 
extent of indicating the level of the performance. However, the identification of 
the woman with her performance does not matter, as it is not imitation. The 
woman does not win in all cases. Turing expects that the interrogator will often 
―decides wrongly‖, which means the man‘s level of performance is high.  
We now ask the question, ‗What will happen when a machine takes 
the part of A in this game?‘ Will the interrogator decide wrongly as 
often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is 
played between a man and a woman? (1950, p.434) 
Will the same apply when the machine takes the part of player (A)? Will the 
interrogator fail to distinguish its imitative behaviour as often as in man/woman 
setting? 
The second version of the game is digital computer – machine imitation game.  
Turing suggests replacing the man that is player A, the core player of the game, 
with a machine. First, this is only suggested but it does not take place; in other 
words, the imitation game does not take the form of ‗player A is a machine 
imitating a woman and player B is a woman‘. Second, Turing insists on 
identifying the ‗machine‘ that will be permitted to play the imitation game 
beforehand: ―following this suggestion we only permit digital computers to take 
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part in our game‖ (1950, p.436).  
Turing differentiates between actual digital computers classified as ―discrete 
state machines‖ and the universal digital computers. The former has a finite 
number of possible states, and limited storage capacity (1950, p.440). Thus 
their actions are predictable. The universal digital computers, on the other hand, 
have enormous or infinite number of states, larger storage and higher speed, 
and thus can be programmed to ―mimic the behaviour of any discrete state 
machine‖ (1950, p.441). In the context of a computer-machine imitation game, 
the universal digital computer (as A), that is, as a man, imitates the discrete 
state machine, which is (as B) a woman. The interrogator will be – similar to the 
man/woman imitation game – unable to differentiate between them due to the 
digital computer‘s universal property (1950, p.441). The universality property 
means the ability to mimic the behaviour of any discrete state machine. Taking 
this to the first version also means that the man has the universality property, 
that is the ability to mimic the behaviour of any woman (this could be supported 
by the man in the ―Paper Machine‖ which ―is in effect a universal machine‖ 
(Turing 2004c, p.416)). The criterion of evaluation is that the interrogator cannot 
differentiate between them and the woman or machine they imitate. 
The modifications required for the third game‘s conditions are as follows. It 
could be argued that the third game version is actually the third round in the 
game course as the man and computer imitative performance is high. Turing 
clarifies the following points: it is not a case of ―constructing a thinking machine‖ 
with ―every kind of engineering technique‖ (1950, p.436), ―men born in the usual 
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manner are excluded from the machines‖ (1950, p.435).  The third version or 
round of the imitation game is described below: 
But in view of the universality property we see that either of these 
questions is equivalent to this, ‗Let us fix our attention on one 
particular digital computer C. Is it true that by modifying this computer 
to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, 
and providing it with an appropriate programme, C can be made to 
play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B 
being taken by a man?' (1950, p.442).98 
In this version it should be noticed that the computer is not (as A: a man) and 
the man is not (as B: a woman) as in the previous version.99 First, the part of A, 
which is here taken by the computer, is constantly imitating the woman. 
Considering the properties of universality and imitation, this means the 
computer is not a man imitating a woman or giving answers given by a woman. 
Rather, it has an internal state through which it differentiates itself as a 
computer, defines its action as playing, its role as imitating, its context as a 
player in a game, its imitating model and database resources which can be 
collected from the other, in this case from player B, to increase and compare its 
performance, and its aim as winning. Second, The part of B is constantly 
convincing the interrogator that s/he is the woman, which is here taken by a 
man and this can only mean, ―in view of the universality property‖ that the man 
is seen as a proper model of the woman. The man, here, is a real player and 
thus ―it will be assumed that the best strategy is to try to provide answers that 
would naturally be given by a man‖ (1950, p.435). The man here is not required 
to give ―truthful answers‖ like the strategy devised for the woman but he is 
advised to ‗try‟ to give ―answers that would naturally be given by a man.‖ This is 
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because in this setting he has no model to imitate and he ―cannot pretend to be 
the machine (the computer)‖ (1950, p.435). Third, the question concerning the 
interrogator‘s evaluation remains the same. The modification made to the 
computer, which now can ―give a good showing in the game‖ (1950, p.436). If 
the interrogator was able to distinguish their performances, the computer loses 
the game. 
In this respect, the conclusion drawn here is comparable with Saygin et al. 
(Saygin et al. 2000), who suggests that ―the man and the machine are 
measured in terms of their respective performances against a real woman‖ 
(2000, p.467) but, the gender issue, although not addressed against woman, is 
still determined in Turing‘s paper. Simply, the only changing variable in the 
treatment condition is the gender while all the other variables, the task, the role 
of players A and B, the language, the instructions and the role of the 
interrogator, are kept consistent.100 There is no reason for us to assume that the 
man in this context would behave in a different way to the way already identified 
by Turing: imitating a woman.101 The non-gendered version of the imitation 
game is unlikely. Turing clearly describes the conditions of his game 
experiment,102  identifies who is who and the roles of each person in the first 
scenario, as well as mentioning any relevant modifications later on.103 
5.3.2. Is there a Turing test? 
Yes, there is a Turing test, which is different from Turing‘s imitation game. 
Lassègue (1996) points out correctly that the word ‗test‘ appears only three 
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times in Turing‘s 1950 paper and it has specific meaning in the mathematical 
field as being objective and ―free from any personal bias‖ (1996, p.39). 
However, it is worth noting that Turing has two versions: one is a ‗game‘ and the 
other is a ‗test‘, which are not equivalent, or the same, and which he himself 
differentiates in the 1950 paper and elsewhere. The imitation game (described 
above) considering its setting and gendered form as the computer/man game is 
a ‗replacement‘, a ‗variant‘ or a ‗substitution‘ for the original question: ‗Can 
machines think?‘ Turing says:   
We cannot altogether abandon the original form of the problem, for 
opinions will differ as to the appropriateness of the substitution and 
we must at least listen to what has to be said in this connexion (1950, 
p.442). 
This means that Turing – being aware of the gendered issues the replacement 
raises – could not discard the original question in his paper.104 The second 
setting is the machine/human test, which Turing calls his ―test‖ (Newman et al. 
2004, p.119). He emphasizes: 
I would like to suggest a particular kind of test that one might apply to 
a machine. You might call it a test to see whether the machine thinks, 
but it would be better to avoid begging the question, and say that the 
machines that pass are (let‘s say) ‗Grade A‘ machines (Newman et 
al. 2004, p.118). 
This test is based on the original Turing question, ‗Can machines think?‘, which 
he believes is ―too meaningless to deserve discussion‖ (1950, p.442). In the 
1950 paper, the word ‗test‘ appears in Turing‘s argument against Professor 
Jefferson:105 
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Probably he [Professor Jefferson] would be quite willing to accept the 
imitation game as a test. The game (with the player B omitted) is 
frequently used in practice under the name of viva voce to discover 
whether someone really understands something or has learnt it 
parrot fashion (1950, p.446). 
This test case as a viva voce examination, also mentioned elsewhere (Turing 
2004e, p.114), is actually different from the game case. The following can be 
noted from the quotation above. First, there is no player B – the woman or the 
man imitating the woman. Second, player A is also omitted as the example 
Turing provides is a dialogue between an interrogator and a ―witness‖. Third, 
the description of this ‗witness‘ is more likely to fit the actual digital computer, 
that is the ‗discrete state machine‘ rather than the universal digital computer. 
This is because the recording and switching functions imply a finite number of 
states that Turing associates with these machines (1950, p.447). And, fourth, 
the imitative nature itself is replaced by a parrot-like rather than a man-like 
imitation, and the task has come to measure understanding rather than 
identification. The outcome of this case is the generalized Turing test, the 
machine/ human test.  Turing describes his test as follows: 
The idea of the test is that the machine has to try and pretend to be a 
man, by answering questions put to it, and it will only pass if the 
pretence is convincing. A considerable proportion of a jury, who 
should not be expert about machines, must be taken in by the 
pretence. They aren‘t allowed to see the machine itself – that would 
make it too easy. So the machine is kept in a far away room and the 
jury are allowed to ask it questions, which are transmitted through to 
it: it sends back a typewritten answer … And the questions don‘t 
really have to be questions, any more than questions in a law court 
are really questions ... Likewise the machine would be permitted all 
sorts of tricks so as to appear more man-like ... We had better 
suppose that each jury has to judge quite a number of times, and that 
sometimes they really are dealing with a man and not a machine. 
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That will prevent them saying ‗It must be a machine‘ every time 
without proper consideration (2004, p.118-119).  
As can be seen, an essential difference between the two is that the test is 
associated with pure answering/questioning and pretence technique (Turing 
2004e, p.114) and thus the imitation and the imitated disappear in this 
condition.106 While pretence requires representing the performance without 
exact matching, imitation is actual and exact modelling of the performance that 
requires a third party.  
5.4. Summary 
This chapter repositions the Turing Machine from being considered as abstract 
and non-existent to being seen within the virtual-actual realm and thus existent. 
This is important in order to validate the counter-becoming of the Turing 
Machine in the next chapter. The Turing Machine had an actual existence that 
could be seen in some of the first designed machines (e.g. Manchester Baby, 
ACE and Ferranti Mark 1). However, it was abstracted for two reasons. The first 
one is perceiving machines by their limitations where whatever they cannot do 
is abstracted, and simultaneously, perceiving the Turing Machine in its final or 
complete project, which at that time lacked the two properties Turing suggested: 
universality and infinity. By repositioning the Turing Machine within the realm of 
virtual-actual, these limitations (not having universal and infinite properties) 
could be seen as virtual, that is, they were real in essence but incomplete. They 
could become actual reality in the course of machine evolution or development. 
For example, the universal property, which refers to a machine that can imitate 
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any other machine, has become an actual reality of current computers 
(Copeland 2004, p.15).  
Secondly, scientific culture imposes another type of abstraction on the Turing 
Machine in order to allow its adaptation to scientific cultural norms by preventing 
the notion that science, for Turing, became a self-expression of desires. This 
abstraction serves as a means to select the areas of scientific interest without 
risking the essence of science or accepting personal experience as part of 
scientific research. There are two different versions of the Machine-human 
interaction suggested by Turing: the Turing Test and the Turing imitation game. 
The main difference between them is that the Turing test is a one-to-one 
conversation without an interrogator and based on the machine‘s pretence of 
being human while the imitation game is based on the machine‘s imitation of a 
human being. The imitation game, where the computer imitates a woman, is 
linked to Turing‘s desires and affective experience. The difference between the 
game and the test is abolished in AI, and they are referred to as the Turing 
Test, which also means the imitative performance is reduced to pretence.  
The abstraction of the Turing Machine and the selection of the Turing Test allow 
scientific culture to control and modulate the individuation of the Turing Machine 
through the exclusion of interaction and subjective experience. Reasonably, in a 
metaphorical way, Turing fathers computer science, as pointed out by scientific 
culture, but computer science has never been called the child of Turing. 
Following Heidegger‘s description of the role of modern science and scientist, 
and through abstraction and selection, science itself has become a discipline of 
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self-expression.107 The next section will elaborate on the individuation of the 
Turing Machine in relation to Simondon‘s account. The focus will be on 
exploring the process of interaction, experience and affective modality in the 
Turing Machine individuation.  
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6. Chapter Six: Individuation in AI 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on understanding the individuation of the Turing Machine 
as a process by focussing on his work related to artificial intelligence. This 
understanding is based Simondon‘s work on individuation, which, on the one 
hand, is introduced to counter the mind/body, subject/object polarizations 
noticed in both HCI and Hansen‘s account. On the other hand, it deepens our 
understanding of the being problem, technical culture and the becoming 
process of human-machine relationships. Simondon‘s work was introduced in 
the introduction of the previous chapter. Here, an expansion on his account and 
application to the Turing Machine account will be pursued. 
Turing has already described a situation where the machines, will take control 
over humans (2004b, p.475). Turing is against the opposition, fear and anxiety 
that the construction of such machines might supersede human beings. He 
likens this to the fear of being superseded by the pig or the rat (2004a, p.486). 
Yet, he believes that no bounds can be set on machine imitation of human 
characteristics. He foretells of machines that ―would not take long to outstrip our 
feeble powers‖ (2004b, p.475). Machines that will converse with each other 
(2004b, p.475). For Turing, intellectuals should not be afraid that the machines 
would put them out of their jobs. The intellectuals will be trying to keep their 
―intelligence up to the standard set by the machines‖ (2004b, p.475). Turing was 
agnostic about machine‘s limitations. Turing wrote all his theoretical 
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‗hypotheses‘ and practical work at a time, when the word ‗computers‘ was used 
to describe human beings, and when the machines were electronic instead of 
digital. This explains why Turing‘s account perceived as mediation between his 
expertise, desire and prediction could not be accounted for by external 
individuation controlled by scientific culture. This individuation acts from outside 
the relationship between Turing and machine. It progresses through selecting 
only those elements that interest the scientists in the relationship while 
abstracting other elements, as pointed out earlier. Turing‘s account can only be 
explained through the internal individuation of the relationship itself. This 
individuation progresses through affective modality, which is a primary 
constituent of any relationship. Affective modality, here, refers to the manner 
within which emotions and feelings are experienced and qualified throughout 
the on-going process or interplay in-between human and machine. It is essential 
in understanding Turing‘s account and how Turing  has already predicted the 
changes in the relationship between the human and the computer as well as the 
modulation of the current culture.. 
6.2. The loss and gain of affective modality 
As could be seen, Turing expected that human beings‘ position would be 
marginalized by machines. This marginalization is what motivates Simondon‘s 
work on providing an understanding of the human and technical object‘s 
individualization, and the human and nonhuman dynamic backgrounds in the 
current culture. These will be elaborated in the following section. For Simondon 
this understanding is central to overcome the loss of the genesis of affective 
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modalities. These have disappeared with the progression from the artisanal 
mode of production to the industrial one leading to the alienation of the human 
being, antagonism and nostalgia for the return to the artisanal modalities, which 
has become an illusion (2009, p.21). Affective modalities characterized the 
artisanal age for a number of reasons. First, the human being was the technical 
individual, as he used his body to integrate different tools to operate and 
harmonize the whole (1980 [1958], p.69). He was the source of energy that is 
exercising and building, and the source of information, which refers to learned 
skills through education. The exercise regulated the aim and the information of 
the material. Second, the relationship between him, the object and its materiality 
and nature was immediate and in a continuous processual contact (2009, p.20). 
Object transformation was a multifactored process between different forces: 
human and non-human (2009, p.20). Third, the man‘s  work was the ―sole 
expression of his technicality‖ and ―his need to work is translation of this need of 
expression‖ (1980 [1958], p.67 n 5). His expression signified his expertise and 
efficiency through knowing his job, his tools, and the necessary modifications in 
insuring ―the internal distribution and self-regulation of the job‖ (1980 [1958], 
p.67). Human beings could cooperate either to speed up the work or to perform 
different organized roles to achieve the job. In the latter case, the genesis of the 
group was similar to the genesis of the technical ensemble (1980 [1958], p.67) 
in that the ensemble produces different relationships between members or 
elements of the group without destroying their autonomy (1980 [1958], p.55).  
246 
 
Then, the man has started a process of humanizing the machine ―to the extent 
that he looks on the machine-as-technical individual as if it were a man‖ (1980 
[1958], p.70). He has discovered natural sources of energy, so he thought that 
he possesses ―a considerable power‖ (2009, p.21). Thus, he has made way to 
the appearance of the ―industrial modality‖ (2009, p.20) and concrete machines. 
As the machine becomes more concrete, that is, it maintains its own functioning 
and becomes autonomous, the man increasingly believes in its being a man 
(1980 [1958], p.70).  
Consequently, in the current industrial mode, a ―role-change‖ in man‘s position 
is observed (1980 [1958], p.70). The man has become the source of information 
only and the source of energy is left to nature (2009, p.20). As the machine 
requires different types of people with a variety of knowledge and information 
contribution (2009, p.21), the man has to adapt himself to become part of the 
technical ensemble (1980 [1958], p.70). Specialization and fragmentation 
appear. It is the machine that has become ―the most general form of technical 
individuals‖ (1980 [1958], p.67). A technical individual is characterized by its 
self-conditioning and autonomy. It has a separate existence. It seems to imitate 
the man. It ―takes the place of man the tool-bearer‖ (1980 [1958], p.67). It 
replaces him as the working individual. The man feels frustrated. Antagonism 
appears. He is ―separated from his role as technical individual.‖ He loses the 
method through which he expresses himself. He is either an organizer or a 
servant of the machine but he remains either ―unhappy inventor‖ or 
―dehumanized worker‖ (2009, p.21). He is a technician not an artisan. He goes 
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between machines but he is no longer the centre in-between them. It could be 
said that the man has lost his subjectivity as the machine is the one that 
represents the world and the man altogether.  
The man is represented by the machine, through the machine, in relation to the 
machine and in machine ways. The man is left with his ―memories of himself‖ in 
the old days (1980 [1958], p.70). Nostalgia appears. He feels alienated, in his 
own ―human environment,‖ sometimes perceiving machines as idolatries with 
unconditional power that he can exploit for his own use, other times as ―robots‖ 
that are ―a duplicate of man, but without interiority‖ (1980 [1958], p.13) that 
become a threat for his existence. The slavery and freedom of the man has 
come into question (1980 [1958], p.70). So what should he do?  
He should become the ―machine-bearer‖ (1980 [1958], p.68). For Simondon, 
this alienation of the man is a consequence of the misunderstanding of the 
nature of machines and limiting them to the world of utility rather than meaning. 
The man as a ―perpetual invention‖ (1980 [1958], p.14) is a permanent 
coordinator, organizer and interpreter of the machines around him and of the 
technical ensembles (1980 [1958], p.13) whom, having a similar intensity, affect 
and are affected by their performance. In other words, he should assume his 
position as a technical individual by perceiving a form of leadership, which acts 
as a trajectory point (e.g. a conductor of an orchestra) through which 
communication and performance take place (1980 [1958], p.13/70). He should 
(re)place himself as the centre between the machine and the natural world 
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(1980 [1958], p.68). In order to take this position, Simondon seems to suggest 
two ways. 
First, the technical object, ―must be known in itself‖ for the man (1980 [1958], 
p.70), which is elaborated in section 6.4. In this respect, the machine becomes 
the ―machine-tool‖ that is without self-regulation (1980 [1958], p.68). Limiting, 
regulating or controlling machines is achieved via their primitive margin of 
indetermination (1980 [1958], p.13), that is a margin of information conversion 
between the machine and nature, where they can be grouped into coherent 
ensembles and exchange information. Understood in this sense, it could be 
argued that the man cannot reclaim his position and re-celebrates his 
technicality, except through controlling the machine‘s capacity of being 
autonomous and self-regulated. This contradicts Simondon‘s emphasis that 
technical individuals must be self-conditioning. The controlling of machines 
becomes a matter of discovering their weakness, which signifies the weakness 
of the man in obtaining a human-technical culture. 
The second way for the man to reclaim his position is by concretizing the 
technical mentality. This, as pointed out in the introduction of chapter five, is 
based on Cybernetic theory and assumes crossing of thresholds of functioning. 
Its perfection is in uniting ―in a single criterion the manifestation of cognitive 
schemas, affective modalities, and norms of action: that of the opening; 
technical reality lends itself remarkably well to being continued, completed, 
perfected, extended‖ (2009, p.24). This requires the unification of the technical 
and natural environments to form one source of information entry, thus allowing 
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―the experience of technical reality as a whole‖ (2009, p.21). For Simondon, the 
technical mentality is complete (or concrete) by the production of a ―made-to-
measure assemblage‖. Assemblage, here, refers to the multifactored process 
between human and non-human forces that participate in object transformation. 
An assemblage constitutes transduction, which means mediation between 
heterogeneous forces that develops into internal coherent relations. In this 
context, the human could be represented by the image of the technician, who is 
also the inventor, and constructor, that acts between ―the material and 
conceptual synthesis of particularity‖ in relation to the technical pieces and the 
geographical environment. The non-human appears as industrial 
―concentration‖ in the factory that investigates the natural environment for the 
fabrication of adaptable pieces (2009, p.22). ―Made-to-measure‖ describes a 
self-stable condition. For example, an artisanal ―made-to-measure‖ object 
derives its essence from 
an analytical organization which always leaves the way clear for new 
possibilities, possibilities which are the exterior manifestation of an 
interior contingency. In the encounter between the coherence of 
technical work and the coherence of the system of industrial needs, it 
is the coherence of utilization that prevails. The reason for this is that 
the made-to-measure object is one which has no intrinsic limits; its 
norms are imposed from without; it fails to achieve its own internal 
coherence; it is not a system of the necessary; it corresponds to an 
open system of requirements (1980 [1958], p.22). 
Understood in these terms this could be problematic in relation to Simondon‘s 
concept of becoming, as there is no concretization of the object. Concretization 
means that the object has internal coherence enabling it to achieve an 
autonomous and self-conditioning status, so that it maintains its own 
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functioning. Except, if the ―made-to-measure assemblage‖ has a form of 
becoming through which it conserves its coherence of utilization, intrinsic limits 
and internal coherence, which makes it a ―system of the necessary‖ rather than 
requirement. This form of becoming comes into existence when the industrial 
phase ends, as within it there is an industrial modality, which does not limit itself 
with the technical environment but extends ―itself through nature‖ (2009, p.22). 
This extension occurs when the manufactured object leaves the factory. Here, it 
plays a transductive role by participating in a ―maze of a virtual network‖ 
between the factory and the human world where natural structures ―serve as the 
attachment point for the network that is being developed‖ (2009, p.22). This 
―attachment point‖ is multifunctional as it becomes the associated milieu 
between the human, nature and industry. It connects different technical objects, 
natural habitats and human beings, thus, unifying the sources of information 
and energy (e.g. Eiffel Tower is part of a multifunctional network as it 
interconnects with many masts and stations in Europe) (2009, p.22). In this 
way, the object is transformed into an assemblage and the attachment point 
represents networks of thought, information, and energies in-between the two 
environments (networks thus acts like a synthesis of the various dynamic 
backgrounds).  
―A thought-network‖ is established due to a ―certain effect‖ exerted by the 
assemblage, which ―constitutes the harness of nature‖ (2009, p.22) due to its 
inseparability from the attachment point (Simondon gives examples of this effect 
in expressions such as the Raman or Compton effects) (2009, p.19).108 As 
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pointed out previously, quality, for Simondon, is defined as a force in which 
fixed effect is not necessarily sensory or practical. Individuals develop 
sensitiveness to this quality. The thought-network has as a support to it, a 
physical-network, that is the energy-network, which obtains a similar effect due 
to a standardization of the assemblage. The standardization refers to the 
distribution of similar industrial pieces over different attachment points allowing 
an informational role (multifunctional use of energy controllers and devices) 
(2009, p.22). In this way, the assemblage influences both the thoughts and lives 
of different human beings and, thus, it conserves its coherence of utilization in 
the virtual and actual networks.  
.In this sense, it could be argued that the human or the inventor has retrained a 
different type of affective modalities, that emerge from the industrial distribution 
of the object (that is fame as a quantitative measure) and the latter‘s 
participation in different user‘s thoughts and lives (that is qualitative value). 
Reasonably, the object becomes part of the ―psychosocial life‖ of the individual 
and collective. This, for Simondon, forms a source of resistance of the technical 
mentality at the level of voluntary decisions and social norms (2009, p.24). The 
object, first, has to cross a threshold of functioning in order to develop schemes 
of concretization that mark its self-conditioning and autonomy. Then, the 
autonomous self-conditioned object has to cross another threshold of norms in 
order to develop ―schemes of action‖ that mark its universal ―value code‖ and 
make it capable of ―yielding a morality in human environments that are entirely 
dedicated to industrial production‖ (2009, p.21). For Simondon, the object‘s 
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‗fate‘ is not decided at the moment of its birth but at the moment of meeting with 
users‘ decisions, voluntary choices and social norms. Rob Shields in his book 
The Virtual (2005) calls such moments of transformation ―liminality‖, in relation 
to ‗limen‟ which means threshold (Shields 2005, p.12). Crossing this threshold 
has a ―transformative power‖ where the participants receive new status. Liminal 
time is a ―time out of time‖ as it is a suspension of everyday regulations where 
the object encounters ―the adaptive powers of a culture‖ (2005, p.12). Simondon 
sees the object as ―a closed object, a false organism that is seized by a holistic 
thought that was psycho-socially produced‖ (2009, p.24). This moment of 
encounter is one and the same with the moment of judging, valuing and 
introducing the object into.life.  
Adaptation to the psychosocial level is another form of the hypertelic 
phenomena. Hypertelia will be explained in section 6.4 but here it is important to 
say that it describes a negative effect that appears due to an object‘s 
specialization and adaptation as it restricts its evolution process. It appears as 
an inflation of ―obsolescence‖, which refers to the ageing of the object in relation 
to its ―disuse‖ (2009, p.23). This disuse is due to a change in social conventions 
and habits rather than ―a loss of functionality of the technical object‖ (2009, 
p.23). For example, cars and planes have a ―network reality‖ but cars age 
before planes because they are social objects influenced by inessential criteria 
of choice such as, representing the individual‘s prestige, charm, flattery of social 
myths or personal faiths (2009, p.23). The main source for ―obsolescence‖ is 
the existence of a ―virtual‖ human (e.g. the presumed buyer) - whom voluntary 
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choices are affected by those non-technical norms - at the production process, 
and the latter‘s anticipation of a ―mixed character‖ object that achieves both 
aims: the social and the industrial (2009, p.23-24).  
In this sense, the psychosocial level is another element to consider in the 
technical imagination which will be explained in section 6.4, which requires 
sensitiveness to the object‘s social and psychological qualities. Simondon 
suggests two ways to overcome the resistance of technical mentality. Firstly, 
―ascetism‖ as a way of getting rid of social norms and ―hypertelic developments 
or developments that in reality don‘t function‖ (2009, p.24). Secondly, the object 
should have a reticular structure that allows the object openness to 
manipulation in ―the state of perpetual actuality‖ (2009, p.24). It should consist 
of a 
unity of two layers of reality: a layer that is as stable and permanent 
as possible, which adheres to the user and is made to last; and a 
layer that can be perpetually replaced, changed, renewed, because it 
is made up of elements that are all similar, impersonal, mass-
produced by industry and distributed by all the networks of exchange 
(2009, p.24). 
This is what Simondon calls the postindustrial object as it has permanent and 
adjustable parts for different usage, which ensures its newness and 
contemporariness (2009, p.24) (this could be thought in relation to Simondon‘s 
explanation of information in the case of the human being which is presented in 
section 6.3). The next section elaborates on Simondon‘s concept of human and 
technical object‘s individuations 
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6.3. Living being and machine individuation 
6.3.1. Living being individuation 
In Simondonian terms, the process of individuation is part of the ―ontogenetic‖ 
development of the being, defined by a process of becoming. Becoming, as a 
dimension of the being, represents its capacity of falling out of phase with itself 
due to the forces of tension, and its mode of resolving the initial incompatibilities 
that occur and which are commonly overburdened with potentials. The end 
resolution of each phase appears as a stage in the being (considered as a 
whole) and of the being (considered as an end phase of the whole being). 
Therefore, there is no final outcome in becoming. There are only phases and 
stages of the being‘s development where the individual is a result of each phase 
of the being at that stage (1992, p.300-301).  
Simondon sees the living being as ―a veritable theater of individuation‖ (1992, 
p.305). Three participants of the play are defined where the play is only its own 
becoming participants, initially staged on a supersaturated un-phased 
preindividual reality, which they share and which keeps them intact through 
internal, external and transindividual beings. The internal individuation is a 
‗psychic being‘ who is continually trying but is unable to resolve its own 
problematic due to the dimension of becoming. Affectivity and perception allow 
the emergence of new dimensions, thus endowing the living being with ―an 
open ended axiomatic‖ (1992, p.307). Therefore, it is supported by a collective 
individuation or a collective aspect that is an associated part of the individual 
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reality, inherited and borne with it from the preindividual reality. This is external 
individuation.  
By entering into a relationship of participation as a unit, on the level of the 
subject as a living being in a continual psychic becoming, and participation as 
an element of unity of the whole process of individuation on the level of 
individual-milieu or individual-group, that is as a collective being, the living being 
is able to contribute to resolving both its own and group problematics. 
Simondon (1992, p.306) terms this participation, which unites both the psychic 
and the collective individual and makes the constitution of a new problematic, 
transindividuation. The transindividual does not only constitute the psychic and 
social realities and the reciprocal effect between them but also the preindividual 
individuation underlining all of them. Within the three-party theatre of becoming 
and the relations between them and the milieu, the individual does not strive – 
as it does not need to – to become individualized, this is a closed system, 
because the double-participatory role keeps it open. This double-participatory 
role manifests as, first, an element or infra-individual; a psyche – similar to an 
organ of a body – with all its energies, potentials and future virtualities and 
second, a unit without which the whole cannot become or emerge as new but 
remains trapped in an endless temporality; it is an incomplete project with 
potentiality. Taking this together with the preindividual reality, mediation 
between heterogeneous orders is central to Simondon. This is because it is not 
limited to the becoming of the living being in relation to the outside world, but 
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also to its own interiority as being constitutive of the individuating process where 
an internal mediation, termed the internal resonance, takes place.  
Internal resonance as ‗a form of communication,‘ and transduction are both 
considered primitive forms, developing between primordial orders of magnitude 
and thus they exist in both physical objects and living beings (1992, p.318). 
Internal resonance, on the one hand, as a ‗primitive form of communication‘ 
within the transductive process between heterogeneous orders, amplifies 
individuation and condenses it towards taking a phase or structuring a third 
order of magnitude. On the other hand, it exists in the individual or system, 
between it and its preindividual reality, as well as all that is formed by it, thus 
enabling a new transduction to take place; in other words, the new always 
emerges from internal resonance. A more complex system, for example, a 
machine, requires a permanent communication and adaptation of its 
relationship with its milieu (1992, p.305). On the other hand, the living being, 
having interiority as constitutive of its individuating system, requires 
contemporaneousness to deal with its immediate temporal and spatial relations 
with its milieu. For this reason, Simondon replaces substance and form with 
information as ―information always exists in the present, that it is always 
contemporary, because it yields the meaning according to which a system is 
individuated‖ (1992, p.311).  
The living being, then, contains within itself all levels of internal resonance. In 
this sense, while the preindividual metastable reality is always there, shared 
between all orders of magnitude, existing and emerging, internal resonance – 
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understood in its requirement of the highest level as the transmission of 
contemporary information in communication between orders of magnitude – 
ensures the openness of the individual to the new dimension, made available by 
perception and affection (1992, p.307). Information, for Simondon, is not the 
specificity of one order nor is it a pregiven but it appears when two disparate 
orders, in the very process of their ‗disparation‘, in the interlinking between their 
sets of potentials, become one system. The communication of these two 
disparate orders is already preconditioned by a shared preindividual reality. The 
new dimension of individuation is revealed, instigated and is organized in the 
resolution process (1992, p.310-311). The new then emerges with internal 
resonance that ensures its basic communication and individuation, and as a 
system or a node of information that ensures its autonomy and self-regulation.  
Anxiety could appear as a result of the failure of one of two of internal 
resonance‘s double process. Firstly, there is a continual amplification due to the 
metastability and internal or psychic individuation of the system, where 
condensation prevents information transmission. Condensation here could be 
understood as the appearance of a structured layer of emotion preventing the 
emergence of the multiple dimensions of the active being. Consequently, the 
formation of another layer necessary for individuation does not take place. This 
leads either to inward condensation that might eventually reach the internally, 
the centre or the heart of the system and stop its activity, or leads to system 
fragmentation. Condensation could have an inward effect due to the successive 
failures of the active being, in resolving its affective problem. Thus, its energy or 
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activity keeps reducing allowing a thickening of the condensed emotion. 
Fragmentation appears when the living being is left with no more dimensions of 
becoming or potentials to explore. Secondly, there is a continual amplification – 
as a necessary condition marking the existence of potential energy for 
individuation – but a condensation event does not take place; as such there is 
no phasing out that marks the system resolution, thus it is captivated within a 
temporal open series of iterations without actualization. For Simondon,  
If the individual being puts itself, but nothing else, into question, then 
it will not be able to move beyond the limits of anxiety, for anxiety is a 
process without action, a permanent emotion that does not succeed 
in resolving affectivity, a challenge in which the individuated being 
explores the dimensions of its being without being able to progress 
beyond them (1992, p.310).  
Anxiety then is a negative emotion that limits the individual‘s becoming to its 
psychic problem and prevents it from establishing relationships through which it 
can proceed.    
6.3.2. Technical object individuation 
Simondon, identifies two movements of thought or cognitive schemas as 
methods that offer a mode of knowledge for ―the discovery of common modes of 
functioning—or of regimes of operation—in otherwise different orders of reality‖ 
(2009, p.17). These orders of reality could be chosen ―from the living or the inert 
as from the human or the non-human‖. The first one is related to the Cartesian, 
the other to the Cybernetic (2009, p.17). The Cartesian is simple, logical, 
rigorous and productive. The essence of the technical object is in its capacity to 
transfer forces without losses or gaps through a successive chain of links or 
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levels, where one layer is the foundation for the one coming next. Then 
arrangement and control, to put the pieces in a unified whole, is required. In this 
sense, thought for Simondon, 
needs an anchoring point that is the operative equivalent of the stone 
under the building, or of the ring that is attached to the origin of the 
chain: certum quid et inconcussum: it is evident what remains after 
all attempts at deconstruction, even after hyperbolic doubt (2009, 
p.18). 
The second one is Cybernetic theory, which is useful for the construction of 
automatic equipment where the technical realization of finalized conduct is due 
to the recurrence of information for an active adaptation. This is based on a 
theory of knowledge that is realist idealist, which can grasp the phenomenology 
or ‗universality of a mode of activity‘ without any ontological presuppositions 
(2009, p.19). This kind of technical mentality, requires two conditions. First, it 
requires the normalization of crossing ―threshold of functioning‖ (2009, p.24), 
which determines the emergence of the technical object as a functioning 
invention (2009, p.19/24). The realization of this threshold earns the object its 
self-maintenance that is ―a regime of automatism‖ where each phase forms the 
base of completion for the following phase (2009, p.19). Second, the object 
should be perceived as a regime of functioning and not only a structure. This 
entails an understanding and examination of its subsets, and the ―degree of 
solidarity‖ between them, which constitutes the measure of the optimum 
functionality of the regime in relation to the threshold of functioning (2009, p.24). 
Simondon‘s thesis, On the mode of Existence of Technical Objects, aims to 
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provide an account of these two conditions determinate to the understanding of 
technical culture.  
Simondon rejects automation of machines, which although having no technical 
significance but social and economical (1980 [1958], p.13), has become a 
human objective which limits machines‘ real perfection. Simondon, thus argues 
that the real perfection of machines, that is its level of technicality, is in 
concealing a certain margin of indetermination (1980 [1958], p.13). This margin 
differentiates between a closed automatic machine and an open one. The 
machine being is conceived as a ―unity of becoming‖ within specific networks of 
temporal and spatial relations (Mackenzie 2006, p.14) which could be human or 
nonhuman. The margin is sensitive to information from outside (Simondon 1980 
[1958], p.13) and, being so, it makes possible the technical ensemble which 
could be understood as the formation of relations or dimensions of becoming 
between the networks‘ elements, without these elements losing their autonomy. 
Following Mackenzie (2006), the margin could be seen as having two functions: 
transducers or converters of information into determined forms and, 
simultaneously, preventers of the machine from becoming an entirely different 
entity (2006, p.26). Mackenzie states that machines, for Simondon, are 
transducers of information (2006, p.25). In this sense, when machines are 
absolutely concrete, which, for Simondon, is not possible (1980 [1958], p.43), 
the margin of indetermination disappears.  
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The technical object has an essence or absolute origin. This essence lays in 
two things: its fecundity or non-saturation character that makes it a centre of a 
phenomena, and its ―asymmetric conductance‖ or dissymmetrical functioning 
that makes it of extensive virtue (1980 [1958], p.37). An example of this is the 
diode which is a two-way valve with a hot and emissive electrode (which could 
be cathode or anode) and a cold and non-emissive electrode (anode), where 
the latter attracts electrons in its positive state. This creates the origin of the 
technical object. It, then, engenders a family (e.g. the diode is the ―forefather of 
the triode as well as of other multiple-electrode tubes‖) and thus it creates a 
―lineage of technical objects‖ that is ―marked by a synthetic act of invention‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.38). This essence remains stable and ―capable of producing 
structures and functions by internal development and progressive saturation‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.38). 
The technical object does not evolve through ―artificialization‖ but through 
concretization. Artificialization is an intervening action of man on the 
artificialized object, where the latter‘s biological or natural regulations are 
manipulated or replaced as it remains dependent on its environment e.g. 
laboratory or green house (1980 [1958], p.40). A concretized object in its 
primitive stages starts as an artificial object but as it evolves, it ―loses its artificial 
character‖ due to its internal coherence and because it ―incorporates part of the 
natural world which intervenes as a condition of its functioning‖ (1980 [1958], 
p.40). It gains a mode of existence peculiar to it, where it becomes more 
internally organized and then closed, to the extent that it can depart its artificial 
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environment and exist independently from it (1980 [1958], p.41). Thus, they 
become self-sustainable and can create relations with other technical or natural 
objects (1980 [1958], p.41). This makes it viable to the inductive studies of 
science (1980 [1958], p.42). If its origins are to be traced and identified with the 
individual sciences that participate in its mode of existence or its production as 
a whole, then, a different science will appear. This is mechanology (1980 
[1958], p.42). Mechanology is not a science of studying comparisons of outward 
observable behaviours or exterior characteristics. Moreover, the automaton is 
denied as ―there is no species of automata‖, but technical objects with functional 
organisations and different degrees of automatism (1980 [1958], p.42). This 
could be understood in relation to the ―regime of automatism‖ explained 
previously. Consequently, mechanology focuses on the ―exchanges of energy 
and information within the technical object or between the technical object and 
its environment‖ (1980 [1958], p.42).  
The technical object has a genesis, which is essential to it (1980 [1958], p.18). It 
is not what it is given in time and space but that which has a sequence and an 
extended continuity (1980 [1958], p.19). The genesis of the technical object is in 
its evolution marked by the ―synthetic act of invention‖ which has three 
characteristics: convergence, adaptation, and unification by internal resonance 
(could refer to the intercommunication between its internal sub-sets). Technical 
objects could be abstract/primitive (logical assembly) or concrete/industrial. 
Abstract objects are recognizable as each element functions alone on the 
allocated time in solitude and isolation from others, so any exchange of energy 
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or relation is seen as an imperfection of each of them. Each one has its 
primitive or abstract form, through which it is materially and theoretically 
perceived in its absoluteness as a constitutive closed system with its ‗intrinsic 
perfection‘. Intrinsic perfection refers to ―the material and structural support for 
certain practical qualities‖ (1980 [1958], p.61). This means that the 
arrangements of form and matter for a certain use have gained a stable 
structure that identifies the ―intrinsic value‖ (1980 [1958], p.63) of the object‘s 
practical quality (e.g. adze requires a technical ensemble of foundry, forge and 
tempering to produce the quality that enables it to work with hard wood without 
being damaged) (1980 [1958], p.60). In this sense, when abstract objects are 
integrated, a compatibility problem occurs between them (1980 [1958], p.20).  
This informs a conversion stage. Structures, pure technical requirement and 
economic constraints (preferences and motivations) of the abstract mode 
(manual) converge into a structural unity through concomitance between 
conflicting requirements (1980 [1958], p.21). This stage brings about a concrete 
technical object. The coherence of the utilization is the most important aspect. 
For example, the handmade or ―made-to-measure‖ object has no intrinsic limits, 
and it fails to obtain internal coherence. It is an open system of requirement that 
depends on external individuation from without (1980 [1958], p.22). It has an 
analytic character, which means it requires more construction. A more technical 
complicated form of the ―made-to-measure‖ object is where each element, as 
pointed out above, acts as a complete system. If an element is broken down, it 
ruins the system (1980 [1958], p.22).   
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The conversion from primitive or abstract to concrete is the first mutation stage 
in the evolution of the technical object. This brings ―successive systems of 
coherence‖, due to, firstly, improvement in usage, raw material production and 
better adaptations, and, secondly, changes to its structure (1980 [1958], p.37). 
The technical object is ‗the theatre of a number of relationships of reciprocal 
causality‘ (1980 [1958], p.25). Differentiation lies at the core of these 
relationships while specialization is important in overcoming antagonism and 
reducing side effects. For Simondon, the evolution of the technical object 
depends on its interior distribution of functions where the essence for its 
concreteness lies in the ―organizing of functional sub-systems into the total 
functioning‖ (1980 [1958], p.30). Concretization (one element performing 
several functions instead of one) should not be confused with the possibilities 
the technical object opens due to its complex structure (1980 [1958], p.27), 
because for concrete objects the indetermination should be reduced and 
interaction should be defined. Each piece of the technical object is part of the 
whole system and its effect is not determined by the design plan (1980 [1958], 
p.31). The progress of the technical object depends on the transcending of the 
limitations between its sub-sets and relations, while an integration of structures 
in total synergy of functioning takes place. This integration creates a leap or a 
phase in the technical being due to the modifications in the internal dispositions 
of functions (1980 [1958], p.25). Its degree of perfection is where ‗all functions 
fulfilled by a particular structure are positive, essential, and integrated into the 
functioning of the whole (1980 [1958], p.31).109 The Guimbal turbine is an 
example of this concretizing process. It is immersed in the water-pipe and 
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connected to a small generator in hosing filled with oil, under pressure. Here, 
appears a field of intercommunications and potentials that materialize in the 
‗plurifunctional‘ relations that specify each item (1980 [1958], p.47). The water 
―supplies the energy that activates the turbine and the generator, and evacuates 
heat produced by the generator‖. The oil ―lubricates the generator, insulates the 
gears, and conducts heat from the gears to the housing, where it is evacuated 
by the water ... prevents water seepage through the axle-casing into the 
housing, because the oil pressure within the housing is greater than the water-
pressure without‖ (1980 [1958], p.47). This difference between the two becomes 
a quality in itself, of potentials, where the pressure ―effects permanent greasing 
under pressure in the bearings, while preventing seepage of water if the 
bearings are not quite watertight‖ (1980 [1958], p.47).  
What makes the Guimbal turbine interesting is, on the one hand, it is a case of 
evolutionary adaptation, and, on the other hand, it is a case of concretization. 
Adaptation is the second characteristic of the technical object‘s evolution that 
determines its ―double relationship‖ with both geographic and technical 
environments, which integrate it and simultaneously are brought together by it 
regardless of their heterogeneity of compatibility (1980 [1958], p.46). Adaptation 
has two forms: as a result of the environment or as a process of the object 
evolution. The first one is governed by a ―hypertelic phenomena‖ which 
identifies the negative effect of the compromising relation between the object‘s 
specialization and adaptation. While specialization allows the object to 
overcome antagonism and reduce side effects (1980 [1958], p.25) by limiting 
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the object to certain use or environment, adaptation, in its higher level, allows 
the object to self-condition itself in order to delimit its existence to a certain use 
or environment. Hypertelia, thus, restricts and could be fatal to the process of 
the object‘s evolution. It has two cases. The first one appears at the production 
stage where what constitutes the object- that is its qualities- is adapted in 
relation to the environment and conditions of its use. The environment could be 
geographical (e.g. a pump produced for cold weather might not work in hot 
weather) or technical (e.g. pairing a clock‘s functionality with a particular 
electrical circuit, thus, it might work in France but not in America) (1980 [1958], 
p.45). Although the object, in both cases, is autonomous as it can exist 
independently but it cannot exist outside either its geographical or technical 
environment. The second case of hypertelia is a functional over-adaptation 
identified by an inter-dependent relationship between the functions of two 
objects. This occurs as parasitism (e.g. some small planes can only be 
launched by a larger one) or as a partnership where the technical object is an 
asymmetrical part of a technical whole (e.g. a transport glider as part of a 
towing vessel) (1980 [1958], p.44). In these cases, the object does not gain 
autonomy peculiar to it. In all these cases, adaptation is part of the object but 
not of its evolutional process. The second form of adaptation signifies 
adaptation without the risk of hypertelia. This seems to be the case when 
adaptation is not directed towards overcoming prior external relations with any 
of its environments or conditions of use, but towards internal development of 
relational modality. Simondon highlights the internal necessity in the evolution of 
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the technical object rather than the external or economic one (1980 [1958], 
p.21). 
It is not the production-line which produces standardization; rather it 
is intrinsic standardization which makes the production-line possible 
(1980 [1958], p.21).  
This is the case of the Guimbal turbine. Here, adaptation appears in 
modifications or replacements of elements based on their qualities (e.g. 
qualities of the water and oil). The more these qualities allow mediations 
between the technical and geographical environments, the greater their 
relations and field of use (1980 [1958], p.47). In this sense, it ―represents real 
technical progress‖ (1980 [1958], p.47) because it could be seen as part of the 
process of evolution identified by the object‘s autonomy and concretization. The 
generator‘s size, its placement in the water-pipe, the water, the oil and the 
pressure all could be thought of as a solution for a problem. But this is not the 
point because not all types of changes due to problems are part of the evolution 
of the technical object. For example, minor improvements, negativity or change 
of the technical object in order to meet different aims of the inventor or user, 
might not be essential to the progress of the technical object (1980 [1958], 
p.60). The essential, here, emerges from the point that concretization and 
adaptation are self-referential processes and thus extend in a continuity. 
Concretization becomes possible because of ―the new conditions erected by 
concretization‖ itself, and adaptation is non-hypertelic when the environment is 
―created by the adaptation itself‖ (1980 [1958], p.48). The new stage in the 
evolution of the technical object comes into view from this adaptation-
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concretizing process. It is identified by the emergence of a new self-conditioned 
―technogeographical‖ environment that becomes part of ―a systematic and 
plurifunctional convergence‖, which becomes regulated (1980 [1958], p.49).  
―Invention‖ is the term reserved for technical objects that emerge through this 
self-conditioning process, that materialize through the technogeographical 
environment. Inventions only ―exist in their completeness or not at all‖ as they 
cause their own conditions of functioning or existence (Simondon 1980 [1958], 
p.50). The technogeographical environment is called the ―associated milieu‖, 
which allows the individualization of the technical object. This milieu is the 
mediator between two systems: a ―definite system of natural elements 
surrounding the technical object‖ and ―a definite system of elements which 
constitute the technical object‖ (1980 [1958], p.49). It is a ―transfer system‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.54) that institutes a recurrence causality (e.g. of the regulated 
interplay between water and oil) that conditions the object‘s individuation, 
makes it visible and open to reciprocal influences.  
The invention is the new individual that emerges from the concretization 
process. For Simondon, although the technological object, ―approximates the 
mode of existence of natural objects‖, it does not have signification like a living 
being where the latter exists in its absolute concreteness from the beginning 
(1980 [1958], p.40). The former‘s signification resides in the study of its process 
of temporal evolution, which remains open as a tendency towards 
concretization (1980 [1958], p.43). Nevertheless, it never concretizes by 
bringing about an end-come. This tendency defines the becoming of the 
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technical object as a process of ―condensation and concretization‖ signified by 
crossing ―a threshold to start up and to maintain their own functioning; above 
this threshold, they are absurd, self-destructive; below it, they are self-stable‖ 
(2009, p.19).110 Without condensation the object is destroyed due to the 
continuous amplification (e.g. over-heating an engine causes it to deteriorate 
irreversibly) and without concretization, it becomes stable so that its evolution 
stops and becomes ―a made-to-measure‖ object that has no intrinsic coherence. 
It is required but not necessary (2009, p.22). For this reason, the object of 
invention exists as ―a regime of functioning‖ within a ―schema of concretization‖ 
(2009, p.19) with its associated milieu that gives it an autonomy and self-
conditioning.  
Technical individualization could be observed in three levels: the element, the 
ensemble and the individual. The first level, the element, is the infra-individual 
technical object, which is analogue to the organs of the body (this resembles 
the psychic individual in human being individuation).111 The element does not 
have an associated milieu prior to the whole object constitution (1980 [1958], 
p.50). As pointed out previously, the element has an intrinsic quality that defines 
its degree of perfection (1980 [1958], p.60). Simondon explains how the adze, 
as an example of a good tool, is made up of a plurality of functioning zones that 
are arranged to achieve a certain system of usage with a stable structure. This 
arrangement is based on an internal distribution of the molecular chains of 
metal, for example, between the cutting edge and the flat part, and between the 
socket and the cutting part of the blade. This molecular distribution varies 
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between the zones to increase the solidarity and the elasticity of the adze, thus, 
ensuring its quality as a whole (1980 [1958], p.62). Technicality is the term 
reserved for this quality (1980 [1958], p.63). The quality here refers to the 
―forces‖ of the element identified as the ―capacities for producing or undergoing 
an effect in a fixed manner‖ (1980 [1958], p.64). Being fixed means it is a stable 
―positive characteristic‖, defining the element concreteness level or technical 
reality (1980 [1958], p.63). Being concrete means its quality is determined. The 
element is the bearer of the technicality of the ensemble or the technical 
individual.  
Elements signify ―a line of causality‖ (1980 [1958], p.57) in the evolution or 
progress of the technical object that marks a present spatial solidarity and 
historical successive solidarity of the technical being (1980 [1958], p.58). In 
other words, what passes in the temporal line of the technical object are the 
elements produced through the internal intercommunication between the 
ensembles (1980 [1958], p.60), only to ―participate in a cycle of becoming‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.58). The spatial solidarity is the present moment of integration 
between elements, ensembles and technical individuals. Elements are 
detachable from the ensembles and, thus, able to join other technical beings 
and modify the latter‘s characteristics, which in turn is reflected in the 
ensembles that produce other elements (1980 [1958], p.57-58). Thus, a 
successive solidarity is established through the ―transductive role‖ played by 
concrete elements in the transmission of technicality from one age to the next 
(1980 [1958], p.65).112 The elements are ―good witnesses of technical 
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development‖ (1980 [1958], p.66) and as ―an analysis of the technics of a 
human group on an analysis of the elements produced by their individuals and 
ensembles‖ (1980 [1958], p.66). 
Elements are integrated in the technical individual and enter into new 
compositions (1980 [1958], p.63). Once different elements are organized as a 
whole by an internal consistency, a relation between them is established in a 
circular causality in order to achieve a future ensemble (1980 [1958], p.52). The 
integration of elements in order to form a whole is not a matter of chance but is 
the ―conditioning of the present by the future, or by what up to now does not 
exist‖ (1980 [1958], p.50). This conditioning takes place through technical 
imagination, which is 
a capacity for perceiving in objects qualities that are not practical, 
qualities that are neither directly sensory nor wholly geometric, 
qualities that have to do neither with pure matter nor pure form but 
belong to the in-between level of systems. The technical imagination 
may be considered as defined by a particular sensitiveness to the 
technicality of elements that paves the way for the discovery of 
possible connections (1980 [1958], p.63-64). 
 
This ―sensitiveness‖ precedes the invention. Inventions are individuals formed 
by the participatory elements. The second level of technical object, 
individualization, lies in the sub-ensembles of a higher ensemble (e.g. 
laboratory or factory) which is identified by ―its capacity to effect various free 
relationships without destroying the autonomy of individualized sub-ensembles‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.55). These sub-ensembles or devices are not connected (1980 
[1958], p.56) but each of them constitutes a recurrent causality with their 
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associated milieu (this resembles the collective individual in human being 
individuation). The sub-ensembles should be grouped or connected in 
relationships that do not interfere with the autonomy and the independency of 
their different associated milieux (1980 [1958], p.55). As long as their 
organization requires independence, they do not require a unique associated 
milieu (1980 [1958], p.56). The associated milieu of the sub-ensemble is 
different from the unique associated milieu of the technical individual described 
earlier. It has a ‗recurrent causality‘ but lacks the ‗plurifunctional‘ or ‗reciprocal‘ 
causality with other sub-ensembles. Moreover, its conditions of function affect 
other sub-ensembles only through the relations effected by the higher 
ensemble. The groupings of sub-ensembles are established based on 
axiological value, in order to best achieve certain results from their functioning. 
In this sense, their adaptation is subject to external influences such as the 
choices made in order to achieve the best result and the technical or natural 
environments (1980 [1958], p.54-56). The third level of a technical object‘s 
individualization is the technical individual (this resembles the trans-individual in 
human being individuation), which has a unique associated milieu essential to 
its functioning and can only act within it (1980 [1958], p.53). It has achieved 
evolutionary or self-conditioning adaptation and interior concretization (1980 
[1958], p.56). It is characterised by its infra-individuals or elements (1980 
[1958], p.57). Apart from the elements as transmitters of technicality, nothing 
lasts because both the technical individual and the ensembles are temporary 
(1980 [1958], p.66). 
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The living being is similar to the technical object as it is an individual that brings 
its associated milieu with it (1980 [1958], p.51). ―The ability to be self-
conditioning is a principle of production capacity in self-conditioning objects‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.51). Thus, the dynamism of the two is analogical on these 
terms. The technical object is analogical to the mental system where the former 
influence each other through dynamism of material functioning, the latter 
influence each other through dynamism of thought (1980 [1958], p.51). The 
unity of the associated milieu of a technical object is analogue to the unity of the 
living being (1980 [1958], p.50). There is always an active dynamic background, 
which associates the individual, the form, the living being, the technical object, 
the organ or the piece of thought. There is a ―participational relationship‖ 
between the forms and their background. The background ―gives existence to 
the system of forms‖ (1980 [1958], p.51). Forms interact with their background 
before they even have a separate existence. Forms are systems of actuality. 
They are passive as long as they are not organized in relation to their 
background. The background is ―a system of virtualities, of potentials, and of 
moving forces‖ (1980 [1958], p.51). The participational relationship ―brings the 
virtual to bear upon the actual‖ (1980 [1958], p.51). The whole holds a 
reciprocal influence of recurrence causality with its associated milieu. 
Backgrounds and forms relate through causality and conditioning. The technical 
object has a functioning background that connects its elements into a structural 
unity. It conditions the object‘s structures as it is influenced by each structure 
individually but influences them collectively through an asymmetrical recurrence 
of causality (1980 [1958], p.51). It is the ―vehicle for information-controlled 
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energy‖ (1980 [1958], p.51). This informed energy supplies the elements with 
their conditions of functioning (1980 [1958], p.50) and establishes an internal 
coherence between them. There is also the natural environment that 
determines their usage. The technical individual is the one that has a 
homeostatic associate milieu that emerges in-between these two environments 
(1980 [1958], p.51). The body has a living matter as a background, connecting 
all its organs into an organism and preserves chemical and physical 
equilibriums of the system (1980 [1958], p.52). There is also the ‗no organ‘, a 
structure that appears as ―hidden forms‖ (that is the unconscious) that could be 
related to explicit forms only through a psychic background (1980 [1958], p.52). 
Thought has a mental background linking its representations, images, 
memories and perceptions. A human individual has a homeostatic mental 
associated milieu as an environment that emerges in-between life and 
conscious thought (1980 [1958], p.53).  Simondon asserts, 
 
we are able to create technical beings because we have within 
ourselves an interplay of relationships and a matter-form association 
which is remarkably analogous to that which we establish in the 
technical object (1980 [1958], p.53). 
 
Inventions materialize from this interplay of relationships in-between, as a 
reciprocal process of ―a humanization of nature‖ and ―a naturalization of man‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.49). The ―sensitiveness‖ of the in-between does not only appear 
in the interplay between the physical and biological but also between the 
concrete and the abstract‖ (1980 [1958], p.63). A new system emerges with its 
ability to be autonomous.  ―The self-conditioning of a system by virtue of the 
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result of its operation, presupposes the use of an anticipatory functioning which 
is discoverable neither in nature nor in technical object, made up to the present‖ 
(1980 [1958], p.49). That is why the invention is an ―integral inventivism‖ 
(Massumi et al. 2009, p.38) and not a mere development or improvement.  
In summary, Simondon emphasizes the process of becoming as a dimension of 
the human-technical culture. Becoming is marked by crossing thresholds where 
the future acts on the present, leading to the emergence of new autonomous 
systems. This reversed action is due to the sensitiveness to qualities in-
between heterogeneous systems which might not have practical or sensory 
existence. Reasonably, they could be in-between actual and virtual, and 
knowledge and emotions. They transform the assembled object into an 
assemblage with continual effects. Assemblages represent interplay between 
the human and machine‘s becomings. Affectivity is an essential character for 
this interplay. A change in affective modalities appears within the industrial 
phase that challenges human‘s becoming and subjectivity. This requires the 
development of a mental technicality defined by regimes of functioning, 
schemes of concretizations and of actions that unite the sources of information 
and energy and overcome psychosocial obstacles.   
6.4. The Turing Machine “taking-effect” 
In Simondon‘s account, the loss and the gain of affective modality is essential 
for the counter-becoming between human and machine. The loss of affective 
modality started by humanizing the machine and believing that it is a man. The 
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Turing Machine stands on the very line between the loss and gain of affectivity, 
as Turing was the first to claim that machines are intelligent and thinking beings. 
This is because it determines the degree of sensitiveness to the non-practical or 
indirect sensory qualities while experiencing the technical object. This allows an 
action of future on present, that is, an ―autonomous taking-effect of a futurity‖, 
which allows the emergence of ―an effective coming into existence that 
conditions its own potential to be as it comes‖ (Massumi et al. 2009, p.40). 
Elizabeth Wilson, interested in coassembling affects with artificial intelligence‘s 
pioneers, puts forward Turing‘s case in detail by pointing out, ―Turing‘s geeky 
attachment to machines was not thinly cognitive or logical. Rather, 
computational space and strong, positive feeling were often allied in Turing‖ 
(2008, p. 23). This attachment could be perceived as ‗introjective‘ where 
machines are brought psychologically ‗inside‘ in order to generate intimacy with 
them and expand their own competency (Wilson 2011). The ―computational 
space‖, in this sense, is the dynamic background that plays the informational 
role between Turing and the machine to which they both participate. Turing‘s 
arguments, on the other hand, challenge ‗what exists‘: the limitations and 
boundaries as he refuses to satisfy or submit to ‗objective proving‘ through 
experimentation and the compiling of statistical results. Respectively, neither his 
questions nor his answers address the current states of machines. He asserts, 
―we are not asking whether all digital computers would do well in the game nor 
whether the computers at present available would do well, but whether there 
are imaginable computers which would do well‖ (1950). He gave a simple 
answer to Newman‘s question about the time it would take to match a man and 
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a machine: ―Oh yes,‖ he replied ―at least 100 years, I should say‖ (Newman et 
al. 2004, p.119); this is the imaginable time. This highlights the sensitiveness to 
the relationship between machines and himself that, at the ‗present‘ is only ―a 
foretaste of what is to come‖. For Turing, the future is already casting its 
―shadow of what is going to be‖ (Turing Papers AMT A/1,cited in (Wilson 2004, 
p.42). Some examples of what has taken place within this time are provided 
below. 
In 1982, for example, Time magazine announced the winner of the ‗Man of the 
year‘ competition to be a computer, calling it the ―Machine of the year.‖ The 
competition, which started in 1927, is based on selecting the person who 
influenced the news and affected people‘s lives for either good or evil. The 
article documents its choice of the computer;  
there are some occasions, though, when the most significant force in 
a year's news is not a single individual but a process, and a 
widespread recognition by a whole society that this process is 
changing the course of all other processes (Friedrich 1983), 
The computer then has passed the threshold of the social norms and started to 
create virtual and actual networks. An actual application of the Turing Test will 
be informative of the source of this influence. A contest that was held in 1991, 
showed that some computers are mistaken for human.113 The human 
confederate was misclassified as a computer due to her expert knowledge. ―Her 
replies seemed to be too expert to be human‖ (Epstein 2009, p.10). Thus, 
Epstein affirms that, 
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As Turing anticipated, the contest tells us as much, or perhaps even 
more, about our failings as judges as it does about the failings of 
computers. People‘s preconceptions about the limits of computers – 
and of people – strongly biases their judgments (2009, p.10).  
In other words, computers were perceived through their limitation but knowing 
what they can really do is based on having experience with them. Ironically, the 
experience of the effect of expertise, here, seems to computerize the human in 
a similar way to humanizing the machine. A final example is the report of a real 
marriage of a Japanese man, nicknamed ‗Sal9000‘, to a video game character 
called Nene Anegasaki in 2009, by Reuters (Katayama 2009; Meyers 2009). 
The couple met in a dating simulation game called ‗Love Plus‘.114 These 
examples show that the reasons for abstracting the Turing Machine, affectivity 
and subjective experience, are the same reasons for the continuity of its 
multiple emergences and networks outside the realm of scientific culture.  
These examples support two of the embodied or situated characteristics of 
Turing‘s man-machine transformation and interaction. These highlight the 
definition of intelligence as an emotional concept, which has been overlooked 
within the scientific abstraction of the Turing Machine, where intelligence is 
linked to cognition and has been recently reported as being ―missed‖ by Turing 
(Shah and Warwick 2009, p.325), and the extraction of ―comparable 
circumstances‖ between the man the computer. In relation to the former, what 
takes place within the future time, for Turing, is not machine-man or man-
machine metamorphosis, that proceeds by replacing the man‘s organs with the 
machine‘s.  
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Turning disapproves of the task of building a ‗thinking machine‘ by taking ―a 
man as a whole and trying to replace all the parts of him by machinery‖. This is 
because ―the creature would still have no contact with food, sex, sport, and 
many other things of interest to the human being‖ (Turing papers AMT C/11:16–
17, cited in (Wilson 2004, p.40). In this sense, Turing links ‗thinking‘ with what 
interests human beings. Although what interests human beings -  ―food, sex, 
sport, and many other things‖ - is related to the organs of the body, the body 
seems only as a vehicle or means to obtain a contact with such interests. This 
contact appears as emotions by which Turing defines intelligence. Thus, 
intelligence as an ―emotional concept‖ (2004c, p.431), here, could be defined as 
the capacity of any-body-whatever to produce emotional effects. Turing argues 
that ―with the same object therefore it is possible that one man would consider it 
as intelligent and another would not; the second man would have found out the 
rules of its behaviour‖ (2004c, p.431).  
The rules of behaviour, in the case of machine, could refer to its written set of 
rules of procedures as in the case of the ―Paper Machine‖, where Turing argues 
that it could ―produce the effect of a computing machine‖ (2004c, p. 416). 
Emotional effects can be found through experience (it could be argued that, for 
Turing, scientific research is based on discovering pre-determined rules or facts 
and not on intelligence).  For Turing, ―we have to have some experience with 
the machine before we know its capacities‖ (Turing Papers AMT A/1,cited in 
(Wilson 2004, p.42). Having an experience with machines would allow more 
encounters with their emotional effects (that is their intelligence). Reasonably, 
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these effects, in Simondon‘s terms, mark the machine‘s technicality and 
Turing‘s sensitiveness towards it.  
A man-machine transformation is necessary in order to allow this experience 
and elevates the machine from the abstractness and limitations attached to it. 
For Turing, this transformation should be based on extracting ―comparable 
circumstances‖ between the man and machine (Turing 2004c, p.421). A 
mechanic mind is not a real mind, but mind functionality could be seen as 
stripping off the skin of an onion, where eventually putting all the skins together 
does not produce the totality or reality of the mind (Turing 1950, p. 454-455). It 
produces a different mind with its own totality. The real and the assembled will 
always be different. The extraction of the functions from the mind does not 
mean ‗freeing‘ it from the brain, but that the functions of the mind are selected, 
as any-whatever detachable qualities, which appear in their effect or force. This 
allows the ―mechanical analogues of brains‖ which requires accepting the real 
brains themselves as ―a sort of machine‖ (Turing 2004f, p.483). Programming is 
the method through which these can be transferred to a mechanical brain and 
function within it. The functions become visible as behaviour which in turn is 
―predictable by calculation‖ (Turing 2004f, p.483) (it could be said that they can 
then become subject to scientific research or comparative experimentations). In 
a way, then, Turing perceives the mind in its functions (thinking) and the body in 
its actions (behaviour), where the mind‘s function is qualified by the predictable 
and calculable machine‘s action. 
281 
 
A machine is ―completely described by the relation between its possible 
configurations at consecutive moments‖ (2004c, p. 419). Relations can be 
modified by the machine, that is ―self-modification‖, or by ―interference‖ from 
outside, which changes the description of the machine. Normal operations do 
not alter the description of the machine. Self-modification is related to altering 
the content of storage– but not the instruction table - by internal operations. 
Turing differentiates between two types of interference from outside. The first is 
by replacing the machine‘s parts with different parts, which does not hold his 
interest. The second is ―paper interference‖, ―which consists in the mere 
communication of information to the machine, which alters its behaviour‖ 
(2004c, p. 419). For example, a man‘s behaviour approximates a machine 
without interference when he is concentrating, that is, when he eliminates the 
distractions surrounding him. This behaviour, however, is determined by his 
previous interferences (2004c, p.421). Interference results in ―successor 
relation‖, that changes the original properties of the machines configurations. 
The outcome of this process is a ―different machine‖ (2004c, p. 419). 
6.5. The mixed and virtual characters in Turing Machine 
The previous section brings us to the realization of the mixed and virtual 
characters in the Turing Machine. As pointed out previously, Turing insists that 
―unproved conjectures‖ are important and useful for scientific research (1950, 
p.442). This is already implied by the test and the imitation game versions. The 
former, so far has accommodated the interest of science, thus, rescuing the 
Turing Machine by insuring its adaptability and continuity within the scientific 
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culture. The latter, that is the game, is relevant to Turing‘s interest of abolishing 
gender through imitating (this should be understood within the previous 
definition of the emotional concept). In all cases, the machine, as pointed out in 
the Turing imitation game, has an internal state to differentiate itself.   
Moreover, a patriarchal order appears where Turing describes two types of 
domestic machines as alternatives for abolishing gender: thinking machines 
simulating adult minds and learning machines simulating children minds; adults 
and children, that are present and future respectively. Lassègue (2009) 
correctly comments that the imitation game is a fantasy to abolish gender 
differences. In the adult‘s version, the ―gender difference is only denied but 
does not disappear in the game‖ (2009, p.166). In the case of the child–
machine version ―the desire to abolish gender difference is ... linked to the 
desire of building a physical object which would not be subject to the initial 
divergence of physical systems‖ (2009, p.167). The following section elaborates 
on these versions.  
6.5.1. The child-machine 
Turing obtains his aforementioned position as the father of computer science for 
potentializing the machine within the process of construction rather than 
perceiving it as a constructed ‗whole‘. Turing suggests building a machine with 
little capacity that can be educated and can modify its behaviour through 
learning (2004c, p.422). He argues, ―we need not be too concerned about the 
legs, eyes, etc. as there are other means of communication‖ (1950, p.456). 
These sensory organs can be developed later but initially his ambition was to 
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send the ‗Creature‘ to school without children making fun of it and for it to be 
able to communicate with the teacher (1950, p.456). The programmable child 
machine, with its speed and storage capacity, can be constructed from the very 
beginning to overcome any organizational and cultural constraints.  
Turing asserts that ―there is so little mechanism [writing] in the child-brain that 
something like it can be easily programed‖ (1950, p.456). Machines do not 
evolve but are constructed and the external selection takes place within this 
very process of construction. While its structure is ―hereditary material‖, its 
changes are described as ―mutations‖ controlled by the experimenter‘s 
judgments (this is similar to natural selection) (1950, p.456). The experimenter, 
who is ―not restricted to random mutations‖, can induce changes based on ―the 
exercise of intelligence‖ (1950, p.456), which in relation to our previous section 
could refer to the assessment of emotional effect. In this way, experiencing a 
machine and a machine‘s learning from experience could be interrelated. 
Specialization appears, as a number of people are required to work with the 
machine. Information and experiences communicated to the machine are 
controlled and selected by the experimenter in order to speed up the machine‘s 
learning (Turing 2004f, p.106). A schoolmaster carries out Teaching and 
facilitates learning. This can take place through rewards and punishments which 
could develop in a pleasure-pain system (2004c, p.422). For example, the 
pleasure/pain interference system is based on perceiving temporal 
configurations that determine a machine‘s future state. Pleasure as a positive 
experience occurs when the machine is right and prevents its behaviour from 
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changing, while pain is a negative experience that occurs when the machine is 
wrong, thus, it disturbs and changes its behaviour (2004c, p.425).  
Information entry is restricted by the communication channels available to the 
teacher. ―Orders are to be transmitted through the 'unemotional ' channels‖. 
―Symbolic language‖ could be used to teach the machine to obey orders (1950, 
p.457).115 Different logical inferences based on various kinds of definitions and 
propositions- with the exception of propositions related to belief-value - could be 
built or programmed in (1950, p.457). Propositions could be developed into 
imperatives within the system, which may be ―given by authority‖ or reached by 
the machine through  ―scientific induction‖ (1950, p.458). These imperatives 
could be classed as ―well-established facts‖ but they are ―not  part of the rules of 
the system‖  (1950, p.458). Some of the rules can be changed because they are 
―time-invariant‖ and ―claiming only an ephemeral validity‖ (1950, p.458). The 
teacher knows nothing about the machine‘s inner workings. A random element 
used in searching for information works better than a systematic method in a 
learning machine. This is linked to the learning process which ―may be regarded 
as a search for a form of behaviour which will satisfy the teacher‖ (1950, p.459). 
In this sense, Turing argues, ―Intelligent behaviour presumably consists in a 
departure from the completely disciplined behaviour involved in computation, 
but a rather slight one, which does not 'give rise to random behaviour, or to 
pointless repetitive loops‖ (1950, p.459).  
Another person to work with the machine is the mechanic who constructed it. If 
it operates incorrectly, the mechanic reverts it to a previous position and 
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decides about aspects that need to be repeated, but he is not involved in 
teaching (Turing 2004f, p.107). The machine has a memory that keeps a 
chronological list of statements and actions performed by or to it, an 
alphabetical index of experiences based on vocabulary recognition and times of 
occurrence, and an index of participants. Remembering is when the machine‘s 
memory ―include[s] important parts of the configuration of the machine at each 
moment‖ (2004f, p.475). A new choice of the next action is taken by matching 
some features of the present situation with the indexed information and 
previous choices. The new choice might differ from one machine to the other, 
based on the machine‘s degree of education in relation to the found favourable 
or unfavourable indications and outcomes, which at the first stages could be 
solvable by crude rules and later by some kind of index (2004f, p.474). In this 
way the machine learning is situated.  
6.5.2. Adult-machine: The imitation game 
Simulating adult-mind is the second version for abolishing gender. Turing thinks 
that it would be necessary to ―think a good deal about the process which has 
brought it [adult brain] to the state it is in‖ (1950, p.455). This will require 
information about its initial state, its previous education and experience. The 
imitation game seems one way to overcome this problem (constructing a child 
machine is the other alternative). As observed the imitation game has 
conditions and a process, which are elaborated upon in chapter one. Instead of 
thinking about the previous education and experiences, the game situates the 
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adults in a playing space. Two aspects could be noted here: first, the nature of 
imitation and second the effect of the process.  
The argument about the nature of thinking or imitation, provoked by Turing‘s 
paper, is in line with Gibbs‘ idea  that  mimetic communication is a ―complex 
communicative process‖ (2010, p.187) that takes place voluntarily and 
involuntarily, naturally and culturally, and involves visceral affect at its heart and 
other sensory modalities that produce emotional convergence in forming social 
processes. Regardless of the different forms it might take (e.g. synchrony and 
contagion), they establish a new ―epidemiology of affect‖ that is a new way of 
perceiving continuities and discontinuities between homogenous and 
heterogonous networks of images, conversations, bodies and other things, in 
addition to social bonds being formed or broken. Essential to mimesis is the 
‗asubjectivity‘ and ‗anti-representational‘ approach accorded to it in the 
Deleuzian-Spinozian view. 
But at the heart of mimesis is the immediacy of what passes between 
bodies and which subtends cognitively mediated representation, 
which it does not entirely replace or supersede. It is not analyzable 
within a semiotic model, nor does it require an ‗I‘: it is essentially 
asubjective even though it plays a crucial role in the formation of 
subjectivity. Mimesis can morph bodies, changing color, odor, form, 
or movement; or it might choose words or clothes or cars or even 
ideas as its medium. But what it signifies and the medium in which it 
operates is less important than its mode of operation. Mimicry is not 
representation of the other, but a rendering – a relation between 
things in ‗which, like a flash, similarity appears‘ (Gibbs 2010, p.193, 
citing Foucault 1973, p.24). 
This statement informs us that, in the case of Turing, the universal property of 
imitation cannot be reduced to a machine with pure cognition or mind 
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functionality, but a machine that is rendered to have the possibilities of forming 
and belonging to social bonds. Imitation in Turing‘s game cannot be restricted to 
writing the same sentences or doing the same actions because this remains on 
the subjective level as an imitation of identity, forms, subject, organs or 
functions. As mentioned earlier, Turing rejects man-machine transformation 
through organs and insists on extracting ―comparable circumstances‖. The 
universal property of imitation, in this sense, is emotional intelligence, which has 
the capacity for producing the same effect.  
If desire makes the body a machine, then it makes the machine a body. For this 
reason, the mechanical body is not excluded from the Turing Machine. In the 
imitation game, the machine‘s body is a ‗hidden object‘ from the interrogator. It 
should be noted that Turing uses the word mimic and imitate interchangeably 
because for him learning a language ―depend[s] rather too much on sense 
organs and locomotion to be feasible‖ (2004c, p.421). This means that he does 
not separate verbal behaviour from non-verbal embodied behaviours. Then, it is 
not a mind without a body, but a mind with a hidden body. In a way, the body, 
especially at the newness stage of machine, becomes the differentiator 
between the human and the machine. If the mechanical body was revealed at 
this stage, it could only be perceived as an object of science and not through its 
effects.  
The hidden body, then, enters into relations for being hidden. Only after the 
evaluation through which its effects are experienced and judged, its emotional 
intelligence is affirmed. Then, the effect of visibility could be ruled out. It crosses 
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the threshold to gain its life before being seized by the ―holistic thought‖ and 
being judged as mechanical. When the mechanical body appears after crossing 
the threshold, its mechanics cannot be perceived without its effects (chapter 
one informs us that as the machine‘s effect is affirmed, there is no reason for 
the body to be hidden any longer. Comparative experimentation is now based 
on contrasting bodies through their effects). In his paper ‗Can Digital Computers 
Think?‟ (1951), Turing asserts, 
But I certainly hope and believe that no great efforts will be put into 
making machines with the most distinctively human, but non-
intellectual characteristics such as the shape of the human body; it 
appears to me to be quite futile to make such attempts and their 
results would have something like the unpleasant quality of artificial 
flowers (2004a, p.486). 
In this sense, the meaning of a machine‘s body changes from being barely 
mechanical, to constitute the effects that come with it.  
This brings about the second aspect related to the effect of the process. If 
effects precede the organ, then, the organ can be identified by its effects, which 
for Turing are the emotions it exerts. This brings in Deleuze and Guattari‘s 
concept of becoming in relation to Spinoza.  Deleuze and Guattari emphasize 
that the body is defined by counting its affects (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 
p.283) where ―affects are becomings‖ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, p.283). 
Becoming is not imitation nor does it occur in the imagination (2004, p.261). The 
organs or individuals become elements in a ―machinic assemblage‖, which is 
defined by ―a list of active and passive affects in the context of the individuated 
assemblage it is part of‖ (2004, p.283). The body‘s coordinates are identified as 
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longitude and latitude. The first is defined as ―the sum total of the material 
elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness‖, where the second, that is  latitude, means ―the sum total of the 
intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential‖ (2004, 
p.287). Heterogeneous bodies are involved in unnatural participation that is  
a composition of speeds and affects involving entirely different 
individuals, a symbiosis; it makes the rat become a thought, a 
feverish thought in the man, at the same time as the man becomes a 
rat gnashing its teeth in its death throes. The rat and the man are in 
no way the same thing, but Being expresses them both in a single 
meaning in a language that is no longer that of words, in a matter 
that is no longer that of forms, in an affectability that is no longer that 
of subjects (2004, p.285). 
Becoming  as a process of desire in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) means the 
extraction or emitting of particles that are with, or capable of taking, relations of 
movement and reset, in order to enter into a ―zone of proximity‖ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, p.300-301), where the identification of the boundaries between 
the two systems is impossible. Becomings are molecules; a plane that is 
defined by its intensity, deterritorialization and mobility in contrast to the molar 
plane which is defined by its extensity, organisms, subjects, and identities (see 
appendix for an example becoming-woman).  
The situated game is, then, a situation for allowing the unnatural participation 
where the computer is experienced and known by its affects and intensities 
rather than its mechanical body. In this way, it is permitted its first hold to 
becoming-other. This is supported by Turing‘s focus of software development, 
complex programming and the undifferentiated effect between the paper 
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machine and mechanical equipment materiality as explained in the previous 
chapter five. As noted in the previous chapter, the man imitates the woman, and 
the digital computer imitates the machine before the man and the computer 
arrive at the final imitation competition. From the previous elaboration on the 
nature of this imitation, emotional intelligence and experience, it could be 
argued that the imitation game becomes a transversal passage in which both 
the man and the computer pass through to become-other. The computer, which 
has evolved from the ―discrete state machine‖ is in analogy with the man who 
imitates and uses the woman as its resource – it has produced a universal man 
or machine. This passage is situated so that an embodied effect at ‗asubjective‘ 
level can take place involuntarily between the two systems. Thus, the threshold 
of becoming is approached.  
6.6.2. Compound of heterogeneous systems 
The effect of the process as becoming-other can be better understood in the 
case of the Turing Machine itself rather than the game. In this sense, Turing 
was becoming-machine, that is becoming-other, but within his thought-of-
becoming, the machine was becoming-man, becoming-the-same, by showing 
intelligence, and becoming-other through behaviour. A similarity appears or is 
made to appear, a resemblance is figured between the machine and Turing 
(thinking), and between the machine and the woman-imitating man (behaviour), 
a compound of compatibility – similarity with difference. An example of this is 
when Turing says that thinking is a ―‗buzzing‘ in his head‖ (2004, p.184), he 
uses the machine‘s sound to approximate his thinking with machines. In 
291 
 
reverse, the machines are buzzing and thus thinking. Confirming the affective 
dimension of the Turing Machine, it could be claimed that Turing perceives 
‗man‘ and ‗machine‘ not from a scientist‘s perspective but from ‗in-between‘. 
Perceiving from the ‗in-between‘ does not go to extremes but absorbs the 
extremes within its evolution. The man machine is not a mere tendency towards 
a replication of human body or thinking because the machine and human are 
not ‗identical‘ systems.  
This compound can be called the ―dark precursor‖. This is one of Deleuze‘s 
concepts, which he describes as a ‗differentiator‘ acting as a communication 
agent, which makes heterogeneous systems coexist and communicate. For 
Deleuze,  
Given two heterogeneous series of differences, the precursor plays 
the part of the differentiator of these differences. In this manner, by 
virtue of its own power, it puts them into immediate relation to one 
another: it is the in-itself of difference or the ‗differently different‘ – in 
other words, difference in the second degree, the self-different which 
relates different to different by itself (2004, p.146).  
The dark precursor is a point formed between two heterogeneous systems‘ 
differences and includes both of them. This merging of, or interaction between 
differences will lead to a new difference (a new compound); a difference ―in-
itself‖ that is ―differently different‖ (2004, p.146). This new compound relates the 
systems‘ differences as each difference finds a resemblance in the compound, 
but this resemblance is inseparable from the compound as it is already part of a 
new identity. In this way the resemblance and identity become effects rather 
than preconditions of the precursor (2004, p.146).  
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Given that the Turing Machine emerges between the two heterogeneous bodies 
called the ‗human body‘ and the ‗machine body‘, as a compound that is a dark 
precursor, and it constitutes resemblance to them and an internal difference 
from them, nevertheless, it remains as a homeostatic associated milieu. This 
internal difference is formed, as Turing‘s previous accounts show, by extracting 
―comparable circumstances‖, having experience with machines and delimiting 
their capacities. This difference does not aim to erase the specifications of a 
system and/or diminish the characteristics of the other or, more profoundly, blur 
the difference between them. Actually, the originality only manifests itself in the 
difference. The difference is strength, and the creative investment is, if we 
speak in terms of consciousness, directing this difference to re-strengthen or 
empower both systems. Becoming is the in-between of the heterogeneous 
systems, a unitary compound of both systems. What constitutes the Turing 
Machine compound is the emotional effect that has abstracted the Turing 
Machine on one level and allowed its emergence and continuity on another one. 
The Turing Machine itself becomes an effect or an attachment point defining 
artificial intelligence. This effect does not constitute the Turing Machine as a 
technical object or a ‗machine‘ thought of by Turing, but it constitutes the 
relationship in-between human and machine. In other words, it is not the 
machine, but the relationship that has taken effect. The networks it has created 
are undeniable now, not only thought-networks, social-networks, energy-
networks but along with them desire-networks where Hansen‘s account 
reserves a place here. 
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In summary, the mixed character propositions in Turing‘s account are due to his 
attempts to merge both his scientific knowledge of computation with his desire. 
It could be argued that he was directing the question of his psychic problem 
towards the machine as the collective for resolving his physical problems. The 
actual and virtual, the real and unreal are connected to the dynamic background 
in which they participate. The machine is taken as a method of construction and 
convention. The imitation game and the test, the child-machine and adult-
machine contributed to the resolutions of the problematic issues for Turing with 
his psychic and collective individuals. While mediation did reveal a new 
dimension with its potentiality, continuity and futurity in the relationship between 
Turing and machines, which has been individuated due to the scientific culture, 
it did not resolve the physical and psychic problem for Turing. While Turing‘s 
thought showed transductivity in thinking, his psyche was haunted by fantasies, 
and his body was nowhere, that is imperceptible as he tried to satisfy his 
desires in a scientific way. This might lead, through amplification, to continual 
dedifferentiation or immanence on the one hand between science/desire, 
proved facts/unproved conjectures and, on the other hand, between effects and 
qualities of paper/digital, human/non-human, child/adult, self/machine, and 
living/mechanical bodies. It exceeded the limits. The increase of this 
dedifferentiation could be realized in his refined papers that started from 1948. 
His 1950‘s paper ‗Computing Machinery and Intelligence‟ is the accumulation of 
the indications of this immanence.  
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6.7. Summary 
This chapter introduces a different understanding of the Turing Machine based 
on Simondon‘s concept of individuation. It emphasizes the role of affective 
modality in modulating the relationship between Turing and Machine that has 
led to the event of ―taking-effect‖ or individuation. In his writing, Turing 
emphasized a number of characteristics that participated in this effect ‗taking-
effect‘. Experience was the method through which machines‘ capacities could 
be known, extraction of ―comparable circumstances‖ between human and 
machine is the principle to apply in humanizing machines, intelligence is an 
emotional concept, and a machine‘s intelligence is in the effect they produce. 
Multiple emergence and mixed character appeared as Turing attempted to 
mediate between, on the one hand, scientific culture and his desire and on the 
other hand, the simulation of adult-mind and the construction of the child-mind 
to play the game. Turing induced the fragmentation of tasks carried out by the 
individuals working with machines and later on emphasized that machines 
would overcome intellectuals and take control. In other words, and in relation to 
Simondon‘s account, they will marginalize human beings. He also indicated that 
machines would have networks as he pointed to their expected communication 
with each other. 
6.8. Conclusion: beyond immanence 
This phase of the transdisiplinarity approach follows the previous two phases, 
which focused on the analysis of empirical and phenomenological accounts of 
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the relationship between human and machine embodiments. It aims to address 
the problems found in the previous analyses where reduction of embodiment 
and embodied interaction is observed in relation to the indirect or subjective 
application of the Cartesian mind/body split. It hypothesizes that the analysis of 
the Turing Machine could counter the previous accounts, since it has led to 
multiple emergences of relationships between humans and machines, as well 
as different fields to study these relationships, such as AI and HCI. This phase 
also benefits from considering two aspects identified in the analysis of 
Deleuze‘s work on cinema. These are the relational and the becoming 
dimensions. The understanding of these two dimensions is expanded through 
the work of Gilbert Simondon on individuation. Thus, this phase attempts to 
read the relationship between Turing and machine through these dimensions.  
This reading informs us of a number of characteristics from which human-
computer interaction can be understood. Firstly, the whole is the relationship 
and not the computer or the human. These are elements that compose the 
whole through participatory relationships as individual units and, 
simultaneously, as participants in these relations. This composition requires a 
dynamic background in which the relations between elements manifest. This 
background ensures the achievement of short-term objectives and sets the 
foundation for long-term aims. Other potentials could appear in the course of 
time due to the modulation of relations, development of systems and the 
incoming of new participants. In practical words, the background could be 
thought of as an application field where the human and computer are 
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participants in a task completion. If the task is thought of as a relation in-
between human and computer, then, the question would not be about the effect 
of virtual embodiment on humans, as posed in chapter one, but how both of 
them could take part and extend the other‘s skills, abilities and potentials for 
further achievements. The same question could be thought in relation to 
disciplines, how they could extend each other while participating in a specific 
background. 
Secondly, the role of affective modality in the relationship between the human 
and machine should be reconsidered. This affective account is beyond that of 
the physical interaction in Hansen‘s analysis, as it is based on forces and 
qualities that do not have practical implications. Practical implications and 
inventions, as a future dimension, become the effect of these forces and 
qualities and not a precedent to it. Affectivity appears within the dynamic 
background and participatory relationship to constitute this future dimension of 
becoming. Practically, if the human and virtual embodiment participated in a 
task, an affective bond could emerge between them. This could be intensified, 
as seen in the second part of this thesis, through qualitative progression, that is, 
by extending the embodied character qualities and functions to participate in 
different task requirements.  
Finally, it could be argued that there is immanence between the human and 
computer to the degree of communication, and there is polarization to the 
degree of difference. In other words, the background and participatory 
relationship between the human and computer set them as a transductive unit, 
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without erasing the difference between them or the singularity peculiar to each 
of them. This enables new dimensions and relations of becoming to appear. 
Practically, instead of seeing the human and computer as identical or seeking to 
effect this identicality, the focus should be on allowing new forms of information, 
potentials and modes of individuation in-between them.  
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7. Conclusion and future implications 
7.1 Summary 
The aim of this conclusion is to summarize the previous cases about 
embodiment in HCI, new media and AI, and to present points for the future 
phase of the research. This thesis aims to rethink the relationship between the 
human and machine embodiment within a transdisciplinary approach. A 
transdisciplinary approach is problem-based and goes across and beyond 
disciplinary boundaries. It preserves the research as a process of becoming, or 
individuation where each phase leads to another phase. Machine embodiment 
is generally understood as the opposition of Cartesian mind/body dualism 
where, for the former, the body and emotions have a role in the human mind. 
Although studies in AI and HCI developed to conceptualize machine 
embodiment, in practice, the influence of the Cartesian effect of the split 
ensured it remained within concepts such as ‗embodied cognition‘, which put 
the mind in service of the body. Machine or virtual embodiment means 
equipping the software or hardware with a body that reflects its cognition or 
intelligence.  
A transition has taken place within scientific and neuroscientific with emphasis 
on the interconnection (anatomical) and interrelation (e.g. behaviour) between 
mind and body. Consequently, embodiment, especially in AI and HCI studies, is 
realized in the ‗embodied effect‘, which suggests that having a body makes 
other elements such as emotions, intelligence and non-verbal communication 
behaviours of a machine visible. These, in turn, have positive effects on human-
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computer relationships and on human embodiment, interaction and task 
completion. The relationship between human and machine embodiment is 
perceived within this effect.  
The first phase of this research focused on investigating the human-computer 
relationship within objective reality and the contradictions in this reality 
motivated the movement to the second phase. This phase explores what exists 
at the empirical level in the HCI field. Chapter one of this thesis presents an 
analytical study, using a meta-analysis or a quantitative review of experimental 
studies, in the field of pedagogical agents (PA). This study aimed to find out the 
effect size of embodied agents on participants and to resolve the on-going 
contradiction in the evaluative studies‘ findings. The findings do not confirm the 
―person effect‖, that is, the positive effect of virtual embodiment on participants 
and show issues related to the persistence of mind/body effect. Moreover, they 
present a lack of theoretical basis for the definition of embodiment and 
embodied effect, as well as the misapplication of conventional methodology in 
evaluating embodied conversational agents (ECA). The ‗embodied effect‘ was 
not evaluated as the embodied interaction was overlooked. Neither participants‘ 
embodiment (e.g. actions or activities), nor the relation between them and 
virtual embodiment was mentioned. The focus was on embodiment, which was 
reduced to an image and evaluated as a mental or cognitive effect, measured 
through verbal judgments that take place after the interaction. 
This redirects the research to find how embodiment is perceived within a 
different discipline. The second phase of the transdisciplinary approach looked 
300 
 
for embodiment and embodied interaction in new media, where Mark Hansen 
has shown interest in defining a model of embodiment in interacting with new 
media. This model is based on ‗Erlebnis‘, which is a short subjective and 
corporeal experience. Hansen claims to focus on a phenomenological concept 
of embodiment beyond representational and cognitive models, where embodied 
perception and embodied affectivity are seen as phenomenological modalities. 
Hansen‘s focus is on the participant‘s embodiment, so his illustration from 
Artwork is broader than the previous chapter. Besides the interaction with 
interface embodiment, which he terms Digital Facial Image (DFI), he also 
provides analysis of embodiment in virtual environments and virtual reality. For 
the benefits of understanding ‗embodiment‘, this analysis does not exclude the 
broader area in Hansen‘s account. This is because it seems that the theoretical 
and philosophical work Hansen engages in in his analysis, are more useful to 
our understanding of embodiment and embodied constituents than Hansen‘s 
work itself. On the one hand, Hansen‘s account in itself does represent a way of 
experiencing DFI or ECA (in HCI, this way of interaction is referred to as the 
‗agent misuse‘) and, theoretically, it is a way of interpreting or using technology. 
On the other hand, it is restrictive.  
This restriction is evident in two ways, firstly, due to Hansen‘s use of technology 
as a medium for constant projection of a mental model of patriarchal order as a 
model of embodiment. The ‗technology is female‘ model limits the technological 
situations, as interaction is explained in relation to knowledge of the human 
body‘s functions as a vehicle of reproduction, therefore this projection of 
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patriarchy on technology does not allow a critique of embodiment in 
technological situations. Such critique might be confused with the critique of the 
social situations, morals, ethics or female positions rather than situations 
involving technology. Second, Hansen insists on mapping technology to the 
body of participants rather than cognition, this means his account is explicitly 
dominated by mind/body, affection/perception and subject/object polarizations. 
Generally, it shows a lack of theoretical or scientific support for these 
polarizations. Reasonably, then, this transfer does not stand for 
phenomenological experience of technology per se and thus, it fails to 
accommodate for an experience of technology or technicality, or the relationship 
in-between the human and technology.  
Through his engagement with different theoretical, scientific and philosophical 
work, Hansen introduces us to Gilles Deleuze‘s transformation of Henri 
Bergson‘s theory of embodiment in cinema.116 This transformation 
demonstrates a different way of embodying technology, which makes us rethink 
virtual embodiment and its relationship to the human. Deleuze seems to present 
us with ‗embodied cinema‘ or we can even say ‗cinema intelligence‘, with the 
emphasis that creative thinking is not in repeating what is there, but in showing 
difference. Cinema‘s powers and potentialities are in bringing what is cinematic 
about cinema, which is creating new images, extracting effects and forming 
relations peculiar to its own techniques. Embodied cinema is perceived in 
relation to movement and time images within the perspectives of relation and 
becoming. The movement-image is a linear direct presentation of events while 
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the time image presents time indirectly and in an irrational way. Movement 
images have a direct impact or effect on the viewer while the film as a whole 
has durational effect. Deleuze does not deny the difference between the cinema 
as a body and the human body, instead, he used natural embodiment to 
empower cinema and used the cinema‘s embodiment to extend natural 
embodiment.  
 
This account redirects the research to analyze a different account of the 
relationship between the human and the computer, that has produced such a 
relation. This is the work of Alan Turing on machine intelligence. This phase 
shows how the Turing machine has influenced the relationship between human 
and machine, leading to the emergence of new research fields such as AI and 
HCI. There are two aspects of this account, first, Turing‘s relationship to the 
machine, which is described as affective, as there is a counter-becoming 
between Turing and the machine, where Turing is becoming-machine and the 
machine is becoming-Turing. This counter-becoming has led to a mixed 
character in Turing‘s writing as he describes the Turing machine, the Turing 
test, the Turing imitation game, the child machine learning through experience 
and the adult machine learning through imitation. Second, the Turing machine is 
important in the account of virtual embodiment since it presents the foundation 
on which AI and HCI research has develoved to date. Here, Turing identified a 
number of qualities for man-machine transformation. This transformation should 
be based on, extracting ―comparable circumstances‖ between human and 
machine, through having experience with machines. Turing also defined 
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intelligence as an ―emotional concept‖ experienced through the effect of the 
machine, rather than the rules of its behaviour as mentioned in chapter six of 
this thesis. This definition of intelligence has been overlooked in scientific 
culture until recently, due to the change of approach to mind/body split as 
explained in the introduction.  
7.2. Points for future phase  
This research consists of an analytical study and philosophical or theoretical 
studies, focusing on the relationship between human and computer or machine 
embodiments. I think there are two future paths that might complete the circle of 
this research. The first one is an integrative phase where the analysis of 
applications could be based on a hybrid of interpretations and theories. The 
second path is using the analyses in this thesis to inform the design and 
evaluation of interactive applications or systems using virtual embodiment. 
Reasonably, this could be seen as a solution to some of the issues in chapter 
one. Currently, I am interested in following the latter path as a future phase of 
my research. This could be achieved through eliciting some points that address 
the shortcomings observed in chapter one of this thesis. Here are some of the 
characteristics deduced from these cases and the theoretical work underpinning 
them:  
First, embodied perception is seen in the extended action or movement. 
Perception is the selection of images of interest and the reaction to them. It is 
influenced by the variation of images, distance between the perceiver and 
perceived, and time of reaction. The selection of images and actions is affected 
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by memory and affection. It might be explained, to a great extent, by a tendency 
towards movement and the extended action upon the object. Sensorimotor 
knowledge mediates between the perceiver and the environment. The perceiver 
knows that they can access the virtual information through some movement 
(e.g. head or eye movement). They have awareness and expectations of the 
changes that could take place, based on their movement or action and the 
objects movement. Perception is based on perspectival properties of the object, 
which are determined by the perceiver‘s location or vantage point.  
Based on this, variation in participants ECA‘s movement coordination need to 
be rethought. Sensorimotor skills that participants exhibit during the interaction 
could be explored in relation to their perceptions. The same variations should 
be considered in designing ECA, not only in relation to its technical background, 
but also in relation to the participant and the outside environment.  
Second, embodied affectivity stresses the inseparability between affection and 
perception. The selected and embodied action is not a perceptual indicator only, 
but is also an indicator of affection. Affectivity or sensations have a role in 
prefiguring the immediate future action. Embodied affection can be achieved 
through suggestibility and imitation. Affectivity could be explained through 
‗qualitative progression‘, which describes the gradual progress or alternation in 
intensities of affective states. This progress takes place on both physical and 
psychic levels. The degree of intensity of all the different affective states, such 
as muscular effort sensations, aesthetic affect, affective sensations and 
representative sensations, depends on two aspects that vary from one type of 
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affectivity to the other. The first aspect is the degree of power of the sensation 
that correlates to the number of the participating muscles and sensations. The 
second one is the degree of depth, which depends on the nature of the 
heterogeneous feelings, memories, ideas, and perceptions that participate in 
the affective state. As the progress proceeds by elements changing their nature 
and joining in, the subjective level and a difference in response from one person 
to the other is ensured. This ensures variation in the affective effect.  
Embodied affectivity is important in modeling, designing and evaluating the 
interaction with ECA. Affectivity is not a new concept in HCI and affective 
computing has already made some progress (some examples are provided in 
chapter one). Muscle contraction and the degree of intensity of affects could be 
seen as measures for the embodied involvement with ECA. At the same time, 
the latter could be designed and modeled to extract certain emotional affects, 
ECA which can bring different combinations of affective states or alter 
perceptions. 
Third, the evaluation can be captured through the process rather than the 
outcome. The process reveals the changes in embodied behaviors, actions, 
emotions and their intensity, that take place during the interaction. These 
changes show how the outcome is achieved rather than the outcome itself.  
Fourth, becoming is a continuous process through which the relation between 
the human and computer is changed within an extended period. Becoming 
implies change in embodied behaviors, affectivity and perception and reveals 
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the formation of new relations, skills and abilities. It also reveals new 
requirements and developments.  
Fifth, dynamic background and participational relationships could be seen as 
fields or applications, in which both human and machine interact and 
simultaneously participate. This implies information circulation between the two 
systems regarding a certain context or task.  
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8. Appendices 
8.1. Appendix 1. Meta-analysis Keywords 
8.1.1. Definitions 
Publication bias: The tendency of researchers and editors to publish 
significant findings which bias the results of systematic reviews toward 
published research. It is usually represented by graphical aids such as the 
funnel plot of standard error by effect size. A symmetrical funnel indicates the 
absence of bias while an asymmetrical one indicates the opposite. The bias is 
detected using a number of methods such as ‗Fail-safe N‘ analysis and the ‗trim 
and fill‘ method. 
 „Fail-safe N‟ analysis: Detects the file drawer studies which could be available 
but unpublished because of their insignificant results. It computes the number of 
null studies to nullify the effect size.  
„Trim and fill‟ method: Locates the missing studies and fills in the missing 
values on the right and left of the funnel plot based on the standard error and 
Hedges‘s g.  
Chronological cumulative analysis: Cumulates the results chronologically by 
adding the sample of participants to the second study and aggregating the 
effect size. This increases the precision (p-value) of the effect size. 
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Sufficiency of studies: Examines the need for additional studies to establish 
the effectiveness of pedagogical agents on learning.  
Stability of results: Examines the possibility that the addition of other studies 
might change the effect size aggregated. 
Hedges‟s g:  An inferential index that measures the magnitude of the effect 
based on the bias-corrected standardized mean difference. It is computed by 
using the square root of the mean square error from analysis of variance for the 
differences between two groups. The conventional interpretation is that an 
effect is small <= 0.20, medium =0.50, or large >=0.80. 
Fixed effect model: Estimates the ‗true effect size‘ of the combined studies 
based on the assumption that the variation between effect sizes is because of 
within-study error and therefore assigns the highest weight to the study with the 
largest participants.  
Random effect model: Estimates the mean effect size of the combined studies 
based on the assumption that the variation between effect sizes is because of 
within-study error and discrepancy between studies.  
Binomial effect size display (BESD): A general purpose effect size display 
used to practically interpret the results based on the change in the success rate 
attributed to the treatment procedure.  
Heterogeneity test: Focuses on measuring the variation between the effect 
sizes and studies. Significant p-value indicates that there are differences 
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between the effect sizes and rejects homogeneity. The observed dispersion is 
measured by Cochran‘s Q-value. If the Q-value is less than or equal to the 
degree of freedom (the number of studies minus one) then there is no evidence 
of difference between effect sizes or the difference is attributed to sampling 
error. In these cases the p-value is insignificant. However, if the Q-value 
exceeds the value of the degree of freedom and the p-value is significant, then 
the discrepancy between effects sizes reveals a real variation between studies.  
Diagnostic regression/residuals: The analysis used to identify individual 
studies that could bias the results. The outlier study has a significant 
standardized residual. 
Sensitivity analysis: The analysis demonstrates how the removal of one study 
could affect the effect size. It is used to determine the influential studies among 
the collected sample. 
I-squared: An index to measure the variance between effect sizes. It is not 
affected by the number of studies. It has a range of zero to one hundred where 
the values of 25, 50 and 75 are perceived as low, moderate and high, 
respectively. 
Tau-squared: An index of measuring between-study variance 
8.1.2. Effect size calculations 
Q-value 
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



 
Q
dfQ
=I  
Weighted mean: The pooled average of the different sample sizes. 
X
−
=
∑ Xi
N
                           (Xi = mean, N = number of sample sizes) 
Pooled standard deviation 
   
Kn+n
sn+sn
=S p

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21
2
22
2
11 11   
 
8.1.3. Included studies 
1. Atkinson, R. K. (2002) ‗Optimizing Learning From Examples Using 
Animated Pedagogical Agents.‘ Journal of Educational Psychology 94(2): 
416–427 (two studies). 
 
2. Babu, S., Suma, E., Barnes, T. and Hodges, L. F. (2007) ‗Can immersive 
virtual humans teach social conversational protocols?‘ Virtual Reality 
Conference. Charlotte, NC, 10-14 March. IEEE: 215–218 (one study). 
 
3. Baylor, A. L. (2002) ‗Expanding preservice teachers' metacognitive 
awareness of instructional planning through pedagogical agents.‘ 
Educational Technology Research & Development 50(2): 5-22 (one 
study). 
 
4. Baylor, A. L. (2003) ‗Effects of image and animation on agent persona. 
Does the presence of image and animation enhance pedagogical agent 
persona?‘ Journal of Educational Computing Research 28(4): 373–394 
(one study). 
 
5. Beun, R.-J., de Vos, E.and Witteman, C. (2003) 'Embodied 
Conversational Agents: Effects on Memory Performance and 
Anthropomorphisation,' in Rist, T., Aylett, R., Ballin, D. and Rickel, J. 
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(eds) Intelligent Virtual Agents Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2792. 
Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer. 315-319 (one study). 
 
 
6. Choi, S. and Clark, R. E. (2006) ‗Cognitive and affective benefits of 
animated pedagogical agents for learning English as a second 
language.‘ Journal of Educational Computing Research 34(4): 441–466 
(one study). 
 
7. Conati, C.and Zhao, X. (2004) 'Building and evaluating an intelligent 
pedagogical agent to improve the effectiveness of an educational game,' 
in  Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Intelligent user 
interfaces. Funchal, Madeira, Portugal: New York: ACM Press. 6-13 (one 
study).  
 
8. Craig, S., Gholson, B.and Driscoll, D. (2002) 'Animated pedagogical 
agents in multimedia educational environments: Effects of agent 
properties, picture features, and redundancy.' Journal of Educational 
Psychology 94(2): 428–434 (one study). 
 
9. Craig, S., Graesser, A., Sullins, J.and Gholson, B. (2004) 'Affect and 
learning: an exploratory look into the role of affect in learning with 
AutoTutor.' Learning, Media and Technology 29(3): 241-250 (one 
study). 
 
10. Dirkin, K. H., Mishra, P.and Altermatt, E. (2005) 'All or nothing: levels of 
sociability of a pedagogical software agent and its impact on student 
perceptions and learning.' Journal of Educational Multimedia and 
Hypermedia 14(2): 113-128 (one study). 
 
11. Duggan, M. H. and Adcock, A. B. (2007) ‗Animated Agents Teaching 
Helping Skills in an Online Environment: A Pilot Study.‘ Journal of 
Interactive Online Learning 6(1). Online at <http://www.ncolr.org/jiol/> 
(consulted Spring 2007) (one study). 
 
12. Dunsworth, Q.and Atkinson, R. K. (2007) 'Fostering multimedia learning 
of science: Exploring the role of an animated agents image.' Computers 
& Education 49(3): 677–690 (one study). 
 
13. Holmes, J. (2007) 'Designing agents to support learning by explaining.' 
Computers & Education 48(4): 523-547(one study). 
 
14. Hubal, R. C.and Day, R. S. (2006) 'Informed consent procedures: An 
experimental test using a virtual character in a dialog systems training 
application.' Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39(5): 532-540 (one 
study). 
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15. Jackson, G. T., Ventura, M., Chewle, P.and Graesser, A. (2004) 'The 
Impact of Why/AutoTutor on Learning and Retention of Conceptual 
Physics,' in Lester, J. C., Vicari, R. M. and Paraguaçu, F. (eds) Intelligent 
Tutoring Systems Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3220. Berlin / 
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 501–510 (one study). 
 
16. Mayer, R. E., Dow, G. T.and Mayer, S. (2003) 'Multimedia Learning in an 
Interactive Self-Explaining Environment: What Works in the Design of 
Agent-Based Microworlds?' Journal of Educational Psychology 
December 95(4): 806-812 (one study). 
 
17. Mitrovic, A.and Suraweera, P. (2000) 'Evaluating an animated 
pedagogical agent in ' in Gauthier, G., Frasson, C. and VanLehn, K. 
(eds) Intelligent tutoring systems Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
1839. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer. 73-82. (one study). 
 
18. Moreno, R., Mayer, R. E., Spires, H. A.and Lester, J. C. (2001 ) 'The 
case for social agency in computer-based teaching: do students learn 
more deeply when they interact with animated pedagogical agents?' 
Cognition and Instruction 19 (2): 177–213 (four studies). 
 
19. Moundridou, M.and Virvou, M. (2002) 'Evaluating the persona effect of 
an interface agent in a tutoring system.' Journal of Computer Assisted 
Learning 18(3): 253-261 (one study). 
 
20. Robertson, J.and Good, J. (2003) 'Using a collaborative virtual role-play 
environment to foster characterisation in stories.' Journal of Interactive 
Learning Research 14(1): 5-29 (one study). 
 
21. Silverman, B. G., Holmes, J., Kimmel, S., Branas, C., Ivins, D., Weaver, 
R.and Chen, Y. (2001) 'Modeling emotion and behavior in animated 
personas to facilitate human behavior change: The case of the HEART-
SENSE game ' Health Care Management Science 4(3; ABI/INFORM 
Global): 213-228 (one study). 
 
22. Van Vugt, H. C., Konijn, E. A., Hoorn, J. F., Keur, I.and Eliens, A. (2007) 
'Realism is not all! User engagement with task-related interface 
characters.' Interacting with Computers 19(2): 267-280 (one study). 
 
23. Xu, D.and Wang, H. (2006) 'Intelligent agent supported personalization 
for virtual learning environments.' Decision Support Systems 42(2): 825-
843 (one study). 
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10. Notes 
1 The scientific aim of developing the homologous technology and the artist's usage of the developed 
technology should be noted.  
2 Wilson has investigated six approaches of embodied cognition. (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is 
time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the 
cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is body based. Only the last one, which 
has received less attention in cognitive sciences,  focuses on the role of the body.   
3 This research was the foundation for almost all design and research in ECA studies from different 
fields, tending to verify, maximize or apply embodiment to acquire the persona effect.  
4 My emphasis. 
5 Oxford Online Dictionaries: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/auto-(accessed 3rd 
December 3, 2012) 
6 Line of flight here is seen as a line that basses through heterogeneous systems drawing them a part. 
7 Emphasized in source.  
8 Nicolescu differentiates transdisciplinary from multidisciplinary (which is disciplinary goal-oriented 
while researching the topic from different perspectives), and interdisciplinary (which is concerned with 
method transfer; the Meta-analysis study in this research is an example of interdiscplinry because it uses a 
research method usually applied in medical contexts in HCI field).  
9 Nicolescu uses capital „R‟ to emphasize the pragmatic and ontological meaning of Reality as 
„resistance‟ to accentuate its relational view. 
10 Nicolescu‟s transdisciplinary approach share similar foundations with Gilbert Simondon‟s approach of 
individuation or transindividual. However, there is not enough space in this thesis to explore this relation 
between the two.  
11 If “the faith in truth and objectivity of science ... is overthrown” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 2008, p.364) 
because science cannot be separated from the researcher‟s subjectivity, it is because science attempts to 
be „performative‟, a performance without a performer, where authentic scientists, more than any other 
people, realize that this is an „illusion‟. Citations by authors‟ names refer exactly to this point; that is, to 
the researcher‟s researching for knowledge rather than universal facts discovered by someone thinking in 
a certain way. On the other hand, it might be that the research culture can no longer be separated from the 
culture where the human being is „transformed into a commercial object‟ and thus researchers become the 
„doers‟ of research rather than researchers of knowledge. 
12 Two meta-analyses – one from communication studies and another for PA – were published after 
starting this research which find small effect sizes but neither of them identified the reasons for the 
continually contradictory studies. 
13 The search was refined by 2009 but no more studies were identified. 
14 For example the same material was used with two distinct age groups of learners (Moreno 2001). 
15 It is an odd task in itself to set a theory by principally aiming at reversing someone else work, i.e. 
Deleuze‟s work of Bergson. This celebrated „reversing‟ of Bergson clearly overturns Deleuze, who 
championed the work of Bergson, as Guerlac has termed it, as the “object of so many hatreds” instead of 
Bergson. 
16 This argument could be extended to our previous case study by asserting the focus on the embodied 
image effect and the disregard for the participant‟s embodiment suggests that affectivity and perception 
are located in the image qualities and are unsupported by the participant‟s body. 
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17 An interview with Deleuze on A Thousand Plateaus and assemblages is posted on October 8, 2009 at 
laveral subjects blog, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/deleuze-on-assemblages. 
18 Hansen, M. B.N. (2006) New Philosophy for New Media. Cambridge: The MIT Press.  
19 A concept related to Deleuze‟s conceptualization of the cinema as having a real vocation by raising the 
action-thought to the supreme power of “monism” (2005b, p.156). 
20 It seems that as HCI argues for the „newness‟ of the virtual embodiment, Hansen argues for the 
„newness‟ of the participant‟s embodiment. It might actually be that this debate is not of much relevance 
to Hansen, himself, as much to the „newness‟ or let us say the „illusion of the newness‟ that seems to 
possess both the science and art research cultures. The newness is conceived as an objective to be 
achieved or an outcome to be measured, rather than an effect of development or becoming. Yet, we come 
to realize that the newness, if available, is reaped less and, therefore, we become „old wine in new 
bottles‟; but with mass publication, mass media and mass disciplines, beside our advancement and 
caution with our environment, we are in the age of „new recycled bottles‟. This understanding of the 
newness-driven culture appropriates Hansen‟s assertion that the comparison evaluating today‟s situation, 
between the cinema and computer, such as that presented by Manovich, regardless of their “correctness”, 
could lead us to “divorce our theorizing of new media (and particularly our understanding of new media 
art) from the empirical givens of today‟s most prevalent new media forms and conventions” (2006b, 
p.35). This announcement, however, renders paradoxical Hansen's interest in comparing and negatively 
criticizing different media theorists and Gilles Deleuze in particular. Simply, common sense informs us 
that the „correct‟ comparison could not lead to divorce our understanding of the new relations but the 
inverse, that such understanding will enhance our theorizations and appropriates them that we might 
decide to divorce some of our old relations; except the „correctness‟ will deprive the new relations from 
the glorious effect associated with newness. We are looking for novelty, and we know that the „new‟ is 
never wholly novel. Specifically, if we consider the human being, the image and their relating nature we 
might find that it is a matter of difference, adjustment, adaptation, variation and creativeness rather than 
newness. This lends us to rephrase Hansen‟s assertion. Even the “fact that HCI extends the sway of 
immobility must” actually NOT “be seen as occasion for criticism of the cinematic heritage of new 
media” but rather an opportunity for the “exploration of unheeded or unprecedented alternatives” (Hansen 
2006b, p.35). That is simply because we would not be able to identify these as „alternatives‟ in the first 
place in order to entitle them as „unheeded or unprecedented‟, which brings us to appreciate the 
significance of understanding the repetition and the difference between the heritage, the inherited and the 
new in terms of the body, technology, art and science, in themselves, and the interdynamic interaction 
between them. On the other hand, criticizing the cinematic heritage will only limit our evaluation of the 
alternatives to negativities and oppositions instead of following a developmental perspective. What we 
observe is no longer a cinema and a computer, art and science – although these should not have been 
observed as distinct from the very beginning – but a constitutive change tending towards maximal 
interlacing between them. If we cannot historicize media independently from the evolution of the human, 
as Hansen has pointed out (2006a), we also cannot historicize it independently from its philosophy and 
thinkers, and for sure, we certainly cannot build new philosophy solely on negative criticism. Indeed, this 
sounds as if new civilizations cannot emerge except on the complete destruction of old civilizations and 
their heritage; that each time we have to begin from emptiness and wait to end in emptiness. 
21 This is in reference to his analysis of cultural critic Robert Markley‟s work „Virtual Realities and Their 
Discontents.‟ (Hansen 2000, p.53). 
22 My emphasis. 
23 This is from Benjamin, On some motifs in Baudelaire (1968).  
24 Transduction is a Simondonian term referring to a process of individuation where an activity extends 
itself in all directions. As a process of becoming, each layer reaches a stage of amplifying and condensing 
to form the basis for the next layer. In the introduction to my research methodology, this forms the phase 
transition. 
25 It might also be said that the technology, for Hansen, is the other emphasising his concept of 
„otherness‟. In other words, Hansen perceives and feels (as his model is based on phenomenological 
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experience) that the technology is the other‟s body and to this other‟s body he brings what he identifies 
the woman‟s body with.It is not the female body that is technological because this is the type of technesis 
Hansen is against since his model calls for taking advantage of what is given rather than going beyond 
that to theoretical or scientific reductive models that would not fit even if embodiment is addressed. 
Indeed, if there is transformation from the female body to technology then this is, at least for Hansen, 
should be seen to enhance the technological Other without „reducing‟ it to a different entity as Hansen‟s 
account informs us that he is against such reductions. But, do not we always start from that which we are 
familiar with? It is fair enough to say that the going beyond that which is familiar remains questionable in 
Hansen‟s account. 
26 Emphasized in source. 
27 This is not to say that a methodology or procedure cannot be deducted from philosophical thought. It is 
a matter of synthesis or analysis. Synthesis appears when for example a number of frames are designed, 
keyframed and added to a timeline where a transition between them is selected so the movement looks 
natural and the effect is achieved. On the other hand, an analysis that starts from the product might 
actually emphasizes that which does not look natural as part of the whole effect. 
28 Bergson, Matter and Memory, The choice of images (2004, pp.26–27). 
29 This an important point in relation to the previous chapter because a representation is not constitutive 
of the body. This point has been overlapped in designing and evaluating PA as pointed previously. Two 
programmes using AI technology and those using a mere animation technique could present the same 
image but one has an intelligent-model underline the representation, the other one is merely 
representational.  
30 Being-becoming is an ontological perspective while becoming-being is ontologenesis perspective 
(individuation). 
31 Emphasized in source. 
32 Deleuze asserts, “the essence of the cinematographic movement image lies in extracting from vehicles 
or moving bodies the movement which is their common substance, or extracting from movements the 
mobility which is their essence” (2005a, p.24). Extraction, here, does not mean that it tears or separates 
movement or mobility away from its object but making these as qualities of power by intensifying them 
or suppressing other parts of the object.  
33 This is related to the work of Bresson (2005a, p.112). 
34 The name is spelt as Jorge Iven in Deleuze (2005a, p.113).  
35 Deleuze pointed out that “the naturalist time seems to be under an inseparable curse ... It is therefore 
inseparable from an entropy, a degradation” (2005a, p.131). 
36 King Midas is a fairytale based on a Greek mythology. Midas was so possessed by his desire for gold 
that he wished that everything he touched would become gold. His wish was answered as he was asked to 
choose between the golden touch and love. Midas chose the golden touch. Gradually, his happiness 
started to disappear as he realized that he could not enjoy touching anything anymore. Midas learned that 
the golden touch was nothing but a curse when he touched his own daughter and turned her into gold. 
Midas regretted his wish and wished to get rid of the golden touch. His wish was answered.  
37 Bergson also uses „living body‟ and „living matter‟ to refer to the physical body apart from the brain.  
38 It is important to note here that perception does not subtract from the image what interests it but 
isolates it by suppression, where some other influences become unconsciously isolated and others might 
not be perceived as they might not be in the being‟s space.  
39 In his essay about dreams these take the form of outlines regulated by memory.   
40 „Prolong‟ is used in translated text of Matter and Memory which could mean „extend.‟ It could be a 
matter of translation or there might be a qualitative difference between the two words where „prolong‟ 
could imply that the continuity in the process is presupposed.   
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41 As referred to by Bergson (2004, p.25).   
42 Actual perception as measured by the degree of utility (2004, p.71). 
43 Subjective perception is distinguished by simple subtraction (Deleuze 2005a, p.66).  
44 A structural coupling is based on the living system‟s interaction with those changes in the environment 
or medium that only keeps the maintenance of its autopoietic organization (the composite unity or 
totality). That is, it appears to know how to live while conserving its internal autopoietic relations and its 
adaptation with the medium it exists in (Maturana 2002, p.17), yet it is blind to the consequences rising 
from its interaction with other molecules (Maturana 2002, p.8). A „structural coupling‟ is formed, where 
certain structures (components and the relations between them) of its organization are selected, leading to 
the triggering of a determined structural change in the organization. Although it forms a recursive 
spontaneous and congruent relation with the medium to re-establish itself – thus conserving the 
autopoietic organization – destruction or disintegration could occur in the absence of these conditions. In 
effect, within the autopoietic system the conserved organization conserves the virtual organization for the 
organism and, at the same time, relegates evolution and reproduction to historical networks of self-
interest interactions that cause structural change but maintain and protect the physical boundaries of the 
organization. 
45 This challenges Bergson‟s and Deleuze‟s image ontology (2006b, p.174). But what becomes a core 
issue here is where the creation process itself is not fundamentally impured by affection and memory; 
learning. 
46 In The Embodied Mind Varela and the co-authors (1992) base some of their notions regarding 
mind/body unity, consciousness, “mindfulness/awareness”, “groundlessness” and “own-being” on the 
Buddhist tradition: Madhyamika or “middle way”. These are transferred in Hansen‟s account of new 
media.  
47 What Hansen conceives as deterritorialization of Bergson is rather reterritorialization of 
phenomenology. 
48 It could be wondered whether Hansen has taken notice of this reversal effect of his analysis or not. 
While the touch, here, changes any-whatever into a valuable materiality that is gold, it strips the life out 
of it turning it into a non-living matter. It could be presumed that this turning from living to non-living 
does not matter for the subject. However, with the touch the subject also turns all the qualities and effects 
into one quality that is the effect of gold. Consequently, two movements appear. Firstly, the body loses its 
interest in its surroundings and secondly, it loses its interest in the golden touch. That is because it 
develops into a learned cause-effect pattern that communicates the same effect. 
49 This move, as Hansen explains, marks the “passage from interactivity to dynamics” (Hansen 2006b, 
p.167) related to the difference Depraz noted between the phenomenological (Husserl, Paarung) and the 
Chilean school of autopoietic (acoplamiento) experiential-conceptual structures (Depraz 2008, pp.239–
240).  
50 Emphasized in the source. 
51 Emphasized in the source. 
52 In opposition to the previous account, that absolute survey does not need a supplementary dimension; 
Hansen views VR as a technical supplementation to the absolute survey.  
53 What Hansen means by “absolute subjectivity” or what makes this subjectivity “absolute” is unclear – 
whether it is the primary consciousness, “subjectless” subjectivity or the primary and secondary 
consciousness as an absolute unit, a whole. In relation to VR, Hansen explains that it “mediates an 
absolute survey of nothing other than the space of the body itself – that paradoxical being which is neither 
object nor absolute subjectivity” (2006b, p.177). By the end of the chapter, however, Hansen insists that 
VR facilitates “a technical expansion of the (human) domain of absolute subjectivity and of the (human) 
capacity for affective self-intuition” (2006b, p.196).  
54 Rowlands (2006) has criticized the „sensorimotor knowledge‟ as actually being ambiguous and that 
instead of placing representation within the visual, it is placed in this „knowledge‟. This is an argument I 
335 
 
                                                                                                                                
agree with as I do experience similar difficulty with this concept, which Noë seems to take pains to 
explain in precise terms without falling into Rowlands‟s representational grip due to Noë using – as 
Rowlands points out –descriptions such as perceivers‟ “expectation”, “knowledge” and “awareness”, 
which raises the question about the form of this knowledge and these expectations. However, Rowlands 
dismisses the idea of the „virtual‟ representation and action which forms the main theme of his book: 
perception as „virtual‟ action. Noë avoids the relevance of time, memory and habit in establishing the 
sensorimotor knowledge which he argues not to be propositional. I think what Noë is trying to envisage 
here is a position closer to Bergson‟s work on memory and motor habit, where the latter is perceived as 
acted or lived and draws on automatic reactions.  
55 It should be noted that Bergson has already considered how the environment might actually affect the 
sleeper and the content of the dream such as the sleeping statues and dreaming of floating or flying.  
56 This might even result in what Noë calls change or “inattentional blindness”, where the viewer 
focusing on certain details might fail to notice the change or other details brought into the image (2004, 
p.51). 
57 Here. Deleuze focuses on a kind of division between the camera‟s and character‟s (the viewer could be 
identified with the character from a similar point of view) perspectives seen in Pasolini‟s thesis 
elaborating on Bakhtin‟s linguistic forms as the „free indirect discourse‟ which is of two subjects (reporter 
and reported). Pasolini takes that as a matter of style, where the character sees the world in a certain way 
and the camera sees the character and the world. 
58 As pointed out previously, Hansen has already referred to his aim in eschewing the deep theoretical 
bias that lies at the heart of Bergson‟s ontology “by decoupling human freedom from the capacity to 
translate material stimuli into mental representations,” insists “we open entirely new possibilities” (2000, 
p.72). 
59 Rushton relates this to Hansen's claim that the DFI is an answer to the “late capitalist semiotic 
machines” and for Rushton it is the same.  
60 Emphasized in the source. 
61 The difference between affection and emotion should be noted in relation to body and brain. Whereas 
affection or intensity appears in the body, emotions, the qualified affections, are localized in the brain.   
62 Emphasized in the source. 
63 Hansen presents the quotation of Deleuze that argues exactly the opposite of what he is saying. 
64 A further discussion of the time-image will be presented in temporality section. 
65 Provided that „affective power‟ is transferable!  
66 We can also claim that there is no image, generally, that does not „trigger‟ affectivity. 
67 As we are not accustomed to observing ourselves directly, but perceive ourselves through forms 
borrowed from the external world, we are led to believe that real duration, the duration lived by 
consciousness, is the same as the duration which glides over the inert atoms without penetrating or 
altering them. Hence it is that we do not see any absurdity in putting things back in their place after a 
lapse of time, in supposing the same motives acting afresh on the same persons, and in concluding that 
these causes would again produce the same effect (1950, p.154). 
68 For Bergson, space is discrete while duration is continuous.  
69 “A large number of psychic states are accompanied, in fact, by muscular contractions and peripheral 
sensations. Sometimes these superficial elements are co-ordinated by a purely speculative idea, 
sometimes by an idea of a practical order. In the first case there is intellectual effort or attention; in the 
second we have the emotions which may be called violent or acute: anger, terror, and certain varieties of 
joy, sorrow, passion and desire” (1950, p.27).  
70 Deleuze‟s theorization of the liberation of affect is related to the body without organs (BwO) or 
Spinoza‟s ethics of what the body can do, where he perceives affects, especially desire, as constrainted by 
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the organism. Yet, in this context, „qualitative progression‟ is more related to Bergson‟s presentation, 
especially when we think about it in relation to hypnotism and suggestibility. 
71 Rushton (2008), at first, undoes Hansen‟s criticism of Deleuze in relation to cinematic spectatorship 
and interaction by bringing in the Deleuzian concept of “cinematographic Cogito” which, as he notes, is 
explicitly taken from Bergson‟s article „Memory of the present and false recognition‟. Deleuze‟s 
understanding of Cogito, as Rushton (2008, p.127-128) explains, presupposes a double-spectatorship 
experience; one is receptive and embodied as it responds automatically to the images, and the other one is 
transcendental and intellectual that monitors and semi self-reflects on the interaction. In relation to cogito, 
Deleuze does not support mind/body dualism but rather his view is influenced by Bergson‟s monism.   
72 The out-of-field refers to the virtual effect, first, at the end of a frame that actualizes the viewer‟s 
virtuality into the second one, and at the end of a film that opens it without actualization of the viewer‟s 
virtuality.  
73 In a way the set tells the viewer, „yes, you are right in thinking this or in feeling that way or not.‟ 
74 This does not mean that the whole notion of „liberating affects‟ has no support. This could be 
explained in terms of olfactory perception which related to chemical molecular such as pheromones. But, 
here, we are dealing with visual perception and affection where other scientific findings such as nerve 
mirroring (we could also say imitation) could be more relevant. 
75 As Noë‟s analysis of perception shows, some brain stimulation can bring some impressions.  
76 Apparently this is the same vocation Hansen sees in new media but instead of the three Bergsonist 
concepts of crude perception, auditory image and idea, Hansen stops with the sensorimotor circuits. 
77 It should be noted that Deleuze has already noted the decline of the “shock” and Bensmaїa (2005, 
p.148) has noted the reduction of its noetic dimension to a “nooshock”. 
78 In other words, Hansen refuses to provide the image with a level of subjectivity. That is to say, „my 
failure to forge contact is affective‟ rather than „this responsiveness is affecting me‟. 
79 I represent the definitions here in order to re-emphasize their connection within Varela‟s work.  
80 Appraisal is defined as a causal and temporal evaluation of a situation directed towards the self, that is, 
one‟s goals and well-being, through which meaning is constructed and the individual makes sense of the 
world (Lewis 2005, p.170). 
81 Heidegger forwarded the primacy of time over affects (Varela and Depraz 2005, p.154). 
82 Emphasized in the source. 
83 Emphasized in the source. 
84 Gordan‟s work represents the interval or cut between images which characterizes the movement-image 
(the curve of movement, prediction and out-of-field exemplified by his experience) rather than the 
interstice between images that characterizes the time-image. 
85 Although instead of unit of information, I would prefer to refer to it as „affect‟. 
86 For Massumi the words intensity and affects refer to the same meaning but for Bergson intensity 
defines the degree of power and degree of depth of affects. That is intensity is a dimension of the 
emotion, which is identified after our consciousness awareness of the affects. In this way, what is missed 
within the half-second is not intensity but the molecular movement or the qualitative progression that is 
the building-up of intensity.     
87 Massumi comments that it is Deleuze who actually reopened the path to these authors, including 
Spinoza.   
88 The word claimed is used here because no evidence to support this polarization was provided by 
Hansen. The presented neurocognitive accounts in chapter four show that such polarization does not exist. 
89 Emphasized in source (quotation as in source). 
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90 This criticism is directly applicable to the feminist theories. 
91 Simondon‟s work is not fully translated into English language. This thesis makes use only of the 
translated sections. 
92 Turing has pointed to this attitude towards machines asserting that the nature of machine is seen in 
doing “the same thing over and over as long as it keeps going”(Turing 2004c, p.410).  
93 This definition is based on the associative law or property in mathematics which is applied to 
operations such as addition and multiplication where the change in the way elements are grouped does not 
change their result (e.g. 2 + 3 + 4 = 9 is associative with (2 + 3) + 4 = 9). An associative translation into 
symbols could be (i.e. a + b + c = (a + b) + c).  
94 This also means that the provision of alternatives of the same design or implementation- such as 
modem computers- does not mean the original design Turing machine itself is faulty or abstract. Even if 
the provided alternatives could function in a better way than the original or initial design, they remain 
alternatives provided in the course of development. In this way, they have an associated relation of being 
actual probability representing the future or the „fate‟ of the original design. 
95 We can take the meta-analysis study in chapter one as illustration of this point where it is applied to 
resolve problem of the increasing number of studies that decreases qualified applicable findings. The 
literature review or the state-of-art is the representation of the incalculable struggle to which meta-
analysis study adds itself as a struggling point that is another representation. Meta-analysis‟ quality is in 
quantifying the already existing quantity. The already existing quantity of a phenomenon forms its 
representations. As pointed in the chapter, the choice of the random mean effect, unlike the fixed method, 
means this set of studies represents a larger set of studies whether exists or not. Publication bias describes 
the problem where all meta-analyses have to find and claim finding, after a thoroughly search, all the 
studies in the field but at the same time have to admit that out there, there could be studies that are not 
found. In this way, the publication bias forms a solution by reserving a space in the meta-analysis‟ quality 
to call for more studies thus securing quantity as quality by the quality itself.  
96 Turing argues that the validity of Lady Lovelace‟s and other researchers‟ position that the machines 
cannot originate anything but can do „whatever we know how to order it to perform‟ is based on how the 
machines are used rather than how they can be used (2004a, pp.111–112).    
97 Turing points out that there are two rooms; one of them is for the interrogator (Turing 1950, p. 434). 
98 My emphasis. 
99 In the machine imitation game anything the discrete state machine (as B), as the woman – Turing 
provides the tasks of the „mother‟ as an analogy for the discrete state machine (1950, p.438), describing 
them as predictable – can perform, the universal digital computer can perform. 
100 Shieber makes the point about the possibilities of the instructions that will be provided to the 
interrogator; that is, will s/he be informed that the competitors are man/woman, machine/human, 
machine/woman or machine/man. Turing has not proposed any change in the interrogator‟s instruction 
simply because in all cases both players constantly compete on being identified as the woman and in the 
machine imitation game on being identified as the discrete state machine.  
101 Except our beliefs and preferences. 
102 It should be noted that most of the confusion is due to the researchers‟ overgeneralization of the „test‟ 
over the „game‟ and „thinking‟ over „imitation‟, ignoring the fact that Turing is intelligent enough to 
know the differences, similarities and relations between them. Looking at the following quotation informs 
us that the great effect of playing the imitation game should be considered within game theory. 
It might be urged that when playing the „imitation game‟ the best strategy for the machine may possibly 
be something other than imitation of the behaviour of a man. This may be, but I think it is unlikely that 
there is any great effect of this kind. In any case there is no intention to investigate here the theory of the 
game, and it will be assumed that the best strategy is to try to provide answers that would naturally be 
given by a man (1950, p.435). 
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103 Another point is raised by Genova that “Turing attempting us to misread” (1994, p.315) by using „C‟ 
to refer to both the interrogator and computer. Using „C‟ is likely to add another character to the 
universality of the computer – besides the exclusion of women and desecrate state machines – which is it 
cannot distinguish whether B is a man or a woman; thus “making one equal to two” (Turing 1950, p.443). 
104 This clarifies the points of some researchers who are interested in Turing‟s previous work and see 
this work as continuum to it. The continuity still exists but it does not block the existence of the 
difference.  
105 In this argument, Turing does not even use players A and B but an interrogator and witness. 
106 Piccinini (2001, p.577) has already mistaken the „specimen questions and answers‟ as a conversation 
between the interrogator and player A. Actually, Turning would have used C for the interrogator as he 
does in the preceding section but here he used Q and A which simply means „Question‟ and „Answer‟ 
(Piccinini 2001, p.577). Hodges also insists that the Q/A sample interrogation contradicts the “literal 
meaning of the words” advocated by other authors as the gendered interpretation of the game (Hodges 
1997, p. 37). 
107 This can be observed in the problems of the scientific research such as: the misinterpretation of the 
probability test, the increase of contradictive results and findings, the reduction of scientific hypothesis to 
unsupported assumptions based on the misunderstanding that contribution to knowledge is obtained 
through testing what has not been tested yet, the mass publication and the publication of the same content 
under different titles, the increase of conferences as the „scientist‟s Hollywood‟ ... etc. 
108 Raman and Compton effects are two phenomena related to light scattering in physics. Raman Effect 
describes “a change of wavelength exhibited by some of the radiation scattered in a medium. The effect is 
specific to the molecules which cause it, and so can be used in spectroscopic analysis”. Compton Effect 
describes “an increase in wavelength of X-rays or gamma rays that occurs when they are scattered” 
(Oxford 2012).  
109 It could be understood that the degree of perfection refers to a practical stable quality of the object 
but it varies in relation to the object‟s level wether it is an element, ensemble or individual. 
110 These two processs are analogue to condensation and amplification in human being individuation. 
111 Organlogy is used to refer to the study of organs as element, wheras mechanology refers to the study 
of the complete technical objects. 
112 This process could be seen as viral becoming which takes place as the technical object does not 
engender its own species.  
113 In 1985 Epstein set the Loebner Prize Competition offering US$100,000 in prize money to 
developers of a computer program that could fool people into thinking it was a person (2008, p.3). 
114 In 2009, Reuters reported a real marriage of a Japanese man called „Sal9000‟ to a video game 
character called Nene Anegasaki. The couple met in a dating simulation game called „Love Plus‟.Online 
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/20/us-japan-videogame-idUSTRE5BJ1XX20091220,  
Video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26mWFuOWwuU. Accessed 6.08.2011. 
115 Contradictory to the use of pleasure/punishment system, Turing states that “these definitions do not 
presuppose any feelings on the part of the machine” (1950, p.457). 
116 The literature review shows that there is quite a lot of research going on the embodiment which now 
includes affective computing. Here, my account will be kept in relation to the section and findings.   
